ATLAS DEVELOPMENT AND ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION (FORMERLY ATLAS CEMENT CORPORATION), PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. HON. BENJAMIN M. GOZON, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCE…

The Court of First
Instance of Rizal, upon motion of respondent Pasig Mining Association, dismissed the peti­tion of Atlas
Development and Acceptance Corporation seeking to set aside the decisions of
the Director of Mines and of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
concerning certain conflicting mineral claims in Antipolo,
Rizal.  Also
dismissed was the cross-claim filed by respondent Carsec
Mining Corporation.  The matter is now
before us on appeal by ATLAS and CARSEC from the order of dismissal.

It is alleged that ATLAS,
long before filing the petition under consideration, discovered limestone
deposits in Antipolo, Rizal.  In conformity with the provisions of the
Mining Act it located, staked, and recorded three mineral claims (denominated
Atlas I, Atlas II and Atlas III) and filed the corresponding lease
applications.  Respondent CARSEC
protested and alleged that said claims overlapped or were in conflict with
claims of its own.  Similar overlappings were alleged by PASIG
and by one Manuel J.C. Reyes.  The
conflict was ventilated before the Director of Mines, who ruled as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office believes and so holds
that the pro­testant has the preferential right to lease the area in question
covered by its “CARSEC I and IV” claims, and respondent Pasig Mining Association has the prefer­ential right to
lease the area in question covered by its ‘PAMIAS I,
II and III’ placer claims.”

Upon appeal to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (who incidentally was himself
the Director who decided the case in the first instance) the decision was
affirmed.  Disagreeing with the decision,
ATLAS filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Civil Case No. 7508) against the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the Director of Mines, Carsec Mining
Association, Pasig Mining Association and Manuel J.C.
Reyes.

After reciting the
antecedent facts leading to the decision of the Secretary, the petition
proceeds as follows:

“14.  That the aforementioned De­cision (Annex ‘D’)
rendered by the Director of Mines and the Decision (An­nex ‘F’) of Respondent
Honorable Ben­jamin M. Gozon as Secretary of Agri­culture
and Natural Resources are both contrary to law and the evidence in that, among
others, ?

(a)    the Respondent Carsec Mining Association was not in existence at the time
its mineral claims were al­legedly discovered on December 31, 1956 and allegedly located on January 5-29, 1957 because even per
its supposed Articles of Association, it was formed only on March 25, 1957;

(b)    the Placer Mineral Claims PAMIAS I, PAMIAS
II and PAMIAS III of Respondent Pasig Mining
Association were not actually located in the field as strictly and specifically
required by the Mining Law as amended,
and that while the theory of said respondent was that said claims were merely
relocations, even said relocations, assuming the same to be true, were
defective and do not com­ply with the strict requirements of the provisions of
the Mining Law as amended relating to discovery and location of Placer Mineral
Claims;

Further, petitioner reserves the right to invoke other points of
error committed by said respondents Director of Mines and Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources in their respective decisions;

15.  That on the other hand, Placer Mineral
Claims, “Atlas I”, “Atlas II” and “Atlas III” of
petitioner herein had all been actually located in the field strictly in accordance with the provi­sions
of the Mining Law as amended, the lease applications therefor
having been already been duly filed with the Bureau of Mines and the lease
surveys therefor having been approved by the said
Office;

16.   That the Placer Mineral Claims, particularly Carsec II, Carsec III and Carsec V, of the Respondent Carsec
Mining Association and the Placer Mineral Claims Pamias
I, Pamias II and Pamias III
of Respondent Pasig Mining Association not having
been validly located in accordance with the Mining Law as amended, and considering that
the Placer Mineral Claim “Manny” of Respondent Manuel J.C. Reyes
having been allegedly located and registered much later already than the dates
of registration of “Atlas I”, “Atlas II” and “Atlas III” Placer Mineral
Claims of petitioner herein, that, therefore, the petitioner herein, has the
exclu­sive and prior right over the areas in question covered by its
“Atlas I”, “At­las II” and “Atlas III” and has
the pre­ferential right to lease the same to the exclusion of any other party.”

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended by Republic Act No. 746,
otherwise known as the Mining Law, Petitioner respectfully prays:

1.     That
the decision (Annex ‘D’) of the Respondent Director of Mines and the decision
(Annex ‘F’) of the Res­pondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
be set aside;

2.     That the mineral claims of the respondents,
namely, Carsec Mining Association, Pasig Mining Association and Manuel J.C. Reyes which
overlapped and are in conflict with Placer Mineral Claims “Atlas I”,
“Atlas II” and “At­las III” of the petitioner herein be
declared null and void;

3.     That judgment be rendered declaring that
the petitioner herein has the exclusive and prior right over the areas in
question covered by its “Atlas I”, “Atlas II” and
“Atlas III” and has the preferential right to lease the same to the
ex­clusion of any other party;

4.     Further,
petitioner prays for such other relief as may be just and equitable under the
premises.”

CARSEC filed its answer
to the petition with a cross-claim against PASIG, praying that the decision be
set aside insofar as the mining areas awarded to the latter were concerned, and
that said cross-claimant be given the preferential right to lease the same.

PASIG filed a motion to dismiss both the petition
of ATLAS and the cross-claim of CARSEC on the ground of lack of cause of
action.  The lower court defined the
issue posed by the said motion as follows: 
“whether this action should be considered as an independent
ordinary civil action or that the petition should be considered either as a
form of appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources or a petition for certiorari. 
The court then went on to rule in effect that an independent civil
action to resolve mining conflicts is not authorized by law; that such
conflicts should be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision, with the
right of appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources; and that
it is from the decision of either one of these officials that recourse may be
had to the court either by appeal or by certiorari.  Upon those premises the court granted the
motion to dismiss in this wise:

“As this petition is
neither an appeal because it has not complied with the formalities
regarding appeal, or a petition for certiorari because it has failed to make
all the necessary allegations as required by law, the Court finds that the
petition has not made out a valid cause of action.

The cross-claim filed by the Carsec
Mining Association lacks merit.  As the
main petition has failed to state a valid cause of action, it necessarily
follows that the cross-claim has like­wise no reason to exist.  In this connection, the position of
cross-claimant Carsec Mining Co. is even more
precarious because Carsec did not appeal the deci­sion
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and consonant with the
provisions of Section 61 of Commonwealth Act No. 137, as amended, the
“decision or order shall be final and binding” upon him.”

ATLAS maintains that the
petition it filed in the court below is not, nor is it intended to be, an
appeal or a petition for certiorari, but rather an ordinary civil action filed
in a court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with section 61 of the
Mining Act, which pro­vides:

“SEC. 61. Conflicts and disputes
arising out of mining locations shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for
decision.  Provided, that the de­cision
or order of the Director of Mines may be appealed to the Secre­tary of
Agriculture and Natural Re­sources within 30 days from the date of its
receipt.  In case anyone of the parties
should disagree from the decision or order of the Director of Mines or of the
Secretary of Agri­culture and Natural Resources, the matter maybe taken to a court of competent jurisdiction
within thirty (30) days from the
receipt of such deci­sion or order; x x x “

It is at once evident that the law just quoted does not
contemplate a special civil action in certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which is available only when a tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion and there is no appeal or other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  Certiorari is ruled out by the fact that the matter may be taken to
court directly from the decision of the Director of Mines, this notwith­standing
the availability of appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.  Nor would it be logical to
say that after such appeal has been taken certiorari is the proper recourse
from the decision of the Secretary, for the law speaks of only one
and the same judicial remedy from the decision of either of the said officials;
and if it is not certiorari as against the Director
it cannot be certiorari as against the Department head.

The order of dismissal under review implies that, alternatively,
Section 61 of the Mining Act contemplates an appeal, which according to the
lower court must comply “with the formalities regarding appeal.”  That the Court of First Instance is a
“court of competent jurisdiction” within the meaning of the said provision is conceded by the
parties.  Consequently the
“formalities regarding appeal” mentioned in the order must have
reference to those provided in Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which deals with
appeals from inferior courts to Courts of First Instance.

We are not convinced that this was the intention of the lawmaking
body when it drafted Section 61 of the Mining Act.  If it were, it should have been easy enough
to so provide, in explicit and unmistakeable
language, instead of saying merely that the matter may be taken to court.  It is significant that Section 61 does speak
of appeal, but (from the decision of the Director of Mines) to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. 
Furthermore we see no cogent reason, considering the terms of the
statute, to hold that the formalities pre­scribed in Rule 40 must be followed,
such as perfection of the appeal within fifteen (15) days, posting of an appeal
bond, reproduction of pleadings on appeal, vacation of the judgment appealed
from and trial de novo in the Court of First Instance.^[1]

On the other hand, we
cannot subscribe to the view of appellant ATLAS that what is authorized by
Section 61 is an ordinary civil action brought before the Court and triable by it without regard to the decisions of the
administrative officials.  If that were
so there would be no point in the mandatory character of the first sentence of
the provision, that “conflicts and disputes arising out of mining locations
shall be submitted to the Director of Mines for decision,” nor in the
subsequent portion which states that the case may be taken to court “in
case anyone of the parties should disagree” with the decision or order of
the Director, or of the Secretary on appeal. 
What is implicit in the law is not an ordinary original civil action,
nor even a trial de novo of the case, but in reality a review of
the administrative decision.  This is our
ruling in Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Judge Jose
M. Mendoza, et al., L-15809, August
30, 1961.  Indeed the very
allegations in the petition of ATLAS below show that it is meant to seek such
review, by impleading respondent officials, pointing
out the errors committed by them and asking that their respective decisions be
set aside.

Section 61 does not
provide the precise procedure to be followed, except to fix a period of thirty
(30) days within which to take the matter to court; but we are satisfied that
the petition filed in the Court below is sufficient for the purpose
intended.  Judicial review of the
decision of an administrative official is of course subject to certain
guideposts laid down in many decided cases. 
Thus, for instance, findings of fact in such decision should not be
disturbed if supported by substantial evidence; but review is justified when
there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law, or fraud, col­lusion
or arbitrary action in the administrative proceed­ing.  Whether or not the findings of fact in the
deci­sions sought to be reviewed in this case find support in the evidence is a
question that must await the trial.  We
do hold, however, that as a petition for review, the action filed by ATLAS in
the lower court is not open to attack on a motion to dismiss for
lack of cause of action:  it contains
sufficient allegations to warrant judicial cog­nizance under Section 61 of the
Mining Act.

With respect to the case of CARSEC, whose cross-claim against PASIG
and Manuel J.C. Reyes was dismissed by the lower court, such dismissal should
be maintained, because the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources had already become final insofar as the subject of the cross-claim is concerned.  In view of our conclusion that the proceeding
initiated by ATLAS in the Court of First Instance is not an ordinary original
civil action, it did not leave the door open for a cross-claim on the part of
any of the respondents, which likewise seeks a review of the administrative
decision, unless such cross-claim was filed within the thirty-day period
prescribed by the statute.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the
case remanded for further proceedings with respect to the petition of Atlas
Development and Accept­ance Corporation; and affirmed with respect to the
cross-claim of CARSEC Mining Association. 
No pronouncement as to costs.

Reyes, Bengzon, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, JJ., are on leave.

^[1]
This case may be distinguished from the
case of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, vs. Hora, 97 Phil. 125, where it was held that an appeal from
the decision of the Secretary under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 739 may be taken in the same manner as
appeals are made in the courts of justice in ordinary civil actions. Act 739
refers to reconstruction or reconstitution of lost or destroyed mining records
in the Bureau of Mines, and Section 4 speci­fically provides that the decision
of the Secretary “may be taken to the court of
competent jurisdiction as in ordinary civil cases within thirty (30) days from receipt of such decision . . .”