THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AMADOR GOMEZ, CRESENCIO I. RICHARDS, J. BOYARSKI, PRUDENCIO UY, EDUARDO VELOSO, LEONCIO SORONIO, IGNACIO DAGTAHAN AND LAURA G…

People versus Gomez

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by the People of the Philippines against Judge Amador Gomez of the Court of First Instance of Cebu and the six accused in a copra overshipment case. The State asks the Supreme Court to declare null and void the trial judge's order dismissing the criminal information on the very first day set for trial, when the prosecution asked for a postponement. The case matters because it draws the line between a valid dismissal, which bars re-prosecution on the ground of double jeopardy, and a void dismissal, which does not terminate jeopardy at all. It is a staple of criminal procedure and of the law on grave abuse of discretion.

Procedural History

At the request of the Monetary Board, the Secretary of Justice designated Special Prosecutor Enrique Agana to investigate and prosecute offenses connected with copra exportation. Acting on that designation, and jointly with the Fiscal of Cebu City, he filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against seven persons for overshipment of copra. The accused filed motions to quash and for bills of particulars, which were eventually denied, and all entered pleas of not guilty. The court then set the case for hearing on two dates in October 1963. Notice of trial was served on Assistant Fiscal Rafael Ybañez, but not separately on Special Prosecutor Agana. On the first day of trial the special prosecutor was absent, attending another case in Tacloban City, and the assistant fiscal manifested that he was not ready because the records were with the special prosecutor. The trial judge then sounded out the accused on whether they would agree to a postponement or to a dismissal without prejudice; counsel for six of them vigorously opposed both, and the judge ordered the case dismissed as to those six, except as to Laura Gingo. A motion for reconsideration was denied, and the special prosecutor filed this petition for certiorari. The accused answered, raising the merits and double jeopardy, and the respondent judge filed his own answer.

Facts

In December 1962 an information was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu charging seven persons with overshipping, overexporting, or smuggling out of the Philippines, between February and March 1961, of 1,700 long tons of Philippine copra valued at 255,000 dollars, in excess of the quantity duly licensed for export. The accused included the general manager, assistant manager, and warehouseman of a copra company, and the representatives of the Philippine Coconut Administration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the Bureau of Customs, and the Philippine Constabulary to the Export Coordination Committee.

The accused then spent almost ten months filing motions to quash and for bills of particulars, which the respondent judge himself later conceded were devoid of serious legal bases and premised only on trivial grounds. He had earlier granted several postponements of arraignment at the defense's request, and even allowed one accused to leave for the United States before he was finally arraigned.

When the case was finally called for trial, the special prosecutor was absent for reasons the judge himself found satisfactory and beyond his control. The assistant fiscal's manifestation that he was not ready amounted to the prosecution's first request for postponement, and it rested on reasonable ground. The judge nonetheless dismissed the case as to six accused, and in his answer later revealed that he had been moved by extraneous matters, an alleged suspicious dinner invitation from a stranger, which he suspected was part of an extortion scheme using his court as a forum.

Issues

• Whether or not the dismissal order was issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and is therefore a nullity.
• Whether or not the grant of the petition would place the accused in double jeopardy.
• Whether or not the respondent judge should be disqualified from further sitting in the case.

Applicable Provisions

Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Who may appeal. The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In all other cases either party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant.

This fixes the rule that the State cannot appeal a dismissal that would place the accused twice in jeopardy, which is why the State proceeded by certiorari instead of appeal.

Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons.

This is the basis on which the Court honored the respondent judge's own request to be relieved of the case.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the dismissal was purely capricious. The delay that the judge cited as his reason was caused by the defense, not the prosecution, and the prosecution's first request for postponement rested on reasonable ground. A dismissal made on its own motion, for no proper reason at all, is void for being issued without authority. The Court also held that a purely capricious dismissal deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and denies the prosecution its day in court, so it is a dismissal without due process and therefore null and void. Finally, the judge's reliance on extraneous matters, even in good faith, rendered the dismissal affected with partiality and bias, void for lack of an impartial judge.

On the second issue, the Court held that double jeopardy does not attach. Since the dismissal is void, it cannot terminate the proceedings, and the same jeopardy that attached continues. The Court reasoned that if the State's submission is sustained, there would in effect be no order of dismissal to speak of, since it would be legally non-existent, and thus no basis for the plea of double jeopardy.

On the third issue, the Court, considering all the circumstances and the respondent judge's own prayer, found his request for disqualification reasonable and deemed him to have inhibited himself from further taking cognizance of the case.

Doctrine

A dismissal of a criminal information that is purely capricious, issued on the court's own motion for no proper reason, is void for lack of authority and for lack of due process, and a void dismissal does not terminate the proceedings. Because the case is not terminated, the jeopardy that already attached continues, and the defense of double jeopardy does not lie. The State may therefore assail such a void order by certiorari even though it could not appeal under Section 2 of Rule 122, precisely because a void order is legally non-existent. A judge who relies on extraneous matters outside the record acts with partiality and bias, and his order is void for lack of an impartial judge.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the dismissal order was declared null and void and without legal effect; the respondent judge was deemed to have inhibited himself at his own request; and the case was ordered to proceed to trial on the merits before another judge of the same court chosen by raffle, with no costs.

Remember This

A void dismissal is no dismissal at all, so it cannot terminate jeopardy. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a void and a merely erroneous dismissal, and to test whether the State may reach a dismissal order by certiorari despite the bar on prosecutorial appeals.