ASKAY, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. FERNANDO A. COSALAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

MALCOLM, J.:


The plaintiff in this case is Askay, an illiterate Igorrote between
70 and 80 years of age, residing in the municipal district of Tublay, Province
of Benguet, who at various times has been the owner of mining property. The
defendant is Fernando A. Cosalan, the nephew by marriage of Askay, and municipal
president of Tublay, who likewise has been interested along with his uncle in
mining enterprises.

About 1907, Askay obtained title to the Pet Kel Mineral Claim located in
Tublay, Benguet. On November 23, 1914, if we are to accept defendant’s Exhibit
1, Askay sold this claim to Cosalan. Nine years later, in 1923, Askay instituted
action in the Court of First Instance of Benguet to have the sale of the Pet Kel
Mineral Claim declared null, to secure possession of the mineral claim, and to
obtain damages from the defendant in the amount of P10,500. Following the
presentation of various pleadings including the answer of the defendant, and
following trial before Judge of First Instance Harvey, judgment was rendered
dismissing the complaint and absolving the defendant from the same, with costs
against the plaintiff. On being informed of the judgment of the trial court,
plaintiff attacked it on two grounds: The first, jurisdictional, and the second,
formal. Both motions were denied and an appeal was perfected.

Two questions are suggested by the assignments of error. The first is whether
Judge George R. darvey had jurisdiction to try the case. The second is whether
the plaintiff has established his cause of action by a preponderance of the
evidence.

1. On April 16, 1923, as appears from the Official Gazette, the Secretary of
Justice authorized and instructed the Honorable George R. Harvey, Judge of First
Instance of the Ninth Judicial District, to hold a special term of court in the
City of Baguio, Mountain Province, beginning May 2,1923. (Administrative Order
No. 43, 21 Off. Gaz., p. 893.) Acting under the authority granted by the order
of the Secretary of Justice, Judge Harvey proceeded to hear the case of Askay
vs. Cosalan, without protest from anyone until after an adverse decision for the
plaintiff and until after Judge Harvey had left the district.

The point which plaintiff now presses is that Act No. 3107, amendatory of
section 156 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes a Judge of First
Instance to be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty, for a
period which shall in no case exceed six months, in a district or province other
than his own, for the purpose of trying all kinds of cases, excepting criminal
and election cases, was not in force until fifteen days after the completion of
the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, or not until August 3,
1923. Plaintiff relies on section 11 of the Administrative Code, which in part
reads: “A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature shall, in the absence
of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day
after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette,
the date of issue being excluded.”

Now turning to Act No. 3107, its final section provides that “This Act shall
take effect on its approval.” The Act was approved on March 17, 1923. Obviously,
therefore, there being a special provision in Act No. 3107, it applies to the
exclusion of the general provision contained in the Administrative Code.

Recalling, therefore, that Act No. 3107 went into effect on March 17, 1923,
and that it was subsequent thereto, on April 16, 1923, that Judge Harvey was
authorized to hold court at Baguio, beginning with May 2, 1923, appellant’s
argument along this line is found to be without persuasive merit. We pass to the
material issue which is one of fact.

II. Plaintiff contends that the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim was
accomplished through fraud and deceit on the part of the defendant. Plaintiff
may be right but in our judgment he has failed to establish his claim. Fraud
must be both alleged and proved.

One fact exists in plaintiff’s favor, and this is the age and ignorance of
the plaintiff who could be easily duped by the defendant, a man of greater
intelligence. Another fact is the inadequacy of the consideration for the
transfer which, according to the conveyance, consisted of Tl and other valuable
consideration, and which, according to the oral testimony, in reality consisted
of P107 in cash, a bill fold, one sheet, one cow, and two carabaos. Gross
inadequacy naturally suggests fraud and is some evidence thereof, so that it may
be sufficient to show it when taken in connection with other circumstances, such
as ignorance or the fact that one of the parties has an advantage over the
other. But the fact that the bargain was a hard one, coupled with mere
inadequacy of price when both parties are in a position to form an independent
judgment concerning the transaction, is not a sufficient ground for the
cancellation of a contract.

Against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, we have the document
itself executed in the presence of witnesses and before a notary public and
filed with the mining recorder. The notary public, Nicanor Sison, and one of the
attesting witnesses, Apolonio Ramos, testified to the effect that in the
presence of the plaintiff and the defendant and of the notary public and the
subscribing witnesses, the deed of sale was interpreted to the plaintiff and
that thereupon he placed his thumb mark on the document. Two finger print
experts, Dr. Charles S. Banks and A. Simkus, have declared in depositions that
the thumb mark on Exhibit 1 is that of Askay. No less than four other witnesses
testified that at various times Askay had admitted to them that he had sold the
Pet Kel Mine to Fernando A. Cosalan.

Having in mind all of these circumstances, how can the plaintiff expect the
courts to nullify the deed of sale on mere suspicion? Having waited nine years
from the date when the deed was executed, nine years from the time Fernando A.
Cosalan started developing the mine, nine years from the time Askay himself had
been deprived of the possession of the mine, and nine years permitting of a
third party to obtain a contract of lease from Cosalan, how can this court
overlook plaintiff’s silent acquiescence in the legal rights of the defendant?
On the facts of record, the trial judge could have done nothing less than
dismiss the action.

We conclude, therefore, that Judge Harvey had jurisdiction to try this case,
that his findings of fact are in accordance with the evidence, that no
prejudicial error was committed in the trial, and that the complaint was
properly dismissed. As a result, judgment is affirmed with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.