SIMON DE LA CRUZ, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE CAPITAL INSURANCE & SURETY CO., INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal by the
Capital Insurance & Surety Company, Inc., from the decision of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (in Civ. Case No. U-265),
ordering it to indemnify therein plaintiff Simon de la Cruz for the
death of the latter’s son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorney’s
fees.

Eduardo de la Cruz, employed as a mucker in the
Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. in Baguio, was the holder of an accident
insurance policy (No. ITO-BFA-170) underwritten by the Capital
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., for the period beginning November 13,
1956 to November 12, 1957. On January 1, 1957, in connection with the
celebration of the New Year, the Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. sponsored a
boxing contest for general entertainment wherein the insured Eduardo de
la Cruz, a non-professional boxer, participated. In the course of his
bout with another person, likewise a non-professional, of the same
height, weight, and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent
on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with
his head hitting the rope of the ring. He was brought to the Baguio
General Hospital unconscious, where the insured expired on the
following day. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage,
intracranial, left.

Simon de la Cruz, the father of the
insured and who was named beneficiary under the policy, thereupon filed
a claim with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under
the insurance policy. As the claim was denied, De la Cruz instituted
the action in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for specific
performance. Defendant insurer set up the defense that the death of the
insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not
accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance. After due hearing,
the court rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff which is the
subject of the present appeal.

It is not disputed that during the ring-fight with another
non-professional boxer, Eduardo Slipped, which was unintentional. At
this opportunity, his opponent landed on Eduardo’s head a blow, which
sent the latter to the ropes. That must have caused the cranial injury
that led to his death. Eduardo was insured “against death or disability
caused by accidental means”. Appellant insurer now contends that while
the death of the insured was due to head-injury, said injury was
sustained because of his voluntary participation in the contest. It is
claimed that the participation in the boxing contest was the “means”
that produced the injury which, in turn, caused the death of the
insured. And, since his inclusion in the boxing card was voluntary on
the part of the insured, he cannot be considered to have met his death
by “accidental means”.

The terms “accident” and
“accidental”, as used in insurance contracts, have not acquired any
technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary
and common acceptation. Thus, the terms have been taken to mean that
which happen by chance or fortuitously, without intention and design,
and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen. An accident is an
event that takes place without one’s foresight or expectation – an
event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an unusual effect of a
known cause and, therefore, not expected.^[1]

Appellant, however, would like to make a distinction between
“accident or accidental” and “accidental means”, which is the term used
in the insurance policy involved here. It is argued that to be
considered within the protection of the policy, what is required to be
accidental is the means that caused or brought the death and not the
death itself. It may be mentioned in this connection, that the tendency
of court decisions in the United States in recent years is to eliminate
the fine distinction between the terms “accidental” and “accidental
means” and to consider them as legally synonymous.^[2]
But, even if we take appellant’s theory, the death of the insured in
the case at bar would still be entitled to indemnification under the
policy. The generally accepted rule is that, death or injury does not
result from accident or accidental means within the terms of an
accident-policy if it is the natural result of the insured’s voluntary
act, unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death or injury.^[3]
There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some
additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs
which produces or brings about the result of injury or death.^[4]
In other words, where the death or injury is not the natural or
probable result of the insured’ s voluntary act, or if something
unforeseen occurs in the doing of the act which produces the injury,
the resulting death is within the protection of policies insuring
against death or injury from accident.

In the present case, while the participation of the
insured in the boxing contest is voluntary, the injury was sustained
when he slid, giving occasion to the infliction by his opponent of the
blow that threw him to the ropes of the ring. Without this unfortunate
incident, that is, the unintentional slipping of the deceased, perhaps
he could not have received that blow in the head and would not have
died. The fact that boxing is attended with some risks of external
injuries does not make any injuries received in the course of the game
not accidental. In boxing, as in other equally physically rigorous
sports, such as basketball or baseball, death is not ordinarily
anticipated to result. If, therefore, it ever does, the injury or death
can only be accidental or produced by some unforeseen happening or
event as what occurred in this case.

Furthermore, the policy involved herein specifically excluded from its coverage—

“(e) Death or disablement consequent upon the
Insured engaging in football, hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing,
polo playing, racing of any kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling.”

Death
or disablement resulting from engagement in boxing contests was not
declared outside of the protection of the insurance contract. Failure
of the defendant insurance company to include death resulting from a
boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads
inevitably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt
itself from liability for such death.^[5]

WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Concepcion, C. J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

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^[1] 29A Am Jur. pp. 308-309, and cases cited therein.

^[2] Travelers’ protective Association vs. Stephens, 185 Ark. 660, 49 S.W. (2d) 364; Equitable Life Assur. vs. Hemenover, 100 Colo. 231, 67 P. (2d) 80, 110 ALR 1270; see cases cited in 29A Am. Jur. sec. 1166.

^[3] Landress vs. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 291, 78 L. ed. 934, 54 S. Ct. 46..1, 90 ALR 1382; Davis vs. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 73 F. (2d) 330, 96 ALR 599, and others.

^[4] Evans vs. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 26 Wash. (2d) 594, 174 P. (2d) 961.

^[5] Brams vs. New York Life Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 11, 148 Atl. 855; Jolley vs. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 95 Wash. 683, 294 Pac. 585.