G.R. No. 224679. February 12, 2020
JONAH MALLARI Y SAMAR, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
LEONEN, J.:
officer resists or uses force that is not dangerous, grave, or severe,
the offense is not direct assault under Article 148 of the Revised Penal
Code. Instead, the proper offense is resistance and disobedience to an
agent of a person in authority, penalized under Article 151 of the
Revised Penal Code.
This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] questioning the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Municipal Trial Court[4]
and the Regional Trial Court’s[5] conviction of Jonah Mallari y Samar
(Mallari) for the crime of direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority.
An Information was filed against Mallari on May 31, 2007.[6] It read:
That on or about the Twelfth (12th) day of January
2007, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused while being pacified by
PO2 Richard F. Navarro who was a duly qualified and appointed police
officer of Olongapo City and while the latter was in the actual
performance of his official duties, that is, maintaining peace and order
in the said locality, and the said accused well knowing before and
during the assault that PO2 Richard F. Navarro who was a duly appointed
police officer, as such, an agent of a person in authority, did then and
there willfull, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, kick and
slap said police officer.CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Mallari pleaded not guilty to the charge during her arraignment. Trial then ensued.[8]
The prosecution presented the victim, Police Officer 2 Richard
Navarro (PO2 Navarro), along with Senior Police Officer 3 Melanio Merza
(SPO3 Merza) and Dr. Rolando Mafel Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), as its witnesses.[9]
The incident transpired on the early morning of January 12,
2007. According to the prosecution, at around 6:45 a.m., the Olongapo
Police Station 3 received a report of an altercation on the ground floor
of GenX Billiard Hall on Gordon Avenue. At this, PO2 Navarro and SPO3
Merza, who were both in uniform, went to the scene. There, they found
two (2) groups of women fighting and pulling each other’s hair out,
among them a visibly drunk Mallari. The officers rushed to stop the
fight.[10]
Once the squabble was over, the officers asked the women to go
to the police station to file proper complaints. However, the
intoxicated Mallari shouted at them, “Wala kayo pakialam sa akin, hindi aka sasama sa inyo.“[11]
She then grabbed PO2 Navarro by the collar, slapped his cheek, and
kicked his legs several times. To restrain her, PO2 Navarro held her by
the shoulders and brought her to the back of the patrol car. SPO3 Merza
was about to pacify the other women, but they eventually agreed to go to
the police station. The incident was entered in the blotter and Mallari
was detained for direct assault.[12]
PO2 Navarro was treated at the James Gordon Memorial Hospital for the minor injuries he got from Mallari.[13] Dr. Ortiz issued him a medical certificate stating that he had sustained swelling on the zygomatic area, or the cheekbone.[14]
The defense presented the sole testimony of Mallari.[15]
Mallari testified that at around 6:00 a.m. that day, she and
her co-workers were singing at a karaoke bar in GenX Billiard Hall when
they got into a heated argument with another group of women, which then
escalated to a physical fight. The ruckus prompted the bar owner to send
the women downstairs, but their fighting only continued.[16]
Later, Mallari added, the police arrived and ordered them to
board the patrol car. Mallari initially obeyed, but after noticing that
her companions did not, she alighted from the vehicle. PO2 Navarro
pushed her back in by holding her stomach and the collar of her blouse.
When she still attempted to alight, PO2 Navarro grabbed her by the
ankles, spreading her legs open in the process. When he pulled her down,
she hit her head and neck on the vehicle’s floor, her buttocks hitting
the ground.[17]
After composing herself from the embarrassment, Mallari boarded
the car and went with the officers to the police station. There, she
was surprised that PO2 Navarro claimed that she had slapped him several
times. She then called her mother and went to the hospital for a medical
examination.[18] She was found to have sustained the following injuries:
Contusion 2×2 cm medical aspect M/3 left forearm
Contusion 2×2 cm medical aspect P/3 left forearm
Contusion 2×2 cm post aspect D/3 left forearm
Contusion 0.5×0.5 cm antero-medical aspect M/3 right forearm
Abrasion 2 cm interscapular area
Swelling left thenar eminence.[19]
Mallari later filed a Complaint against PO2 Navarro and SPO3 Merza
for unlawful arrest, illegal detention, maltreatment of prisoners, and
physical injuries. This was eventually dismissed by the Office of the
Prosecutor.[20]
In its September 5, 2013 Decision,[21]
the Municipal Trial Court found Mallari guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority. It noted that
Mallari admitted to kicking PO2 Navarro and grabbing his shirt while he
was performing his official duties. It likewise gave premium to the
prosecution’s positive testimony against Mallari’s defense of denial.[22] The dispositive portion of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JONAH MALLARI y SAMAR, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Direct Assault upon an Agent of
a Person in Authority and hereby sentences her to suffer an imprisonment of prision correccional in
its medium period of 3 yrs, 6 mos and 21 days to 4 years, 9 mos and 10
days and to pay the fine of PHp1,000.00. With costs against the accused.SO DECIDED.[23] (Emphasis in the original)
The Regional Trial Court affirmed Mallari’s conviction in its July 30, 2014 Decision.[24]
It found that all the elements of the offense were present: PO2 Navarro
was an agent of a person in authority, and Mallari kicked, slapped, and
injured him while he was engaged in the performance of his official
duty. It found that no improper motive could be traced to the
prosecution’s witnesses who clearly testified on the matter. It also
noted that Mallari’s defenses and denials were weak and uncorroborated.[25]
The Court of Appeals, in its October 27, 2015 Decision,[26] affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court’s Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July 30, 2014 of the RTC, Branch 74, Olongapo City, in Criminal Case No. 44-14 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the imposable penalty.
Petitioner Jonah Mallari y Samar is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred (Php500.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.[27] (Emphasis in the original)
In ruling so, the Court of Appeals found that PO2 Navarro’s
testimony was credible and clear on how the incident occurred, while
Mallari was unable to substantiate her claims. It held that Mallari was
the aggressor and PO2 Navarro was only compelled to restrain her as she
was kicking him.[28]
The Court of Appeals denied Mallari’s Motion for Reconsideration in a May 12, 2016 Resolution.[29]
Thus, Mallari filed before this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[30] claiming that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining her conviction.
Petitioner argues that PO2 Navarro’s testimony that she
repeatedly kicked and slapped him was inconsistent with his injury of a
slightly swollen cheekbone.[31]
She points out that it was she who suffered several injuries,
consistent with her allegation that PO2 Navarro “held her feet, pulled
her to the ground and caused her to hit her head, neck and buttocks,”[32] despite no aggression coming from her. Thus, she says that her testimony should have been given more credence.[33]
Assuming that she did kick PO2 Navarro, petitioner asserts that
she was fully justified in doing so as the officer unnecessarily held
her feet, which constitutes unlawful aggression on her honor and
dignity.[34]
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent
People of the Philippines, argued back that the Petition must be denied
as it raises a question of fact, which is not proper in a petition for
review on certiorari.[35]
In any case, the Office of the Solicitor General insists
that petitioner’s assault on PO2 Navarro was sufficiently established.
It points out that the medical certificate stating that PO2 Navarro had a
slightly swollen cheekbone does not negate his testimony that he was
repeatedly kicked by petitioner, as she herself admitted attacking the
officer. It also raises the other officers’ testimonies affirming what
had happened. From the totality of evidence, the Office of the Solicitor
General argues that Mallari is the aggressor and her denials are weak
defenses.[36] That PO2 Navarro
was a police officer on official duty when petitioner assaulted him
completes the elements of the offense charged.[37]
For this Court’s resolution is the sole issue of whether or
not petitioner Jonah Mallari y Samar is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of direct assault upon an agent of a person in authority.
This Court modifies the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
We affirm that the prosecution’s evidence is sufficient to uphold the
findings of fact against petitioner. Questions of fact may no longer be
raised in Rule 45 petitions. In Spouses Miano v. Manila Electric Company:[38]
The Rules of Court states that a review of appeals filed before
this Court is “not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion.”
The Rules of Court further requires that only questions of law should
be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are
not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this
Court’s function to once again analyze or weigh evidence that has
already been considered in the lower courts.Bases Conversion Development Authority v. Reyes distinguished a question of law from a question of fact:
Jurisprudence dictates that there is a “question of law” when
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of
facts or circumstances; on the other hand, there is a “question of
fact” when the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. The test for determining whether the supposed
error was one of “law” or “fact” is not the appellation given by the
parties raising the same; rather, it is whether the reviewing court can
resolve the issues raised without evaluating the evidence, in which
case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is one of fact. In other
words, where there is no dispute as to the facts, the question of
whether or not the conclusions drawn from these facts are correct is a
question of law. However, if the question posed requires a re-evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of
surrounding circumstances and their relationship to each other, the
issue is factual.. . . .
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly, holds that findings of facts
of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are binding upon this Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again. It is only in
exceptional cases where this Court may review findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals.[39] (Citations omitted)
In this case, the Municipal Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court,
and the Court of Appeals all consistently found that petitioner slapped
and kicked PO2 Navarro while he was on official duty as a police
officer.[40] The lower courts
arrived at this conclusion after thoroughly examining both parties’
evidence. This Court will no longer disturb their uniform findings.
However, petitioner should not be held guilty of direct assault, but
rather, of the crime of resistance or disobedience under Article 151 of
the Revised Penal Code.
Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes direct assault:
ARTICLE 148. Direct assaults. — Any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes
of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos,
when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a
public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a
person in authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed.
Direct assault may be committed in two (2) ways:
[F]irst, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any
of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or
resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in
the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance.[41] (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
In this case, petitioner is charged with the second mode of assault. Its elements are the following:
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c)
makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his
agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or
[b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official
duties.4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
5. That there is no public uprising.[42]
A police officer is an agent of a person in authority.[43]
An agent of a person in authority is one who, “by direct provision of
law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged
with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of
life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in
authority[.]”[44] Being a police officer, PO2 Navarro is an agent of a person in authority.
Petitioner was also aware that PO2 Navarro was a police officer.
He introduced himself as one and was in his police uniform. He was
performing his official duties as a police officer when he was pacifying
the melee, and right when petitioner attacked him. Thus, the second,
third, fourth, and fifth elements of direct assault are present in this
case.
However, the first element of the offense is not present.
To be considered as direct assault, the laying of hands or the use of
physical force against the agent of a person in authority must be
serious.
In United States v. Gumban,[45]
this Court held that the amount of force employed against agents of
persons in authority spells the difference between direct assault and
resistance or disobedience:
In reaching this conclusion, we took into account the decision
rendered by this court in the case against Gelacio Tabiana and Canillas,
in which it is said that the distinction between an assault and a
resistance to agents of authority lies largely in the amount of the
force employed in each case, and that a sudden blow given to a policeman
while engaged in effecting an arrest does not constitute that
employment of force which is punishable as assault. We have also
considered the decision rendered by this court in the case against
Cipriano Agustin . . . in which it was also held that a blow upon a
policeman was not an aggression amounting to an assault. It must be
remembered, however, that in these two cases the crime involved was that
of assault upon agents of authority, in which the essential element is
substantially the force employed. It is said in these two cases that
any force is not sufficient to constitute an assault[,] but that it is
necessary to consider the circumstances of each case to decide whether
the force used is, or is not, sufficient to constitute assault upon an
agent of authority.[46] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Previous convictions for direct assault against an agent of a
person in authority involve force that is more severe than slapping and
punching. In United States v. Cox,[47]
the accused “seized [the police officer] by the throat, threw him to
the ground, and struck him several blows with the club which he
succeeded in wresting from the policeman[.]”[48]
In Rivera v. People,[49]
the accused repeatedly hurled menacing threats against the police
officer, challenged him to a fight, and scored a punch on the lip as
they grappled. The officer sustained an injury that would take several
days to heal, while the accused was only subdued with the help of other
police officers. Thus:
… the accused pointed a finger on the policeman and uttered words like “Babalian kita ng buto” (I’ll break your bones). “Ilalampaso kita” (I’ll scrub you). “Pulis lang kayo”
(you are only policemen) and other unsavory and insulting words.
Inspector Leygo who was a little bit angry warned the accused to stop
uttering further insulting words and cautioned him to take it easy and
then informed him that he was being arrested for violation of the
chicken dung ordinance. The accused removed his jacket, placed it inside
the vehicle, assumed a fighting stance and challenged the policeman.
Inspector Leygo then approached the accused and warned him anew that he
was being arrested. The accused responded by punching Inspector Leygo on
his face, particularly on his lip. The two then grappled as Inspector
Leygo tried to hold the accused. Finally, with the help of Policemen
Dayap and Bongcado, the accused was subdued. The accused was then pushed
into one of the police cars but he resisted until Alfredo Castro, one
of the chicken dung dealers in the area, boarded the police car to
accompany him.. . . In the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit “A”) of Inspector
Leygo, his injury described as “contusion with 0.5 laceration , upper
lip, left side” with healing period from 5 to 7 days. Subsequently, this
present case was filed against the accused.[50]
As clarified in People v. Breis,[51]
if the use of physical force against agents of persons in authority is
not serious, the offense is not direct assault, but resistance or
disobedience:
The laying of hands or using physical force against agents of
persons in authority when not serious in nature constitutes resistance
or disobedience under Article 151, and not direct assault under Article
148 of the RPC. This is because the gravity of the disobedience to an
order of a person in authority or his agent is measured by the
circumstances surrounding the act, the motives prompting it and the real
importance of the transgression, rather than the source of the order
disobeyed. The pushing of IO1 Mangili is not of such serious defiance to
be considered direct assault, but is resistance nonetheless.[52] (Citations omitted)
Resistance or disobedience is punished under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
ARTICLE 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person. —The penalty of arresto mayor
and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
not being included in the provisions of the preceding articles shall
resist or seriously disobey any person in authority, or the agents of
such person, while engaged in the performance of official duties.When the disobedience to an agent of a person in authority is not of a serious nature, the penalty of arresto menor or a fine ranging from 10 to 100 pesos shall be imposed upon the offender.
For this crime to be proven, the two (2) key elements must be
shown: “(1) That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the
performance of official duty or gives a lawful order to the offender;
and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person or
his agent.”[53]
In United States v. Tabiana,[54]
where the accused hit the police officer with his fist, this Court
explained the rationale behind the distinction in the force used:
Upon the whole we find the defendant Tabiana guilty of
resistance and serious disobedience to public authority under article
252, Penal Code, and not of the more serious offense indicated in
subsection 2 of article 249, Penal Code, which was applied by the Court
of First Instance. The question whether an offense consists of simple
resistance or to grave resistance is to be determined with a view to the
gravity of the act proved and the particular conditions under which
committed. In considering this question reference should also be had to
the nature and extend of the penalties attached by the authors of the
Code to the different offenses. Thus, when it is observed that the
offense indicated in article 249 carries with it a penalty ranging from prision correccional to prision mayor
in its minimum degree, with corresponding fines, it is obvious that the
lawmaker here had in mind serious offenses, characterized in part at
least by the spirit of aggression directed against the authorities or
their agents. . . .The greatest hesitancy which we have felt in applying article
252 instead of article 249 to this case arises from the words “shall
employ force against them” (emplearen fuerza contra ellos)
contained in article 249. These words, taken without reference to the
context, would seem to make absolutely necessary the application of
article 249 in every case where any degree of force is exerted. We
believe, however, that the words quoted are to be understood as applying
to force of a more serious character than that employed in the
present instance. We are led to this conclusion not only because of the
grave penalty attached, as indicated above, but for the further reason
that the Code mentions grave resistance further on in the same paragraph
and also makes special provision for the offense of simple resistance
in article 252. Now practically and rationally considered in connection
with the subject of arrest, resistance is impossible without the
employment of some force. A man may abscond or evade or elude arrest, or
may disobey the commands of an officer without using force but he
cannot resist without using force of some kind or in some degree. If at
the ultimate moment no force is employed to resist, there is not
resistance but submission; and if it had been intended that every
manifestation of force, however slight, against the authorities and
their agents should bring the case under article 249, it was an idle
waste of words to make other provisions to cover grave resistance and
simple resistance. It therefore seems reasonable to hold that the words
in article 249 relating to the employment of force are in some degree
limited by the connection in which they are used and are less peremptory
than they at first seem. Reasonably interpreted they appear to have
reference to something more dangerous to civil society than a simple
blow with the hands at the moment a party is taken into custody by a
policeman.[55] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, it was established that petitioner grabbed the shirt
of PO2 Navarro, then slapped and kicked him several times. PO2 Navarro
testified:
Q: When you [saw] these (sic) commotion, what did you and Police officer Merza do?
A: We tried to stop them and introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.Q: Who directed them to stop, and did they stop?
A; Yes, sir.Q: What did you do next?
A We invited them at the police station, so that they will file their complaint if there is any.Q: Did they abide on (sic) you?
A: No, sir.Q: And what did they do?
A: After telling them to go to the police station, there was one (1)
woman who shouted: ‘WALA KAYO PAKIALAM SA AKIN. HINDI AKO SASAMA SA
INYO.”Q: Was the woman who shouted part of the group?
A: Yes, sir.Q: What did you do then after you heard those words?
A: We continued telling them to board on the vehicle, but this woman slapped me and kicked me, sir.. . . .
Q: You said that this woman held your collar, and slapped and kicked you. How many times [were] you slapped?
A: I could not remember, sir.Q: Where were [you] slapped?
A: On my right cheek, sir.Q: And where were you kicked?
A: On both legs, sir.Q: How many times were you kicked?
A: Many times, sir.[56]
In the January 12, 2007 Joint Affidavit of PO3 Merza and PO2 Navarro, they stated:
That upon arrival thereat we saw a two group of female persons
fighting each other in front of gen-ex Billiard hall, located along
Gordon Avenue, New Asinan Olongapo City, That we immediately pacified
them, introduced ourselves as a Police officers (sic) despite we
wearing our official Police uniform and invited both parties involved to
our station for proper disposition, but one of the person (sic)
involved later identified as Jona (sic) Mallari Y Samar who reeking with
the smell of alcoholic beverages resisted and shows disrespect and
disobedience upon us, and uttered the following remarks on top of her
voice “WALA KAYO PAKIALAM SA AKIN HINDI AKO SASAMA SA INYO!” then she
grabbed PO2 Navarro (sic) uniform and repeatedly kicked him and slapped him on his face that cause (sic) an injury to his person, and placed us to an embarrassing situation;That we compelled to used (sic) a necessary and sufficient forced (sic) to arrest him and brought (sic) to our Station for proper disposition[.][57]
Mallari also admitted to this. Her testimony reveals:
Q: Ms. Witness, in your complaint affidavit [and] ear[l]ier you
mentioned that PO2 Navarro was in uniform, and he was inviting you to go
to the police station, and in 2.4 paragraph of your complaint affidavit
Ms. Witness, on the last portion of the paragraph you mentioned “I was
afraid he might again harm me, so I grabbed his shirt to push him away
and kick him away.” Now, you admit having grabbed the shirt of police
officer Navarro?
A: Yes, Ma'[a]m.Q: You admit having kicked him?
A: Yes, ma’am.Q: I will let you read the part, “when I get up, PO2 Navarro
approached me.” So he was not doing anything but approaching you,
correct?
A: Yes, Ma'[a]m.Q: And upon getting near you Ms. Witness you grabbed his shirt and kicked him?
A: Yes, Ma'[a]m.[58]
Based on the circumstances, petitioner’s resistance and use of
force are not so serious to be deemed as direct assault. While she
exerted force, it is not dangerous, grave, or severe enough to warrant
the penalties attached to the crime.
Moreover, PO2 Navarro himself stated that he was not kicked hard:
Q: Were you kicked hard by the accused?
A: Not really hard, sir.Court: Did you resent being kicked in the presence of other ladies?
A: Yes, Your Honor.[59]
Thus, instead of direct assault, this Court convicts petitioner of resistance or disobedience.
When the crime proved is different from the offense alleged, the
accused may be convicted of the offense proved when the offense charged
necessarily includes the offense proven.[60] Rule 120, Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court provide:
SECTION 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.
— When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included
in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.SECTION 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.
— An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in
the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the
essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.
In this case, although the charge is direct assault, the
prosecution was able to prove resistance or disobedience. These offenses
have similar elements, varying only as to the degree of seriousness of
the offender’s resistance. Direct assault necessarily includes
resistance or disobedience.
WHEREFORE, this Court MODIFIES
the October 27, 2015 Decision and May 12, 2016 Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36835. Petitioner Jonah Mallari y Samar is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of resistance
or disobedience under Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code. She is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor, which covers one (1) month and one (1) day, as minimum, to six (6) months, as maximum, and a fine not exceeding P500.00.
SO ORDERED.
Gesmundo, Zalameda, and Delos Santos,[*] JJ., concur.
Carandang, J., on special leave.
[*] Designated additional Member per Raffle dated February 5, 2020.
[1] Rollo, pp. 12-27. The Petition was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Id. at 29-40. The
October 27, 2015 Decision was penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C.
Quijano-Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Franchito N.
Diamante and Samuel H. Gaerlan (now a member of this Court) of the
Special Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
[3] Id. at 42-44. The
May 1 2, 2016 Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Ma. Luisa C.
Quijano-Padilla and concurred in by Associate Justices Franchito N.
Diamante and Samuel H. Gaerlan of the Former Special Thirteenth Division
of the Court of Appeals, Manila.
[4] Id. at 74-79. The
September 5, 2013 Decision was penned by Judge Merinnisa O. Ligaya of
Branch 1, Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City.
[5] Id. at 66-73. The
July 30, 2014 Decision was penned by Judge Roline M . Ginez-Jabalde of
Branch 74, Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City.
[6] Id. at 29.
[7] Id. at 30.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 30-31 and 74.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 31.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 70.
[15] Id. at 30.
[16] Id. at 31 and 70.
[17] Id.
[18] Id. at 31, 70, and 77.
[19] Id. at 32.
[20] Id. at 31-32 and 88-90.
[21] Id. at 74-79.
[22] Id. at 77-78.
[23] Id. at 79.
[24] Id. at 73.
[25] Id. at 71-72.
[26] Id. at 29-40.
[27] Id. at 39.
[28] Id. at 35-36.
[29] Id. at 42-44.
[30] Id. at 12-27.
[31] Id. at 19.
[32] Id. at 20.
[33] Id.
[34] Id. at 21.
[35] Id. at 204-205.
[36] Id. at 205.
[37] Id. at 206.
[38] 800 Phil. 118 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
[39] Id. at 122-125.
[40] Rollo, pp. 35, 72, and 77-78.
[41] Gelig v. People, 640 Phil. 109, 116 (2010) [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
[42] Id. at 116-117 citing LUIS REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book II, 15th ed. (2001), p. 122.
[43] US v. Taylor, 6 Phil. 162, 163 (1906) [Per J. Carson, First Division].
[44] REV. PEN. CODE, art. 152 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 873 (1985).
[45] 39 Phil. 76 (1918) [Per J. Avanceña, En Banc].
[46] Id. at 79-80.
[47] 3 Phil. 140 (1904) [Per J. Torres, En Banc].
[48] Id. at 141.
[49] 501 Phil. 37 (2005) [Per J. Garcia, Third Division].
[50] Id. at 41-42.
[51] 766 Phil. 785 (2015) [Per J. Carpio, Second Division].
[52] Id. at 811.
[53] Sydeco v. People, 746 Phil. 916, 932-933 (2014) [Per J. Velasco, Third Division] citing LUIS REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, Book 11, 18th ed. (2008), p. 154.
[54] 37 Phil. 515 (1918) [Per J. Street, First Division].
[55] Id. at 519-521.
[56] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[57] CA rollo, p. 45.
[58] Rollo, p. 78.
[59] CA rollo, p. 79.
[60] Sevilla v. People, 741 Phil. 198 (2014) [Per J. Reyes, First Division].