PEDRO D. GENATO, FOR HIMSELF AND IN BEHALF OF ALL OTHER EMPLOYEES OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA SIMILARLY SITUATED AS HIMSELF, PETITIONER, VS. FAUSTINO SY-CHANGCO IN …

This is an original action for mandamus, to compel the Budget
Commissioner to release the sum of P292,188 for salary
differentials of petitioner Pedro D. Genato and other
employees of the Court of First Instance of Manila – on whose behalf, apart
from his own, he has filed this case – for the period from July 1, 1963 to June
30, 1964, as well as “the corresponding appropriation for the 1964-65
fiscal year.” In the petition herein it was, likewise, prayed that a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued restraining the Budget
Commissioner and the Auditor General from reporting said sum of P292,188
“as reverted to the unappropriated general fund
of the National Treasury at the close of office hours of June 30, 1964, and
ordering said respondents instead to report and/or record that said amount
remain(s), pending further orders of this Honorable Court, as an outstanding
obligation, payable under the current appropriation, for the Court of First
Instance of Manila under Republic Act No. 3845.”

Upon the filing of said petition, on July 1, 1964, a restraining order was issued,
“effective immediately up to July
7, 1964,” on which date the petition for preliminary
injunction prayed for was issued, without bond.

It is not disputed that, on October 5, 1963, herein petitioner and many other
employees of the Court of First Instance of Manila wrote a letter-petition,
addressed to the President of the Philippines,
through proper channels, for the implementation of their salary increases, as
authorized in said Republic Act No. 3845, the general appropriation act for the
fiscal year 1963-1964.  Favorable action
thereon was recommended in the 1st indorsement of the
Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,^[1]
forwarding said letter-petition to the President, through the Secretary of
Justice, as well as in the latter’s indorsement,^[2]
forwarding the basic communication to the Executive Secretary.  Inasmuch as, this notwithstanding, the
release prayed for was not made, petitioner instituted the present action for
mandamus with a writ of preliminary injunction, on his behalf and that of his
co-employees in the aforementioned court of first instance, against the Budget
Commissioner and the Auditor General.

The petition is predicated upon the theory that upon approval of
Republic Act No. 3845, the full amount therein appropriated for the judicial
department had become automatically “alloted and
immediately available to said department for the use of our courts and the
court personnel x x x.”

In their answer to the petition, respondents alleged that the budget
submitted by the President to Congress appropriated the amount necessary to
grant to herein petitioner and those represented by him a one grade increase,
this being the only increase that the condition of our national treasury could
bear; that Congress, however, increased by as much as three grades the salaries
of a number of court personnel, “without taking into consideration the
income in the government as estimated in the budget and the likelihood that
said income might not be realized and fall much below expectations, as it
happened;” that shortly after the approval of Republic Act No. 3845,and
upon the request of the Executive Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, made on August 12, 1963, and its favorable indorsement
by the Secretary of Justice, the Budget Commissioner released the amounts
necessary to effect the one grade increase provided in the budget submitted by
the President to Congress; that the Commissioner’s failure to release the
amount necessary to cover the salary differentials involved in the petition
herein was due to lack of funds, as invisioned in the
budget submitted by the President; that there has been a failure to exhaust the
administrative remedy available to petitioner herein, who had a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the action taken by
the respondents, which was to appeal therefrom –
which petitioner has not done – to the President, who exercises executive
control and supervision over the Budget Commissioner; that an appropriation
“is per se nothing more than the legislative authorization
prescribed by the Constitution, that money be paid out of the treasury;”
that, being merely such authorization, Republic Act No. 3845 does not impose
upon the respondents the ministerial duty to order the release of the funds
appropriated in said Act; that, moreover, the said authorization requires
implementation, which must necessarily be in the nature of a budgetary system
of allocation of funds, so that the income realized by the government from time
to time, may be effectively apportioned and utilized to the fullest extent to
serve the vital needs of the nation; and that such allocation entails the
exercise of judgment and discretion which cannot be controlled by mandamus.

Upon a review of the records, we are satisfied that the petition
herein should be dismissed.  Regardless
of whether or not the Budget Commissioner has a ministerial duty to release any
of the funds appropriated in Republic Act No. 3845, it appears that petitioner
and those whom he claims to represent, as a class, have no cause of action
against respondents herein.  The reason
is that petitioner and those represented by him hold their respective office in
pursuance of appointments stating that they shall receive the compensation they
are now getting, not the increased pay authorized by Republic Act No.
3845.  To be entitled to such increased
pay, they need another appointment therefor,
which has not been extended in their favor.  Thus, in the letter to the Secretary of
Justice, dated October 12, 1963, the Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, urged that the amounts needed to cover the salary increases
sought by the court employees be released in order that “promotional
appointments effective July 1, 1963” could “be issued” in their
favor.

No such promotional appointments for the amounts involved in the
petition herein having made, it follows that petitioner and his aforementioned
co-employees are not as yet legally entitled to said amounts, and,
hence, have no cause of action for mandamus to compel the release thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition herein should be, as it is hereby
dismissed, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 7, 1964, accordingly, dissolved,
without special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.

Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., in the result.

^[1] dated October 7,
1963.

^[2] dated October 11, 1963.