THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO PEREZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

ROMUALDEZ, J.:


The judgment appealed from sentences Pedro Perez to one month of imprisonment
and fine of TWO with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, with
deprivation of the right of suffrage and disqualification from public office for
six months and costs, for a violation of sections 2174 and 2659 of the
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3030.

The error assigned to the judgment of the lower court is its failure to
sustain the defense of the defendant that he believed that a judgment of six
months of imprisonment did not disqualify him from the office of municipal
president.

On June 20, 1914, the herein accused, Pedro Perez, was convicted, with
others, of the crime of assault against a person in authority in criminal case
No. 3447 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, which judgment in its disposing
part says:

“Considering the plea of guilty entered by the defendants in open court and
taking into account the circumstances surrounding the act complained of, the
court finds that the penalty provided by law, even if it is imposed in the
minimum degree, is exaggerated and too severe; wherefore while this court
sentences each of the defendants to the penalty of two years, four months and
one day of prision correctional and the payment of a fine of 625 pesetas each,
and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment,
yet it is resolved to recommend to the Honorable Governor-General the
commutation of this penalty to three months for each of the defendants, for it
is believed that this punishment is more than sufficient, specially if it is
taken into consideration that these defendants have already been
administratively punished, being as they are suspended from their respective
offices.

“The clerk is hereby ordered to send a certified copy of this judgment to the
Chief Executive for such action as may be deemed proper.

“So ordered.

“Cebu, Cebu, June 20, 1914.

(Sgd.) “BARTOLOME REVILLA
“Judge on
duty”

On August 5, 1914, the Honorable Governor-General commuted the penalty
imposed by the trial court, reducing it to six months’ imprisonment. The order
for the purpose is in the words following:

“OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

“MANILA, Aug. 5, 1914.

“By authority of the President of the United States, and upon the
recommendation of the Chief of Constabulary the sentence in the case of Pedro
Perez and Vicente Perez, both convicted by the Court of First Instance of Cebu
of ‘atentado contra la autoridad’ and each sentenced on June 20, 1914, to
imprisonment for two years, four months and one day and to pay a fine of 625
pesetas, or, in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in lieu
thereof, is hereby commuted to imprisonment for six months, with good conduct
time allowance.

“Francis Burton
Harrison
“Governor-General”

In the general elections of June 6, 1922, Pedro Perez was elected municipal
president of Medellin, Cebu, and on the 16th day of October of that year he
entered upon the discharge of the functions of said office.

It is in this in which the offense is made to consist, for section 2659 of
the Administrative Code now in force punishes him who, without any right, should
knowingly assume an office.

And it is alleged that the herein defendant had no right to such office, not
being a qualified voter (sec. 2174 of said Code), inasmuch as he had been
convicted in the aforesaid criminal case of assault against a person in
authority, and sentenced to a penalty exceeding eighteen months, the minimum
limit established in section 432 of said Code.

The first question that presents itself for consideration is whether or not
by virtue of the judgment imposing two years, four months and one day of
prision correctional upon the accused in the aforesaid criminal case
for assault against a person in authority, the appellant became disqualified
from assuming said office of municipal president.

If we confine ourselves to the field of the Penal Code now in force, our
answer would be in the negative for two reasons: First, because in said
judgment, whose disposing part is set out hereinabove, he is ndt expressly
sentenced to be disqualified, which disqualification would have been an
accessory penalty in the form of suspension from office and from the right of
suffrage during the life of the sentence, according to article 61 of the Penal
Code. Article 90 of this Code provides that the accessory penalties are to be
imposed upon the convict expressly, and, according to Viada, they are not to be
presumed to have been imposed (see question presented by Viada in his
comments on the provisions of article 91 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870).

Secondly, even supposing the aforesaid suspension to have been expressly
imposed, it could not have lasted for a longer period than the principal
penalty, because it is so provided in said article 61. And said principal
penalty having been imposed in the year 1914, it is obvious that the two years,
four months, and one day imposed upon the defendant, even without the
commutation made, had elapsed and terminated, together with the accessory
suspension, several years before 1922 in which the defendant assumed the office
of municipal president.

If we view the question under the Election Law, the solution is not so clear.
Was the defendant disqualified to assume the aforesaid office because of being
disqualified to vote, according to section 432 of the Administrative Code?
Following is the pertinent part of the section:

“SEC. 432. Disqualifications.—The following persons shall be
disqualified from voting:

*          *          *          *          *          *          *

“(b) Any person who, since the thirteenth day of August, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight, has been convicted in a court of competent
jurisdiction of an offense punished by death, reclusion, prision, or
imprisonment for more than eighteen months, such disability not having been
removed by plenary pardon.”

Construing this provision, it may be said that one who, since the 13th day of
August, 1898, was sentenced by a competent court to more than eighteen months of
imprisonment, confinement or death, is disqualified to vote unless he has been
granted an absolute pardon.

Considering the case under the light of this provision of the law, we may, of
course, say that, strictly speaking the appellant was not pardoned. But in view
of the wording of the judgment of conviction in the aforesaid case, it might
perhaps be inferred that in such judgment the true intention of the trial court
in sentencing the defendant was in fact not to sentence him to two years, four
months and one day of prision correctional, which penalty the judge who
rendered said judgment did not hesitate to call “exaggerated and too severe,”
but to three months which is the penalty to which he recommended to the
Governor-General that the former be commuted.

But let us admit for a while that the penalty imposed upon the accused in
said case was that of two years, four months and one day of prision
correctional, and that for this reason the defendant was, by virtue of said
section 432 of the Administrative Code, disqualified to vote and therefore not
qualified to assume the office of municipal president, under section 2174 of the
Administrative Code, does it necessarily follow from this that the appellant has
incurred the penalty provided in section 2659 of this Code ?

This leads us to studying the elements of the offense defined in said section
2659, the text of which, as amended by Act No. 3030, is as follows:

“SEC. 2659. Unlawful assumption of office by ineligible persons.—Any
person who knowing that he is disqualified assumes any office shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than one year, and by a
fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, and by
deprivation of the right of suffrage and disqualification from public office for
a period of not more than three years.”

Special attention must be paid to the phrase employed in the law “y a
sabiendas de que no lo tiene” (and knowing that he has not), that is, knowing
that he has no right to assume the office, which phrase in the English text is
“knowing that he is disqualified.”

Evil intent being presumed juris tantum in every unlawful act (sec.
334, No. 2, Act No. 190), it would seem to be superfluous to use said phrase, if
the intention of the law in this case were not to require positive allegation
and proof, as a part of the corpus delicti, of the knowledge on the
part of the accused of his disqualification to assume the office; so that
without such knowledge there is no crime, and consequently without proof of said
knowledge no judgment of conviction can be rendered.

And the necessity of this knowledge is the greater if it is taken into
account that when the unlawful assumption of an office is to be punished not
judicially as a crime, but administratively, with a view to removing the
incumbent, the positive element “knowingly” expressly inserted in said section
2659 of the Administrative Code is no longer required, as may be seen from
section 408 of said Code which says:

“Where an ineligible person is elected to and assumes office he shall be
removed therefrom,” etc.

As to the scope of the term “knowingly” there is a conflict of opinions,
although the weight of authority seems to be that the knowledge required by the
law as an element of the punishable act is the knowledge of the facts and not of
the law, inasmuch as ignorance of the law does not constitute a valid
excuse.

But there are cases in which by such word as “knowingly” the law requires
corruption, malice, or evil intent, and this is undoubtedly the intention of the
law in section 2659 of our Administrative Code, which does not content itself
with saying “knowing,” but says “knowing that he is disqualified.” This shows
that what the law requires is not only the knowledge of the facts constituting
the ground of disqualification, but also the knowledge of the conclusion,—the
knowledge of the disqualification.

Said section thus construed, we think the following decision is applicable to
the instant case:

“In Byrne vs. State (12 Wis., 519), wherein an election officer was
prosecuted for ‘knowingly’ receiving an illegal vote, the court said: ‘The law
only required of them true candor and sincerity, and it will only punish them
for curruption and falsehood—for acting contrary to their own sense of duty and
the dictates of their own consciences. In this sense we understand the word
“knowingly” to be used in the statute; that is, knowing that their duty and the
obligation of their oaths commanded them to act otherwise. It is the wicked
intent or corrupt motive which the laws punish as a crime, and it cannot be
supposed that it was the intention of the legislature, in this instance, to
substitute for them the upright but misdirected efforts of the mind or judgment
of one whose action was not voluntary, but in obedience to the requirements of
the law.” (Note to the decision in Crawford vs. Joslyn, Ann. Cas., 1912 A, pag.
437.)

We hold that the violation of the law which is the subject-matter of the
information was not sufficiently proven.

The judgment appealed from is reversed, and the appellant is acquitted with,
all favorable pronouncements and the costs de oficio. So
ordered.

Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Ostrand, JJ.,
concur.

DISSENTING OPINION

AVANCEÑA J., with whom concurs MALCOLM,
J.:

I vote for the affirmance of the judgment appealed from. The appellant knew
the facts by which he was disqualified in accordance with section 432 of the
Administrative Code. It was not necessary for the prosecuting attorney to prove
that the appellant also knew this law.

Judgment reversed, defendant acquitted.