ST. PAUL COLLEGE, PASIG, AND SISTER TERESITA BARICAUA, SPC, PETITIONERS, VS. ANNA LIZA L. MANCOL AND JENNIFER CECILE S. VALERA, RESPONDENTS.

St. Paul College, Pasig versus Mancol

The Case

This is a labor case about constructive dismissal. Two pre-school teachers of St. Paul College, Pasig, Anna Liza Mancol and Jennifer Cecile Valera, sued the school and its Directress, Sister Teresita Baricaua, claiming that the school's treatment of them after their respective medical leaves made continued employment impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, amounting to a dismissal in law even without a formal notice of termination. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the governing rules on constructive dismissal, the respect owed to the factual findings of labor tribunals, the liability of a corporate officer, and the propriety of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

Procedural History

The teachers filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and money claims before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter ruled in their favor, found them constructively dismissed, ordered their reinstatement, and awarded backwages, overtime pay, holiday pay, thirteenth month pay, service incentive leave pay, overload pay, and attorney's fees. The school appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaints for lack of merit, directing the teachers to report for work if they so desired. The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted the petition, reversed the National Labor Relations Commission, and reinstated the Labor Arbiter's decision with modifications: it deleted the awards of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, and nightshift differential; it awarded moral and exemplary damages; it ordered accrued wages; and it declared the teachers not guilty of forum shopping. On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals denied the motion but clarified that, in lieu of reinstatement, the teachers are entitled to separation pay computed from their first days of employment up to the finality of the decision at the rate of one month pay per year of service. The school then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

Facts

Mancol was employed on June 1, 2004 with a monthly basic salary of 20,311.50 pesos, and Valera was employed sometime in 2003 with a basic monthly salary of 22,044 pesos. Both were pre-school teachers of the school.

Mancol filed a leave of absence for May 21 to June 18, 2010 to undergo a fertility check-up in Canada. Upon returning to the Philippines, she received a letter dated June 10, 2010 from Sister Baricaua requiring her to explain why she should not be dismissed for taking a leave of absence without approval. When Mancol reported back on June 21, 2010, she was allegedly barred from teaching in her class, from entering her classroom, from being introduced to her students, from preparing teaching materials, and from going to other offices within the campus.

Valera, for her part, took a leave of absence without pay from April 13 to June 11, 2010 to undergo a surgical operation for scoliosis. On June 15, 2010, she received a letter from Sister Baricaua advising her to file a sick leave for the entire school year 2010 to 2011, failing which she would be reassigned to a higher grade level, and requiring her to submit a waiver absolving the school from liability for any untoward incident during her teaching duties, as well as a notarized certification of her physician as to her fitness to resume work. The teachers then filed their complaint on June 22, 2010.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court may review the factual findings of the labor tribunals in a petition for review under Rule 45.
• Whether or not Mancol and Valera were constructively dismissed by the school and Sister Baricaua.
• Whether or not the teachers are entitled to backwages, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and the other monetary awards.
• Whether or not Sister Baricaua may be held solidarily liable with the school for the money claims.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as discussed in the decision, limits the Court to questions of law:

The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

This is the general rule that the Court relaxed, because the findings of the Labor Arbiter, the National Labor Relations Commission, and the Court of Appeals were in conflict.

The Labor Code, through the Court's own definition, supplies the meaning of constructive dismissal:

Constructive dismissal arises when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank and or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee.

This definition is the test the Court applied to the facts of both teachers.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that while only questions of law are generally reviewable under Rule 45, and factual findings of labor tribunals are accorded much respect, a relaxation is permissible when the findings of fact are conflicting. Since the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission were completely different from those of the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, the case fell under an exception, and the Court resolved the issues presented.

On the second issue, the Court held that both teachers were constructively dismissed. It affirmed the finding that the school committed acts that were gratuitous, unjustified, unwarranted, and unfair. In Valera's case, the Court noted that she underwent a successful scoliosis operation covered by an approved leave until June 11, 2010, and that the Human Resource Office assured her she could report back for work on June 15, 2010. The Court stressed that at the core of constructive dismissal is the gratuitous, unjustified, or unwarranted nature of the employer's action, and that any allegation of constructive dismissal must be contrasted with the validity of the exercise of management prerogative.

On the third issue, the Court sustained the monetary awards as modified by the Court of Appeals, which had deleted the overtime, holiday, holiday premium, rest day premium, and nightshift differential awards, and which had ordered separation pay in lieu of reinstatement at one month pay per year of service.

On the fourth issue, the Court rejected the argument that Sister Baricaua could not be held solidarily liable merely because she acted as an officer of the corporation, there being no showing of malice and bad faith.

Doctrine

First, constructive dismissal exists when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. At its core is the gratuitous, unjustified, or unwarranted nature of the employer's act, and the allegation must always be tested against the employer's valid exercise of management prerogative.

Second, although a petition for review under Rule 45 raises only questions of law, the Court may review the facts when the findings of the labor tribunals conflict, as when the National Labor Relations Commission departs from the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals.

Third, a corporate officer may be held solidarily liable with the corporation for the money claims of dismissed employees where malice or bad faith attends the dismissal.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals finding Mancol and Valera constructively dismissed, with separation pay in lieu of reinstatement and the monetary awards as modified.

Remember This

Memorize the definition: constructive dismissal arises when continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely, and its core is the gratuitous, unjustified, or unwarranted act of the employer. Examiners use this case to test the conflict-of-findings exception to Rule 45 and the solidary liability of a corporate officer shown to have acted in bad faith.