REMEDIOS M. MASCARINAS, PETITIONER, VS. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, PROMULGATED: INC., RESPONDENT.

Mascarinas versus BPI Family Savings Bank

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by Remedios Mascarinas against BPI Family Savings Bank, arising from the bank's application for a writ of possession over a parcel of land in Quezon City that had been mortgaged by Josephine Abila and foreclosed extrajudicially. When the sheriff attempted to enforce the writ, Mascarinas resisted, insisting that the property being taken was not the bank's lot but her own adjoining lot in Caloocan City, which she had acquired at an auction sale. The case matters for two reasons: it is a study in the liberal application of the sixty-day period for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and it establishes that a survey of both lots is a necessary and indispensable measure to prevent the writ of possession from being enforced on the wrong property.

Procedural History

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, issued the writ of possession in favor of the bank. Mascarinas moved to quash the writ, but the trial court denied the motion, holding that the writ specifically covered the bank's title and not hers, and noting that the two titles bore different technical descriptions. She moved to clarify the order and, later, for reconsideration, praying at the same time for a survey of both lots. The trial court denied both motions.

Mascarinas received notice of the denial on May 5, 2016. On July 4, 2016, the sixtieth day counted from that notice, she filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for a fifteen-day extension to file her intended petition for certiorari, citing pressure of work. The Court of Appeals denied the motion, following Section 4 of Rule 65. She then filed a motion to admit the petition, which she had already filed on July 19, 2016, but the Court of Appeals noted the motion without action and later denied her motion for reconsideration. She then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review, praying that her petition for certiorari be admitted.

Facts

The bank held a real estate mortgage over Lot 3-30-C-2, covered by a transfer certificate of title in Quezon City, in the name of mortgagor Josephine Abila. After extrajudicial foreclosure, the trial court issued a writ of possession over that lot in favor of the bank.

When the sheriff went to serve the notice to vacate, the occupant, Remedios Mascarinas, claimed that the lot on which the writ was being implemented actually belonged to her. She said she had purchased her lot, Lot 3-30-C-1, measuring 1,552 square meters and situated in Caloocan City, at an auction sale in 2007, and that a writ of possession had been issued in her name by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The confusion may have arisen because both lots were previously owned by Josephine Abila and both lie along the boundaries of Quezon City and Caloocan City.

Mascarinas moved to quash the writ and submitted a sketch plan approved by the Land Registration Authority, along with photographs, to prove that the bank's property now forms part of a street in Quezon City. The bank relied on a relocation survey it had submitted in 2012, which it said properly identified the metes and bounds of its lot. The trial court denied the motion to quash, and later denied her motions to clarify and for reconsideration, prompting her to seek relief from the Court of Appeals and then from the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the grant of the petitioner's motion for a one-time extension of fifteen days to file her intended petition for certiorari, and her subsequent motion to admit the petition, will serve the higher interest of substantial justice.
• Whether or not the petitioner's plea for a survey of the lot subject of the writ of possession and of her own lot is a necessary and indispensable measure to ascertain their exact locations once and for all, so as to avoid the reckless implementation of the writ on the wrong property.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as further amended, governs the period for filing a petition for certiorari and the former rule on extensions:

Section 4. When and where petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of said motion.

This provision fixes the sixty-day reglementary period that the petitioner sought to extend, and its strict application was the ground on which the Court of Appeals denied her motion for extension.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the grant of the motion for extension and the motion to admit would serve the higher interest of substantial justice. It acknowledged that heavy workload, standing alone, is relative and often self-serving and is not a sufficient reason to deviate from the sixty-day rule, and that the claim of failing health and old age appeared to be a mere afterthought. Nevertheless, the Court held that when strict application of the rules would result in irreparable damage, if not grave injustice to a litigant, the rules must be relaxed. Precluding the petitioner from pursuing her appellate remedy on a mere technicality would most probably cause her to perpetually and irreparably lose her 1,552 square meter property. The Court quoted its own doctrine:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion.

On the second issue, the Court held that the survey of both lots was a necessary and indispensable measure to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The records showed that the two lots were previously owned by the same mortgagor, were covered by two different titles, and bore different technical descriptions, yet the parties had conflicting claims on their exact locations. The bank insisted that its lot was being occupied by the petitioner, while the petitioner claimed that the bank's lot actually lies on the eastern side, now forming part of a street. To avoid further delay, the Court resolved the case on the merits instead of remanding it, invoking its plenary authority to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding.

Doctrine

First, while a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within sixty days from notice of the judgment or of the order denying a motion for reconsideration, the period may be extended subject to the court's sound discretion, provided a reasonable or meritorious explanation is given. Heavy workload alone is not such an explanation, but where strict application of the rules would result in irreparable damage or grave injustice, the Court will relax the rules in the higher interest of substantial justice, for technicalities must give way to the realities of the situation.

Second, where a writ of possession is sought to be enforced and the occupant claims that the property being taken is not the subject lot but an adjoining lot covered by a different title, a survey of both lots is a necessary and indispensable measure to ensure the correct enforcement of the writ on the right property and to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the Court of Appeals resolutions were reversed and set aside, the motion for extension and the petition for certiorari were admitted, and the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215, was ordered to appoint a surveyor to immediately conduct a survey of both lots, with the parties bearing the survey fees corresponding to their respective lots.

Remember This

Remember the line that technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Examiners use this case to test the liberal application of the sixty-day period under Rule 65 and the rule that a survey is indispensable when a writ of possession may be enforced on the wrong property.