THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MAURICIO LABIS AND ISABELO CABILES, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

Mauricio Labis and Isabelo
Cabiles are appealing from a judgment of conviction
for murder.  The two were, on February 29, 1960, charged by the
provincial fiscal for the killing of
the deceased Clarito Fabria
in Barrio Taytay, Municipality of El Salvador, Misamis
Oriental.  After trial, the Court of
First Instance of Misamis Oriental sitting at Cagayan de Oro City, on September
12, 1963, found both accused guilty as charged and
sentenced each to “suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim Clarito Fabria
in the sum of P6,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.”

The prosecution, relying mainly on the testimonies of two
eyewitnesses – Vidal Masong and Ahenor
Pagasihan – and that of Dr. Megdonio
Bacal, attending physician, es­tablished the following:

At about 3:00 p.m. on August 1, 1959, in Barrio Taytay, Municipality
of El Salvador, Misamis
Oriental, appellant Labis, with a bolo, chased the
deceased Clarito Fabria
near the national highway.  When the
latter happened to pass by a coconut
tree, appellant Cabiles who was standing there,
grabbed him and locked his arms around the shoulders of Clarito Fabria,
with Cabiles‘ chest pressing against the right
shoulder of Clarito. 
This enabled Labis to overtake Clarito Fabria and thereupon, the
former stabbed the latter with the bolo at his back.

Appellant Cables then released the deceased who, badly wounded,
tried to run further towards his father’s house.  Later, Clarito Fabria was brought for treatment to the provincial hospital
at Cagayan de Oro City,
where he died two hours later.

The attending physician, Dr.
Bacal, found an opening stab wound, about
three inches long, at the back lumbar region, middle, which deviated
laterally to the left, and causing an exit wound of one inch in front, at
the left iliac region (lower abdomen).^[1]
Dr. Bacal also testified that the two wounds could
have been caused by a bolo and that the decedent’s death was due to profuse
internal hemorrhage resulting from multiple perforation
of the sig­moid and mysentery of the intestine,
organs usually found on the left of the abdominal cavity.

The defense narrated the events differently.  According to appellants Labis
and Cabiles and three of their alleged eyewitnesses,
what transpired was this:

On the morning of August
1, 1959, Labis and Cabiles
with several of
their barriomates attended a community group work,
locally known as “pahina“, at the public
school compound.  About noontime, they
all proceeded to the wedding party at Pedro Estrada’s house where the deceased and the
latter’s brother-in-law, Raul Espejon, were also
present.  Lunch over,
the group left the place together at the
invitation of the decedent and Espejon.  On
the way home, the two walked ahead while Labis, Cabiles and the rest followed about 20 meters behind.

As the decedent Fabria and Espejon neared the national highway, the latter stopped
near a coconut tree.  As appellant Labis approached, Espejon
confronted him with a bolo, asking whether he had a grudge against Clarito Fabria.  Labis answered that
they ought not fight as they were bro­thers.  Sensing trouble, Francisco Labis, a third degree cousin of Mauricio Labis, intervened and advised the two not to fight.  Raul Espejon then
repaired towards the near­by house of Dionisio Gaid and Labis with the others
went their way.

At this moment, Clarito Fabria, brandishing a bolo, came running towards them and
asked Labis if the latter had any grudges against
him.  Labis
retreated with upraised hands and endeavoured to pacify the deceased by calling him brother
and pleading that they should not fight. 
Clarito answered by slashing his bolo at Labis who, in trying to parry the blow, was wounded on his
left wrist.  Labis
retreated further but Raul Espejon reappeared on the
scene and boloed Labis at
the nape, wounding him also.  Ap­pellant Labis then turned to face Espejon
when Clarito Fabria hurled
his bolo at him with the handle-end thereof hitting Labis
on the breast.  The decedent now bent
down to pick up the bolo which fell by Labis‘ left
side but the lat­ter immediately warded off Clarito’s
hands.  This caused the decedent to turn
half-way to his right, exposing his left flank to Labis.  Instantly, Labis
drew his own bolo from the waist and thrust it at the decedent’s back, at the
left side of the lumbar region on the level of the pel­vis.

Clarito Fabria
then ran away wounded towards Dionisio Gaid’s house.  A few
moments later, policeman Maximo Gallego,
who had fired several shots upwards while still at a distance, arrived at the
scene of the incident and Labis surrendered to him
the bolo (Exh. C, also
marked as Exh. 12) he used
in stabbing Clarito Fabria
and also the bolo (Exh. 14) which the latter
allegedly hurled at him.  Policeman Gallego placed Labis and Cabiles under custody and then went after Raul Espejon in the house of Hugo Fabria
and got Raul’s bolo.  Still later,
Gregorio Salas, the Chief of Police of El Salvador, arrived and brought appel­lants
Labis and Cabiles to the
municipal building for investigation.

Appellant Cabiles denied having held
the decedent Clarito Fabria
as testified to by the prosecution witnes­ses. 
He claimed that when the deceased confronted Labis
with a drawn bolo, he (Cabiles) and Francisco Labis stood between the protagonists and tried to pacify
them and pre­vent a fight.  However, when
Clarito Fabria threw his
bolo at Labis, Cabiles
retreated about four meters away since he was afraid that Clarito
carried a dagger also which he might use.

As between the two conflicting versions, the trial court upheld
the prosecution’s and rejected that of the de­fense.  And We quote the
findings and conclusions of said court:

“At first blush the theory advanced by the de­fense would seem
foolproof but a closer examination of the same reveals weaknesses that cannot
stand the test of judicial
scrutiny.  The defense witnesses, either close friends or relatives of
the accused, gave evidently well-rehearsed testimonies likely to mislead
the gullible and unsuspected person. 
However, a careful evaluation of their version of the incident would
show its inconsistency with the natural course of events and human
conduct.  For in­stance, their claim that
the accused Mauricio Labis delivered the fatal blow
at the back of Clarito Labis
while they were embracing each other and as the latter was about to pick up his
bolo from the ground, is not borne out by the position and direc­tion of the
wounds of said victim.  Their observations do not also coincide because one
declared that Mauricio Labis Pushed aside Clarito Fabria instead of
embraced him as two others testified. 
Some even asserted that Clarito Fabria was hit on the left side of his back which is not
true.

“The finding of Dr. Megdonio Bacal, the examining physician at the Provincial Hospital
of Misamis Oriental, located the entrance wound of about
3 inches in length at the back of Clarito Fabria across the lower portion of his spinal column, and
the injury deflected laterally towards his
left front side below the waistline causing an exit wound of about an inch in
length (Exhs. ‘B’, ‘B-1’ and ‘B-2’).  Since it is admitted that the accused Mauricio Labis,
who is right-handed, used the bolo, Exh.
’12’, about two feet long, pointed and
wide at its middle, by no stretch of imagination could the wound have followed such a course, irrespective of whether said Clarito Fabria was slightly bending to pick up his weapon or in a standing position
locked in an embrace with said accused as the defense tried to picture during
the reenactment of the incident in open court. 
The wound should have come out on the right side of the
deceased if the accused was in front of him when he delivered
the fatal thrust.  The only plausible hypothesis deducible from
the position and direction of the wounds of Clarito Fabria is that it was inflicted by a right-handed assailant
who was either directly behind him or towards his right side.  Such circumstances therefore, lend color of
truth and bear out the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Mauricio Labis
stabbed Clarito Fabria from
the back as Isabelo Cabiles
was holding the deceased.  It must be remembered, however, that ac­cording to the defense
witnesses themselves, Clarito Fabria was more robust and stronger in build than the
accused Mauricio Labis so that he could not have been
easily bested by the latter.  But as the defense
would put it, the encounter involved Clarito Fabria and his brother-in-law Raul Espejon
on one side against Mauricio Labis alone on the other, and
if that is true, the latter must be a superman to have come out of the  struggle practically unscathed.

“Furthermore, it would seem odd if not contrary to human
behavior for Clarito Fabria
to have hurled his own weapon at Mauricio Labis in
the course of their armed struggle and endeavor again to retrieve it knowing
that Mauricio Labis was also provided with a
bolo.  The court cannot also conceive
why the wound of Mauricio Labis on his left forearm allegedly caused by the
thrust of Clarito Fabria’s
bolo appeared small and superficial, involving only the skin and that on his nape
only an abrasion, although it
was supposedly produced by a slash administered by Raul Espejon
with another bolo, considering the sharpness of the weapons used and strength
of the blows delivered as described by the witnesses for the defense.  Certainly, a potent bolo like the one
allegedly used by Raul Espejon would not have
produced just an abrasion which according to medical science may be caused by
mere rubbing of the skin against a hard object. 
Likewise, the arm wound of Mauricio Labis
would have been bigger or deeper because the bolo (Exh.
’14’) allegedly used by Clarito Fabria
is not only sharp but also double?edged at its point.

“The court, nevertheless, is inclined to be­lieve that the deceased Clarito Fabria was not provided
with a bolo at the time because he came from the wedding party in the house of
Pedro Estrada and the accused themselves
observed him carry none while
they were yet there.  On the other hand,
Mauricio Labis admitted having brought his bolo along
and declared that Isabelo Cabiles
also carried a bolo as both of them came from the ‘pahina‘
(group labor) at the schoolhouse.  Isabelo Cabiles, nevertheless,
denied having a bolo at that time, but Francisco Labis
and Dionisio Gaid declared
that he was also provided with a bolo.

“It is very probable that one of the bolos delivered by
Mauricio Labis to patrolman Gallego
may be that of the accused Isabelo Cabiles and Gallego’s
testimony about the ownership of that bolo by Clarito
Fabria is unworthy of credence because of his affinity to said Mauricio Labis by marriage.

“The testimonies of Dionisio Gaid and Demosthenes Dadolo are
not entitled to belief as is that of the Chief of Police Gregorio Salas because
it appears that these witnesses were never investigated by said Chief at all
although according to him, he saw them there immediately after the incident and he went back to the place the next
day to look for eyewitnesses but could only find the prosecution witnesses Ahenor Pagasihan, Vidal Masong and Simplicio
Martinez.  Moreover, if the Chief of
Police believed that Isabelo Cabiles
did not have any participation in the killing why did he include him as one of the accused in his amended
complaint filed before the
Justice of the Peace of El Salvador on August 7, 1959?  But
the actuations of said Chief of Police in connection with this case are
susceptible of suspicion for his failure to take immediate steps to insure the
testimonies of eyewitnesses to the incident before they had a chance for
reflection.”^[2]

In their first three assignments of errors, appellants assail the
above findings and conclusions and would
have this Court believe their witnesses – whom the trial court discredited
– rather than the prosecution witnesses. 
The issue posed then is one of credibility of witnesses. 
And the rule is that unless appellants satisfactorily show
that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and sub­stance as would offset the results of the case, the appellate
court will not disturb said court’s findings especially
when the same are based on the evidence on record.^[3]

Appellants here failed in that task.  They merely harped on the requisites of
self-defense and casually ex­cused the inconsistencies in the testimonies of
their witnesses as “immaterial”. 
Their theory of self-defense is negatived by
the nature and location of the victim’s wounds which, having a right-to-left
direction, could not have possibly been inflicted by a right-handed person in front of the victim with a two-feet
long bolo.  Moreover, it appears highly
improbable that appellant Labis suffered no serious
cut wound,^[4] as per the medical certificate Exh. 8, altho the defense witnesses uniformly testi­fied
that Labis was slashed at the wrist with a sharp bolo
by the decedent, and on the nape with a similar le­thal instrument by Raul Espejon.  Appellant Cabiles was even emphatic that he saw blood oozing
from Labis‘ nape.^[5] Having advanced self-defense, the burden was
on appellant Labis to justify the killing of the
decedent by clear and convincing evidence. 
And the trial court having dis­credited his witnesses, it was further
his duty in this appeal to prove the lower court in error.  Unfortunately, appellant has submitted no
cogent reason for Us to disregard the trial court’s
findings and conclusions which are all based on the evidence on record.

Altho motive need not be considered
anymore on account of the positive identification of the accused,^[6] yet contrary to appellants’
insistence, there is ample proof of motive. 
Reuben Bajuyo testified^[7]
that on July 23, 1959, appellant Labis and
one Isaias Bahian went to
his house looking for the decedent to kill him for having stolen his (Labis‘) chicken.  The
trial court did not disbelieve Bajuyo’s testimony but
rather held it insufficient to establish evident premeditation.

Appellant’s next submission that prosecution eyewit­nesses Pagasihan and Masong were not
present in the scene of the crime is without merit.  They base their claim on the testimonies of
their witnesses whom the lower court found devoid of credibility.  Moreover, the negative testimonies of these
witnesses cannot prevail over the positive statements of said prosecution
witnesses.

However, the testimony of prosecution witness Pagasihan
cannot be given full credit in view of its serious contra­diction with his
sworn affidavit, Exhs. 5 and 5-A wherein Pagasihan claimed
to have seen only the chasing of Raul Espejon by Rufo Labis and that in the fight
between Mauricio Labis and the decedent, appellant Cabiles did not hold the decedent but even tried to stop
the fight.  Of course Pagasihan,
when confronted with said affidavit, repudiated it and claimed
that he was bribed and threatened into signing it by appellant Labis.^[8]

Still, Masong’s lone testimony is
sufficient to sustain appellants’ conviction.^[9]
The fatal stabbing of the decedent occurred just about five meters away from
him.^[10]
No improper motive has been shown why he would impute actuations of serious
consequences against appellants.  The
minor flaws in his testimony he satisfactorily explained, thus:  altho he also saw
the chasing of Raul Espejon by Rufo
Labis, he did not mention that fact anymore in his
direct testimony since it was not the subject of the case being tried, a point
which was also noted by the trial court.^[11]
Masong stated that as of the date when he was
testifying he could no longer remember the exact amount of Asuncion Fabria’s debt which he was trying to collect since it was
only a little account from his sari-sari store.^[12]
He was not able to collect from Asuncion
that day since the door of her house was closed and because of the stabbing
incident that happened in his presence.^[13]
The reason why he saw no policemen in the scene of the crime and why he was not
investigated there, was because he immediately went
home after the incident^[14]
and Masong did not tell his wife about the stabbing
since he did not want her to get nervous.^[15]

His defense of justified killing unsustainable, appellant Labis must suffer the consequences for his unlawful
act.  The killing of the decedent was
qualified treachery.  It has been clearly established that Clarito Fabria was being held firmly by
appellant Cabiles thereby preventing the former from
moving or making any defense when Labis struck him from behind with a bolo.  There was hardly, if any, risk at all for Labis; the decedent was defenseless.^[16] Appellant Labis is liable for murder.

This brings Us to the liability of
appellant Cabiles. 
Unlike Labis, Cabiles
did not advance self-defense.  His stand
was non-participation in the killing. 
However, the entire defense version of the incident was discredited by
the lower court.  Even with particular
reference to appellant Cabiles, We are satisfied that
the trial court did not err.

First,
it is clear from the evidence on record that Cabiles‘
alignment and sentiments were with Labis.  They were together at the “pahina“.  They
went together to the marriage celebration and then went home in company.  Secondly, it strikes Us
as strange behavior for appellant Cabiles to act courageously
and bravely when danger is near and real, and
then to lose such courage when
danger has become less imminent and remote. 
According to the defense version, Cabiles was
standing between Labis and the decedent, who had a
drawn bolo, trying to prevent
the fight.  And yet, after the decedent had
allegedly thrown his bolo at Labis and had, to all
appearances, become unarmed, Cabiles withdrew about four meters away on the conjecture
that the decedent might still be possibly armed with a dagger.  A man sincerely desirous of putting an end to
such incident would have immediately taken advantage of the decedent’s
momentary armlessness by holding him.  Cabiles himself
admitted his being a cousin of the decedent.^[17]
And besides, there were two of them – he and Francisco Labis
– who could have subdued the decedent whom they pictured as the one itching for
a fight.  Lastly, it appears odd why
appellant Cabiles never vigorously insisted on his
innocence from the very start.  It does
not appear that he ever strongly protested being placed under police custody
together with appellant Labis – who openly admitted
having stabbed the decedent – and being brought with Labis
to the municipal building for investigation. 
If he had no participation really, why should he be placed under arrest
like Mauricio Labis? 
Francisco Labis was, allegedly, in exactly the
same situation as he was.  Yet, Francisco
Labis was never placed under police custody.  These considerations are incompatible with Cabiles‘ belated plea of innocence.

On the other hand, it has been sufficiently established that
appellant Cabiles seized the running decedent in such a manner that the latter could not
even move or turn around.  This enabled
the pursuing Labis, who was armed with a drawn bolo
and was barely five meters away from the decedent, to finally overtake him and
stab him at the back with hardly any risk at all. Cabiles
therefore performed another act – holding the decedent – without which the
crime would not have been accomplished. 
This makes him a principal by indispensable cooperation.^[18]            Consequently, appellant Cabiles is also liable for murder.

As recommended by the Solicitor General, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender will be appreciated in favor of appellants Labis and Cabiles.  Instead of running away, they voluntarily
went with the policemen who took them into
custody.  With no aggravating
circumstance to offset voluntary surrender, We must
impose the penalty for murder – reclusion temporal maximum to death – in
the minimum pe­riod, which is reclusion temporal maximum.

Since the resulting penalty is neither death nor life imprisonment, the Indeterminate
Sentence Law applies.^[19]
Appellants are therefore entitled to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which is reclusion temporal maximum – the penalty to be imposed
in view of the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender – and the minimum term – which is one (1) degree lower from
the penalty prescribed by the Code for murder – is anywhere from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal medium.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified
and the appellants Mauricio Labis and Isabelo Cabiles are sentenced to
imprisonment for a minimum term of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal medium, and not to exceed a maximum term of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
maximum.  In all other respects, the
judgment appealed from is affirmed.  Costs against appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Exhs.
B, B-1 and B-2.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 12-16; emphasis supplied.

^[3]
People v. Daga, L-22371 Oct. 26, 1967; People v.
Castro, L-20555, June 30, 1967; People v. Sira-on,
L-15631, May 27, 1966; People v.
Tania, L-18514, April 30, 1966; People v. Secapuri,
L-17518-19, Feb. 28, 1966.

^[4]
Exh.
8 shows that the cut wound on Labis‘
forearm is only one (1) cm. wide.

^[5]
T.s.n.
REMOLADO, p. 111; however, Exh. 8 shows only a superficial abrasion on Labis‘ nape.

^[6]
People v. Portugueza, L-22604, July 31, 1967.

^[7]
T.s.n. MONTES, pp. 43-44; 50-51.

^[8]
T.s.n., MONTES, pp. 118-119.

^[9]
See:  People v. Templonuevo, L-12280, Jan. 30,
1960.

^[10]
T.s.n. MONTES, pp. 14, 20-21.

^[11]
Id., pp. 12-13; 33-34.

^[12]
Id., pp. 15-16.

^[13]
Id., p. 18.

^[14]
Id., p. 32.

^[15]
Id., p. 39.

^[16]
See: People v. Mario, L-13295, May 31, 1960; U.S.
v. Feria, 2 Phil. 54.

^[17]
T.s.n. REMOLADO, p. 67.

^[18]
Art. 17, par. 3, Rev. Penal Code; People v. Mario, supra;
U.S. v. Cueva, 23 Phil. 553; U.S. v. Feria, supra.

^[19]
Sec. 2 of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103, as amended) directs that said law
“shall not apply to per­sons convicted
of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment.”
(Stress Ours) Thus, in People v. Castro,
L-20555, June 30, 1967, the
accused, though con­victed of
murder, got an indeterminate sentence. His voluntary surrender reduced the
penalty for murder to its minimum period, reclusion temporal maximum.