🎧 Case Brief Lecture

ZENAIDA E. SILVER AND NELSON SALCEDO, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE MARIVIC TRABAJO DARAY, IN HER CAPACITY AS JUDGE DESIGNATE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, 11TH JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 11, DA…

G.R. No. 219157. August 14, 2019 August 14, 2019

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Silver versus Daray

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by Zenaida Silver and Police Officer Nelson Salcedo against Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray, in her capacity as the judge designated to the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, together with the private respondents Loreto Hao, Kenneth Hao, and others. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to reverse the Court of Appeals, which had sustained the trial court's finding of probable cause and its issuance of warrants of arrest against them for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act. The case matters because it fixes the standard a judge must observe before issuing a warrant of arrest: the judge must personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence, but need not conduct a full hearing of his own. It is a staple on the constitutional requirement that probable cause be determined personally by the judge.

Procedural History

The Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City initially dismissed the complaints by joint resolution. On review, the Department of Justice modified that resolution and directed the filing of eight criminal informations for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act against Zenaida Silver, Nelson Salcedo, and six others. The informations were first raffled to a branch of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, which later allowed their withdrawal and dismissed the case after a reinvestigation found no probable cause. On petition for review by Loreto Hao and his companions, the Department of Justice directed the city prosecutor to reinstate the informations.

The reinstated informations were raffled to Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. That court, through Judge Danilo Belo, issued an order directing the issuance of warrants of arrest against the accused, except Sheriff Abe Andres. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and Judge Marivic Trabajo Daray denied the motion. The petitioners then went to the Court of Appeals by a special civil action for certiorari, arguing that the judges did not personally determine probable cause. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and later denied reconsideration. Hence this petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Facts

Zenaida Silver was engaged in the buy and sell of motor vehicles. In February 2005 she participated in an auction sale at the Bureau of Customs in General Santos City and emerged as the winning bidder for motor vehicles and assorted spare parts. She obtained financing from Loreto Hao under a memorandum of agreement, and she executed a deed of absolute sale in his favor as security for the loan. The parties later fell into dispute over the release, repair, sale, and possession of the units, and each side accused the other of wrongdoing.

Zenaida Silver filed complaints for recovery of possession of the vehicles before different branches of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City. One branch ordered a sheriff to seize twenty-two motor vehicles and place them under the custody of the court. The sheriff seized nine vehicles and moved them to a compound in Buhangin, Davao City. Zenaida Silver and her companions later caused eight of those vehicles to be moved out of the compound without permission from the court. Nelson Salcedo was among the police officers who accompanied the sheriff in moving the vehicles.

Loreto Hao then filed countercharges of carnapping, asserting that he was the real owner of the vehicles by virtue of the deed of absolute sale and assignment of rights. This gave rise to the criminal informations that eventually reached Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, and to the warrants of arrest that the petitioners now challenge.

Issues

  • Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial court's finding of probable cause against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act.
  • Whether or not the judges who issued and affirmed the warrants of arrest personally determined the existence of probable cause.

Applicable Provisions

Section 6, paragraph (a), of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 6. When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court. - Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by the judge who conducted the preliminary investigation or when the complaint or information was filed pursuant to section 7 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issuance must be resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or information.

This provision supplies the very duty the petitioners say was violated, namely the judge's personal evaluation of the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence before issuing a warrant.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Section 2, Article III of the present Constitution provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

This is the constitutional anchor of the personal determination requirement that the Court applies to the trial judges in this case.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition utterly lacks merit. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest refers to facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. The standard is less stringent than that for establishing guilt, and so long as the evidence shows a prima facie case, the judge has sufficient ground to issue the warrant. The Court noted that the certificates of registration on record showed that the private respondents owned eight vehicles, and that when the petitioners moved these vehicles from the compound there was taking in the concept of carnapping.

On the second issue, the Court held that the requirement of personal determination was satisfied. The judge is tasked to determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt, and need not conduct a de novo hearing; he or she need only personally review the prosecutor's initial determination and see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The Court recalled that Judge Belo examined the prosecutor's report, the supporting documents, the evidence, and the pleadings on record, and conducted a hearing during which the parties presented their evidence. The Court restated the governing rule:

We reiterate the ruling in Soliven vs. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge.

The Court stressed that the judge must go beyond the prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary, and may call the complainant and witnesses to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances so require. Because the records sustained the finding of probable cause, the Court found no grave abuse of discretion.

Doctrine

A warrant of arrest may issue only upon probable cause personally determined by the judge. The judge must personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its supporting evidence, and may not rely on the prosecutor's bare certification alone. The judge has three options: dismiss the case if the evidence clearly fails to establish probable cause, issue the warrant if probable cause is found, or order the prosecutor to submit additional evidence in case of doubt. The judge need not conduct a de novo hearing or personally examine the complainant and the witnesses; a personal review of the report and supporting documents suffices. Probable cause for arrest means facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested, a standard less stringent than that for guilt, satisfied by a prima facie case.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition and sustained the finding of probable cause and the warrants of arrest against the petitioners.

Remember This

Memorize the line that probable cause for a warrant of arrest is determined personally by the judge, who must evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence but need not conduct a de novo hearing. Examiners use this case to test the constitutional requirement of personal determination and the three options open to a judge under Rule 112.