G.R. No. 22388. December 02, 1924
CHUA KIONG, AS SPECIAL ATTORNEY-IN-FACT FOR CHUA YU, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PHILIP C. WHITAKER ET AL., DEFENDANTS. PHILIP C. WHITAKER, APPELLANT.
OSTRAND, J.:
On June 7, 1922, Chua Kiong, as attorney-in-fact for Chino Chua Yu,
brought an action against Philip C. Whitaker and Venancio Concepcion on the
following document, alleging that of the amount therein mentioned only the sum
of P3,903.16 has been paid leaving a balance still due from said defendants to
the plaintiff in the sum of P11,640.06:
“CENTRAL PALMA
“Hog, Negros Occidental,
“I. F.
“Whitaker y Concepcion,
“Propietarios.“Recibi del chino Chua Yu de Hog la cantidad de quince mil
quinientos cuarenta y tres pesos con 22/100 (P15,543.22) como prestamo sin
interes por cuenta de la ‘Central Palma.‘“Ilog, 29 de junio de
1921.
The defendants answered by a general denial but did not appear
at the trial of the case and judgment was rendered against them and in favor of
the plaintiff for the sum of 911,640.06, with legal interest from June 13, 1922,
and with the costs. From this judgment the defendant Philip C. Whitaker
appealed.
After the case had been docketed in this court the plaintiff presented a
motion to amend his complaint by changing the title of the case to read as
follows:
“CHUA YU, represented by his special attorney-in-fact, CHUA KIONG, plaintiff,
vs. PHILIP C. WHITAKER and VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendants.”
The appellant filed an opposition to the motion on technical grounds but did
not allege that he had a good defense and did not present an affidavit of merit.
The writer, then on duty as Vacation Justice, therefore overruled the objection
and granted the appellee’s motion under the provisions of section 110 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The defendant-appellant has now presented a motion asking that the case be
reopened for the sole purpose of receiving his evidence. The motion is
accompanied by an affidavit to the effect that said defendant-appellant did not
appear at the trial of the case, for the reason that the action was commenced
and prosecuted and decision rendered therein in the name of “Chua Kiong, as
special attorney-in-fact for Chua Yu;” that he was informed that an action so
commenced, prosecuted, and decided, could in no way affect his interests and
that it was not necessary for him to appear at the trial or present any defense
whatsoever and, acting on that information, he did not appear at the trial nor
present any defense; that he has a good and valid defense consisting in this:
that Severiano Concepcion had absolutely no authority to borrow the money
referred to in the complaint and that the power of attorney executed by
defendant-appellant in favor of said Severiano Concepcion prohibited him from
borrowing money in excess of P1,000. The affidavit is accompanied by a copy of
said power of attorney.
Counsel for the defendant-appellant intimates that the aforesaid amendment to
the complaint was improperly allowed by this court and very confidently and
rather emphatically asserts that this court never applied the provisions of
section 110 and allowed the amendment of the pleadings. In this counsel is
mistaken; in the case of Alonso vs. Villamor (16 Phil., 315), the complaint was
amended by substituting one party-plaintiff for another even after the case had
been submitted to this court for decision upon the merits. In that case the
court, speaking through Mr. Justice Moreland, says:
“It is undoubted that the bishop of the diocese or the Roman Catholic
Apostolic Church itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff personally
has no interest in the cause of action. Section 114 of the Code of Civil
Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest. The plaintiff is not such party.”
After quoting sections 110 and 503 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court
continues:
“We are confident under these provisions that this court has full power,
apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the process,
pleadings, proceedings, and decision in this case by substituting, as party
plaintiff, the real party in interest. Not only are we confident that we
may do so, but we are convinced that we should do so. Such an
amendment does not constitute, really, a change in the identity of the parties.
The plaintiff asserts in his complaint, and maintains that assertion all through
the record, that he is engaged in the prosecution of this case, not for himself,
but for the bishop of the diocese—not by his own right, but by right of another.
He seeks merely to do for the bishop what the bishop might do for himself. His
own personality is not involved. His own rights are not presented. He claims no
interest whatever in the litigation. He seeks only the welfare of the great
church whose servant he is. He gladly permits his identity to be wholly
swallowed up in that of his superior. The substitution, then, of the name of the
bishop of the diocese, or the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, for that of Padre
Alonso, as party plaintiff, is not in reality the substitution of one identity
for another, of one party for another, but is simply to make the form express
the substance. The substance is there. It appears all through the proceedings.
No one is deceived for an instant as to whose interests are at stake. The form
of its expression is alone defective. The substitution, then, is not substantial
but formal. Defect in mere form cannot possibly prejudice so long as the
substantial is clearly evident. Form is a method of speech used to express
substance and make it clearly appear. It is the means by which the substance
reveals itself. If the form be faulty and still the substance shows plainly
through, no harm can come by making the form accurately expressive of the
substance.”
Numerous decisions both from Federal and State courts are cited in support of
the opinion.
As a matter of fact, amendments to pleadings are frequently allowed after the
case has been entered upon the docket. It is true that such matters are usually
disposed of by minute-orders which do not appear in the reports, but there is
enough in the reports to show that it is never safe for a party in a civil
action to rely on purely technical defenses; under our liberal Code of Civil
Procedure but scant consideration is ordinarily given such defenses by this
court. In the present case counsel for the defendant-appellant in resisting the
amendment of the complaint gave the court no intimation that his client had any
defense on the merits nor was there anything in the record showing such defense.
In these circumstances the court was fully justified in authorizing the
amendment in question, and might well decline to entertain the motion now under
consideration. It seems evident that counsel deliberately refrained from calling
the attention of the court below to the mistake of his adversary, apparently
with the intention of lying in ambush until the proceedings had reached a stage
where the error would be beyond correction. Such practice leads only to delay in
the administration of justice and is no longer encouraged by the courts.
We feel, however, that under the circumstances of the present case the client
should not be made to suffer for the mistake of his counsel and that he should
be afforded another opportunity for his day in court.
The case will therefore be remanded to the court below for the reception of
the evidence of the defendant-appellant and such additional evidence as the
plaintiff may offer and for judgment upon all of the evidence. No costs will be
allowed in this instance. So ordered.
Johnson, Street, Avancena, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.
Malcolm, J., concurs in the result.
Case
remanded with instructions.