FAUSTO MIPALAR, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE M. SANTOS, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF AGRA­RIAN RELATIONS, EUGENIO SAGUN, SOTERO FERNANDEZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

A petition for mechanization of a 45-hectare rice-land in Canaan,
Rizal, Nueva Ecija, was filed by Fausto Mipalar on January
28, 1963 in the Court of Agrarian Re­lations against the fourteen
tenants thereon.

Said petition stated that: 
Petitioner-landowner Fausto Mipalar had previously sent notices to said ten­ants in
writing in the dialect known to them of his in­tention to cultivate the
landholdings thru the use of farm machineries. 
The respondents-tenants received these notices on January 28, 1961 and subsequent dates, the
last being February 23, 1961.  And earlier, on December 28, 1960, Fausto Mipalar filed notice with the Court of Agrarian Relations,
stating his intention to cultivate the same landholdings thru the use of farm
machineries.

A motion to dismiss was filed by respondents
ten­ants on the ground that the petition for mechanization was filed beyond the
reglementary period of two years as required by law
(Sec. 50[a], R.A. 1199 as amended). 
Acting thereon, the Court of Agrarian Relations, on February 13, 1964, dismissed the case, sustaining
the ground afore-stated. 
Petitioner-landowner now appeals from the dismissal order.

Section 50(a) of Republic Act 1199, as amended, provides that:

SEC. 50. Causes for
the Dispossession of Tenant. 
– Any of the following, and no other, shall be sufficient cause for the
dis­possession of a tenant from his holdings:

“(a) The bona
fide intention of the land­holder-owner or his relative within the first
degree by consanguinity to cultivate the land himself personally or through the
employment of farm machinery and implements: 
x x x Pro­vided,
further, That the landholder-owner or the aforesaid relative shall, at
least one year but not more than two years prior to the date of his petition to
dispossess the tenant under this subsection, file notice with the court and
shall inform the tenant in writing in a language or dialect known to the latter
of his intention to cultivate the land him­self, either personally or through
the employment of mechanical implements: 
x x x“

The statute plainly requires that within the period
therein stated, two notices be made:  (1) to the Court of Agrarian Relations; and
(2) to the tenant.  Accordingly, if
notice to the court is within the period but notice to the tenant is outside
the same; or if notice to the tenant falls inside the period but notice to the
court lies beyond it, the statutory requisites of notices are not complied
with, and the petition cannot be entertained.

In the present case, notices to the tenants were made within the
abovementioned period, that is, at least one year but not more than two years
prior to the filing of the petition.  Not
so, however, with the notice to the court. 
It was filed more than two years prior to the filing of the
petition for mechanization; to be pre­cise, two years and one month non-compliance
with the requirements of Section 50(a) before such filing.  It follows that for non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 50(a) on notices, requisites that are substantive, not
merely procedural (Tolentino v. Alzate,
98 Phil. 781), the petition was rightly dismissed.

Appellant would contend that a liberal interpreta­tion should be
followed, and the two-year period should be considered in relation to either
of the notices, or whichever is later. 
The statute uses the word “and” not “or”.  In the interpretation of Republic Act 1199,
more­over, all doubts are to be solved in favor of the ten­ant (Sec. 56, R.A.
1199).  And while it would be favor­able
to the tenant to count the one-year period, before which the
petition cannot be filed, from whichever notice comes later, it would be
unfavorable to him to count the two-year period, after which the
petition cannot be filed, from whichever notice is later.  For while in the first case, the tenant would
in effect have a longer time to stay on the land, in the second case, the
landholder-owner would be given a longer period to ask for his
dispossession.  To prevent such
unfavorable effects on the tenant, such as, for instance, the filing of the
petition after one year from notice to the court, but less than one year from
notice to the tenant; or, as in this case, more than two years from notice to
the court, the rule should be, in accordance with the statute’s obvious import,
that both notices should be made within the period laid down at least
one year but not more than two years prior to the filing of the petition to
dispossess under Sec. 50(a) of R.A. 1199.

WHEREFORE, the dismissal order is hereby affirmed, with
costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and
Fernando, JJ.,
concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., on official leave.