ARTOO P. GARIN, PETITIONER, VS. CITY OF MUNTINLUPA, HON. INTING, JAIME FRESNEDI, IN HIS OFFICIAL AND CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR, KATARUNGAN VILLAGE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., RES…

This Court resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari^[2] assailing the Orders^[3]
of the Regional Trial Court, which suspended the proceedings of a
Petition for Mandamus pending exhaustion of administrative remedies with
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.

Artoo P. Garin (Garin), a resident of Pasig City, wanted to build a house in Katarungan Village in Muntinlupa City.^[4]
Per Section 10 of Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047, one of the
prerequisites to secure a building permit is a clearance from the
homeowners’ association.^[5]

Garin requested clearance from Katarungan Village Homeowners
Association (Katarungan), but clarified that “he is not a member of the
association.”^[6] However,
Katarungan refused to give the required clearance until he paid an
assessment fee and signed up for membership in their association.^[7]

Thus, Garin filed a Petition for Mandamus with application for preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court.^[8]
He sought to compel the City ofMuntinlupa to accept his application for
processing, even without the required clearance. He also prayed that
Section 10 of Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047 be declared
unconstitutional “insofar as it relates to the tasking of the homeowners
association for the issuance of clearance[.]”^[9]

On September 5, 2014, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order^[10]
denying the injunctive relief, but temporarily suspending the
proceedings pending Garin’s exhaustion of administrative remedies with
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board.^[11]

In denying the injunctive relief, the trial court found that Garin
failed to establish a clear right or any substantial injury that would
be caused, since he has not yet commenced the construction of his abode.^[12]

The trial court also temporarily suspended the case pursuant to Rule
11 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9904,
or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and Homeowners’ Associations, which
empowers the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to decide
intra­association disputes.^[13]

Garin moved for reconsideration, but was denied by the Regional Trial Court in its January 9, 2015 Order.^[14]
The trial court emphasized that the alleged suppression of Garin’s
right was caused by Katarungan, not Muntinlupa City Ordinance No.
02-047.^[15] It found that
whether Katarungan properly imposed Republic Act No. 9904 is a matter
that should first be determined by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, before the constitutionality of Section 10 of Muntinlupa City
Ordinance No. 02-047 could be decided.^[16]

Aggrieved, Garin filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari.^[17] On July 27, 2015, this Court required respondents to comment on the Petition.^[18]

Respondent Katarungan^[19] and respondents City of Muntinlupa and Mayor Jaime R. Fresnedi^[20] (Mayor Fresnedi) filed their respective Comments, as noted in this Court’s October 21, 2015 Resolution.^[21]

Upon being required by this Court,^[22] Garin filed his Consolidated Reply,^[23] as noted in this Court’s November 6, 2017 Resolution.^[24]

Petitioner argues that the constitutionality of Section 10 of
Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047 may be addressed by this Court
without petitioner having to first exhaust the administrative remedies
with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. He argues that the
“convoluted procedure”^[25]
recommended by the trial court “serves only to pressure the building
applicant to capitulate rather than pursue the question of unjust
imposition and derogation of one’s constitutional right to
disassociate.”^[26]

Petitioner also notes that the deed of sale of his property had no
annotation on automatic membership in the association. This, he says,
means that there was no contract existing between him and respondent
Katarungan.^[27]

Petitioner argues that respondent Katarungan had “abused [its] delegated power”^[28] which was the “necessary consequence of the undefined authority conferred by the Ordinance[.]”^[29] He argues that “the Ordinance itself prescribes no specific limit or parameter for its exercise[.]”^[30]

Respondent Katarungan counters that if petitioner wants to avail of
its services, he must pay the required dues, fees, and charges.^[31] It notes that its refusal to issue the clearance is based on the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9904,^[32]
which empowers an association to cause compliance on, among others,
structures to be built within the subdivision, in accordance with
existing laws.^[33]

In addition, Section 72 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9904 provides:

SECTION 72. Prohibited Acts. -It shall be prohibited for any person:

. . . .

b. To deprive any homeowner of the right to avail of or enjoy basic
community services and facilities provided that the dues, charges, and
other fees for such services have been duly paid[.]^[34]

As for petitioner’s right to abode, respondent Katarungan argues that
this right can be limited by the general welfare clause under Section
16 of the Local Government Code.^[35] It also argues that Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047 is presumed a valid exercise of police power.^[36]

Respondent Katarungan ends by reiterating that this case involves an
intra-association dispute, which must properly be heard by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board, and not the regular trial courts.^[37]

For their part, respondents City of Muntinlupa and Mayor Fresnedi cite Section 5(c)^[38]
of HLURB Resolution No. R-771, series of 2004, and the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9904, in arguing that:

Clearly, . . . it is NOT the City Government or the
assailed Ordinance which conferred upon [respondent Katarungan] the
authority to issue homeowners clearance and impose fees. It is a
national law no less, R.A. 9904, which the [Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board] is tasked to implement, that confers this authority[.]^[39] (Emphasis in the original)

In addition, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9904 requires every
homeowner to “pay the necessary fees, charges and special assessments of
the homeowners’ association.”^[40]

Assuming that respondent Katarungan’s power to issue a clearance was
granted through Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047, respondents say
that it would still be valid because of Article III, Section 2 of the
“Zoning Ordinance.”^[41]

Respondents also raise that petitioner “resorted to an improper
remedy” because the questioned Order is an interlocutory order, from
which no appeal can be taken.^[42]

In reply, petitioner reiterates that Muntinlupa City Ordinance No.
02-047 is unconstitutional because it conferred on respondent Katarungan
“the absolute, unbridled power to determine the parameters for the
issuance of its clearance”^[43]—”an invalid delegation of legislative authority.”^[44]

For resolution are the following ssues:

First, whether or not a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure is the correct remedy to question
the Regional Trial Court’s Orders;

Second, whether or not petitioner Garin has complied with all the
requisites of judicial review to question the constitutionality of
Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047;

Third, whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in ruling that
primary jurisdiction over the case lies with the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board; and

Finally, whether or not the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has
jurisdiction over a dispute between a non-member homeowner and the
homeowners’ association.

We deny the Petition.

I

As a general rule, only final judgments or orders of the trial court,
the Court of Appeals, or the Sandiganbayan may be appealed through a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On
its face, it may appear that the trial court’s Orders were interlocutory
orders, which are generally not appealable but may be questioned
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

However, the September 5, 2014 Order denied petitioner’s application
for preliminary injunction and suspended the case pending petitioner’s
exhaustion of administrative remedies. While this appears to be
interlocutory, it is, in reality, an order of dismissal. Its dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the application for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED.

Likewise, the instant case is temporarily suspended pending the
exhaustion of administrative remedies by petitioner involving the issue
herein with the HLURB.

SO ORDERED[.]^[45]

The temporary suspension becomes indefmite pending any further action
by petitioner. It creates the presumption that the trial court will
never act on the Petition for Mandamus if petitioner does not file his
case with the proper administrative agency. Thus, while the trial
court’s Order may appear to be an interlocutory order, it effectively
dismissed the Petition without explicitly saying so. Hence, petitioner
availed of the proper remedy.

In any case, petitioner elevated his appeal to this Court based on
what he perceived to be errors of law, not errors of fact, by the trial
court.

II

Petitioner’s main argument is that the trial court erred in refusing
to resolve the issue on the Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02047’s
constitutionality since it was for the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board to resolve. He prays that the Order be set aside and that Section
10 of the Ordinance be declared unconstitutional.

This Court’s power of judicial review may only be exercised if a case
presents the following requisites: first, an actual case or
controversy; second, the person bringing the case must have legal
standing; third, the constitutional question is raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and fourth, the resolution of the constitutional
question must be the very lis mota of the case, that is, it must be absolutely necessary for its determination.^[46]

The first three requisites are present here. The denial of
petitioner’s building permit application presents an actual controversy
and legal standing. Petitioner is the homeowner who was directly
“injured” by the non-issuance of the clearance by respondent Katarungan.
He also raised the constitutional question at the earliest possible
opportunity, submitting it before the trial court after his permit
application had been denied.

The last requisite, however, remains wanting. Petitioner’s cause of
action can be resolved without having to pass upon the constitutional
question.

Petitioner argues that the requirements outlined in Section 10 of
Muntinlupa City Ordinance No. 02-047 are unconstitutional since
requiring a homeowners’ association clearance violates his right to
disassociate. Section 10 ofthe Ordinance states:

Section 10. APPLICATION AND APPROVAL OF PROJECTS. No project
shall be approved unless the applicable requirements per project are
complied with:

* Duly Accomplished and Notarized Application Form

*One Set of Plan

* One copy of lot plan with Vicinity Map

* Transfer Certificate of Title

* Barangay Clearance/Barangay Resolution
* Homeowners Association Clearance

* Deed of Sale

* Certification from MDCC/PHILVOCS^[47]

Here, respondent Katarungan refused to issue petitioner the required
clearance until he has applied for membership and paid up the
assessments amounting to P72,000.00, which, petitioner argues, “had
nothing to do with the zoning, classification purpose of the Ordinance.”^[48]
Because petitioner could not secure the clearance, the City of
Muntinlupa refused to process his application for a building permit.

Republic Act No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners’ Associations, prohibits any person from compelling a
homeowner to join the association unless it is made a condition
precedent in the “the title of the property; the contract for the
purchase of a lot in the subdivision project; or an award under a CMP
project or a similar tenurial arrangement[.]”^[49]
Under Section 9 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations, membership
is optional “[u]nless otherwise provided in the Contract to Sell, Deed
of Sale, or other instruments of conveyance, or annotated in the title
of the property[.]”

If petitioner’s allegation that the deed of sale for his property has
no provision on automatic membership is true, respondent Katarungan
could have possibly violated Republic Act No. 9904 when it imposed
membership as a prerequisite for issuing a clearance. Clearly,
petitioner’s cause of action is against respondent Katarungan, not the
City of Muntinlupa. However, petitioner did not attach any document to
support his claim that there is no provision on automatic membership. He
merely alleged:

When petitioner purchased his property in Katarungan
Village, Muntinlupa City, there was no annotation showing his automatic
membership in the [association]. Thus, no privity of contract arising
from the title certificate exists between petitioner and respondent
[Katarungan].^[50]

Further, petitioner did not state whether the assessments imposed were
for membership fees alone. It is entirely possible that part of the
P72,000.00 worth of assessments included payment for the issuance of the
clearance along with basic services and facilities. Petitioner has the
right to disassociate or not become a member of the association, but he
cannot refuse to pay for basic services and facilities. Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 9904 provides:

SECTION 5. Rights and Duties of Every Homeowner. -Every homeowner has the right to enjoy the basic community services and facilities: Provided, That he/she pays the necessary fees and other pertinent charges.

In any case, it was well within respondent City ofMuntinlupa’s police
power to require clearance from a homeowners’ association as a
prerequisite for granting a building permit.

A homeowners’ association is empowered by law, among others, to
cause compliance with the provisions of the National Building Code or
refuse the establishment of institutions which may disrupt the privacy
and security of its homeowners. Section 1OG) and (k) of Republic Act No.
9904 state:

SECTION 10. Rights and Powers of the Association. – An
association shall have the following rights and shall exercise the
following powers:

(j)	Cause compliance with regard to height regulations, easements, use of homes, buildings, edifices, or structures that may be built within the subdivision, in accordance with the National Building Code, zoning laws, HLURB rules and regulations, existing local ordinances, and existing deeds of restriction;
(k)	Subject to consultation and with the approval of a simple majority of the association members, allow the establishment of certain institutions such as, but not limited to, schools, hospitals, markets, grocery stores and other similar establishments that will necessarily affect the character of the subdivision/village in terms of traffic generation, and/or opening the area to outsiders which may result in the loss of privacy, security, safety, and tranquility to its residents, in accordance with the National Building Code, zoning laws, existing local ordinances, HLURB rules and regulations, and existing jurisprudence: Provided, That such prior approval shall not be necessary for the establishment of sari – sari stores, home industries and similar small-scale business enterprises within the subdivision/village classified as socialized housing[.]

The Ordinance’s requirement to secure a homeowners’ association
clearance applies to all homeowners’ associations in Muntinlupa City,
and not just respondent Katarungan. While the requisites for securing a
clearance from respondent Katarungan may seem violative of Republic Act
No. 9904 for allegedly forcing petitioner to become a member, it does
not follow that the requirements for the issuance of a clearance by all other homeowners’ associations within Muntinlupa City violate the law.

Petitioner’s cause of action, therefore, was not the result of the
alleged invalidity of Section 10 of Muntinlupa City Ordinance No.
02-047, but the alleged illegality of respondent Katarungan’s clearance
requirements. His case can be resolved in the proper proceeding without
passing upon the constitutional question.

The trial court did not err in ruling that the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board has primary jurisdiction over the case. In JAKA Investments Corporation v. Urdaneta Village Association, Inc.,^[51]
this Court held that “[c]ases involving intra-association controversies
fall under the jurisdiction ofthe Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board, the government agency with the technical expertise on the
matter.”^[52]

Section 20(d) of Republic Act No. 9904 provides:

SECTION 20. Duties and Responsibilities of the HLURB.
-In addition to the powers, authorities and responsibilities vested in
it by Republic Act No. 8763, Presidential Decree No. 902-A, Batas
Pambansa Big. 68 and Executive Order No. 535, Series of 1981, as
amended, the HLURB shall:

. . . .

(d) Hear and decide intra-association and/or
inter-association controversies and/or conflicts, without prejudice to
filing civil and criminal cases by the parties concerned before the
regular courts: Provided, That all decisions of the HLURB are appealable
directly to the Court of Appeals[.]

Section 4(w) of the law’s Implementing Rules and Regulations defines an “intra-association dispute”:

(w) Intra-association dispute refers to a
controversy which arises out of the relations between and among members
of the association; between any or all of them and the association of
which they are members; and between such association and the State
insofar as it concerns their individual franchise or right to exist. It
refers also to a controversy which is intrinsically connected with the
regulation of associations or dealing with the internal affairs of such
entity. (Emphasis supplied)

The next question that may be asked is whether the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board has jurisdiction even if petitioner is not a member
of the homeowners’ association.

We answer in the affirmative.

Republic Act No. 9904 differentiates between a homeowner and a member. Section 30) defmes a homeowner:

(j) “Homeowner” refers to any of the following:

(1) An owner or purchaser of a lot in a subdivision/village;

(2) An awardee, usufructuary, or legal occupant of a unit, house
and/or lot in a government socialized or economic housing or relocation
project and other urban estates; or

(3) An informal settler in the process of being accredited as
beneficiary or awardee of ownership rights under the CMP, LTAP, and
other similar programs.

“Member” is not specifically defined, but Section 6 of the law states
that “[a] homeowner as defined under this Act shall be qualified to be a
member of an association[.]”

The issue in this case may be considered a matter involving the
internal affairs of the association. For internal affairs of the
association, the Implementing Rules and Regulations does not mention
that at least one of the parties to the dispute must be a member of the
association.

Moreover, in 2017, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
promulgated HLURB Resolution No. 963-17, or the Revised Rules of
Proceedings Before Regional Arbiters:^[53]

Rule 2

Regional Arbiters

. . . .

6.2. Jurisdiction over homeowners and homeowners associations. The Arbiters shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving homeowners associations, as follows:

. . . .

6.2.4. Disputes or controversies between the association and the
homeowners or other beneficial users relating to the exercise of their
respective rights, duties and obligations[.]^[54]

Based on its current rules of procedure, the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board has jurisdiction over disputes between a non-member
homeowner and the homeowners’ association.

WHEREFORE, the Regional Trial Court’s September 5, 2014 and January 9, 2015 Orders in Civil Case No. 3930 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Hernando, Inting,and, Delos Santos, JJ., concur.
Rosario, J. on official leave.

^[2] Rollo, pp. 10-29.

^[3] Id. at 30-32 and 33-34.
The September 5, 2014 and January 9, 2015 Orders were penned by Judge
Rolando G. Mislang of the Regional Trial Court ofPasig City, Branch 167.

^[4] Id. at 12.

^[5] Id. at 13.

^[6] Id.

^[7] Id.

^[8] Id. at 14.

^[9] Id.

^[10] Id. at 30-32.

^[11] Id. at 32. At present,
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board is part of the Department of
Human Settlement and Urban Development by vittue of Republic Act No.
11201 (2019). At the time of the filing of this case before this Court,
Republic Act No. 11201 was not yet passed into law.

^[12] Id. at 31-32.

^[13] Id. 32.

^[14] Id. at 33-34.

^[15] Id.

^[16] Id.

^[17] Id. at 10-29.

^[18] Id. at 37-38.

^[19] Id. at 39-49. Comment of respondent Katarungan.

^[20] Id. at 50-63. Comment of respondent City Government of Muntinlupa and Mayor Fresnedi.

^[21] Id. at 65.

^[22] Id. at 66.

^[23] Id. at 67-70.

^[24] Id. at 75.

^[25] Id. at 17.

^[26] Id.

^[27] Id. at 21.

^[28] Id. at 17.

^[29] Id.

^[30] Id.

^[31] Id. at 41.

^[32] Id. at 40.

^[33] Id. at 40-41.

^[34] Id. at 41.

^[35] Id. at 41-42.

^[36] Id. at 42.

^[37] Id. at 42-43.

^[38] Id. at 52. HLURB
Resolution No. R-771 (2004). or the Rules on the Registration and
Supervision of Homeowners Association, sec. 5(c) states:

Section 5. Powers and attributes of a homeowners association. – The
powers and attributes of the homeowners association are those stated in
its by-laws, which shall include the following:

….

To impose and collect reasonable fees on members and non-member
residents who avail of or benefit from the facilities and services of
the association, to defray necessary operational expenses, subject to
the limitations and conditions imposed under the law, regulations of the
Board and the association by-laws[.]

^[39] Id. at 53.

^[40] Id. at 54.

^[41] Id. at 53. No copy of the Zoning Ordinance was attached by respondent City Govermnent of Muntinlupa.

^[42] Id. at 54.

^[43] Id. at 67.

^[44] Id. at 68.

^[45] Id. at 32.

^[46] See Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission, 651 Phil. 374 (2010) [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc], citing Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita, 522 Phil. 1 (2006) [Per. J. Carpio Morales, En Banc]; and Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 842 (2003) [Per J. Carpio Morales, En Banc].

^[47] Rollo, p. 13. Lifted from the Petition. The ordinance was not attached to the records.

^[48] Id.

^[49] Republic Act No. 9904 (2009), sec. 22(a) provides:

SECTION 22. Prohibited Acts. -It shall be prohibited for any person:

^[50] Rollo, p. 21.

^[51] G.R. Nos. 204187 and 206606, April 1, 2019,

< https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/65203 > [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

^[52] Id.

^[53] HLURB Resolution No.
963-17 (2017). available at < https://hlurb.gov.ph/wp-
content/uploads/Board%20Resolutions/2017%20Board%20Resolutions/R-963%20s.%202017.pdf
> (last accessed January 19, 2021). Its Rule I, sec. 3(3.3) defines
an arbiter as follows:

3.3. Arbiter refers to the officer authorized by law, rules
and regulations to take hear and resolve disputes filed in accordance
with this Rules. By designation, Arbiters may either be—

3.3.1. Regional Arbiter who exercises jurisdiction within the territorial boundaries of the Regional Field Office to which he/she is assigned, or

3.3.2. LSG Arbiters who exercises the same functions as the
Regional Arbiter except that they are not bound by the confines of the
territorial jurisdiction of any Regional Field Office and hears and
decides cases only when the Regional Arbiter has recused or to assist in
the disposition of cases pending before the Regional Field Offices.

^[54] HLURB Resolution No. 963-17 (2017), Rule 2, sec. 6.2.4.