ALFONSO BUN RAMOS, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. EMILIANO CONDEZ, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

On appeal from an order dismissing the case for
the reason that the cause of action has prescribed.

On 22 May 1963,
Alfonso Bun Ramos and his wife filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. SC-429, against Emiliano Condez and his wife.

The cause of action is shown by the following allegations:

That on 25 June 1952, the defendants sold to the plaintiffs a
parcel of land, with an area of two (2) hectares, situated in the municipality
of Mabitac, Laguna, under Tax Declaration No. 552-A,
as evidenced by a notarial document, annex A of the
complaint; that in the early part of 1956, the plaintiffs “decided to
cultivate the parcel of land sold by the herein defendants, but much to
plaintiff’s surprise, they discovered for the first time that the land sold by
the said defendants to the herein plaintiffs, belonged to another person other
than the defendants, and consequently, plaintiffs were not able to occupy and
cultivate the parcel of land sold by here­in defendants, to the great damage
and prejudice of the plaintiffs”; that the plaintiffs had informed the
defend­ants of “such situation and requested that the defendants deliver
to them the two(2) hectares of land which the said defendants sold to the
herein plaintiffs”; “that de­fendant Emiliano
Condez upon being informed of the said situation,
wrote a letter to plaintiff Alfonso Bun Ramos on or about 10 November 1956,
promising to deliver the two hectares of land sold by him to the plaintiffs, a
true copy of said letter is hereto attached as annex B of this complaint”;
that notwithstanding repeated demands made by the plaintiffs on the defendants
to deliver the land, the latter failed and refused to do so.  The prayer is: “1. Ordering the
defendants to jointly and severally deliver to the plaintiffs the two hectares of
land adjoining the parcel of land described in paragraph 2 hereto or the actual
market value thereof in the sum of P12,000.00“;
and “2. To sentence the defendants to pay attorney’s fees equivalent to
25% of P12,000.00, plus expenses of litigation and costs.”

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) That
the action has prescribed; and (2) That the complaint states no cause of
action.  On the first ground, the
defendants argue that as the deed of sale was executed on 25 June 1952, and the action was filed on 22 May 1963, more than ten years had
elapsed since the accrual of the cause of action, hence, the action has
prescribed.  On the second ground, the
contention is anchored on the following: “While the allegations of the complaint
speak of a sale of a definite parcel of land, which the defendants allegedly
failed to deliver to the plaintiffs, the latter in their prayer ask this Ho­norable
Court to order the defendants to jointly and severally deliver to the
plaintiffs two hectares of land adjoining the parcel of land, described in
paragraph 2 thereof, or the actual market value thereof in the sum of
P12,000.00”, thereby evincing plaintiffs’ – “desire either to rescind
the deed of sale or to demand for specific performance of the contract of
sale.”

In their reply, the plaintiffs contended that, admitting that the
cause of action had accrued on 25 June 1952, however, in view of defendants’
written acknowledgment of the validity of the deed of absolute sale and promise
to deliver the land which they have sold to the plaintiffs, as expressed in
defendants’ letter of 10 November 1956, the running of the prescriptive period
for the commencement of the action was tolled on that date; and, as an action
based upon written contracts prescribes in ten years, hence, the instant action
which was filed on 12 May 1963, was commenced within the period of the statute
of limitation.

Resolving the motion to dismiss, on 1 July 1963, the lower court dismissed the case reasoning
thus:

“The plaintiffs’ action is evi­dently not for reconveyance as stated in the caption of the complaint, but
one for relief on the ground of fraud which prescribes in four years from the
date of the discovery of the fraud, pursuant to Article 1146, par. (1) of the new Civil Code. 
Since the complaint was filed only on May 22, 1963, more than four years from Novem­ber 10, 1956, the defendants’
first ground, to the mind of the Court, is well taken.

“In line with the foregoing, which renders unnecessary the
consideration of the other ground, the court hereby dismisses the case, with
costs against the plaintiffs.”

The question, then, is: What is the nature of the cause of action
stated in the complaint?

In the opinion of the lower court, the action is “not for reconveyance” of real property “as stated in the
caption of the complaint”, but one “for relief on the ground of
fraud”.  To the mind of the lower
court, the fraud consisted of the act of the defendants in sell­ing a
piece of land which did not belong to them. 
In other words, by means of that tortious act,
the defendants received, and the plaintiffs parted with, a valuable
consideration, which is the price of the land. 
Indeed, that was the fraud committed by defendants.  But the question is: What, then, is the
relief sought by the plain­tiffs in the complaint?  The order states that the action is “not
for reconveyance“, without specifying, however,
whether it is one for specific performance or rescission of the contract of
sale, with damages.  Fortunately, the appellees have supplied the answer.  In the motion to dismiss, the defendants
said: “A perusal of the body of the complaint will instantly reveal that
either the plaintiffs desire to rescind the deed of sale or is seek­ing a
specific performance of the contract of sale.” Truly, that is the cause of
action alleged in the com­plaint.  The
defendants’ failure and refusal to deliver the land which they have sold to the
plaintiffs, is the delict or wrong done by the
defendants giving rise to remedial right in favor of the plaintiffs who are now
seeking to enforce that right and to obtain redress for the wrong perpetrated
by the defendants.

The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint, to constitute a cause of action, is whe­ther or not, admitting the
facts alleged, a valid judg­ment can be rendered thereon.  Examining the allegations of the complaint,
which are deemed admitted by the de­fendants for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss, We find that the cause of action is for a judicial declaration of
plaintiffs’ right to the land and recovery of the possession thereof, and
failing in this respect, they ask for damages.

It has not escaped our attention upon reading the complaint, that
it suffers ambiguity and vagueness in its allegations.  Thus, as pointed out by the appellees, while the averments clearly indicate that the
cause of action is either for specific performance or rescission of the
contract of sale, however, in the first paragraph of the prayer a relief is
asked which is not responsive to the allegations in the body of the
complaint.  Under the circumstances, the
remedy of the defendants is to file a motion for a bill of particulars, but not
a motion to dismiss.  Thus, in the case
of Aba
vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., L-14785, Nov.
29, 1960, it was held that a com­plaint must contain ultimate facts
constituting plain­tiff’s cause of action. 
A complaint would be sufficient if it contains sufficient notice of the
cause of action even though the allegations may be vague or indefinite, in
which event, the proper recourse would be, not a mo­tion to dismiss, but a
motion for a bill of particulars.

Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code (new), an action upon a
written contract “x x x
must be brought within ten years from the time the cause of action
accrues.” There is no denying that, in the instant case, the plaintiffs’
cause of action, under the deed of absolute sale, annex A, has accrued on June
25, 1952, but, in view of the defendants’ letter, dated November 10, 1956,
acknowledging the validity of the deed of absolute sale and promising to com­ply
with their commitments as embodied in the deed of sale that they will deliver
the land which they have sold to the plaintiffs, the running of the period of
limitation of action was interrupted on that date, November 10, 1956.  Considering that the action was filed on May 22, 1963, evidently, the cause of
action has not prescribed, because it was filed within the period of limitation
of actions (Article 1155, New Civil Code).

Upon the foregoing considerations,
the order appealed from is set aside and revoked, and the case is remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings. 
Costs against the defendants.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, and Fernando, JJ.,
concur.