NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND GERTRUDES LUCAS VDA. DE RAYMUNDO, RESPONDENTS.

On April 27, 1960,
respondent Gertrudes Lucas vda.
de Raymundo filed a claim for workmen’s compensation
for the death of her husband, Luis Raymundo, on January 23, 1954.  In a complaint before Regional Office No. 3
of the Department of Labor, she averred that her husband was employed at the
National Development Co., petitioner in this case, for more than 12 years, his
last designation being machine tender in the Finishing Department; that as
machine tender, Luis Raymundo’s work consisted of
lifting heavy loads, pushing a wagon loaded with dyed and wet cloth and mixing
chemicals for use in dyeing and printing textiles and that because of strenuous
work done mostly at night and because of exposure to sudden changes in
temperature, her husband began to lose weight, complained of backaches and
chest pains and later spat blood.  On
account of poor health, Luis Raymundo retired from
the service of petitioner on May 6, 1953; eight months after (on January 23, 1954), he died of pulmon­ary
tuberculosis.

In due time, petitioner filed its answer denying liability.  It alleged that Luis Raymundo
never contracted tuberculosis while in its employ and that at any rate
“tuberculosis is not an occupational disease incident and/or peculiar to
the work of the claimant (sic).” It further averred that the claim was
barred by prescription, the complaint having been filed beyond the three-month
period provided in section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, Act No. 3428.

Hearings were held after which a decision was rendered ordering
petitioner to pay to respondent the sums of P4,000 as death compensation and
P200 as reimbursement for burial expenses. 
In addition, a fee of P41 was assessed against petitioner.

On review, this decision was affirmed by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission.^[1]
Subsequent attempt to have the award reconsidered proved unsuccessful as the
Commission en banc found nothing to warrant a modification, much
less a reversal, of its decision.^[2]
Peti­tioner appealed to this Court.

The issues in this case are: 
(1) whether the evidence presented by respondent is admissible to
support an award in her favor; (2) whether death benefits could be recovered
where as here the illness which caused the death of an employee was not
contracted while in the employment of petitioner but was merely aggravated by
the nature of such employment; and (3) whether respondent’s claim could still
be presented despite the lapse of more than three months from the date of the
death of Raymundo.

In affirming the award made in favor of respondent, the
Commission said:

“That the deceased contracted pulmonary tuberculosis while in
the employ of the respondent (now petitioner) can fairly be inferred from the
evidence.  Furthermore, the work that he
performed, which involved heavy lifting cannot be considered light by any
standard.  As a matter of fact, it would
not be an exaggeration to say that such kind of work may be considered as
strenuous and taxing for a man of his advanced age and weak physical
condition.  Inasmuch as he died of
pulmonary tuberculosis, barely eight months after he was retired from the
service, the inescapable conclusion is that the nature of his work must have
had an adverse effect on his illness which shortly led to his death.”

In reaching this conclusion, the
Commission relied partly on the testimony of respondent and on the following:

Exhibit
“E” – Death certificate which states that Luis Raymundo
died on January 23, 1954 of
pulmonary tuberculosis.

Exhibit
“F” – Affidavit of Dr. Crisanto S. Vito
Cruz in which he states that he treated Luis Raymundo
for pulmonary tuberculosis from December, 1952 to January 22, 1954.

Exhibit
“G” – Petitioner’s letter, dated May 6, 1953, advising Luis Raymundo
of the termination of his employment.

Petitioner contends, however, that both respondent’s testimony as
well as Exhibits “E”, “F” and “G” should have been
excluded, because the first is self-serving while the second are hearsays.  Petitioner adds that while the death
certificate (Exh. “E”) is admissible to
prove the fact and date of death, it is not competent to prove the cause
thereof.

Section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act provides in part:

“x x x All
parties in interest shall have the right to be present at any hearing in per­son
or by counsel or by any other agent or re­presentative, to present such
testimony as may be pertinent to the controversy before the Commissioner and to
cross-examine the witnesses against them. 
The Commissioner may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in
dis­pute the following matters, in addition to the sworn testimony at open
hearing:

“1. Reports of
attending examining physician.

“2. Reports of
investigators appointed by the Commissioner.

“3. Reports of the
employer, including copies of time sheets, book of ac­counts or other records.

“4. Hospital
records in relation to the case.”

In addition, section 44 establishes certain presump­tions:

“In any proceeding for the enforcement of the claim for
compensation under this Act, it shall be presumed in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary –

“1. That the claim
comes within the pro­visions of this Act;

“2. That sufficient
notice thereof was given;

“3. That the injury
was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the
injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or another; and

“4. That the injury
did not result solely from intoxication of the injured em­ployee while on duty;
and

“5. That the
contents of verified medical and surgical reports introduced in evidence by
claimants for compensation are correct. 
(As added by sec. 24, Republic Act No. 772)”

It would be easy to dismiss petitioner’s contention by citing
these provisions of the Act, for after all there are precedents for doing so,^[3]
but we believe that it is here necessary to set forth the reasons and the
policy considerations which underlie these statutory enactments in order to
explain their meaning.

The right of a party to be present and give evidence as provided
in section 49 would be meaningless if it did not include the right to testify
in his own behalf.  Indeed, the Rules of
Court enjoins that “neither parties nor other persons interested in the outcome
of a case shall be excluded.”^[4]
For while a party’s interest may to some extent affect his credibility,^[5]
his interest alone is not a ground for disregarding his testimony.^[6]
The argument that the testimony of an interested party is self-serving and
therefore is inadmissible in evidence misses the essential nature of
self-serving evidence and the ground for its exclusion.  Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a
party out of court at one time; it does not include a party’s testimony as a
witness in court.  It is excluded on the
same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination
by the adverse party, and on the consideration that its admission would open
the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony.^[7]
On the other hand, a party’s testimony in court is sworn and affords the other
party the opportunity for cross examination.

Nor is there merit in the claim that Exhibits “E”,
“F” and “G” were erroneously admitted in evidence.  While they may be hearsay by common law rules
of evidence, they are nevertheless admissible under section 49 of the Act.
Section 49 is patterned after similar legislation in the United States,
especially New York, where the widespread adoption of Workmen’s Compensation
statutes was accompanied by a demand for a more simple and summary method of
procedure and proof than those given by the common law.  As noted in a leading article:^[8]

“Legislatures heeded the deep sense of injustice felt by
workers that the burden of proof rested always on them and that probative
evidence was often kept out because it was hearsay.  A growing distrust of our court system had
thus grown up among working men and it was essen­tial to the successful
operation of the acts that workmen feel they were treated fairly while at the
same time duly protecting the interests of industry and the community’s in­terest
in economy.”

Indeed, enactments of the type of section
49 were precisely aimed at the hearsay rule, for the rejection of hearsay
evidence, often of strong probative value, was one of the grievances of working
people against the procedure of the old employer’s liability laws.^[9]

Not that hearsay evidence is adequate to support an award for
compensation,10
but that as aptly observed:11

“[A] compensation board which wants to avoid reversal on
admissibility-of-evidence grounds can best do so by admitting everything and
excluding nothing.  It can be presumed to
apply the appropriate discount to various kinds of hearsay, but it cannot be
presumed to have reached a right result if some important piece of evidence
which have swayed the result has been erroneously excluded on technical
grounds.”

Here, aside from the evidence objected to, there is some other
substantial evidence supporting the award. 
Aside from respondent’s testimony, there is in the record the tes­timony
of Bienvenido Dizon, a
former co-employee of Luis Raymundo.  There is likewise evidence of the payment of
gratuity to Raymundo on account of his illness.

In addition, there is a presumption created by section 44 that Raymundo’s illness was aggravated by the nature of his
employment and that Dr. Vito Cruz’ affidavit that he treated Raymundo for tuberculosis is correct.  This presumption is intended to reverse the
burden of proof and make it the duty of petitioner, as employer, to establish
by substantial evidence, that the illness was not in fact aggravated by the
nature of the job.12 Petitioner has failed to overcome
the evidence and pre­sumptions in favor of respondent.  It has chosen merely to rest its case on the
statement of its medical officer that the deceased employee never met an
accident while in its employment.

Still it is claimed that the award of death benefits in this case
is erroneous because section 8 of the Act allows such benefits only “If
the disease contracted or injury received by the employees as provided
in section two hereof causes his death within two years from the date of such
injury or sickness” and the point is made that here the illness was not
contracted but was merely aggravated by the nature of Raymundo’s
work.  The phrase “illness x x x aggravated by x x x the nature of such em­ployment”
as ground for compensation was inserted in sec­tion 2 of the Act by Republic
Act No. 772 on June 20, 1952.  While a corresponding change should have been
made in section 8, it is nevertheless clear that the omission was a mere
oversight.  After all, section 8 governs
only the amount of compensation while section 2 provides the grounds for
compensation.  Section 8 therefore must
be deemed to cover also cases in which the illness was not contracted but
merely aggravated by the nature of employee’s job.

Finally, it is argued that respondent’s claim is barred because
more than three months had elapsed from the date (January 23, 1954) Raymundo died to the date (April 27, 1960) the claim was
filed.13

There are several reasons why petitioner cannot set up this
defense.  First, petitioner failed to
controvert the claim,14 which means that it cannot now be
heard to say that the claim was not filed on time.15
Second, it paid gratuity to Raymundo under a policy
of retiring employees suffering from tuberculosis.  Under this circumstance the delay in the
filing of the claim is excused.16 Third, petitioner has shown no
damage as a result of the delay in the filing of this case, another
circumstance which, under section 27, excuses delay in filing claims.17

WHEREFORE, the decision of May 29, 1963 and the resolution of August 5, 1963 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission are hereby affirmed without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision, May 29, 1963.

^[2]
Resolution, August 5, 1963.

^[3] E.g.,
Uy Kiva v. Tomas
Lim, G. R. No. L-9232, May 31, 1957;
Industrial Textile Mfg. Co. of the Phil. v. Florzo,
G.R. No. L-21969, Aug. 31, 1966;
Pangasinan Trans. Co. v. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-16490, June 29, 1963.

^[4]
Rule 130, sec. 18.

^[5]
Rule 133, sec. 1.

3
Cf. United States
v. De los Santos,
24 Phil. 329 (1913).

^[7]
See 2 B. Jones, The Law of Evidence sec. 335 (5th ed.)

^[8]
Ross, The Applicability of Common Law Rules of Evid­ence in Proceedings before Workmen’s
Compensation Commis­sions, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263
(1923).

^[9] Id.
at 275.

10 The rule is stated in the leading case of Carroll
v.  Knickerbocker
Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916) as follows:  “The act may be taken to mean that while
the Commission’s inquiry is not limited by the common law or statutory rule of
evidence of by technical or formal rules of procedure, and it may in its
discretion, accept any evidence that is offered, still in the end there must be
a residium of legal evidence to support the claim
before an award can be made.” (Act 509) See also Doca
v. Federal Stevedoring Co. 308 N.Y. 44, 123 N.E. 2d (32 (1954).

11 2 A. Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law sec. 79.10 (1962).

12 See Naira v. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, G. R. No. L-18066, October
30, 1962.

13 Section 24 of the Act provides that “no
compensation proceeding x x x
shall prosper unless x x x
a claim for compensation was made not later than two months after the date of the
injury or sickness, or in case of death, not later than three months after
death.”

14 Id.
sec. 45.

15 National Development Co. v. WCC, G. R. No.
L-19863, April 29, 1964.

16 Workmen’s Compensation Act sec. 24. National Dev.
Co. v. WCC, G. R. No. L-21796, Aug.
29, 1966; Philippine Engineering Corp. v. Florentino, G.R. No. L-16569, May 30, 1064.

17 Saulog v. Del
Rosario, 55 O.G. 1556 (1958).