G.R. No. 23098. February 28, 1967
DOMINGO T. JACINTO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AGUSTIN P. MONTESA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, ALPHA INVESTMENTS AND FINA…
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin and prohibit respondents from
enforcing an alias writ of execution issued against
herein petitioner in Civil Case No. 39990, entitled “Alpha Investments and
Finance Corporation, plaintiff, versus Pastor D. Ago and Domingo T. Jacinto,
defendants”, of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said petition prays that respondents be also
enjoined from further proceeding with the levy on execution of herein
petitioner’s properties.
As gathered from the record, the antecedents of this case are:
On 23 April 1959, Alpha Investments filed a suit in the Court of
First Instance of Manila to recover P26,000.00 plus 10% attorneys’ fees and
court costs from Pastor D. Ago, and from Domingo T. Jacinto, who had guaranteed
Ago’s solvency in a separate document.
Only Pastor D. Ago answered the complaint, but Domingo T. Jacinto failed
to do so, though duly served with summons.
Consequently, upon motion of plaintiff, Jacinto was declared in default.
Subsequently, on 15 November 1960, a pleading entitled
“Stipulation of Facts and Compromise Agreement” was executed wherein
Pastor Ago admitted joint and several liability with Domingo Jacinto, for the
principal sum of P25,654.00 with 12% from 16 March 1960 until fully paid to be
paid at the rate of P5,000.00 every two months from 1 December 1960. This stipulation was signed in the following
manner:
“ALPHA
INVESTMENTS & FINANCE CORPORATION
Plaintiff
By (Sgd) L. L.
Reyes
L. L. REYES
Corporate
Secretary & Counsel
2nd Floor, M.
Tiaoqui Bldg.
Plaza Sta. Cruz, Manila
For Defendants:
(Sgd)
Pastor D. Ago
PASTOR D. AGO
508 Roman R. Santos
Bldg.
Plaza Goiti, Manila
Assisted by:
(Sgd)
Jose M. Luison
JOSE M. LUISON
Counsel for
Defendants
Suite 305 Leyba
Bldg.
Dasmariñas-David,
Manila”
On 18 November 1960, the trial court, through the then presiding
Judge (now Court of Appeals’ Justice), Hon. Julio Villamor, rendered a decision
on the basis of the above-quoted compromise agreement, the dispositive part of
which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the stipulation of facts and compromise agreement
quoted above is hereby approved; judgment is hereby rendered in accordance
therewith, and the parties are hereby enjoined to comply faithfully and well
with their corresponding obligations.
“SO ORDERED.”
For failure of the defendants to comply with their obligations as
enjoined in the above decision, plaintiff moved, on 28 February 1963, for the
issuance of a writ of execution. The
trial court granted, on 3 March 1963, said writ which expired, however, without
being served on, and enforced against, the defendants. Hence, plaintiff, upon application, later
secured, on 1 April 1964, an alias writ of execution.
Upon being served with said alias writ, defendant Jacinto
presented, on 4 April 1964, a motion to quash the same, alleging as grounds
therefor that the judgment based on the compromise agreement is not binding or
enforceable against him since he was not a party nor has he authorized his co-defendant
Ago or his counsel to represent him in said compromise agreement; and that
having been previously declared in default plaintiff, nevertheless, failed to
adduce evidence against him; hence, no judgment could have been validly
rendered against him; and that he was not notified of the above-stated
compromise agreement nor of the judgment and plaintiff’s motion for
execution. Plaintiff opposed said
motion.
On 8 April 1964, the trial court, through the present respondent
judge, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, denied defendant Jacinto’s motion for lack of
merits.
In the meanwhile, plaintiff, by virtue of said alias writ,
levied on Jacinto’s personal and real properties and caused a notice of levy on
execution to be annotated on his land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 11627 of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City.
Defendant Jacinto first went to the Court of Appeals on a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was docketed therein as its CA-G.R. No. 33884-R. Upon its filing, said appellate court issued
the writ of preliminary injunction theretofore prayed. This petition is practically similar as the
instant petition before Us. Said court
found, however, that the main relief prayed for in said petition was not in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction; hence, it dismissed the same, through a decision
promulgated on 3 June 1964, on the sole ground that it lacked jurisdiction to
grant the relief prayed therein and, accordingly, set aside and dissolved the
preliminary injunction previously issued.
On 29 June 1964, defendant Jacinto resorted to this Court on the
present petition, practically reiterating the allegations in his motion to
quash in the Court of First Instance. We
gave due course to the petition, required respondents to answer and, upon petitioner’s (Jacinto)
filing of a bond, issued the preliminary injunction prayed for.
Upon the other hand, respondent Alpha Investments and Finance
Corporation in its answer disputes Jacinto’s claim that he was not a party to
the compromise agreement. Thus, it
points out that, although Jacinto was declared in default, this fact did not
preclude him from authorizing his co-defendant Ago and his counsel to represent
in said agreement as shown and expressed therein that “they have been
authorized by their respective parties with full authority to enter freely and
voluntarily into a stipulation of facts and conclude a compromise agreement in
this case”; and that there were only two (2) defendants in the court
below, one of them being Ago who signed said agreement for “defendents”,
and Atty. Jose M. Luison, who likewise signed it as “counsel for
defendants”; that Jacinto having been duly represented in said compromise
agreement which was approved by the lower court, there is no necessity of
presenting evidence against the defendants (including Jacinto); that the lower
court having admittedly acquired jurisdiction, the judgment rendered thereon is
valid; that said valid judgment having become final and executory, respondent
Judge did not err or commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned alias writ of execution.
Alpha also disputes the propriety of the present remedy claiming
that Jacinto had other and more appropriate and adequate remedy, such as
petition for relief from judgment (Rule 38, Rules of Court), though lost
through herein petitioner’s inexcusable
negligence or deliberate inaction; hence, it prays that the instant
petition be dismissed and the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
be dissolved.
In his answer to the petition, respondent Ago, through his
counsel, manifested that they did not represent Jacinto in said compromise
agreement and in any other incidental proceedings in the lower court; and that
the use of the plural word “defendants” therein is a mere clerical or
typographical error of their typist.
We are inclined to believe
herein petitioner Jacinto’s claim that he has not authorized Ago and his
counsel, Atty. Jose M. Luison, or even engaged the services of the latter, to
represent him in said compromise agreement.
Ago and Luison corroborated this claim.
It appears from the record of this case that Jacinto is not a signatory party
to said agreement, and nothing therein shows that Ago and Luison had any
special authority to compromise the case in behalf of herein petitioner, which
requirement of special authority is mandatory under the law (Section 23, Rule
138, Revised Rules of Court).
“SEC. 23. Authority
of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys
have authority to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation
thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary
judicial procedure. But they cannot,
without special authority, compromise their client’s litigation, or receive
anything in discharge of a client’s claim but the full amount in cash.”
It is not disputed that Jacinto was declared in default in the
lower court and that plaintiff did not adduce evidence to prove his cause of
action against him. Under the circumstances
prevailing in the case at bar, it is clear that no valid judgment was rendered
against Jacinto that may be enforced by execution. As this Court ruled in a case with facts
practically identical to the case at bar, a judgment based upon a compromise
entered by an attorney without specific authority from the client is null and
void, and such judgment may be impugned, and its execution restrained, in any
proceeding by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced (Zafra de
Alviar vs. Court of First Instance of La Union, 64 Phil. 301).
We come now to the issue of propriety of the present
petition. As a general rule, special
civil actions of certiorari or prohibition may only be invoked when an inferior
court, or any of the entities or officers specified in the Rules, has acted
“without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law” (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 65, Revised Rules of Court).
While it has already been held that “as a rule, a judgment
upon compromise is not appealable and is immediately executory, unless a motion
is filed to set aside the compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake, or
duress, in which event an appeal may be taken from the order denying the
motion, and that is the remedy in this case and not certiorari in this
Court” (De los Reyes vs. De Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505; cited in Enriquez vs.
Padilla, 77 Phil. 373), Jacinto was not in a position to urge such vices of
consent, since he was not a party to the compromise, and never agreed to the
same.
Petitioner Jacinto could have availed of the remedy of relief
from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court or appeal from the order
issuing the alias writ of execution (Castro vs. Surtida, 87 Phil. 166;
Salonga vs. Trinidad, G. R. No. L-13927, February 29, 1960); however, such
remedy is rendered inadequate or ineffective in the case at bar where the writ
of execution was in the process of being carried out. Hence, certiorari will lie.
“While as a rule, certiorari does not lie when there is an
appeal, the rule may be relaxed where, as in the instant case, a writ of
execution is in the process of being carried out. Needless to say, the underlying reason for
this doctrine is to give a party litigant his day in court and an opportunity
to be heard.” (Liwanag vs. Castillo, G. R. No. L-13517, October 20, 1959;
citing Saludes vs. Pajarillo, 78 Phil. 754, and Woodcraft Works Ltd. vs.
Moscoso, 92 Phil. 1021).
This Court has also held that –
“As the judgment in question (on compromise) is null and void ab
initio, it is evident that the court acquired no jurisdiction to render
it, much less to order the execution thereof.
Consequently, certiorari lies in favor of the petitioners as it is
clear that against said judgment there is no longer any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” (Zafra de Alviar vs.
Court of First Instance of La Union, supra; citing cases).
It is thus evident from the above-cited authorities that the
petition herein was proper. With this
conclusion, the orders of the trial court, dated 22 December 1966 and 10
January 1967, cancelling the notice of levy on execution, which respondent
corporation questions in this case, are rendered moot and academic, and need
not be further discussed.
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby granted; the
orders of the lower court issuing the original and alias writs of
execution are declared null and void and set aside in so far as they affect the
petitioner, Domingo T. Jacinto, and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent.
Costs against private respondent, Alpha Investments and Finance
Corporation.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concur.