THE BACHRACH TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., AND THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC., PETITIONERS, VS. RURAL TRANSIT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND RURAL TRANSIT SHOP EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, RESPO…

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Industrial Relations, in its CIR Case No. 22-IPA (14), and of a
resolution of the same court, en banc, denying a motion to reconsider the decision.

The record disclosed that: on 9 July 1956, Rural Transit Labor
Association, a legitimate labor union, filed a petition for
certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations,
claiming, among others, majority representation of all employees of
Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., a domestic corporation, which owns and
operates a fleet of passenger buses and engages in business under the
trade name and style of “Rural Transit”, and which will hereinafter be
referred to as the Company. This petition was docketed as CIR Case No.
382-MC.

After allowing intervention of two other unions (Rural Transit
Employees Association and Rural Transit Shop Employees Association),
the Industrial Court heard the certification election case and, on 7
June 1958, it issued an order recognizing Rural Transit Shop Employees
Association as a separate appropriate bargaining unit, apart and
distinct from the fieldmen composed of drivers, conductors, office and
miscellaneous employees of the Company, and directing the holding of a
certification election among employees of the shop department and
another election among the fieldmen in order to choose or determine the
representatives in each of these groups of employees for collective
bargaining purposes.

The record also discloses that while the Industrial Court was
hearing this certification election case all employees of the Company
declared, sometime in the latter part of May, 1958, a strike for
failure to settle some labor disputes with the Company. The President
of the Philippines, being of the opinion that the strike adversely
affected the national interest, certified the dispute to the Industrial
Court for compulsory arbitration. This case was docketed as CIR Case
No. 22-IPA.

On 7 August 1958, the Industrial Court issued a return to work order
to all strikers and the Company to accept these strikers back to work.

On 22 August 1958, Rural Transit Employees Association filed a
petition containing certain sets of claims or demands from the Company.
On 10 September 1958 it also filed a motion to direct the examiner of
the court to verify the correctness of computation of the claims or
demands set forth in the petition, which motion was later amended, on
28 October 1958, to include the verification of “money value of the
accrued leave paid to the employees from 1946”. The Company did not
offer any objection to this amended motion. Pending consideration
thereon, the Industrial Court separated this claim for verification of
money value of accrued leave from the other incidents of the case, and
this was docketed as CIR Case No. 22-IPA (14).

For its part, the Company presented a motion to compel Rural Transit
Labor Association and Rural Transit Shop Employees Association to
intervene in this case, to which motion Rural Transit interposed its
opposition. The Industrial Court, in its order dated 21 October 1958,
granted the motion (Annex “1”, answer). In compliance with this order,
Rural Transit Shop Employees Association filed its intervention dated
25 April 1959 (Annex “2”, answer). Acting on the above-mentioned
petition and amended motion, the Industrial Court issued its order,
dated 9 November 1958, authorizing and directing its Chief Examiner to
conduct the verification prayed for (Annex “3”, answer).

In the meantime, certification election was held on 27 August 1959,
and in that election Rural Transit Shop Employees Association received
the majority of votes cast by employees of the shop department of the
Company. Accordingly, the Industrial Court, in its order dated 8
September 1959, certified said labor union as the sole exclusive
bargaining representative of all employees and laborers of the shop
department of “Rural Transit” (Annex “B”, petition).

As such certified bargaining representative, Rural Transit Shop
Employees Association began negotiations with the Company and
presented, through a letter dated 30 October 1959, a set of proposals
to serve as basis for a collective bargaining agreement (Annex “4”,
answer).

On 21 December 1959, the Company and Rural Transit Shop Employees
Association entered into a collective bargaining agreement (Annex “C”,
petition). In this agreement, it was stipulated that:

“XI. – OTHER DEMANDS

All
other demands contained in the UNION’S letter, dated October 30, 1959,
whether mentioned or not mentioned in this Agreement are hereby
withdrawn by the UNION. The parties agree and hereby certify that this
present Agreement settles all matters, questions and disputes between
them, regardless of whether or not they are mentioned herein.”

After the execution of this agreement, on 10 January 1960, the Chief
Examiner of the court submitted his “Second Partial Report” showing
that there had been underpayment of accrued leave to at least 130 shop
employees and overpayment to about 20 shop employees of the Company
covering the period from 15 December 1954 to 15 December 1958.

Meanwhile, Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., transferred and assigned, on 28
May 1960, the operation of “Rural Transit” to Bachrach Transportation
Co., Inc. As such successor, the latter was included as party in this
case (page 6, petition).

On 20 January 1961, Rural Transit Shop Employees Association
submitted a motion with the Industrial Court, in CIR Case No. 22-IPA,
praying that the Company be ordered to deposit the amount corresponding
to the underpaid accrued leave of shop employees, as shown and
submitted in the “Second Partial Report” (Annex “D”, petition).

The Company opposed the motion, setting up several defenses the most
important and relevant of which, in the case at bar, was that this
claim of underpayment of accrued leave of the shop employees had
already been expressly, clearly and validly waived, renounced and/or
settled when the Company and movant Rural Transit Shop Employees
Association entered into a collective bargaining agreement on 21
December 1959 (Annex “E”, petition).

Ruling on this incident, after due hearing thereon, the Industrial
Court opined that the filing of movant-labor union of its petition for
verification on 28 October 1958 without the Company objecting thereto,
coupled with the fact that the settlement of all claims referred to in
the collective bargaining agreement refers only to claims demanded in
the Union’s letter dated 30 October 1959, and this letter did not
contain any demand for verification, are circumstances which could not
be indicative of movant-labor union’s intention to waive or renounce
its claim for the money value of underpaid accrued leave of the shop
employees of the Company. It also opined that the Sun Ripe Coconut
Products, Inc. case, infra, invoked by the Company is not applicable to
the case at bar; hence, it rendered its decision, dated 16 July 1963,
the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION,
the Second Partial Report of the examiner dated January 7, 1960, is
hereby APPROVED and the respondent is directed to deposit the
corresponding amount indicated therein.” (Annex “F”, petition)

The issue before us is whether the claim for the money value of the
accrued leave of the shop employees, then pending verification by the
Court examiner for report to the Industrial Court when the collective
bargaining contract was celebrated, was renounced or waived under
Clause XI of the Bargaining Agreement.

It is unquestionable that the first part of the said Clause, reading as follows:

“All other demands contained in the Union’s letter,
dated October 30, 1959, whether mentioned or not mentioned in this
Agreement are hereby withdrawn by the Union.”

refers explicitly and solely to the claims stated in the letter of
the Union dated 30 October 1959. It does not, therefore, cover the
alleged underpayment of accrued leave, which was not touched upon in
the letter. But immediately after the opening part, Clause XI of the
Collective Bargaining contract recites:

“The parties agree and hereby certify that this
present agreement settles all matters, questions and disputes between
them, regardless of whether or not they are mentioned herein.”

and we can not agree with the court below that this subsequent
stipulation likewise refers to the demands contained in the Union
letter of 30 October 1959, like the preceding sentence. The Union, in
withdrawing the demands contained in its letter, in effect waived the
same, so that no dispute existed thereafter about said demands. Such
being the case, the second sentence, if construed to refer once again
to the demands already withdrawn in the preceding sentence, would
become a useless duplication and a total superfluity. But the rule is
that:

“In the construction of an instrument where there
are several provisions of particulars, such a construction is, if
possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all”. (Sec. 9, Rule 130,
Revised Rules)

It is not denied that, besides the Union’s demands in its letter of
30 October 1959, there were other disputed claims, one of them
precisely the question of alleged underpayment of accrued leaves of the
shop employees. This claim was included in the Union’s amended motion
of 28 October 1958; and it was pending when the collective bargaining
agreement was executed over one year later, on 19 December 1959. Under
the circumstances, the second part of clause XI of the bargaining
contract, so far as it settles “all matters, questions and disputes”
between the parties, necessarily included therein the question of
accrued leaves.

That at the time the bargaining contract was entered into the court
examiner had not yet reported the exact amount of underpaid accrued
leaves is irrelevant, for a claim can be in dispute even if the exact
amount involved is as yet unknown. As to the Company’s failure to
object to the Union move for verification of the money value of the
accrued leaves, the same is of no importance, the Union’s motion having
been filed prior to the bargaining contract where all claims were
settled.

Considering that the evident purpose of the collective agreement
(Clause XI in particular) is to restore industrial peace by settling
all previous controversies, and that such purpose would be thwarted if
the Union were allowed to reserve and revive the dispute on accrued
vacation leaves; and considering, further, that this Court has ruled
that the right to payment of accrued vacation leave is waivable (PAL
vs. Balanguit, 99 Phil. 486, and cases therein cited), we can only
conclude that the Union claim to such payment of accrued vacation
leaves should be deemed validly and actually renounced by it under its
collective bargaining agreement with petitioner. Hence, the order for
deposit of the value of said leaves is unwarranted.

The resolution and decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, in
its Case No. 22-IPA(14), now under appeal is reversed, and the Union
claim is ordered dismissed, with costs against respondent Rural Transit
Shop Employees Association.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., on leave.