NATIONAL SHIPYARDS AND STEEL CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND DOMINGO DE JESUS, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition
for certiorari, filed by the Na­tional Shipyards and Steel Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as NASSCO) to review: (1) the order of Judge Arsenio I. Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations
(hereinafter referred to as CIR) dated July 30, 1962 deny­ing the motion to
dismiss the complaint of respondent Domingo de Jesus; (2) the decision of Judge
Martinez dated March 12, 1963; and (3) the resolution of the CIR en banc
dated May 24, 1963 denying
petitioner’s motion for recon­sideration of the decision of Judge
Martinez.  The orders and decision,
herein mentioned, are incidents in CIR Case No. 1674-V.

On March 21, 1962, respondent Domingo de Jesus filed a complaint with the CIR alleging,
among other things, that he was employed as welder by the NASSCO since its
initial operation, with a daily wage of P9.02; that he had rendered overtime
services for which he was not paid; and that on October 14, 1960, he was
suspended from his employment for three months but when he reported for work
after the suspension the NASSCO refused to reinstate him, hence he prayed that
he be reinstated to his former employment with back wages
and that he be paid his overtime compensation.

On April 6, 1962, the NASSCO filed its answer deny­ing the
material allegations of the complaint and setting up special defenses, to wit:
(1) that the Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction over the case;
(2) that the complaint states no cause of action; (3) that the action is
already barred by laches or prescription; and (4)
that the dismissal of De Jesus was legal and done through due process.  Later, or on June 20, 1962, the NASSCO moved for the dismissal of the
complaint upon the first three grounds aforestated,
which motion was denied by Associate Judge Arsenio I.
Martinez in his order dated July 30,
1962.

At the trial, De Jesus testified that he had been employed by the
NASSCO as a welder since 1937; that on October 14, 1960, he received a
memorandum requiring him to explain within 72 hours why no administrative
action should be taken against him for having taken or kept welding rods in his
locker; that after making his explanation his case was set for hearing; that at
the hearing which lasted for only five minutes the investigator, Atty. Abundio Macalingcag, only
reprimanded him and he was not given a chance to explain his side; that later
he came to know through his union president that said investigator recommended
his one-month suspension; that after one month he reported for work but the
president of his union told him to wait for the de­cision of the General
Manager of the NASSCO; that thereafter he learned from the manager that he was
suspended for 90 days; that after the lapse of the 90-day period he again
reported for work but the management did not accept him; that Atty. Macalingcag advised him to wait for the decision of the
Board of Directors; that he returned to the NASSCO after six months from the
date of his suspension and he was informed that he was already dismissed from
the service.  De Jesus further testified
that from June to September, 1960, he was required to work overtime because
there were plenty of work; and that he had actually
worked 20 hours overtime a month for which he was only paid 12 hours, leaving a
monthly balance of 8 hours unpaid, or 32 hours for four months from June to
September, 1960.

Petitioner NASSCO, on the
other hand, presented as its sole witness Atty. Abundio
Macalingcag who testified that it was he who
investigated the administrative case against De Jesus; that on the date of the
hearing, October 27, 1960, he apprised De Jesus of his right to be re­presented
by counsel but that De Jesus told him that the service of the president of
their union was enough; that this notwithstanding the investigator appointed
Atty. Augusto Trinidad to act as counsel de oficio for
him; that after the investigation he (Atty. Macalingcag)
submitted his report to the Board of Directors finding De Jesus guilty of the
charge.  This witness, however, did not
touch on, nor refute, the testimony of De Jesus on his claim for overtime pay.

On March 12, 1963,
Judge Arsenio I. Martinez rendered a decision finding
the dismissal of respondent De Jesus illegal or without just cause, and ordered
his reinstatement, and the payment to him of the
additional amount equivalent to 25% of his daily wage of P9.02 as overtime compensation
for 32 hours covering the period from June to September, 1960.  NASSCO’s motion
for reconsideration of the decision of Judge Martinez having been denied by the
CIR en banc, it interposed the present petition for review,
raising issues which may be consolidated as
follows: (1) whether the CIR has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case; (2) whether the action of
respondent De Jesus for reinstatement had already prescribed, or had been
barred by laches; and (3) whether the CIR erred in
awarding overtime compensation to said respondent.

Petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the CIR over this case
upon the ground that although respondent had asked for reinstatement the case
does not relate to violation of the Minimum Wage Law, or the Eight-Hour Labor
Law, or unfair labor practice.  We find
this contention untenable for it misses the doctrine laid down in the Prisco case,^[1]
as amplified in the case of Campos, et al. v. Manila Railroad Company, et al.,
L-17905, May 25, 1962, wherein this Court held:

“We may, therefore, restate, for the benefit of the bench and
the bar, that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire
jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic Act No. 875, the
following circumstances must be present: (a) there must exist between the
parties an employer-employee
relationship, or claimant must seek his reinstatement; and (b) the controversy
must relate to a case certified
by the President to the C.I.R. as one involving national interest, or must have
a bearing on an unfair labor
practice charge, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, or under
the Minimum Wage Law.  In default of any
of these circumstances, the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts.

“In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioner merely
seeks his reinstate­ment with back wages. 
He does not claim any salary differential nor overtime pay that may make
his case come either under the Eight-Hour Labor Law or the Minimum Wage
Law.  Neither does he prefer any unfair labor practice charge against
his employer.  Consequently, the Court of
Industrial Relations has no power to act on his claim for the same is a mere
money claim that comes under the jurisdiction of the regular courts.”

And
elucidating further, this Tribunal, in another case, declared:

“A mere claim for reinstatement, therefore, does not suffice
to bring a case within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.  It is necessary also that the case be one of
the four enumerated cases as amplified in the Campos
case.  Here, a reading of the allegations
of the complaint shows that while plaintiff-appellant seeks her reinstatement
in the company, nothing is alleged therein to indicate that
plaintiff-appellant’s dismissal from the service amounted to an unfair labor
practice.  Neither is it claimed that
this is a case certified by the President to the Court of Industrial Relations
as involving national interest x x x or a case arising under the Eight-Hour Labor Law, x x x or the
Minimum Wage Law x x
x.

“For plaintiff-appellant merely seeks her reinstatement with
back wages, the recovery of moral and exemplary damages suffered as a result of
allegedly malicious criminal actions filed against her at the instance of
defendant-appellee; the recovery of her contributions
to a pension and saving plan; and the recovery of the
money value of her accrued sick leave.

“The Court of First Instance of Rizal
erred therefore in holding that the case is cognizable by the Court of
Industrial Relations and in dismissing the case.” (Barranta v. International
Harvester Company of the Philippines, L-18198, April 22, 1963)

From the foregoing rulings it can be deduced that a mere action
for reinstatement or one coupled with a claim for back wages and/or damages is
not enough to confer jurisdiction upon
the industrial court.  Neither should the
claim for reinstatement be related to the Eight-Hour Labor Law or the Minimum
Wage Law, etc., as insinuated by petitioner, for what is required is that said
action for reinstatement must be accompanied by another claim arising out of
the Minimum Wage Law or the Eight-hour Labor Law in order that the case would
fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations.  The court’s
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation is determined by the
allegations in the complaint, and We find that the
allegations in the complaint in the court below are sufficient to confer
jurisdiction to the CIR.  Since in the
instant case the complaint prayed for reinstatement of res­pondent with payment
of back wages and also for the payment
of overtime compensation, the
latter necessarily involving the Eight-Hour Labor Law, following the rule enunciated
in the aforecited cases, the CIR has jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case at bar.  In the case of Serrano
v. Serrano, et al., L-19562, May 23,
1964, this Court declared:

“x x
x It being settled that the Court of
Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over claims for overtime compensation
when coupled with a prayer for reinstatement, it is clear that the satisfaction of the unpaid wages may likewise be ordered incidentally to
said jurisdiction (Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber
Co., Inc., L-11945, August 18, 1958).^[2]

Having disposed of the first issue, the next question to be
resolved is whether respondent De Jesus has incurred in laches in seeking his reinstatement.  It
is not denied that respondent De Jesus, being a welder of the NASSCO
which is a corporation owned or controlled by the government, belongs to the
unclassified service and covered by the Civil
Service Law.^[3]
It is also undisputed that he was separated from the service as of October 14, 1960 and he instituted
the present action for his reinstatement only on March 21, 1962, or after the lapse of 17 months.  Without ruling on whether or not the industrial
court could still modify or reverse the decision in the administrative case
dismissing respondent, or inquire and/or declare his dismissal with or without
just cause, considering that said respondent filed the present action for
reinstatement more than one year from his removal from the service, We declare
that his action is now barred by laches.  In the case of Alipio,
et al. v. Rodriguez, et al., L-17336, December
26, 1963, this Court held:

“x x x In
the case of Unabia vs. City Mayor of Cebu, et al., x x x we held that ‘in view of the policy of the State contained
in the law fixing the period of one year within which actions for quo warranto may be instituted, any person
claiming right to a position in the civil service should also be required to
file his petition for reinstatement within the period of one year, otherwise he
is thereby considered as having abandoned his office.’ The defense of laches in the present case was therefore correctly
sustained by the lower court.”

In the more recent case of
Morales v. Patriarca, et al., L-21280, April
30, 1965, this Court
held:

“Petitioner, however, cannot be reinstated, since the present
action for reinstatement is filed more than one year from his removal.  As a public official in the service, he shall
have begun his court action for reinstatement, be it by quo warranto
or mandamus, within one year from his removal or separation, otherwise
his action is barred (Sec. 16, Rule 66, Rules of Court; Unabia
vs. Mayor, 53 O.G., 132; Velasquez vs. Gil, 53 O.G. 5615; Jose vs. Lacson, L-10477, May 17, 1957; Cuyo
vs. City Mayor of Baguio, 101 Phil. 558.; Abella vs. Rodriguez, 54 O.G. 2879; Erauda
vs. Cramen, 54 O.G. 6223; Alipio
vs. Rodriguez, L-17336, December 26, 1963).”

Anent the third issue
raised in this appeal, We agree with the finding of the industrial court that respondent De Jesus should be awarded
overtime compensation equiva­lent to 25% of his daily wage of P9.02 for 32 hours corresponding to the
period from June to September, 1960.  We
quote the pertinent part of the lower court’s decision, as follows:

“With respect to the first issue, it is opined that petitioner
has rendered overtime services in respondent corporation.  From the evidence on record, it has been
established that petitioner had rendered a total of 20 hours overtime a month
starting from June up to September, 1960.  Out of these 20 hours a month, he was
only paid 12 hours a month thus leaving a balance of 8 hours unpaid per
month.  In other words, petitioner had
not been paid a total of 32 hours during the 4-month period in question.  This fact
has been creditably portrayed in the direct and cross-examination of petitioner.  No evidence was introduced by
respondent to deny or overcome such fact. 
Atty. Abundio Macalingcag,
the only witness presented by respondent, testified on the manner how the
investiga­tion of the administrative charge against petitioner was conducted, without touching on petitioner’s claim of
overtime.  In the absence of any proof,
testimonial or documentary, to contradict the overtime claim there is no
plausible reason why the Court should not grant petitioner’s claim on the face
of such situation, since the burden of proof lies upon respondent to dispute
such claim.  In the light of the failure
of respondent to adduce evidence and/or deny such assertion, the inescapable
conclusion is that petitioner truly
rendered overtime services on the aforestated period
of time.”

The foregoing finding of facts of the court a quo
is conclusive upon this Court.^[4]

While We have ruled in this decision
that the action of respondent De Jesus for reinstatement has been barred, his
action for the payment of overtime compensation is not barred.  The record shows that said respondent’s right
of action for payment of overtime pay accrued in October, 1960, and he filed
his complaint on March 21, 1962.  An action to enforce a right under the
Eight-Hour Labor Law can be brought any time within three years after the cause
of action accrued.^[5]

WHEREFORE, with the modification that respondent De Jesus
should not be reinstated and not paid his back wages, the decision and orders
appealed from are affirmed in all other respects, without pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion,
C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.., Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Sanchez,
and Castro, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Price Stabilization Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations, et
al., L-13806, May 23, 1960.

^[2]
See also Gracella v. El Colegio del Hospicio de San Jose,
Inc., L-15152, January 31, 1963; Kim Kee, Chua Yu
& Co., Inc. v. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-16803, June
29, 1964.

^[3]
Executive Order No. 356, Section 10, October
23, 1950 (46 O.G., 4677); See also Philippine
Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) v. CIR., et
al., L-17950, August 31, 1964;
Diaz, et al. v. Arca, et al., L-21008, October 29, 1965.

^[4]
“The finding of the Court of Industrial Relations that
the said respondents had worked overtime is a finding of fact” (NASSCO v. CIR, et al., L-20838, July 30, 1965). “As long as
there is evidence to support a
decision of the Industrial Court, we may not revoke or reverse it just because
it is not based on overwhelming or preponderant evidence” (Manila Metal
Caps and Tin Cans Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. CIR, et al., L-17578,
July 31, 1963; citing Philippine Newspaper Guild v. Evening News, Inc., 86 Phil., 303.)

^[5]
Section 7-A, Commonwealth Act 444, as amended by Republic Act
1993.