MARY ELIZABETH TY-DELGADO, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND PHILIP ARREZA PICHAY, RESPONDENTS.

Ty-Delgado versus House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Pichay

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado against the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and Philip Arreza Pichay. Ty-Delgado asks the Supreme Court to annul the Tribunal's ruling declaring Pichay eligible to hold and serve as Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur. The case matters because it settles two things every election lawyer must know: that libel is a crime involving moral turpitude, and that a candidate disqualified under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code who nonetheless swears to his eligibility commits a false material representation that voids his certificate of candidacy from the very start.

Procedural History

Ty-Delgado first filed a petition for disqualification against Pichay before the Commission on Elections, grounded on his conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. The Commission's First Division dismissed that petition for lack of jurisdiction. Pichay was then proclaimed, and Ty-Delgado filed an ad cautelam petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, later manifesting her amenability to convert it into a regular petition for quo warranto. The Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction, but dismissed the petition and declared Pichay eligible, reasoning that the circumstances of his libel conviction did not show moral turpitude. The Tribunal denied her motion for reconsideration. Ty-Delgado then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Facts

In September 2008 the Supreme Court convicted Pichay by final judgment of four counts of libel. In lieu of imprisonment he was sentenced to pay a fine of six thousand pesos for each count, and one million pesos as moral damages. That judgment became final and executory in June 2009. In February 2011 Pichay paid the fine and the moral damages.

In October 2012 Pichay filed his certificate of candidacy for Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur in the May 2013 elections. Ty-Delgado sought his disqualification, arguing that the five-year bar had not yet lapsed when he filed. Pichay answered that libel does not necessarily involve moral turpitude, and that he did not personally write the libelous articles, his conviction resting only on his presumed responsibility as president of the publishing company.

Pichay was proclaimed the winner with seventy-six thousand eight hundred seventy votes. Ty-Delgado pressed her quo warranto petition before the Tribunal, which dismissed it and declared him eligible. Hence this petition.

Issues

• Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's conviction for libel did not show that moral turpitude is involved.
• Whether or not the Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in failing to declare Pichay ineligible or disqualified from holding office by reason of his conviction for libel, a crime involving moral turpitude.
• Whether or not the Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in failing to declare that Pichay falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he was eligible.
• Whether or not the Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in failing to declare that Pichay's certificate of candidacy is void from the beginning, so that he was never a candidate at all.
• Whether or not the Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in failing to apply the rule on the second placer, and in failing to declare Ty-Delgado the rightful winner.

Applicable Provisions

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified.

This is the disqualification provision on which Pichay's ineligibility rests, and it fixes the five-year period counted from service of sentence.

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code provides, in its relevant part:

The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

This is the requirement of a sworn statement of eligibility that Pichay violated.

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five, days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

This is the remedy for a false material representation, which the Court treats as akin to quo warranto and which supplies the ground for voiding Pichay's candidacy.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Tribunal gravely abused its discretion. Libel is a crime involving moral turpitude, and the Court had already listed it as such. Moral turpitude means everything done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals, an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties a man owes his fellowmen or society. Malice is the essence of libel, and in the earlier Tulfo case the Court found Pichay liable for publishing four defamatory articles with reckless disregard of whether they were false or not. Pichay's claim that he was merely the president of the publishing company fails, because the Revised Penal Code makes the publisher responsible to the same extent as the author, and the law does not distinguish where it does not distinguish. The imposition of a fine rather than imprisonment does not change the character of the crime.

On the second issue, the Court held that Pichay is disqualified under Section 12. Since he served his sentence when he paid the fine in February 2011, the five-year period ends only in February 2016. He was therefore disqualified when he filed his certificate of candidacy in October 2012.

On the third issue, the Court held that Pichay made a false material representation of his eligibility, because he knew of his final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. A candidate barred by final judgment who still swears that he is eligible makes a false material representation under Section 78.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that a certificate of candidacy denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 is void from the beginning, so the person is deemed never to have been a candidate at all, and his votes are stray votes.

On the fifth issue, the Court applied the second placer rule. Since Pichay was never a valid candidate, the qualified candidate who received the highest number of valid votes, Ty-Delgado, must be declared the winner. The Court also stressed that although the Tribunal is the sole judge of contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House, the Supreme Court retains jurisdiction to check grave abuse of discretion, which arises when the Tribunal utterly disregards the law and settled precedents.

Doctrine

Libel is a crime involving moral turpitude, because malice is its essence and it is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the duties a man owes his fellowmen and society. A crime remains one involving moral turpitude even if the penalty is reduced to a fine. Under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, the five-year disqualification runs from service of sentence, which means payment of the fine. A candidate disqualified under Section 12 who states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible commits a false material representation under Sections 74 and 78. A certificate of candidacy cancelled on that ground is void from the beginning, the candidate is deemed never to have been a candidate, and his votes are stray. The qualified candidate who obtained the highest number of valid votes is then declared the winner.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the Tribunal's decision and resolution, declared Pichay ineligible to hold the office, and declared Ty-Delgado the winner of the May 2013 elections for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur, the decision being immediately executory.

Remember This

Memorize this line: libel involves moral turpitude, and a disqualified candidate's false oath of eligibility voids his certificate of candidacy from the beginning, making his votes stray. Examiners use this case to test the second placer rule, the five-year disqualification period counted from service of sentence, and the Supreme Court's power to correct grave abuse of discretion by the electoral tribunal.