THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE LAOTA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

OSTRAND, J.:

The defendant is accused of the crime of homicide and lesiones, the
information alleging “that on or about February 7, 1924, in the barrio of
Tejeros, municipality of Makati, Province of Rizal, Philippine Islands, and
within the jurisdiction of this court, the aforesaid accused Vicente Laota,
provided with a sharp and pointed weapon, did wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally and with intent to kill Demetria Torreblanca, Maria Eufemio and
Joaquin Geronimo, assault and attack said Demetria Torreblanca, Maria Eufemio
and Joaquin Geronimo several times, thereby inflicting several wounds, mortal of
necessity, which caused the death of Demetria Torreblanca and also various
wounds on different parts of the bodies of Maria Eufemio and Joaquin Geronimo,
which required a period of more than eight days, but less than thirty days of
medical attendance in order to heal and rendered said Maria Eufemio and Joaquin
Geronimo incapacitated to do their usual work for the same period.”

Upon arraignment the defendant pleaded guilty but on motion of his counsel
was permitted to introduce evidence in regard to the circumstances which led to
the commission of the crime. On the witness stand he stated that the deceased
Demetria Torreblanca was his wife and that they were living as husband and wife
in the house of one Joaquin Geronimo; that he had trouble with the deceased
because she deceived him and that finally she ejected him from the house; that
he thereupon, at the invitation, of Emilia Torreblanca, the sister of his wife,
went to live in the house of her parents in the same vicinity; that he watched
his wife and one evening saw her lie in bed with Joaquin Geronimo; that he then
tried to enter the house where she lived but found the door locked; that on the
following evening his wife, together with Geronimo and the latter’s mother, came
to the house of the defendant’s father-in-law, where the defendant was then
living, but that his father-in-law refused them permission to enter; that
Geronimo then said to the defendant’s father-in-law “why will you not permit me
to enter your house; am I not as good a man as he is (referring to the
defendant) ? The defendant further explains that having lived with his wife for
many years and seeing her attitude towards Geronimo, he was overcome with rage
to such an extent that he did not know what he was doing and while in this
condition he attacked and wounded the would-be visitors.

Upon the defendant’s plea of guilty and the facts stated, the trial court
imposed upon the defendant a penalty of fourteen years, eight months and one day
of reclucion temporal for the homicide and two months and one day of
arresto mayor for each of the other offenses with which he is charged,
all with accessory penalties and costs. From this sentence the defendant appeals
and his counsel argues that he is entitled to the benefit of the first paragraph
of article 423 of the Penal Code which reads as follows:

“Any husband who, having surprised his wife in the act of adultery, shall
kill her or her paramour in the act, or shall inflict any serious physical
injuries upon either, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.”

The defendant’s contention cannot be sustained. The provision quoted applies
only to cases where the homicide occurs immediately after the discovery of the
act of adultery. (Sentences of the supreme court of Spain of June 27, 1872, and
April 23, 1904.) The case of United States vs. ‘Alano (32 Phil, 381) cited by
the appellant is not in point. There the discovery of the adultery, the pursuit
of the paramour and the killing of the wife was one continuous act; in the
present case the killing of the wife occurred the day after she was caught in
the commission of the adultery.

The Attorney-General recommends that the extenuating circumstance of
arrebato y obcecacion be taken into consideration and that the sentence
for the homicide be lowered to twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal. But this extenuating circumstance is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of the deceased being the spouse of the defendant and the penalty
must therefore be imposed in its medium degree, i. e.f that given the defendant
by the court below. The result will be the same if it is found, as is very
probable, that the defendant and the deceased were not legally married; we could
not then take into consideration the circumstances of arrebato y
obcecacition, there being no moral justification for the impulse of
aggression. (Sentence of the supreme court of Spain of May 18, 1893; U. S. vs.
Hicks, 14 Phil., 217.)

The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.