THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SIXTO COMIGJOD, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

People versus Comigjod

The Case

This is the case of People versus Comigjod, a criminal appeal from a conviction for murder. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Sixto Comigjod for killing Pastor Ladesa, his wife's stepfather, whose body was found in a coffee grove in Astorga, Santa Cruz, Davao. The case matters to a reviewee because it is a compact lesson on the weight of an extrajudicial confession, on the credibility of alibi against positive identification, and on how treachery is established from the nature and location of the wounds.

Procedural History

Sixto Comigjod was charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Davao. After trial, that court convicted him of murder, sentenced him to life imprisonment with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Pastor Ladesa in the sum of 4,000 pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Comigjod appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which decided the case in May 1967.

Facts

On the evening of July 28, 1960, at about half past seven, the body of Pastor Ladesa was found in a coffee grove some 200 to 300 meters from his house in Balaban, Astorga, Santa Cruz, Davao. He bore several incise wounds on the head, which caused his death at about two o'clock that afternoon from cerebral concussion and cerebral hemorrhage, with internal and external hemorrhage. The only question was who killed him. Sixto Comigjod was married to Juliana Calungsod, whose mother, Ana Albano, was Ladesa's common-law wife, and so the witnesses called Ladesa the appellant's father-in-law.

Early in the morning of July 29, 1960, Juliana told the vice-barrio lieutenant, Victorino Andres, that her husband was the killer. Andres relayed this to Policemen Frank Bumpus and Modesto Alama, who went to the scene where the appellant was. Bumpus asked whether he had killed Ladesa, and the appellant did not reply. When Alama confronted him with his wife's report, the appellant admitted being the killer. Asked about the instrument, he said it was a bolo in his house, and he led the policemen there and turned over the bloodstained bolo. At the police station, he confessed to Bumpus that he had killed Ladesa because the latter had been too harsh with him. Bumpus then typewrote a statement, which the appellant thumbmarked and swore to on July 30, 1960, before the Justice of the Peace of Santa Cruz, Artemio Cometa.

The appellant testified that he had been in Andres's house with his wife from eleven in the morning to four in the afternoon; that he denied the killing at the scene; that the policemen took the bolo from his house rather than receiving it from him; and that he thumbmarked the statement without knowing its contents because the policemen promised to release him, and later boxed him on the stomach and kicked him on the forehead. The policemen denied any duress. The justice of the peace affirmed that he had the statement translated into Visayan in the appellant's presence, checked the translation, and confirmed with the appellant that the English text was accurate, to which the appellant agreed. No one saw any external sign of maltreatment. Andres contradicted the alibi, declaring that the appellant came to his house only at four o'clock, and so was not there at two o'clock when the crime was committed. The defense did not present the wife, who could have been cross-examined on her revelation to Andres.

Issues

• Whether or not the appellant was sufficiently identified as the killer of Pastor Ladesa, in light of his alibi and his claim of duress.
• Whether or not the extrajudicial confession was admissible and credible, given the claim that it was extracted through force and without knowledge of its contents.
• Whether or not the killing was attended by treachery, qualifying the offense as murder.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote any statutory text; it applies the law on murder and on the credibility of confessions and alibi without reproducing provisions. The governing rules are therefore stated in the doctrine below, drawn strictly from the Court's reasoning.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court was fully satisfied that the appellant committed the act charged. His alibi was contradicted by Victorino Andres, who testified that the appellant arrived at his house only at four o'clock, not at two o'clock when the crime was committed. The defense also failed to present the wife, whose testimony would have exposed her revelation to Andres that her husband was the murderer, a fact impliedly confirmed by the appellant's own admission that the policemen asked him at the scene why he had killed Ladesa.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the claim of duress. The alleged maltreatment came, by the appellant's own account, only after he had thumbmarked the statement, and the policemen denied it. The justice of the peace positively affirmed that the contents were translated into Visayan in the appellant's presence, that he checked the accuracy of the translation, and that the appellant confirmed the English text was accurate. No one saw any external sign of maltreatment. The Court held that the appellant's testimony could not prevail over that of the justice of the peace.

On the third issue, the Court found treachery. The nature and location of the injuries showed that Ladesa was attacked from behind, and this, with the other circumstances in the confession, sufficiently established that the appellant acted with treachery, making the offense murder. With no modifying circumstance, the penalty was imposed in its medium period, as the trial court had done.

Doctrine

First, an extrajudicial confession is credible when its execution is attested by a justice of the peace who caused its contents to be translated into the accused's dialect, verified the translation, and confirmed the accused's understanding of it; such testimony prevails over the accused's bare claim of force. Second, a claim of duress fails where the alleged maltreatment occurred after the confession was thumbmarked and no external signs were ever observed. Third, alibi cannot prevail over positive identification, especially where the accused's own witness fixes his presence elsewhere at the time of the crime. Fourth, treachery is established by the nature and location of the wounds showing the victim was attacked from behind, qualifying the killing as murder.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, with costs against the appellant Sixto Comigjod.

Remember This

The single line to memorize is that a confession solemnly translated and sworn before a justice of the peace prevails over a belated claim of duress. Examiners use this case to test the credibility of extrajudicial confessions, the weakness of alibi against positive identification, and how treachery is inferred from wounds inflicted from behind.