BENJIE LAGAO Y GARCIA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

Lagao versus People

The Case

This is a criminal case where Benjie Lagao y Garcia, the petitioner, challenges his conviction for homicide before the Supreme Court. The petitioner was found guilty by the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the death of Anthony Sumad-ong Nerida, his relative and neighbor. The case matters because it tests the prosecution's burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, particularly when the evidence identifying the accused rests on hearsay statements and when medical evidence on the cause of death is conflicting. The Supreme Court ultimately acquitted the petitioner, making this a landmark ruling on the equipoise rule and the requisites for admitting dying declarations and statements as part of res gestae.

Procedural History

The petitioner was charged with homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union, Branch 33. After trial, the trial court rendered a decision on April 24, 2012, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The trial court also ordered the petitioner to pay the heirs of the victim actual damages, moral damages, death indemnity, and costs.

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the appeal and affirmed the trial court's decision on May 29, 2014. The Court of Appeals held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not hearsay because what was sought to be admitted was the fact that the utterance was actually made by the victim, and not necessarily the truth of the matters stated. The appellate court also considered the victim's declaration as part of res gestae. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals on March 20, 2015.

The petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme Court, which granted the petition and reversed the conviction.

Facts

On February 20, 2008, at around seven thirty in the evening, prosecution witness Ricardo de Guzman saw the victim with a bleeding nose. When asked what happened, the victim initially replied "none." Later, while having a drink, the victim told De Guzman that he and the petitioner had an altercation about the victim being drunk at work, during which the petitioner boxed him on the nose and hit him with a bottle at the back of his head. Another witness, Ryan Cruz, corroborated this account and observed that the victim had an open wound about three inches long on his head. The victim refused to seek medical attention and continued drinking for about thirty minutes.

The victim's father, Alfredo Nerida, Sr., testified that the victim told him the petitioner caused his injuries. The victim died on February 22, 2008, two days after sustaining the injuries. The defense presented the petitioner, who denied inflicting any injuries on the victim, and Dr. Bernardo Parado, the Municipal Health Officer who conducted an autopsy. The death certificate prepared by another doctor stated that the victim's immediate cause of death was respiratory failure secondary to sepsis, with the underlying cause being acute pancreatitis and pneumonia. However, Dr. Parado testified that based on his post-mortem examination, the victim died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to intracranial hemorrhage secondary to blunt force injury to the occipital area.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction of the crime of homicide despite the prosecution's failure to prove the petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Whether or not the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses identifying the petitioner as the perpetrator were admissible as a dying declaration or as part of res gestae.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 130, Section 22 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Witnesses; their qualifications. — Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

This provision establishes the general rule that witnesses can only testify on matters within their personal knowledge, which is the foundation of the hearsay rule applied in this case.

Rule 130, Section 38 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.

This provision sets the requisites for admitting a dying declaration, particularly the requirement that the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death at the time of the declaration.

Rule 130, Section 44 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:

Part of the res gestae. — Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, under the stress of excitement caused by the occurrence, with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

This provision defines the requisites for admitting statements as part of res gestae, emphasizing the element of spontaneity and the absence of time to contrive or devise.

Ruling

The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted the petitioner. The Court found that the uniform conclusion made by the Court of Appeals and the trial court was manifestly mistaken, warranting a re-evaluation of the evidence. The Court applied the equipoise rule, holding that when the evidence is in equipoise, or when the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one consistent with innocence and another with guilt, the prosecution has not met the test of moral certainty.

On the cause of death, the Court noted a variance between the death certificate and the autopsy report. The death certificate, being a public document, was admissible as prima facie evidence of its contents and indicated that the victim died of respiratory failure secondary to sepsis, with the underlying cause being acute pancreatitis and pneumonia. The autopsy report, on the other hand, stated that the victim died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to intracranial hemorrhage secondary to blunt force injury. The Court held that this left the evidence in equipoise, warranting the petitioner's acquittal because there was a possibility that the victim died of natural causes and not of the injury he sustained.

On the admissibility of the testimonies identifying the petitioner, the Court held that they were hearsay and did not qualify as either a dying declaration or part of res gestae. For a dying declaration, the second requisite was wanting because the victim was not under the consciousness of an impending death. The victim's actions indicated no sense of urgency, as he continued drinking and refused medical attention. For res gestae, the element of spontaneity was absent because at least two hours had passed between the injury and the declaration, and the victim's conflicting answers negated spontaneity. The Court quoted the testimony of De Guzman to illustrate this point:

I asked him what happened to his nose but he said none, sir. ... When we were already drinking we talked about a wound on his head, sir. ... It was hit by Benjie Lagao he said, sir.

The Court held that there were intervening events between the occurrence and the declaration, and the victim had time to deliberate and fabricate the identification. Since the prosecution's case was anchored heavily on these inadmissible testimonies, their exclusion resulted in the petitioner's acquittal.

Doctrine

The equipoise rule in criminal cases provides that when the evidence is in equipoise, or when the facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one consistent with innocence and another with guilt, the accused must be acquitted because the quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt is not met. The prosecution bears the burden of proving the guilt of the accused on the strength of its own evidence, without regard to the weakness of the defense.

For a dying declaration to be admissible, the declarant must be under the consciousness of an impending death at the time the declaration is made. The declaration must be uttered under the fixed belief that death is inevitable and imminent, and the declarant's actions must indicate a sense of urgency consistent with that belief.

For a statement to form part of res gestae, the following elements must concur: the principal act is a startling occurrence, the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise, and the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The essence of res gestae is spontaneity, and the statement must be made at the time of or immediately after the startling occurrence, while the exciting influence thereof still continued in the mind of the declarant.

Disposition

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversed and set aside the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and acquitted Benjie Lagao y Garcia of the crime of homicide, with entry of judgment to be issued immediately.

Remember This

Memorize the requisites for dying declarations and res gestae, and remember that the equipoise rule mandates acquittal when medical evidence on the cause of death is conflicting. Examiners like to use this case to test your understanding of hearsay exceptions and the prosecution's burden of proof in criminal cases.