G.R. No. 215925. March 07, 2022
ESPERANZA P. GAOIRAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 12 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOCOS NORTE, SPS. TIMOTEO S. PABLO AND PERLITA PABLO, MARY NYRE D…
HERNANDO, J.:[*]
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Esperanza P.
Gaoiran, seeking the reversal of the August 15, 2014 Decision[2] and November 14, 2014 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 129945.
The property subject of the instant petition is a 275-square
meter parcel of land situated in Barangay Poblacion San Miguel & San
Pedro, City of Laoag, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(TCT) T-34540 issued under the name of respondent Perlita S. Pablo
(Perlita), married to Timoteo Pablo (Timoteo).[4]
Petitioner alleged that on September 22, 2009, her friends
introduced to her a certain Timoteo H. Pablo, Jr. who was allegedly
looking for a buyer of a land registered under the name of his wife,
Perlita S. Pablo. Timoteo offered for sale the subject property to
petitioner and her husband. Timoteo was able to convince petitioner to
purchase the said property upon the representation that he was
authorized by his wife, Perlita to sell the same. On the same day,
petitioner delivered the purchase price to Timoteo in the amount of
P500,000.00 and in exchange, Timoteo surrendered the first owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 to petitioner and undertook to deliver a
deed of absolute sale signed by his wife on or before October 22, 2009.
Timoteo, however, did not make good his promise.[5]
Demands were made by petitioner upon Timoteo to return the
amount of P500,000.00 or to deliver the appropriate deed of conveyance,
but to no vail. This prompted petitioner to institute before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City a complaint for Estafa against
Timoteo.[6] Finding probable
cause, an Information for Estafa was filed before the RTC of Laoag City,
Branch 14 docketed as Criminal Case No. 14608.[7]
On June 8, 2012, petitioner executed an affidavit of possession with notice of lis pendens[8]
and brought the same to the Register of Deeds of Laoag City (RD-Laoag)
for annotation of an adverse claim in TCT T-34540. However, the RD-Laoag
advised her that the said complaint, being criminal and not civil in
nature, cannot be annotated in the original certificate of title.[9]
Meanwhile, on the claim that the owner’s duplicate copy of the subject
property’s title was missing, respondent Mary Nyre Dawn Alcantara
(Mary), representing herself as the niece of respondent Perlita, and the
latter’s trustee of TCT T-34540, filed before the RTC of Laoag City on
June 25, 2012 a petition[10]
praying that the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 that had been
lost be declared as null and void. She likewise prayed for the issuance
of a second owner’s duplicate copy of TCT T-34540.[11]
In support of the said petition, Mary submitted an affidavit of loss on
June 14, 2012 duly notifying the Register of Deeds of the lost title.
The same had been annotated at the back of TCT T-34540.[12]
Perlita also executed an affidavit stating that she had entrusted the
owner’s duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 to Mary being her administrator
and overseer but the same was lost in the latter’s possession. Hence,
she encouraged Mary to file a petition for the issuance of a new owner’s
duplicate title in lieu of the lost one.[13]
Finding sufficient, competent and credible evidence in support of the
petition for issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate of title,
the RTC of Laoag City, Branch 12, in a Decision[14]
dated August 28, 2012, ordering the issuance of a second owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT T-34540. Pursuant to which, the RTC of Laoag City
declared the lost owner’s duplicate copy as null and void.[15]
On May 17, 2013, petitioner instituted before the CA a petition for annulment of judgment[16]
seeking to annul the August 28, 2012 Decision of the RTC of Laoag City,
which granted Mary’s petition for the issuance of a second owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT T-34540. Petitioner averred that it was only on
April 10, 2013, upon her inquiry with the RD-Laoag about the status of
the aforesaid title, that she discovered that a second owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT T-34540 was issued in favor of Perlita pursuant to an
affidavit of loss executed by Mary on June 14, 2012, attesting to the
loss of the first owner’s duplicate copy of TCT T-34540, which she
registered with the RD-Laoag. In view of the foregoing incidents,
petitioner filed the aforesaid petition for annulment of judgment before
the CA on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Essentially, she contended that the reconstituted title was obtained by
the respondents by means of fraud and deceit. She further argued that
the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue a new title as the first owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 was never lost, and in fact, is in her
possession all along.[17]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
On August 15, 2014, the CA dismissed the petition for annulment of
judgment declaring that a petition under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
cannot be used to impugn the second owner’s duplicate certificate of
title which was issued in the reconstitution proceeding before the trial
court for to do so would constitute a collateral attack upon the issued
certificate of title which is sanctioned by Section 48 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1529.[18]
The dispositive portion of the CA’s Decision reads:
Accordingly, in view of the foregoing premises, and consistent with the caveat
in the first paragraph of Section 5, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.[19]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution[20] dated November 14, 2014.
Hence, this petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
Issue
The issue before the Court is whether or not the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for annulment of
judgment.
Petitioner insists that the existence of the owner’s
duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 in her possession renders the RTC of Laoag
City devoid of any jurisdiction to entertain Mary’s petition for
issuance of a second owner’s duplicate copy. Moreover, the petition for
annulment of judgment she filed before the CA is not an attack upon TCT
T-34540, the main purpose of which is the annulment of the August 28,
2012 Decision of the RTC of Laoag City granting the reconstitution of
TCT T-34540, despite the fact that the first owner’s duplicate copy
thereof was never lost. Thus, the cancellation of the reconstituted
title is only a necessary consequence of the annulment of the assailed
August 28, 2012 Decision. Since the first owner’s duplicate copy of TCT
T-34540 is not in fact lost, the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in not annulling the
August 28, 2012 RTC Decision on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.[21]
For their part, respondents counter that the instant petition for certiorari
should be dismissed for being an improper remedy because the proper
recourse to assail the dismissal of the Rule 47 petition filed with the
CA is through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, it being a continuation of the original action
filed before the CA. Even if the Court treats the petition as one under
Rule 45, it must still be dismissed for late filing and by reason of
which, the assailed CA Decision and Resolution already attained
finality. The instant case is devoid of highly exceptional circumstances
as to warrant the invocation of liberal application of the rules.
Finally, they aver that even assuming that a Rule 65 petition may be
availed of, it must still fail since the CA committed no grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment filed
therewith.
Our Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Prefatorily, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of appeal when she filed before the Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the August 15, 2014 Decision and November 14, 2014 Resolution of the CA. A petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that may
be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[22]
In Mandy Commodities, Inc. v. The International Commercial Bank of China,[23] the Court held:
In Alba v. Court of Appeals and Linzag v. Court of Appeals,
it was held that a party aggrieved by the decision of the Court of
Appeals in a petition filed with it for annulment of judgment, final
order or resolution is not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, but rather an ordinary appeal under Rule 45 where only questions of law may be raised. A petition for certiorari
is, like a petition for annulment, a remedy of last resort and must be
availed of only when an appeal or any other adequate, plain or speedy
remedy may no longer be pursued in the ordinary course of law. A remedy
is said to be plain, speedy and adequate when it will promptly relieve
the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts
of the lower court or agency.[24]
In this case, the CA acted within its jurisdiction when it
rendered the assailed August 15, 2014 Decision. The decision was a final
judgment that disposed of the case in a manner leaving the court with
nothing more to do. Accordingly, petitioner should have filed a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, in this Court.
Nevertheless, We bear in mind that the acceptance of a petition for certiorari, as well as the grant of due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the Court.[25]
We recognize that although procedural rules ought to be strictly
enforced by courts in order to impart stability in the legal system, We
have, nonetheless, relaxed the rigid application of the rules of
procedure in several cases to afford the parties the opportunity to
fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is because the ends of
justice would be better served if the parties were given the chance to
argue their causes and defenses. We are likewise constantly reminded
that the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application
of justice to the opposing claims of the competing parties and always
be guided by the principle that procedure must not hinder but, rather,
promote the administration of justice.[26]
Thus, notwithstanding the foregoing procedural lapse committed by
petitioner, in the interest of justice and to prevent further prolonging
the proceedings in this case, the Court resolves to give due course to
her petition and rule on the merits thereof.[27]
This is so especially considering that petitioner has presented a good
cause for the proper and just determination of her case.
Under
Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, the only grounds for annulment
of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In this case,
petitioner alleges that the CA erred in failing to annul the Decision
of the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Lack of
jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the
subject matter of the claim. In case of absence, or lack, of
jurisdiction, a court should not take cognizance of the case. Thus, the
prevailing rule is that where there is want of jurisdiction over a
subject matter, the judgment is rendered null and void. A void judgment
is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from
which no right can be obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one,
and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void.
It is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can never
become executory. It also follows that such a void judgment cannot
constitute a bar to another case by reason of res judicata.[28]
In this case, the Court finds that the CA erred in denying petitioner’s
petition for annulment of judgment holding that the same was a subtle
experiment to collaterally dispute the owner’s duplicate certificate of
title which was issued in favor of Perlita in the reconstitution
proceeding before the RTC.
In Spouses Ibias v. Macabeo,[29] citing Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc.[30] the Court described reconstitution, thus:
The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a
lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition.
It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land covered by
the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original
certificate of title, by itself does not vest ownership of the land or
estate covered thereby.[31]
Verily, the reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes
restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed
instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of land. The
purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same
way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.[32]
Section 109 of PD 1529[33] provides for the procedure in case of loss of an owner’s duplicate certificate of title:
Section 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate.
– In case of loss or theft of an owner’s duplicate certificate of
title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in
his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the
land lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate
certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person
applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the
registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such
loss or destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person
in interest and registered.Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in
interest, the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the
issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate
certificate, but shall in all respects be entitled to like faith and
credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as
such for all purposes of this decree.
From the foregoing, it appears that for an order of reconstitution
to be issued, it must be clearly shown that the certificate of title
had been lost or destroyed. If a certificate of title has not been lost,
but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the
reconstituted title is void and the court that rendered the decision had
no jurisdiction.[34]
Indubitably, the fact of loss or destruction of the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title is crucial in clothing the RTC with jurisdiction
over the judicial reconstitution proceedings.[35]
As early as the case of Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[36] citing Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals,[37] the Court has held:
[T]hat if a certificate of title has not been lost, but is in
fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted title
is void and the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction.
This was reiterated in Demetriou vs. Court of Appeals and New Durawood Co, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the allegedly lost owner’s
duplicate certificate of title was all the while in the possession of
Atty. Iriarte, who even submitted it as evidence. Indeed, private
respondent has not controverted the genuineness and authenticity of the
said certificate of title. These unmistakably show that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction to order the issuance of a new duplicate, and
the certificate issued is itself void.[38] (Citations omitted)
Similarly, in Spouses Paulino v. Court of Appeals,[39]
the Court reiterated the rule that when the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact
in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void
because the court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
The same ruling holds true in the case of Billote v. Solis,[40]
where the Court pronounced that “since the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title has not been lost, but was in the possession of
William, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition
for the issuance of a new owner’s duplicate certificate of title. Hence,
the CA was correct in declaring the decision of the RTC as well as the
second owner’s duplicate certificate of title issued pursuant thereto a
nullity. It is, therefore, the fact of the loss or existence of the
owner’s duplicate certificate, and not whether the process prescribed by
applicable law was successfully complied with, that determines the
presence or lack of jurisdiction of the trial court.”
Otherwise
stated, reconstitution presupposes the existence of an original
certificate of title which was lost or destroyed. If there was no loss
or destruction as in the case at bar, there is actually nothing to
reconstitute. Here, petitioner clearly alleged in her petition before
the CA that, contrary to the claim of Mary in the reconstitution
proceeding, the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT T-34540 was not really
lost, as the same was surrendered to her by Timoteo and was in her
possession all along. The alleged lost TCT was in fact offered in
evidence by petitioner before the CA and private respondents did not
contest the genuineness and authenticity of the same. Thus, with
evidence that the first owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. T-34540 was
not lost but was actually in the possession of another, the RTC decision
was null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
That there was no
valid contract of sale executed between Perlita and petitioner is of no
moment. The indelible fact remains that the allegedly lost genuine
certificate of title was all the while in the custody of petitioner.
Ergo, the RTC did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the reconstitution proceeding.
In its ruling, the CA cited the case of The Heirs of the Late Sps. Luciano P. Lim v. The Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,[41] (Sps. Lim)
in declaring that a petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court cannot be used to attack the validity of the second
owner’s duplicate certificate of title issued in the reconstitution
proceeding before the RTC, and that the proper remedy of petitioner is
to file a direct action before the RTC for the cancellation of the
reconstituted title. In short, the CA held that petitioner’s resort to a
Rule 47 petition before the CA to impugn the reconstituted title in
favor of Perlita was incorrect.
We do not agree.
The CA’s reliance in the Sps. Lim
is utterly misplaced. In that case, the Court affirmed the CA’s
dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment not because the said
petition was a wrong recourse but because the petitioners therein were
not real parties-in-interest to dispute the reconstitution of the
original and duplicate copy of the TCT in dispute. The CA found that the
property claimed by petitioners in Sps. Lim was entirely different and not even a part of the property covered by the reconstituted title. Thus, the Court held:
We reviewed the titles presented by both parties in the
proceedings below and arrived at the same conclusion as that of the
Court of Appeals. Indeed, per their TCT, petitioners’ lot was derived
from Lot-22-D-3, whereas respondent Cañosa’s covers the entire Lot 22-A.
Simple logic dictates that Lot 22-A is different from Lot-22-D-3, and
that Lot-22-D-3 could not have been in Lot 22-A.Petitioners are not real parties-in-interest because the
reconstitution of the original and duplicate copy of TCT No. 169395 will
have no effect on their property, the latter being different from, and
not even a part of the property covered by the reconstituted title. One
having no right or interest of his own to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court as a party plaintiff in an action, thus
petitioners’ petition for annulment of judgment was rightfully
dismissed.[42] (Emphasis supplied)
Since the property claimed by the petitioners in Sps. Lim
was entirely different, and was not even a part of the land covered by
the certificate of title they sought to be annulled, the Court held that
the petitioners therein did not have the standing to question the
reconstituted title.
On the contrary, it is undisputed that the
property covered by the reconstituted title in the instant case is the
same property covered by the first owner’s duplicate copy of TCT T-34540
which petitioner presented in evidence before the CA and claimed to be
in her possession since September 2009. Considering that the subject of
the controversy herein involves the same property, the ruling of this
Court in Sps. Lim is clearly not applicable in the instant case.
Moreover, in Sps. Lim,
the Court noted that both parties raised issues of ownership and
spuriousness of their respective titles. Thus, the Court stressed the
well-entrenched rule that a certificate of title cannot be subject to
collateral attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a
direct proceeding in accordance with law. Simply put, the Court ruled
that a certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked in a
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court,
thus:
However, the Court of Appeals noted that both parties raised
issues of ownership and spuriousness of their respective titles – with
petitioners claiming that no records exist in the Quezon City Assessor’s
Office nor in the Taxation (Real Estate Division) of the ownership of
respondent Cañosa’s predecessor-in-interest over a 33,914 sq. m. land in
Quezon City, and with respondent Cañosa asserting that the title issued
to petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest is a spurious, having emanated
from a spurious private subdivision survey (Psd) plan. Obviously, the
validity of the parties’ respective titles is being attacked, in a
proceeding which was brought merely to seek the nullification of an
order of reconstitution. This cannot be allowed. It is a well-settled
doctrine that a certificate of title cannot be subject to collateral
attack and can be altered, modified or cancelled only in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. This is the very same reason why the
Court of Appeals could not, and did not deign to, resolve the matter of
ownership. The Court of Appeals’ declaration that it is not a trier of
facts must be taken within this context.[43]
In contrast, it bears stressing that the parties in the instant
case did not impugn their respective titles to the property in question.
An examination of the petition for annulment of judgment before the CA
reveals that petitioner never questioned Perlita’s ownership of the
subject property. In fact, petitioner acknowledged Perlita’s ownership
thereof. Neither did respondents Perlita and Mary in any way challenge
the genuineness and authenticity of the first owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT T-34540 submitted by petitioner. To stress, what petitioner sought
in her Rule 47 petition with the CA was the annulment of the RTC
Decision reconstituting TCT T-34540, on the ground that the first
owner’s duplicate copy thereof was never lost but was in fact in her
possession all along. Petitioner only needed to show the fact that the
owner’s duplicate copy was not, in truth, missing in order to determine
the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court resulting in the annulment
of judgment thereof. The CA’s application of the ruling of the Court in Sps. Lim is, therefore, plainly misplaced in view of its factual variance with the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The August 15, 2014 Decision and November 14, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129945 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The August 28, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 12, in CAD Case No. 47-12 is ANNULLED
and the new owner’s duplicate certificate of title issued by authority
of the said proceedings in lieu of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-34540 is declared VOID. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Zalameda, Rosario, and Marquez, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, S.A.J., on official business.
[*] Acting Chairperson, per Special Order No. 2872 dated March 4, 2022.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-21.
[2] Id. at 67-75. Penned by Associate Justice Eduardo P. Peralta, Jr. with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Stephen C. Cruz.
[3] Id. at 77-78.
[4] Id. at 24-28.
[5] Id. at 37-38.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 35-36.
[8] Id. at 6.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 29-31.
[11] Id. at 31.
[12] Id. at 30.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 22-23.
[15] Id. at 23.
[16] Id. at 56-65.
[17] Id. at 58-63.
[18] Id. at 73.
Presidential Decree No. 1529 is entitled “AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE
LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION Of PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.”
Approved: June 11, 1978.
[19] Id. at 74.
[20] Id. at 77-78.
[21] Id. at 10-17.
[22] Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 1.
[23] 609 Phil. 355 (2009).
[24] Id. at 367, citing Alba v. Court of Appeals, 503 Phil. 451, 464 (2005), and Linzag v. Court of Appeals, 353 Phil. 506, 524 (1998).
[25] Sps. Leynes v. Court of Appeals, 655 Phil. 25, 45 (2011).
[26] Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 725 Phil. 590, 602-603 (2014).
[27] Chua v. People, 821 Phil. 271, 280 (2017).
[28] Sebastian v. Spouses Cruz, 807 Phil. 738, 743 (2017).
[29] 793 Phil. 389 (2016).
[30] 426 Phil. 61, 83-84 (2002), citing Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 217, 230 (1998).
[31] Supra note 29 at 396.
[32] Sebastian v. Spouses Cruz, supra note 28.
[33] Entitled “AMENDING
AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF PROPERTY AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.” Approved: June 11, 1978.
[34] Spouses Ibias v. Macabeo, supra note 29 at 397.
[35] Sebastian v. Spouses Cruz, supra note 28 at 744.
[36] Supra note 30.
[37] 272-A Phil. 467, 482 (1991).
[38] Supra note 36 at 227-228.
[39] 735 Phil. 448, 460 (2014).
[40] 760 Phil. 712, 724 (2015).
[41] 586 Phil. 310, 319 (2008).
[42] Id. at 317-318.
[43] Id. at 319.