RAMON BLANCO ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, THE SECRETARY-TREASURER OF THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, AND THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, RESPONDENTS.

MALCOLM, J.:


Fifteen participants in the last medical examinations, in a complaint in
mandamus, ask the court to order the Secretary of the Interior to confirm the
final results of the examinations. The Attorney-General on behalf of the
respondents has filed an answer. The petitioners, in turn, have demurred to the
answer.

The petitioners, along with other qualified persons, took the examinations
prescribed by law for a physician’s certificate on May 13 to 16, 1924, and
apparently passed the same. The Board of Medical Examiners thereupon submitted
the final results of the examinations to the Department Head for confirmation.
But the Secretary of the Interior held the matter in abeyance, pending the
outcome of an investigation conducted by the Under-Secretary of the Interior.
The finding of the special investigator was that the questions on the subjects
of the medical examinations held on May 13 to May 16, 1924, had leaked out
before said dates. Following the recommendation of the Under-Secretary, the
Secretary of the Interior annulled the results of the examinations.

The last paragraph of section 776 of the Medical Law, as found in the
Administrative Code, and as last amended by section 10 of Act No. 3111, provides
that “The results of all examinations (medical), including the average and
grades obtained by each applicant, shall be submitted for confirmation to the
Department Head (the Secretary of the Interior) and made known to the respective
candidates within one month after the date of the examination.” Is this official
duty discretionary or ministerial in nature?

It is elementary law that the writ of mandamus will not issue to control or
review the exercise of the discretion of a public officer. Where the law imposes
upon a public officer the right and duty to exercise judgment, in reference to
any matter to which he is called upon to act, it is his judgment that is to be
exercised and not that of the court. “* * * If the law imposes a duty upon a
public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be
performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. * * *” (Lamb
vs. Phipps [1912], 22 Phil., 456; Gonzalez vs. Board of
Pharmacy [1911], 20 Phil., 367; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 515; Mechem on
Public Officers, pp. 631-633.)

Under the plain terms of the Medical Law, it is the discretionary duty of the
Secretary of the Interior to confirm or not to confirm—to confirm or, as in this
instance, to annul—the report of the medical examiners. To hold that the
Secretary of the Interior must in all cases confirm, shutting his eyes to any
irregularity, no matter how glaring, would convert him into an automatic rubber
stamp for imprinting the requisite approval. That the Department Secretary who
appoints the members of the Board of Medical Examiners, who has the Board under
his administrative supervision, and who has the power of confirmation of the
report of the Board, cannot do more than perform the clerical duty of approving
the results of the examinations, under any and all circumstances, is too
specious an argument to merit serious consideration. It is likewise elementary
law that mandamus may issue to correct abuse of discretion, if the case is
otherwise proper. But here, the record discloses that the Secretary of the
Interior did not exercise the power granted to him with manifest injustice, or
with gross abuse. Quite otherise.

The manly course for the petitioners to pursue, the wholesome remedy at their
command, is to submit anew to examinations free from all hint of carelessness,
collusion, or fraud.

The complaint is dismissed with costs. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.