MARILOU S. LAUDE AND MESEHILDA S. LAUDE, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ROLINE M. GINEZ-JABALDE, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 74, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF THE CITY OF OLONGAPO; HON. PAQUITO N.…

Laude versus Ginez-Jabalde

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, with a prayer for a writ of mandatory injunction, filed by Marilou Laude and Mesehilda Laude against Judge Roline Ginez-Jabalde of Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, together with the People of the Philippines and the United States Marine Joseph Scott Pemberton. The petitioners are the siblings of Jeffrey Laude, known as Jennifer, who was killed in Olongapo City, and they sought to compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to surrender Pemberton to the Olongapo City Jail. The case matters because it fixes the discipline of motions in criminal proceedings: the three-day notice rule and the conformity of the Public Prosecutor are not dispensable formalities, and the Visiting Forces Agreement governs custody even while a Philippine court exercises jurisdiction.

Procedural History

Marilou Laude filed a complaint for murder against Pemberton before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor. The Public Prosecutor then filed an Information for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, raffled to Branch 74, presided over by Judge Ginez-Jabalde. A warrant of arrest was issued, and Pemberton surrendered personally to the judge and was arraigned. On the same day, Marilou Laude filed an urgent motion to compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to surrender custody of the accused to the Olongapo City Jail, set for hearing three days later, without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit, and later denied the motion for reconsideration. The petitioners went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, and the Court dismissed the petition.

Facts

On the eleventh of October 2014, Jennifer Laude was killed at the Celzone Lodge on Ramon Magsaysay Drive in Olongapo City, allegedly by Pemberton, a nineteen-year-old United States Marine. Four days later, Marilou Laude filed a complaint for murder against him before the Olongapo City Office of the City Prosecutor. On the twenty-second of October 2014, Pemberton was detained in Camp Aguinaldo, the general headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

On the fifteenth of December 2014, the Public Prosecutor filed an Information for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, raffled to Branch 74. A warrant of arrest was issued the next day. Pemberton surrendered personally to Judge Ginez-Jabalde on the nineteenth of December 2014 and was arraigned.

On that same day, Marilou Laude filed an urgent motion to compel the Armed Forces of the Philippines to surrender custody of the accused to the Olongapo City Jail, set for hearing on the twenty-second of December 2014. She served the motion on Pemberton's counsel by registered mail, and furnished a personal copy only at the hearing itself. The motion carried no conformity from the Public Prosecutor. On the twenty-third of December 2014, the trial court denied the motion for utter lack of merit. The petitioners received the order in January 2015, filed a motion for reconsideration, again without the Public Prosecutor's conformity, and that too was denied.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the urgent motion on the ground of failure to comply with the three-day notice rule for motions.
• Whether or not the petitioners' right to access to justice under international human rights law excuses noncompliance with the rules of procedure.
• Whether or not the urgent motion, filed by a private complainant without the conformity of the Public Prosecutor, is a mere scrap of paper.
• Whether or not custody of Pemberton must be transferred to the Olongapo City Jail notwithstanding the Visiting Forces Agreement.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

This is the rule the petitioners violated, and its notice requirement protects the adverse party's procedural due process.

Rule 110, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. However, in Municipal Trial Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when the prosecutor assigned thereto or to the case is not available, the offended party, any peace officer, or public officer charged with the enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority ceases upon actual intervention by a prosecutor or upon elevation of the case to the Regional Trial Court. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including the guilty parties, if both are alive, nor, in any case, if the offended party has consented to the offense or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the pardon by the parents, grandparents, or guardian shall not produce any legal effect as to the other offended parties who did not give their consent. In cases of adultery, as defined in Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, and concubinage, as defined in Article 334, the offended party may file a complaint for the annulment of the marriage. In all cases where the offended party is a minor, the State shall initiate the criminal action.

This provision anchors the rule that the active conduct of the prosecution belongs to the public prosecutor, so a private complainant's motion without his conformity is defective.

Article 2, paragraph 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.

The petitioners invoked this provision as their right to access to justice, but the Court held it does not dispense with domestic procedural rules.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the three-day notice rule is mandatory, and that failure to comply renders the motion defective. The exception, where the court may still act on a defective motion, applies only if no prejudice is caused to the adverse party. Here, Pemberton's counsel received the motion only minutes before the hearing, which had been set for another incident, so he had no meaningful time to study and oppose it. The Court quoted its own doctrine that the notice is meant to avoid surprises sprung upon the adverse party, who must be given time to study and meet the arguments in the motion. The general rule therefore applied, and the trial court correctly denied the motion.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioners went too far. The Philippines is bound by the Covenant, but the obligation it creates is for the State to provide accessible and effective remedies under domestic law; it does not authorize a litigant to ignore a procedural rule designed to protect the human right of the adverse party. General exhortations of human rights cannot excuse the failure to meet the notice rule or to obtain the Public Prosecutor's concurrence.

On the third issue, the Court held that the conformity of the Public Prosecutor is not a superfluity. The active conduct of the trial is the duty of the public prosecutor, and the issue of confinement pertains to the criminal aspect of the case, which belongs exclusively to the People. The newspaper statements attributed to the Secretary of Justice could not supply the missing conformity, being hearsay twice removed.

On the fourth issue, the Court distinguished jurisdiction from custody. Philippine authorities have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction, which is why the case is tried in a Philippine court. But custody, the actual physical control over the person of the accused, resides with the United States military authorities under the Visiting Forces Agreement from the commission of the offense until completion of all judicial proceedings. The accused, while undergoing trial and before conviction, is already detained in the Philippines in compliance with that Agreement, and the trial court retains authority to try the case.

Doctrine

First, the three-day notice rule for motions is mandatory, and a motion that violates it is a mere scrap of paper, save when the court may act without prejudice to the adverse party's right to procedural due process. Second, the right to access to justice under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obliges the State to provide effective domestic remedies; it does not excuse a private complainant from complying with the Rules of Court. Third, under Rule 110, Section 5, criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, so a private complainant's motion without his conformity is defective. Fourth, jurisdiction and custody are distinct: the Visiting Forces Agreement gives Philippine authorities primary jurisdiction, but custody remains with United States military authorities until completion of judicial proceedings.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed, and the petitioners lost; the trial court's denial of the urgent motion and of the motion for reconsideration stood.

Remember This

Memorize this line: human rights exhortations cannot excuse the three-day notice rule or the absence of the Public Prosecutor's conformity. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory nature of the notice of hearing, the prosecutor's control of criminal actions, and the jurisdiction-versus-custody distinction under the Visiting Forces Agreement.