PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PONCIANO ESPINA Y BALASANTOS ALIAS “JUN ESPINA AND JR”, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Espina

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecute Ponciano Espina for the killing of Ernando Reyes, Junior. The accused was charged with murder for shooting the victim with a firearm during a drinking spree. The case matters to the reviewee because it gathers in one decision the settled rules on three recurring examination points: how intent to kill is proved, how treachery is established as a qualifying circumstance, and how a death certificate is treated as evidence without need of a medical expert. It also illustrates the rule against changing one's theory of defense on appeal.

Procedural History

The accused was charged with murder by an Information filed in the Regional Trial Court of Taguig City. On arraignment he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim actual damages, civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modification, declaring that he shall not be eligible for parole and increasing the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, with interest at six percent per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.

The accused then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by appeal, praying anew for acquittal. Both the Office of the Solicitor General and the accused manifested that, in lieu of supplemental briefs, they were adopting their respective briefs filed before the Court of Appeals.

Facts

On the evening of May 26, 2005, the accused Ponciano Espina, the victim Ernando Reyes, Junior, Russel Michael, Pio Manjares, and a certain Dante were having a drinking spree inside Pio's house in Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig City. While the drinking was ongoing, the accused left. When he returned, he showed his companions a .45-caliber gun and asked them to hold it, which they did. He later retrieved the gun and tucked it on his waist.

After a while, the accused pulled out the gun and pointed it close to Ernando's chest, asking, "Ano gusto? Patay buhay?" Then, right off, he shot Ernando in the upper right chest. The others scampered away. Russel came back and helped rush Ernando to the Rizal Medical Center, where Ernando later died. The victim's wife, Evelyn Reyes, and his relatives incurred funeral expenses of 25,500 pesos and sought damages of 200,000 pesos.

For the defense, the accused denied the charge and even denied knowing Ernando, Evelyn, Russel, or Pio. He claimed that in 2005 he resided in Las Piñas City and had never been to Taguig City, and that he only began staying in his cousin's house at Ibayo Tipas, Taguig City, in August 2006. He testified that on September 14, 2006, he was involved in a stabbing incident in Pasig City, surrendered to barangay officials, and was charged with frustrated homicide. Four days later, a warrant of arrest for the present murder case was served on him while he was detained at the Pasig City police station. He was later acquitted in the frustrated homicide case but remained under custody for the murder charge.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the accused's conviction for murder despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the death certificate of the victim was admissible in evidence without authentication by a medical expert.
• Whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established intent to kill.
• Whether or not treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Whether or not the penalty and the awards of damages were correctly imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 16, defines treachery as an aggravating circumstance:

Article 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances: x x x 6. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

This provision supplies the definition the Court applies in testing whether the sudden shooting of the unarmed victim qualified the killing to murder.

Section 19 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court classifies documents for purposes of their presentation in evidence:

Section 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents are: (a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country; (b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments; and (c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein. All other writings are private.

This provision anchors the Court's holding that a duly registered death certificate is a public document.

Section 23 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court governs the evidentiary weight of public documents:

Section 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

This provision explains why the death certificate proved the fact of death without the testimony of a medical expert.

Ruling

On the first issue, the appeal is devoid of merit. The Court held that the fact of the victim's death was duly established by his death certificate, and that in this jurisdiction a duly registered death certificate is a public document. To be admissible in evidence, there is no need for a medical expert to authenticate or verify it; its issuance by the Office of the Civil Registry concerned is sufficient proof of the death of the person named therein.

On the second issue, the Court noted that the theory of lack of intent to kill was not what the accused pleaded before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. As a rule, a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such a late stage. To allow otherwise would be unfair to the adverse party, who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory. The Court added that changing postures of defense betray a guilty mind and sheer lack of credibility.

On the third issue, the Court held that intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned only through external manifestations. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of the means used by the malefactor; the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; the conduct of the malefactor before, during, or immediately after the killing; and the circumstances under which the crime was committed. The Court also considered the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries. Here, the accused left the drinking spree, returned showing off his gun, pointed it at Ernando while asking "Ano gusto? Patay buhay?", and right off shot the unarmed victim in the right chest. The Medico Legal Report stated that Ernando sustained one gunshot wound, through and through, causing laceration of his right lung, diaphragm, liver, and stomach, with the cause of death recorded as gunshot wound, trunk. The Court held that if the victim died because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that treachery attended the killing. Treachery has two elements: the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means. It cannot be presumed; the evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. The Court stressed that the essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim without the slightest provocation on the latter's part, and that the victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack. The accused employed means which ensured the commission of the crime without exposing himself to any risk from the victim's possible act of retaliation or defense. The aggravating circumstances of nighttime and use of a firearm, though alleged in the Information, were not proved and were correctly ruled out.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and there being no aggravating circumstance proven, reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed. In accordance with the guidelines on the use of the phrase without eligibility for parole, that phrase need not be borne in the decision to qualify the penalty. The Court affirmed the civil indemnity of 75,000 pesos, increased moral and exemplary damages to 75,000 pesos each in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence, and deleted the actual damages of 25,500 pesos. Because the actual damages proved during trial were less than the sum allowed by the Court as temperate damages, temperate damages of 50,000 pesos were awarded in lieu of actual damages. All amounts earn six percent interest per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid.

Doctrine

A duly registered death certificate is a public document, and its issuance by the civil registry is sufficient proof of the death of the person named therein; no medical expert need authenticate it. A party who deliberately adopts a theory upon which the case was tried and decided below cannot change that theory on appeal, and arguments not raised in the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing court.

Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is proved by external manifestations: the means used, the nature, location, and number of wounds, the conduct of the malefactor before, during, and immediately after the killing, the circumstances of the crime, the motive of the offender, and the words uttered at the time of the injuries. If the victim died because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.

Treachery, as defined in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, requires the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means. It cannot be presumed and must be proved as conclusively as the crime itself. Its essence is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim without the slightest provocation, the victim not knowing the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack.

Disposition

The appeal was denied, and the accused was found guilty of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, ordered to pay the heirs of the victim civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of 75,000 pesos each, and temperate damages of 50,000 pesos, all with six percent interest per annum from finality of the decision until fully paid.

Remember This

Memorize this line: intent to kill is conclusively presumed when the victim dies because of the deliberate act of the malefactor, and treachery's essence is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack without the slightest provocation. Examiners like to use this case on the sufficiency of a death certificate without a medical expert, on the rule against changing one's theory on appeal, and on the two elements of treachery.