PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. FIDEL TAN, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

People versus Tan

The Case

This is the case of People versus Tan, a criminal appeal decided by the Supreme Court in February 1967. The Government, through the Solicitor General, appealed from an order of the Court of First Instance of Samar refusing to order the re-arrest of Fidel Tan, a convict whom the provincial warden had released ahead of time on a good conduct time allowance. The case matters because it fixes the boundary between judicial and administrative authority over a prisoner: the court that imposes the sentence keeps the power to see it served, and only the Director of Prisons may grant good conduct time allowance. It is a staple in remedial law and criminal law examinations on jurisdiction after final judgment, double jeopardy, and the computation of good conduct credits.

Procedural History

Fidel Tan was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Samar and sentenced under a modified judgment to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two years and four months, as minimum, to four years and two months, as maximum, both of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the heirs of Sinforoso Volfango in the amount of 3,000 pesos, and to pay the costs. He appealed, but upon his own motion the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal in a resolution dated 1 August 1958, so the sentence became final.

On 2 March 1959 the accused was committed to the Director of Prisons through the provincial warden, but the warden kept him in the Samar provincial jail instead of sending him to the national penitentiary, and later released him on 23 November 1961 after crediting him with good conduct time allowance. On 6 September 1962 the provincial fiscal moved for his re-arrest and recommitment to the national penitentiary. The trial court denied the motion in its order of 4 January 1963, and the Government appealed that order directly to the Supreme Court.

Facts

After his conviction became final, Fidel Tan was committed to the Director of Prisons on 2 March 1959 through the provincial warden. The warden, however, did not commit him to the national penitentiary. He retained the prisoner in the Samar provincial jail, explaining later that in 1959 the Director of Prisons had asked provincial jails to withhold transfers because of congestion and riots at the national prison, and that the prisoner was under close medical treatment for a wound in his left lumbar region, his left thigh, and the presence of blood in his urine.

The warden then took it upon himself to apply Articles 97 and 99 of the Revised Penal Code and Act Number 2489, credited the prisoner with good conduct time allowance, and released him on 23 November 1961 after an actual confinement of two years, eight months, and twenty-one days. He claimed his computation was correct in good faith, based on the maximum term of four years and two months.

On 6 September 1962 the provincial fiscal moved for the re-arrest of the accused and his recommitment to the national penitentiary, on the ground that the warden had no authority to release him with good conduct time allowance. The motion was unopposed. The trial court required the warden to explain, and on 4 January 1963 it denied the motion, holding that it had lost jurisdiction over the prisoner's person with respect to his imprisonment, that re-arrest would amount to double jeopardy or deprive him of liberty without due process of law, and that the accused had served the judgment in good faith even if the jailer's act was irresponsible and erroneous.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court retained jurisdiction to order the re-arrest and recommitment of the convict after his commitment to the jail authorities and his release by the provincial warden.
• Whether or not the re-arrest of the convict would place him twice in jeopardy or deprive him of liberty without due process of law.
• Whether or not the provincial warden had authority to credit the prisoner with good conduct time allowance and to release him on that basis.

Applicable Provisions

Section 1740 of the Administrative Code, as discussed in the decision, provides:

A person sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment is an insular prisoner.

This is the basis for the Court's holding that Fidel Tan, sentenced to more than one year, was an insular prisoner who should have been sent to the national penitentiary and not kept in the provincial jail.

Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code, as invoked in the decision, provides:

The Director of Prisons shall have the exclusive authority to grant good conduct time allowance to prisoners.

This is the provision the Court uses to condemn the warden's act of crediting the prisoner and releasing him, since that authority belongs exclusively to the Director and no one else.

Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, as applied in the decision, provides:

The deduction for good conduct time allowance shall be five days for each month of good behavior during the first two years of imprisonment, and eight days for each month during the next three years.

This is the provision the Court uses to compute the credit and to show that, even assuming entitlement, the release was premature and a portion of the sentence remained unserved.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court had lost jurisdiction to amend or alter its judgment of conviction, but not over its execution or satisfaction. The court's jurisdiction was not terminated by the commitment of the convict to the jail authorities, because the commitment was but the start in carrying out the court's decision. It is the prerogative of the court meting out the punishment to see to it that the punishment be served until, by act of a lawfully authorized administrative agency of the State, the convict is pardoned or paroled or, on lawful grounds, set at liberty sooner than the expiration of the sentence imposed.

On the second issue, the Court held that the prisoner's re-arrest would not place him twice in jeopardy, because his re-incarceration is merely a continuation of the penalty that he had not completely served due to the erroneous act of the warden; it is not a new or subsequent conviction. Neither would his re-arrest deprive him of liberty without due process of law, because he was not yet entitled to liberty at the time he was released. Service of penalties and allowance for good conduct are specifically, even elaborately, governed by the Penal Code and do not depend upon the good faith of the warden and of the prisoner.

On the third issue, the Court held that the warden had usurped the authority of the Director of Prisons. Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code vests such authority exclusively in the Director and no one else. The Court also found the warden's excuses unacceptable: the alleged fear that the convict might be involved in riots was a flimsy pretext for evading the warden's plain duty of remitting the prisoner to his proper place of confinement, and the failure to send him to Muntinlupa was a breach of duty for which the officer should be held accountable. The Court warned that to allow provincial wardens to retain insular prisoners without proper authorization would open the way to all sorts of discrimination in the treatment of prisoners and constitute a standing invitation for the commission of abuses and anomalies for personal or political motives.

Finally, the Court computed the good conduct credit: five days for each month during the first two years, or 120 days, and eight days for each month during the next three years, or 64 days for the balance of eight months, for a total of 184 days, equivalent to six months and four days. Adding this to the actual confinement of two years, eight months, and twenty-one days gives three years, two months, and twenty-five days. Since the maximum term is four years and two months, the convict had an unserved portion of eleven months and five days.

Doctrine

A final judgment of conviction does not strip the trial court of jurisdiction over its execution or satisfaction; the court retains the prerogative to see that the punishment is served until the convict is lawfully pardoned, paroled, or set at liberty by a lawfully authorized administrative agency. Re-incarceration to serve the unexpired portion of a sentence is a continuation of the same penalty, not a new conviction, and therefore does not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. The authority to grant good conduct time allowance belongs exclusively to the Director of Prisons under Article 99 of the Revised Penal Code, and a provincial warden who credits and releases a prisoner on his own authority acts without authority. A person sentenced to more than one year of imprisonment is an insular prisoner under Section 1740 of the Administrative Code and must be committed to the national penitentiary. Good conduct credits are computed under Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, and a release before the full service of the sentence, even with credits, is premature.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed the appealed order and entered a new one ordering the re-arrest of Fidel Tan and the continuance of his imprisonment for one year, five months, and eleven days more, directing the Director of Prisons to incarcerate him in the national penitentiary if conditions allow, or in any other suitable jail, without prejudice to credit for good behavior from 2 March 1959, and furnishing copies of the decision to the Director of Prisons and the Secretary of Justice for action against the warden. No costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the court that imposes the sentence keeps jurisdiction over its execution, and only the Director of Prisons may grant good conduct time allowance. Examiners like to use this case on jurisdiction after final judgment, double jeopardy, and the computation of good conduct credits under Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code.