G.R. No. 21697. September 23, 1966
FRED ENRIQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. DOMINGO M. CABANGON, PRESIDING JUDGE, CAR, SAN FERNANDO PAMPANGA, AND JUAN MANALO, RESPONDENTS.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Relations, Third Regional District, in its Case No. 1149-P (1962).
The case arose from a petition filed in April, 1962 by Juan Manalo
(respondent-appellee herein) to recover from his landlord, petitioner
herein Fred Enriquez, the quantity of 10 1/3 cavanes of palay deducted
from the gross produce of the land in Guagua, Pampanga, cultivated by
the tenant. This rice corresponded to the reaping and insecticide
expenses allegedly defrayed by the tenant, but which the landlord
admittedly took in addition to his share, and deposited in a rice mill.
The tenant also asked for a change from share tenancy to lease tenancy
under Republic Act No. 1199 at an annual rental of 37.5 cavanes,
claimed to be 25% of the average gross produce of the landholding,
which is first class land. Finally, the tenant prayed for litigation
expenses and attorney’s fees.
The answer admitted the taking of the 10 1/3 cavanes of palay, as
alleged in the petition, but denied the other allegations of
petitioner; pleaded the unconstitutionality of section 14 of Republic
Act 1199, allowing the change in the system of tenancy, and disputed
its applicability to petitioner-tenant for lack of requisite notice to
the landlord; claimed that the tenant had forfeited the right to stay
in the land because he cultivated other landholdings without the
landlord’s knowledge and consent; and counterclaimed for the ejectment
of the tenant on the ground that he had injured the landholding and
impaired its productivity; and further, claimed back the land for
cultivation by the son of the landlord, who is allegedly in urgent need
of work.
After trial, the Agrarian court, on July 13, 1963, found for the
tenant; allowed recovery of the 10 1/3 cavanes of palay from the
landlord, or its equivalent value; declared the tenancy system to be on
a leasehold basis beginning from the agricultural year 1963-1964, and
dismissed the landlord’s counterclaims. It denied the tenant’s recovery
of litigation expenses and counsel fees for lack of bad faith in the
landlord.
From the decision, the landlord, Enriquez, appealed directly to this
Court, assigning several errors of fact and law as committed by the
trial judge.
The issues of fact posed by petitioner-appellant involve only
questions of credibility of witnesses and weight of conflicting
evidence that are peculiarly within the sphere of the Agrarian court to
determine; and Act 1267, section 13, as amended, provides only for
review of the decisions of that court limited to questions of law
and that findings of fact of the Agrarian tribunal supported by
substantial evidence may not be questioned. Moreover, the Land Reform
Code, Republic Act No. 3844, section 156, in force before the present
appeal was interposed, requires appeals on questions of fact to be
submitted to the Court of Appeals. By appealing directly to this Court,
petitioner-appellant, in effect, waived all such questions. We shall,
therefore, confine our review to the issues of law.
On the right of the landlord to take and retain the 10 1/3 cavanes
deducted from the gross crop, he invokes the provisions of section 34
of the Rice Tenancy Act (R. A. 1199), as barring the tenants’ claim for
recovery. Said section provides:
“SEC. 34. Reimbursement Not Allowed. –
Contributions or shares in the contribution to the production of the
crop in the form of cash, grain or services, once shouldered or
rendered alone by one party may not be reimbursed by the other party
after the phase or phases of work required in the joint undertaking
shall have been completed.”
We agree with the court below that the above-quoted section
referring, as it does, to “contributions or shares” for the production
of the crop does not include the cost of seed, fertilizer, pest or weed
control, reaping and threshing. Under section 32 of Act 1199, as
amended, expenditures for this purpose are deducted from gross produce
and are not shared but reimbursed to the one who paid for the same.
Says section 32, R. A. 1199, as amended by R. A. 2263:
“SEC. 32. Share Basis. – The parties shall,
on ricelands which produce a normal average of more than forty cavans
per hectare for the three agricultural years next preceding the current
harvest, receive as shares in the gross produce, after setting aside
the same amount of palay used as seed, and after deducting the cost of
fertilizer, pest and weed control, irrigation fees, reaping of not more
than ten per centum of the gross harvest, threshing and, whenever
applicable, broadcasting or other farm operations not listed in this
Act as contributions or labor of tenant, the amount corresponding to
the total equivalent of their individual contributions, computed as
follows:
Per CentLand————————————————————————————- Labor———————————————————————————— 3. Farm Implements ———————————————————————– 4. Work Animals ————————————————————————– 5. Final harrowing of the field immediately before thetransplanting ————————- 6. Transplanting ————————————————————————– Provided,
however, That the participation of any of the contributions enumerated
above which are not actually contributed because of the nature of the
farming culture followed, shall be divided between the landholder and
tenant in the same proportion as their total contribution to the
production.”
As the 10 1/3 cavanes taken by the landowner were found by the
Agrarian court to cover the reaping and insecticide expenses incurred
by the tenant, the latter’s right to recover the palay from his
landlord (who carried them away in violation of law) is indubitable. No
error was, therefore, incurred in ordering their return.
The right of the tenant to change the tenancy system under section
14 of the Rice Tenancy Act is attacked on the ground that the same is
unconstitutional. The question need not now be considered at length.
The validity and constitutionality of this part of the law has been
already passed upon and upheld by this Supreme Court in final decisions
(Ramas vs. C.A.R., et al., L-19555, May 29, 1964; Vda. de Macasaet vs.
C.A.R., et al., L-19750, July 17, 1964), and petitioner has not
submitted any new argument or authorities warranting a deviation from
those rulings.
Petitioner also contends that, under section 14 of Act 1199, the
change of system must be made by notice independent of the petition. We
find nothing in the section referred to which requires such separate
notice. The petition itself, served on the landlord, is effective as a
notification, and since the Agrarian court made the change effective on
the crop year 1963-64, the year after the filing of the petition, no
prejudice was caused to the landlord. The law (section 14, R. A. 1199,
as amended by R. A. 2263) requires merely that the right be exercised
“at least one month before the agricultural year when the change shall
be effected”, and no particular form of notice is prescribed by the
statute.
The argument that the right to change the tenancy system was
forfeited, because the tenant had cultivated other properties in excess
of the 5 hectares allowed by section 24 (i), and had employed
subtenants, contrary to section 24(2) of the Rice Tenancy Act, must be
overruled, since the factual basis for the claim was found to be
non-existent by the Agrarian court.
Finally, the landlord avers that if the court below found that a
notice of change system made in the tenant’s petition is sufficient, it
should have also held that the landlord’s counterclaim was adequate
notice of the desire to have the landholding cultivated by his son.
This thesis is without merit: under the Rice Tenancy Act, as amended,
section 50 (a), the landholder-owner, “at least one year prior to the
date of his petition”, must “file notice with the Court and inform the tenant in writing
in a language or dialect known to the latter of his intention to
cultivate the land”. The language of the law (unlike in the requirement
for a change of system under section 14) is clear that the written
notice of dispossession must not only be filed in court but also
furnished to the tenant one year ahead of the petition; hence, it can not be merged with the petition itself.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is affirmed, with costs against petitioner Fred Enriquez.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
Regala, J., no part.