ANDRES FUENTES, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

OSTRAND, J.:


This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner alleging that
he is illegally detained in Bilibid Prison in the City of Manila.

It appears from the records of the court that the petitioner was convicted of
the crime of parricide by the Court of First Instance of Cebu and sentenced to
suffer the death penalty. Upon its review by this court the sentence was
affirmed in a decision promulgated January 29, 1923,[1] and the petitioner is
now in confinement awaiting its execution. Only eight justices took part in the
review of the case, the ninth being absent. The decision of the court was
written by one of the justices and concurred in by the other seven justices
present.

The petitioner argues that one of the justices being absent, the case was not
considered per curiam and that the decision being written by only one of the
justices and not having been signed by the absent justice, it has not been
rendered in the manner provided for by subsection 2 of section 1 of Act No.
3104, and therefore is null and void. There are several reasons why the petition
must be denied. It is, for instance, clear that even assuming that the
petitioner’s contention is correct, it still appears that the petitioner is
legally confined under a lawful judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
which has not been reversed or modified. In such cases the writ of habeas corpus
will not lie. We might let the matter rest here, but in order to definitely
settle the questions raised by the petitioner, we prefer to briefly discuss the
case on its merits.

The discussion turns upon the construction of subsection 2 of section 1 of
Act No. 3104, which was enacted subsequently to the promulgation of the decision
in question. The pertinent portions of the section read as follows:

“SECTION 1. The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must
be imposed under existing law, except in the following:

“First. * * *

“Second. When in the consideration of the case in the second instance there
is not a unanimous vote of all the members of the Supreme Court as to the
propriety of the imposition of the death penalty: Provided, however,
That the consideration of the case in the second instance shall always be per
curiam and the sentence shall be signed by all the members of the said court:
And provided, further, That in case one or more Justices are legally
disqualified from taking part in the consideration of the case, the unanimous
vote and signature of only the remaining justices shall be required.”

The phrase “all the members of the said court,” as employed in the subsection
quoted, may have two different significations: It may mean all the justices who
are legally entitled to sit on the court, or it may mean the members of the
court present for duty and actually constituting the court at the time the
particular case is heard and decided.

The petitioner argues that the first interpretation is the proper one. At
first blush his argument seems quite plausible, but on closer examination it
becomes apparent that if his interpretation is adopted and if, as counsel
contends, the provision in question is to be regarded as mandatory, it may lead
to serious interference with the functions of the court and to intolerable
delays in the administration of justice, in direct conflict with the provisions
of the Organic Act, which vouchsafes the accused in a criminal prosecution the
right to a speedy trial.

A justice of the court may be incapacitated through illness from taking part
in the deliberations of the court during several terms. Justices may also be
legally absent on leave for prolonged periods; in the past it has, indeed, but
rarely happened that all justices have been present for duty at the same time.
We cannot presume that the Legislature intended that in such eventualities
persons sentenced to death by lower courts shall languish in prison until the
absent justice returns to duty so that all the members who are legally entitled
to sit on the court may take part in the revision of the sentences of the lower
courts. On the contrary, the presumption is that the Legislature intended to so
frame the law as to conform with the provisions of the Organic Act.

It is further to be observed that the Government of the Philippine Islands is
modeled upon the constitutional governments in the United States which are
distinguished by the care that has been exercised in committing the legislative,
executive and judicial functions to separate departments and in forbidding the
interference by one department with the functions of another. (12 C. J.,
802.)

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is fixed by the Organic Act and cannot
be restricted by an act of the Legislature. Though the Organic Act does not
specifically so provide, it may be conceded that the Legislature has the power
to make reasonable changes in the laws of the procedure of the court, but it
cannot by a statute of procedure prevent a court from exercising its
constitutional jurisdiction during the lawful sessions of the court. (12 C. J.,
817, citing Flanigan vs. Guggenheim Smelting Co., 63 N. J. Law, 647.) This is
exactly what Act No. 3104 would do if interpreted in accordance with the
petitioner’s contention. In this connection we may quote the language of the
court in the leading case of Ocampo vs. Cabangis (15 Phil., 626) :

“* * * doctrine js weu established in the various States of the Union that
the legislatures have no power to establish rules which operate to deprive the
courts of their constitutional authority to exercise the judicial functions. A
constitutional court when exercising its proper judicial functions can no more
be unreasonably controlled by the legislature than can the legislature when
properly exercising legislative power be subjected to the control of the courts.
Each acts independently within its exclusive field.”

In order to give validity to the provision in question we must therefore
presume that in speaking of the Supreme Court the Legislature means the court as
actually constituted at the time of the consideration of each particular case to
which subsection 2, supra, may apply. If so, there can be no question
whatever as to the validity of the decision in question. The case was considered
per curiam, there was a quorum of the court present, and all
the justices who sat in the case signed the decision.

Looking at the case from a somewhat different angle, we arrive at the same
final result. The courts have generally held that provisions of a nature similar
to that of the one here under consideration are directory and not mandatory. In
the case of Ocampo vs. Cabangis, supra, the court, construing section
15 of Act No. 136, says:

” * * * Presumably no legislature intends to impose upon the courts
conditions and restrictions which will render them incapable of performing their
functions properly and efficiently. The results which would follow strict
compliance with a statute of this nature may properly be taken into
consideration in order to determine whether or not the Legislature intended the
statute to be mandatory or merely directory. It should not be assumed in the
absence of specific language to the contrary that a legislature intended that
the rights of parties should be seriously affected by the failure of a court or
some officer to comply strictly with the statutory requirements as to the manner
of official action. Legislatures often enact statutes for the purpose of
providing an orderly procedure for the conduct of public business, but procedure
is secondary in importance to substantive rights, and the nonobservance of such
procedure should never be permitted to affect substantive rights, unless the
intention of the legislature is clearly expressed. It is desirable that courts
should state the grounds upon which their decisions rest, but it is possible to
conceive of conditions under which strict compliance with a statute requiring
this would be impracticable or even impossible. Instead of protecting the
interests of litigants by securing a prompt and orderly administration of the
law, it would then result in obstructing or stopping the wheels of the judicial
machinery, to the prejudice of all parties.

*          *          *          *          *          *          *

“A strict and literal compliance with this statute would often render it
impossible for the court to decide a case. The Act declares the manner in which
the Supreme Court shall perform the strictly judicial act of giving final
expression to its decision, but it does not say that the failure to comply
therewith shall render the decision ineffective. The direction is as to a matter
which is not of the essence of the thing to be done, and there is nothing to
suggest that the Legislature intended that strict compliance therewith should be
essential to the validity of a decision duly and formally rendered in some other
regular manner. It seems to be universally held that statutes of this nature are
Zmerely directory, and that compliance therewith is not necessary to the
validity of the proceedings.* * *”

The petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied. So
ordered.

Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.

CONCURRING IN THE RESULT

STREET, J.,

I concur in the result but cannot accept all that is said in the opinion.

It would perhaps be sufficient for the decision of the case to point out that
the original judgment imposing the death penalty upon this petitioner was
rendered before Act No. 3104 of the Philippine Legislature was passed; and the
passage of that Act cannot, in any sound view of the case, be considered as
rendering ineffectual the decision previously promulgated by this court.

In the second place it is pertinent to record the fact that the Justice of
this court who failed to take part in the condemnatory decision was absent at
the time in the United States on leave. He was, therefore, “disqualified” within
the meaning of the Act referred to, or “inhibited,” as the expression appears in
the Spanish version.

But in my opinion Act No. 3104 is clearly invalid as being in contravention
of that provision of section 3 of the Jones Law wherein it is declared “that no
bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill.” The Act in question states
two distinct subjects in the title and there are two distinct matters treated in
the body of the bill. Furthermore, it will be noted that the second subject
treated, namely, the mode of the execution of the death penalty, is completely
foreign to the subject-matter of the statute which is the subject of amendment
in the first part of the Act.