PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PIERRE ADAJAR Y TISON @ SIR PAUL, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Adajar

The Case

This is People versus Adajar, a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Pierre Adajar, known to his young student as Sir Paul, for sexually abusing a ten-year-old girl. The trial court convicted him of four counts arising from a single period of abuse: two counts of rape through sexual intercourse and two counts of rape by sexual assault. The case matters for the bar candidate because the Supreme Court uses it to settle three things at once: the elements of statutory rape where the victim is under twelve, the proper nomenclature and penalty when sexual assault is committed against a child, and the operation of the variance doctrine when the information alleges less than what the evidence proves.

Procedural History

Four separate informations for rape were filed against Adajar before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. At arraignment, assisted by counsel, he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered its decision in December 2013, finding him guilty of all four counts: two counts of rape through sexual intercourse under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B, and two counts of rape by sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. In September 2015, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions with modification, but reclassified one count, finding that the information did not allege insertion of a finger, so that he was liable only for the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336. The case then reached the Supreme Court on automatic appeal, since the penalties imposed included reclusion perpetua. Both the accused and the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that they would rely on their briefs already filed.

Facts

The victim, referred to as AAA, was born in July 1999 and was therefore ten years old in 2010. Adajar was her ballet instructor at the Quezon City Performing Arts. When he resigned, he formed a new dance group with AAA and others. In August 2009, he asked AAA's mother for permission to stay in the family's internet shop, and when the family moved to a new residence, he went along with them. He was treated as part of the family. He courted the child, bought her gifts, and sent her romantic messages.

In February 2010, the mother noticed the unusual closeness between Adajar and her daughter. One night she read the child's cellular phone and found messages from him calling AAA "Mi," including one that said no one else should do to her what he does, and another declaring his love and asking her to keep their promise to each other. She also found an autograph book in which he called AAA his wife. Confronted, AAA revealed what had been happening.

AAA testified to four incidents between January and February 2010. In one, Adajar entered her room, kissed her on the lips, placed his hand inside her jogging pants, and inserted his finger into her vagina. In another, he removed his shorts and briefs and forced her hand to hold his penis, then inserted his finger into her vagina. In a third, he entered the bathroom, locked the door, undressed her, carried her by the waist, and inserted his penis into her vagina. In a fourth, he followed her to her room, locked the door, removed her jogging pants and panties, made her lie on the foam facing him, and inserted his penis into her vagina, warning her not to tell anyone. The medico-legal examination found a deep healed laceration on her hymen and concluded that the finding showed evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma. Adajar's defense was plain denial, arguing that the house was full of relatives and that the acts could not have happened.

Issues

• Whether or not the testimony of the child victim, corroborated by the medical findings and her positive identification of the accused, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape despite the alleged inconsistencies.
• Whether or not the presence of other people in the house where the abuse occurred creates reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the accused is guilty of statutory rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code where the victim was under twelve years of age.
• Whether or not the crime committed by inserting a finger into the vagina of a child under twelve should be denominated and penalized as sexual assault under Article 266-A in relation to Republic Act Number 7610, rather than under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
• Whether or not the accused may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 where the information alleged only holding of the private parts and kissing, and not insertion.

Applicable Provisions

Paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as quoted in the decision, provides:

By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age, or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

This is the provision under which the two counts of rape through sexual intercourse were sustained, because the victim was under twelve.

Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, on variance between allegation and proof, provides:

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

This is the basis for convicting the accused of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness in the count where insertion was not alleged.

Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, on when an offense includes or is included in another, provides:

An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

This defines the relationship between the crime charged and the crime proved that makes the variance doctrine work.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court's factual findings and its assessment of credibility are accorded great weight and respect, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. AAA narrated the details of the abuse in a straightforward and candid manner, her account was corroborated by the medical findings, and she positively identified Adajar. This was sufficient to support conviction.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the argument that the presence of people in the house made the crime impossible. It held that the presence of people in a certain place is no guarantee that rape will not and cannot be committed, and that rapists bear no respect for place and time. The defense of denial, being a negative defense unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the testimony of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters without any ill motive.

On the third issue, the Court sustained the conviction for statutory rape. It held that regardless of whether there was force, threat, or intimidation, it is enough that the offended party is under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her. Even if the child consents, the law presumes she is incapable of giving a rational consent. The Court also clarified that the phrase without eligibility for parole need not be appended to reclusion perpetua, since persons penalized with an indivisible penalty are not eligible for parole, and it increased exemplary damages to seventy-five thousand pesos in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

On the fourth issue, the Court modified the nomenclature and the penalty. Where the acts constituting sexual assault are committed against a victim under twelve years of age, the offense should now be denominated as sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5, paragraph b, of Article III of Republic Act Number 7610, instead of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-B. The reason is that Republic Act Number 7610 is a special law that prevails over the general law amending the Revised Penal Code, and it provides the higher penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court imposed twelve years, ten months, and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to fifteen years, six months, and twenty days of reclusion temporal as maximum, with civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of fifty thousand pesos each.

On the fifth issue, the Court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The information alleged only that Adajar held the complainant's private parts and kissed her on the lips; it did not allege insertion of his finger into her genitalia. Since the crime proved includes the crime charged, he may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code pursuant to the variance doctrine.

Doctrine

First, in statutory rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A, the only elements are that the offended party is under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her. Force, threat, or intimidation need not be proven, and the consent of the child is immaterial because the law presumes she cannot give rational consent.

Second, the presence of other people in the place where the abuse occurred does not negate the commission of rape, and denial, being a negative defense, cannot outweigh the positive and categorical testimony of a credible witness.

Third, where lascivious conduct is committed against a child under twelve, the crime is sexual assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A in relation to Section 5, paragraph b, of Article III of Republic Act Number 7610, and the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, because the special law prevails over the general law.

Fourth, under the variance doctrine embodied in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 120, an accused may be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved, as when one charged with sexual assault is convicted only of acts of lasciviousness because insertion was not alleged in the information.

Disposition

The appeal was denied and the convictions were affirmed with modification: the accused remains guilty of two counts of statutory rape and is convicted of sexual assault under Republic Act Number 7610 in one count and of acts of lasciviousness in another, with the penalties and damages adjusted accordingly.

Remember This

Memorize this line: in statutory rape, age and carnal knowledge are all that matter, and consent is no defense. Examiners use this case to test the interplay between Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act Number 7610, and the application of the variance doctrine under Rule 120.