G.R. No. 219340. April 28, 2021

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC., RESPONDENT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions April 28, 2021 THIRD DIVISION HERNANDO, J.:
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HERNANDO, J.:


For Our Resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration[1] of the November 7, 2018 Decision[2] which granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari[3] of petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), which sought the reversal of the May 8, 2015 Decision[4] and the July 10, 2015 Order[5] in Civil Case No. 14-1330 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 66 of Makati City.

The RTC Decision and RTC Order granted respondent Standard
Insurance Co. Inc.’s (Standard Insurance) Petition for Declaratory
Relief and permanently enjoined the CIR and its agents from implementing
Sections 108 and 184 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
against Standard Insurance until Congress enacts House Bill No. 3235 (HB
3235) entitled An Act Rationalizing the Taxes Imposed on Non-Life Insurance Policies into law.[6]

The Antecedent Facts:

Petitioner CIR is the head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), a
government agency tasked with the power and duty of assessing and
collecting all national internal revenue taxes, fees, and charges among
others.[7] Respondent Standard
Insurance is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and engaged in the business of non-life insurance.[8]

On February 13, 2014, respondent received from the BIR a Preliminary
Assessment Notice (PAN) regarding its liability amounting to
P377,038,679.55 arising from a deficiency in the payment of documentary
stamp taxes (DST) for taxable year 2011.[9] Standard Insurance contested the PAN[10] but the CIR nonetheless sent it a formal letter of demand.[11] Although respondent requested reconsideration,[12]
it received on December 4, 2014 the Final Decision on Disputed
Assessment (FDDA) dated November 25, 2014, declaring its liability for
the DST deficiency, including interest and compromise penalty, totaling
P418,830,567.46.[13] On
December 11, 2014, it sought reconsideration of the FDDA, and objected
to the tax imposed pursuant to Section 184 of the NIRC as violative of
the constitutional limitations on taxation.[14]

Meanwhile, respondent also received a demand for the payment of its
deficiency income tax, value-added tax (VAT), premium tax, DST, expanded
withholding tax, and fringe benefit tax for taxable year 2012 which
respondent protested in its letter dated December 10, 2014 on the ground
that the VAT rate and DST rate imposed on premiums charged on non-life
property insurance pursuant to Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC are
violative of the constitutional limitations on taxation.[15] Respondent also received a demand for payment of deficiency DST for taxable year 2013.[16]

On December 19, 2014, Standard Insurance commenced Civil Case No.
14-1330 in the RTC with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) for the judicial
determination of the constitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the
NIRC with respect to the taxes charged against the non-life insurance
companies.[17]

In its
Petition, the respondent contended that the facts of the case must be
appreciated in light of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 10001 (RA
10001) entitled An Act Reducing the Taxes on Life Insurance Policies,
whereby the tax rate for life insurance premiums was reduced from 5% to
2%; and the pendency of deliberations on House Bill 3235, whereby an
equal treatment for both life and non-life companies was being sought as
a response to the supposed inequality generated by the enactment of RA
10001.[18]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:

On December 23, 2014, the RTC issued a TRO enjoining the BIR,
its agents, representatives, assignees, or any persons acting for and in
its behalf from implementing the provisions of the NIRC adverted to
with respect to the FDDA for the respondent’s taxable year 2011, and to
the pending assessments for taxable years 2012 and 2013.[19]

On January 13, 2015, the RTC issued an Order granting the application
for WPI of respondent and thereby ordering the CIR and his/her
representatives to refrain from further proceeding with the
implementation or enforcement of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC until further orders, upon posting by respondent of the requisite bond.[20]

Thereafter, the RTC issued the WPI on January 14, 2015 and an Order on
February 18, 2015: (a) dismissing the CIR’s motion to set hearing for
dismissal of the case on the ground that the issues contained therein
can be resolved simultaneously with the main case; (b) denying the CIR’s
motion for reconsideration to the RTC’s issuance of the WPI on January
13, 2015; and (c) denying Standard Insurance’s motion to declare
petitioner in default.[21] The RTC Orders dated January 13, 2015 and February 18, 2015 thereafter became the subject of a Petition for Certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals (CA).

On May 8, 2015, the RTC rendered its Decision holding that although
taxes were self-assessing, the tax system merely created liability on
the part of the taxpayers who still retained the right to contest the
particular application of the tax laws; and holding that the exercise of
such right to contest was not considered a breach of the provision
itself as to deter the action for declaratory relief, and decreed
thusly.[22] The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondent, its
agents, representatives, or any persons acting on its behalf is hereby
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the implementation or
enforcement of Sections 108 and 184 of the National Internal Revenue
Code against petitioner Standard Insurance Co., Inc. until the Congress
shall have enacted and passed into law House Bill No. 3235 in conformity
with the provisions of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The CIR moved for reconsideration which the trial court denied for lack of merit in its July 10, 2015 Order.[24]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals:

On April 27, 2014, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
before the CA pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to (a) set
aside the Orders dated January 13, 2015 and February 18, 2015 of the RTC
granting respondent’s application for issuance of a WPI and subsequent
denial of the MR; and (b) dissolve the WPI dated 14 January 2015.[25]
The Petition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 140403, was later
dismissed by the appellate court in its October 30, 2015 Resolution for
failure of the petitioner to comply with the CA’s August 19, 2015
Resolution to submit copies of pertinent pleadings.[26]

Assailed Decision of the Court:

On September 7, 2015, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
before Us praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC
Decision and RTC Order on the following grounds: (a) The RTC erred in
taking cognizance of the case because a Petition for Declaratory Relief
is not applicable to contest tax assessments and the petition is fatally
defective for failing to satisfy the basic requisites under Rule 63 of
the Rules of Court; (b) The RTC erred in adjudging Sections 108 and 184
of the NIRC as violative of the equal protection clause; (c) The RTC
gravely erred in granting injunctive relief in favor of respondent, the
same being specifically prohibited by Section 218 of the NIRC and for
having been issued despite the absence of a clear legal right; and (d)
The RTC erred in granting the relief provided in the RTC Decision since
the resultant remedy falls outside the purview of an action for
declaratory relief and it is violative of the rule that judicial
decisions must finally determine the rights, obligations, and
responsibilities of parties.[27]

On November 7, 2018, We rendered the assailed Decision granting the Petition for Review on Certiorari.[28]
We ruled that the RTC grossly erred and acted without jurisdiction in
giving due course to the petition for declaratory relief and permanently
enjoining the enforcement of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC, in
violation of Section 218 of the NIRC and Section 11 of Republic Act No.
1125. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered in Civil Case No. 14-1330 on May 8, 2015 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, in Makati City; DISMISSES Civil Case No. 14-1330 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction; QUASHES
the writ of preliminary injunction issued against the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue in Civil Case No. 14-1330 for being issued without
jurisdiction; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.[29]

We opined that respondent’s Petition for Declaratory Relief failed
to comply with the requisites for the said action, since the subject
provisions, i.e., Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC have been
infringed by respondent prior to the institution of the action.
Moreover, respondent’s allegation that it could be rendered insolvent
through the imposition of taxes imposed by Sections 108 and 184 of the
NIRC did not result in the action for declaratory relief becoming an
actual controversy ripe for judicial determination.

Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.

Respondent argues that the Court erred in not dismissing the Petition
outright on the ground that petitioner committed deliberate and willful
commission of forum shopping, and that the issues raised in the Petition
are factual in nature and are barred under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, respondent alleges that the RTC has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of respondent’s action for declaratory relief and that
the latter has fully satisfied the essential requisites of a petition
for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court.[30]

Lastly, the respondent argues that the Court erred in disregarding its
clear and unmistakable right to equal protection to uniformity and
equitability of taxation, in relying in Section 218 of the NIRC and in
not finding that the RTC has jurisdiction to issue injunctive writs and
the latter lie against the implementation of unconstitutional statutes,
and in finding that the RTC violated the rule that judicial decisions
must finally determine the rights, obligations and responsibilities of
the parties.[31]

Issues

To dispose of the instant case, the following issues must be resolved:

First,
whether the Petition must be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping
and/or non-compliance with the certification against forum shopping
requirement;

Second, whether the Petition must be dismissed on the ground of raising issues of fact, which are barred under a Rule 45 petition;

Third,
whether the RTC had the jurisdiction to take cognizance of respondent’s
petition for declaratory relief and issue injunctive relief against the
implementation of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC; and

Fourth,
whether the RTC should have dismissed respondent’s petition for
declaratory relief for failure to comply with the essential requisites
of a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court.

We resolve to deny the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Petitioner is not guilty
of forum shopping and has complied with the certification against non­
forum shopping requirement under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

Forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse decision in
one forum, or in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion
in another forum through means other than appeal or certiorari. There is forum shopping when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata
in another. They are as follows: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such parties that represent the same interests in both actions, (b)
identity of rights or causes of action, and (c) identity of reliefs
sought.[32]

In sum, both actions must involve the same transaction, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes of
action, subject matter, and issues. Clearly, forum shopping does not
exist where different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of
action and issues were raised, and two objectives were sought.[33]

Under the foregoing test, we find that petitioner did not commit forum
shopping in filing the instant Petition during the pendency of CA-G.R.
SP No. 140403 with the CA.

A careful reading of the allegations of the instant Petition with the Court and the Petition for Certiorari filed with the CA indicate that the elements of litis pendencia are
not present. At the outset, petitioner assailed different orders of the
RTC – the first pertaining to interlocutory orders of the RTC in
connection with the grant of the WPI and the other which decided the
main action. Moreover, a comparison of the allegations and reliefs
sought in the instant Petition and the Petition for Certiorari undoubtedly shows that petitioner prayed for different reliefs and ultimately, sought different objectives.

Being interlocutory in nature, the RTC orders assailed in CA-G.R. SP
No. 140403 dealt with the preliminary matter of whether the
implementation of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC against respondent
should be held in abeyance at a stage when the trial on the merits has
yet to be held and the judgment rendered. Thus, petitioner, in assailing
the RTC orders which granted and upheld the WPI in favor of respondent,
merely sought the dissolution of the said writ which prevented
petitioner from implementing Sections 108 and 184 against respondent until further orders and while the main case had yet to be decided on the merits.

On the other hand, the RTC Order and RTC Decision assailed in the
instant Petition were in the nature of a final judgment or order which
disposed of the main case on the merits. This is so since the Petition
for Declaratory Relief was granted, thereby permanently enjoining
petitioner from enforcing Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC against
respondent until the Congress shall have enacted and passed into law HB
3235 in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution. Being in the
nature of a final judgment, petitioner merely pursued his correct
remedy, which was to file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In any event, we note that the issue on forum shopping may be
considered moot once the proliferation of contradictory decisions, which
is precisely what the prohibition on forum shopping seeks to avoid, is
no longer possible.[34] In
connection thereto, CA-G.R. SP No. 140403 has already been dismissed by
the appellate court on technical grounds; hence, the danger which the
rules on forum shopping seeks to prevent will no longer materialize in
the instant case.

Respondent’s claim that petitioner failed to
comply with the requirement for a certification against forum shopping
must likewise fail. Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides
that the sworn certification against forum shopping must be attached to
the petition for review on certiorari.[35]
In contrast, there is no requirement that motions for extension of time
be accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.[36]

While the Court is not unaware that petitioner failed to disclose the
proceedings in the CA in the certification against forum shopping
attached to its motion for extension of time to file the Petition, we
emphasize that petitioner nevertheless promptly disclosed the said
proceedings when it timely filed the Petition with the required sworn
certification against forum shopping. Thus, we consider the same to be
sufficient compliance with the requirement.

Petition raises only questions of law that are cognizable through a Rule 45 petition.

It is settled that only questions of law should be raised in a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[37]

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain
set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and
to the whole, and the probability of the situation.[38]

Respondent alleges that the Petition raises questions of fact that the
Court cannot resolve without re-evaluating established or undisputed
facts on which the trial court based its ruling. However, an examination
of the present petition shows that petitioner is challenging the RTC’s
grant of the petition for declaratory relief on the premise that a
petition for declaratory relief is inapplicable to contest tax
assessments; that the petition for declaratory relief failed to comply
with the basic requisites of Rule 63 of the Rules of Court; and the
constitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC vis-à-vis the equal protection clause. Moreover, petitioner assailed the propriety of the RTC’s grant of injunctive relief vis-a-vis
Section 218 of the NIRC and the rule that a judicial decision must
bring a final determination of rights, obligations, and responsibilities
of parties. These are clearly questions of law which merely call for an
examination and interpretation of the prevailing law and jurisprudence,
and are cognizable by the Court in a petition for review on certiorari.

The RTC acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the Petition for Declaratory Relief
and issuing an injunction against the collection of taxes.

To begin with, Commonwealth Act No. 55 (CA 55) provides that
petitions for declaratory relief do not apply to cases where a taxpayer
questions his liability for the payment of any tax under any law
administered by the BIR. Section 1 of CA 55 provides:

Section 1. Section one of Act Numbered Thirty-seven hundred and thirty-six is hereby amended so as to read as follows:

SECTION 1. Construction. — Any person interested under a
deed, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, may bring an action in a Court of First Instance to
determine any question of construction or validity arising under such
deed, contract, instrument or statute and for a declaration of his
rights or duties thereunder: Provided, however, That the provisions
of this Act shall not apply to cases where a taxpayer questions his
liability for the payment of any tax, duty, or charge collectible under
any law administered by the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
(Emphasis supplied)

The Court has previously clarified that CA 55 has not been repealed by another statute and remains to be good law.[39]
Thus, the courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory
relief against the imposition of tax liability or validity of tax
assessments.

More importantly, a principle deeply embedded in our
jurisprudence is that taxes being the lifeblood of the government
should be collected promptly, without unnecessary hindrance or delay. In
line with this principle, Section 218 of the NIRC[40]
expressly provides that no court shall have the authority to grant an
injunction to restrain the collection of any national internal revenue
tax, fee or charge imposed by the code. An exception to this rule,
provided under Section 11 of RA 1125[41],
obtains only when in the opinion of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) the
collection thereof may jeopardize the interest of the government and/or
the taxpayer.[42]

In
the instant case, it is undisputed that respondent only proceeded with
its petition after receiving tax assessments from the BIR and after
various requests for reconsideration, where it notably already raised
the alleged unconstitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC as a
ground to contest the tax assessment against respondent. However,
instead of appealing the assessments in the proper forum, respondent
filed with the RTC the Petition for Declaratory Relief with a prayer for
issuance of a TRO and WPI to enjoin the implementation of the
aforementioned provisions while the said petition is pending. In
reality, respondent’s Petition for Declaratory Relief is utilized as a
vehicle to assail and prevent the enforcement of the tax assessments by
alleging the supposed unconstitutionality of Sections 108 and 184 of the
NIRC. On this basis, the RTC should have dismissed respondent’s
petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Thus, we reiterate our
statement in the assailed Decision that the RTC acted without
jurisdiction in not only taking cognizance of respondent’s petition, but
in issuing an injunction enjoining the BIR from proceeding with the
implementation or enforcement of Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC
against respondent.

Even assuming arguendo that the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition, the
RTC should have dismissed respondent’s Petition for Declaratory Relief
for failure to comply with the requisites for the said action.

A petition for declaratory relief is an action instituted by a
person interested in a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
executive order or resolution, to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the instrument, executive order or
regulation, or statute and for a declaration of his rights and duties
thereunder.[43] The said
action must comply with the following requisites: (1) the subject matter
of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; (2)
the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and
require judicial construction; (3) there must have been no breach of the
documents in question; (4) there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose
interests are adverse; (5) the issue must be ripe for judicial
determination; and (6) adequate relief is not available through other
means or other forms of action or proceeding.[44]

After a review of the records of the instant case, We find no
reason to disturb our finding that the RTC should have dismissed
respondent’s Petition for Declaratory Relief for failure to comply with
the abovementioned third, fourth, fifth and sixth requisites.

In connection with the third requisite, the Court in City of Lapu-Lapu v. Philippine Economic Zone Authority[45]
ruled that the trial court should have dismissed Philippine Economic
Zone Authority’s Petition for Declaratory Relief for lack of
jurisdiction in view of the City of Lapu Lapu and Province of Bataan’s
demand for payment of real property taxes prior to the filing of the
petition for declaratory relief. The Court explained:

We rule that the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority] erred in
availing itself of a petition for declaratory relief against the City. The
City had already issued demand letters and real property tax assessment
against the [Philippine Economic Zone Authority], in violation of the
[Philippine Economic Zone Authority’s] alleged tax-exempt status under
its charter. The Special Economic Zone Act of 1995, the subject matter
of [Philippine Economic Zone Authority’s] petition for declaratory
relief, had already been breached. The trial court, therefore, had no
jurisdiction over the petition for declaratory relief.”
[46] (Emphasis supplied)

It is undisputed that respondent had already received assessments
from the BIR for deficiency documentary stamp taxes for the years 2011,
2012, and 2013 and deficiency VAT for the year 2012, which were imposed
pursuant to Sections 184 and 108 of the NIRC respectively, when it filed
its Petition for Declaratory Relief assailing the constitutionality of
the said provisions. In view thereof, the RTC should have already
dismissed respondent’s Petition for Declaratory Relief for lack of
jurisdiction.

Anent the fourth and fifth requisites, a
justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory. A question is ripe for adjudication
when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.[47]

In the instant case, respondent’s Petition for Declaratory Relief does
not present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination.
Respondent’s petition failed to demonstrate that respondent’s legal
rights are subject of an imminent or threatened violation that should be
prevented by the declaratory relief sought; the apprehension that its
business may be rendered technically insolvent in view of the continued
enforcement of the taxes under Sections 108 and 184 of the NIRC appear
to be merely conjectural and anticipatory.

Moreover,
respondent’s adequate remedy upon receipt of the FDDA for the DST
deficiency for taxable year 2011 was to file an appeal in due course
with the CTA instead of resorting to a petition for declaratory relief
with the RTC.[48] Similarly,
the respondent’s adequate remedy in the event of the issuance of a FAN
in connection with its assessments for deficiency VAT for taxable year
2012 was to protest the same with the BIR and if denied, appeal such
denial to the CTA or request for reconsideration with the CIR.[49]
Thus, the sixth requisite is likewise absent. In view of the absence of
the aforementioned requisites, the RTC should have dismissed
respondent’s Petition for Declaratory Relief.

All told, this
Court finds no reason to overturn the assailed Decision. The assailed
Decision is in accord with law and existing jurisprudence and with due
regard to extant facts and evidence.

WHEREFORE, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY for lack of merit.

No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen (Chairperson), Inting, Delos Santos, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.


[1] Rollo, pp. 404-472.

[2] Id. at 394-403;
penned by Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin (now a retired Member of this
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Francis H. Jardeleza (now a
retired Member of this Court), Noel Gimenez Tijam (now a retired Member
of this Court), and Andres B. Reyes, Jr. (now a retired Member of this
Court). Associate Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo was on wellness leave.

[3] Id. at 25-72.

[4] Id. at 76-85; penned by Presiding Judge Joselito C. Villarosa.

[5] Id. at 73-75.

[6] Id. at 73-85.

[7] Id. at 26.

[8] Id. at 132.

[9] Id. at 98.

[10] Id. at 103.

[11] Id. at 104-108.

[12] Id. at 109-115.

[13] Id. at 116-120.

[14] Id. at 135.

[15] Id. at 121-129, 135.

[16] Id. at 136.

[17] Id. at 395.

[18] Id. at 130-160.

[19] Id. at 77.

[20] Id. at 302-305.

[21] Id. at 306-307.

[22] Id. at 76-85.

[23] Id. at 85.

[24] Id. at 73-75.

[25] Id. at 297.

[26] Id. at 314-315.

[27] Id. at 25-71.

[28] Id. at 394-403.

[29] Id. at 401-402.

[30] Id. at 37-44.

[31] Id. at 44-56.

[32] Polanco v. Cruz, 598 Phil. 953, 958 (2009).

[33] Jose v. Javellana, 680 Phil. 13, 24 (2012).

[34] Belo Medical Group, Inc. v. Santos, 817 Phil. 381 (2017).

[35] RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 4. It reads:

Section 4. Contents of petition. — The petition shall be
filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the
court being indicated as such by the petitioner and shall (a) state the
full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party
as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof
either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates
showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject
thereof was received, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received;
(c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the
reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be
accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified
true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the
clerk of court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain
copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would
support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. (2a) (Emphasis supplied)

[36] Mega-Land Resources and Development Corp. v. C-E Construction Corp., 555 Phil. 591 (2007).

[37] RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, sec. 1. It reads:

SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth. 1a, 2a (Emphasis supplied)

[38] Tagulao v. People, G.R. No. 249735, February 3, 2020; citing People v. Dela Cruz, 776 Phil. 653 (2016).

[39] CJH Development Corp. vs. BIR, 595 Phil. 1051, 1057-1058 (2008).

[40] NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, sec. 218. It reads:

SECTION 218. Injunction not Available to Restrain Collection of Tax.
— No court shall have the authority to grant an injunction to restrain
the collection of any national internal revenue tax, fee or charge
imposed by this Code.

[41] Section 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal.
— Any person association or corporation adversely affected by a
decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector
of Customs or any provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may
file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty days after the
receipt of such decision or ruling.
No appeal taken to the Court of Tax Appeals from the decision of the
Collector of Internal Revenue or the Collector of Customs shall suspend
the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of any property of the
taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as provided by
existing law; Provided, however, That when in the opinion of the
Court the collection by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the
Commissioner of Customs may jeopardize the interest of the Government
and/or the taxpayer the Court at any stage of the proceeding may suspend
the said collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the
amount claimed or to file a surety bond for not more than double the
amount with the Court
(Emphasis supplied).

[42] Angeles City v. Angeles Electric Corporation, 636 Phil. 43, 51-52 (2010).

[43] Commission on Audit v. Pampilo, Jr., G.R. Nos. 188760, 189060 & 189333, June 30, 2020.

[44] Republic v. Roque, 718 Phil. 294, 304 (2013).

[45] 748 Phil. 473 (2014).

[46] Id. at 515.

[47] Barrio Balagbag of Pasay City Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 230204 (2019).

[48] Section 3.1.4, Revenue Regulation (RR) No. 12-1999, as amended by RR 18-2013.

[49] Id.