PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JONAS PANTOJA Y ASTORGA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Pantoja versus People

The Case

This is the appeal of Jonas Pantoja y Astorga, whom the People of the Philippines charged with murder for the stabbing death of a six-year-old child in Taguig City. Pantoja did not deny the killing. He staked his liberty on the defense of insanity under the Revised Penal Code, and failing that, on the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. The case matters because it gathers in one place the Court's stringent test for insanity as an exempting circumstance, the evidentiary burden that the accused must carry, and the rule that a mitigating circumstance cannot lower a penalty that the law prescribes as indivisible.

Procedural History

Pantoja was arraigned before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 163, Taguig City Station, and pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole under Republic Act Number 9346, and ordered him to pay damages to the victim's heirs. Pantoja appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modification, reducing the award of actual damages. The case then reached the Supreme Court on automatic review, and the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with a further modification of the damages.

Facts

Pantoja had a history of mental illness. After he was mauled in an altercation when he was twenty-one years old, his mother Cederina observed changes in his personality and difficulty sleeping. He was diagnosed with schizophrenia at the Philippine General Hospital and had been in and out of confinement since 2003. He was admitted to the National Center for Mental Health on the eighth of July 2010, but he escaped on the fourteenth of July 2010 and made his way home by himself. His mother informed the hospital that he was in her custody, but the family could not afford to bring him back at that time. He continued to take his medications at home.

On the morning of the twenty-second of July 2010, Cederina was washing dishes while Pantoja sat on the balcony of their house. She noticed that he was gone, went outside to look for him, and saw that the front door of the neighboring house, where the six-year-old victim lived, was open. She heard a child crying from inside and went up the stairs. There she saw Pantoja holding a kitchen knife and the child sprawled on the floor, bloodied. She took the knife from him and asked what happened, but he did not respond and appeared dazed. The child had sustained four stab wounds, on his forehead, his neck, his right shoulder, and below his collarbone, and he died of his injuries.

At trial, the prosecution presented Cederina as a hostile witness, the victim's father, and the medico-legal officer who performed the autopsy. The defense presented Cederina and Pantoja himself. Pantoja testified that he had been confined for mental illness since 2003, that he took his prescribed medicines, and that he could not recall what happened on the morning of the killing. The defense also offered a letter from the National Center for Mental Health, patient identification cards, a clinical record, and prescription slips. No psychiatrist testified.

Issues

• Whether or not the accused clearly and convincingly proved his defense of insanity so as to be exempt from criminal liability.
• Whether or not his mental condition constitutes diminished willpower that mitigates his liability and lowers the penalty.
• Whether or not treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Whether or not the award of damages was proper in amount.

Applicable Provisions

Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, on exempting circumstances, provides:

Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from criminal liability: An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

This is the provision under which Pantoja sought complete exemption, and the Court measured his evidence against its requirement of insanity at the time of the act.

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, on the application of indivisible penalties, provides:

Article 63. Rules for the Application of Indivisible Penalties. In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. When both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the act, the courts shall reasonably allow them to offset one another in consideration of their number and importance, for the purpose of applying the penalty in accordance with the preceding rules, according to the result of such compensation.

This governs why the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower could not pull the penalty below reclusion perpetua.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession and avoidance. The accused who asserts it admits the commission of the crime, and the burden of proof shifts to him to establish his defense by clear and convincing evidence. Two elements must concur: first, that the insanity constitutes a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment; and second, that such insanity existed at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime. The Court found the evidence insufficient. Cederina's testimony showed odd behavior, such as going in and out of the house, but nothing at the time of the incident or in the hours before it that showed insanity. Prior confinement at a mental institution does not by itself prove insanity at the time of the crime, and Pantoja himself admitted he was released whenever the doctors found him well, showing lucid intervals. The hospital records did not state that he was insane at the time of the killing, and no expert testified. The Court stressed that not every aberration of the mind constitutes insanity, and that mere behavioral oddities cannot support the defense unless the totality of the behavior indubitably shows a total absence of reason, discernment, or free will at the time the crime was committed.

On the second issue, the Court held that while the evidence did not show a complete deprivation of intelligence, it showed some impairment of his mental faculties, so he may be credited with the mitigating circumstance of diminished willpower. But a mitigating circumstance does not change the nature of the crime; it can only affect the imposable penalty. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, and under Article 63 the lesser penalty is applied when there is a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance. Reclusion perpetua was therefore correctly imposed.

On the third issue, the Court held that treachery attended the killing. The victim was only six years old, and the killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown, because the weakness of the victim due to tender age results in the absence of any danger to the accused.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that where the circumstances call for reclusion perpetua only, the proper amounts are 75,000 pesos as civil indemnity, 75,000 pesos as moral damages, and 75,000 pesos as exemplary damages, regardless of the number of qualifying aggravating circumstances.

Doctrine

Insanity as an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code requires a complete deprivation of intelligence, reason, or discernment, existing at the time of, or immediately preceding, the commission of the crime. The defense is a confession and avoidance, so the accused bears the burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties, behavioral oddities, or prior confinement in a mental institution will not exclude imputability, and the presumption of sanity, or of a lucid interval, stands absent proof to the contrary. Diminished willpower may be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, but it cannot change the nature of the crime; where the penalty is indivisible, Article 63 requires its application regardless of mitigating circumstances. The killing of a child of tender years is attended by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown.

Disposition

The Court affirmed the conviction of Pantoja for murder and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, ordering him to pay the victim's heirs 75,000 pesos as civil indemnity, 75,000 pesos as moral damages, and 75,000 pesos as exemplary damages, with interest at six percent per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.

Remember This

Insanity exempts only when it is a complete deprivation of intelligence existing at the time of the crime, proved by clear and convincing evidence, and diminished willpower can never lower an indivisible penalty. Examiners use this case to test the stringent insanity standard, the confession and avoidance burden, and the application of Article 63 to indivisible penalties.