G.R. No. 214542. January 13, 2021
RONNIE L. SINGSON, PETITIONER, VS. ARKTIS MARITIME CORP./FILPRIDE SHIPPING, CO., INC./PROSPER MARINE PRIVATE LTD., RESPONDENTS.
HERNANDO, J.:
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 07134 denying petitioner
Ronnie Singson’s (Ronnie) claim for permanent and total disability
benefits.
Antecedent Facts:
On January 13, 2010, respondent Fil-Pride Shipping Co. (Fil-Pride),
for and in behalf of its foreign principal, respondent Prosper Marine
Private Ltd. (Prosper)[4] hired Ronnie as “third engineer officer” on board the vessel “MIT Atlanta 2” for a period of 10 months.[5]
Ronnie boarded the vessel on January 20, 2010 and commenced his employment.[6] Concurrently, Fil-Pride was replaced by Arktis Maritime Corp. (Arktis) as the new manning agent of Prosper.[7]
On October 13, 2010, petitioner complained of severe stomach pains
and was confined at the Citymed Hospital in Singapore. On October 14,
2010, Dr. Noel Yao, petitioner’s attending physician, declared him to be
fit to rejoin the vessel with rest on board for three more days.[8] When his condition did not improve, petitioner was recommended for repatriation.
He arrived in Manila on October 17, 2010.[9] The following day, he was referred for a medical check-up at the company’s accredited clinic, Christian Medical Clinic, Inc.[10]
The company physician, Dr. Lyn C. de Leon (Dr. de Leon), diagnosed
petitioner as suffering from “cholecystlithiasis and r/o pancreatic
pseudo cyst,” with a recommendation for surgery.[11]
About four months later, or exactly 134 days from petitioner’s
arrival in Manila, he again underwent an examination. This time, he was
declared by Dr. de Leon as “fit to work” in the Medical Report dated
February 28, 2011.[12]
On September 12, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint against
respondents Arktis, Fil-Pride, and Prosper for the payment of his
disability benefits, sickness allowance, refund of medical expenses, as
well as damages and attorney’s fees.[13]
Petitioner alleged that after he was diagnosed with the disease and recommended for surgery, Arktis took no action on the same.[14] Consequently, he consulted Dr. Villanueva who recommended that he undergo an operation.[15]
Due to Arktis’ inaction, petitioner claimed that he was forced to
undertake medication at his own expense without receiving any assistance
from the respondents.[16] He
further alleged that Arlctis denied him his sickness and medical
benefits and failed to give him an assessment of his disability.[17]
Considering that he contracted the illness during the term of his
employment contract, he maintained that his illness was work-related.[18]
Moreover, petitioner argued that for more than a year since his
medical repatriation on October 17, 2010, he has been unable to resume
work as a seafarer and there has been no finding or declaration from the
companyÂdesignated physician regarding his disability.[19]
Consequently, he prayed for payment of permanent and total disability
benefits, the refund of his medical expenses, damages and attorney’s
fees.[20]
On the other hand, respondents alleged that petitioner was no longer
in their employ after the latter voluntarily disembarked from “MIT/
Atlanta 2” on October 17, 2010.[21]
In the absence of an employment relationship between the parties,
respondents claimed that no liability should attach to them especially
since petitioner himself freely executed a letter of appreciation in
favor of the company.[22] Respondents also stressed that petitioner was already declared as fit to work by the company physician.[23]
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter (Arbiter):
The Arbiter granted[24] petitioner’s claim for disability benefits, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondents ARKTIS MARITIME
CORPORATION, FIL-PRIDE SHIPPING COMPANY, INC. AND PROSPER MARINE PRlVATE
LTD., are hereby Ordered to pay complainant jointly and solidarily the
following amounts:
The awards in U.S. Dollars are convertible to Philippine Currency on the date of actual payment.
The rest of the claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission:
Aggrieved, respondents filed an appeal with the NLRC by submitting their Memorandum of Appeal[26] and attaching a Motion to Reduce Bond and Admit Surety Bond[27] in the amount of P800,000. However, the NLRC dismissed their appeal in its March 15, 2012 Resolution[28] on the ground that it was filed out of time. Consequently, it denied their motion to reduce the appeal bond.[29]
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting on the
timeliness of their appeal as shown by the registry return receipts and
the affidavit of the person who served the registered mail, and the
certification from the postmaster.[30]
On August 23, 2012, the NLRC issued a Resolution[31]
holding that the appeal was indeed filed on time, as posited by
respondents. Nevertheless, the NLRC resolved the respondents’ Motion for
Reconsideration in this wise:
In the instant case, We do not find merit in respondents’ request to be allowed to post a reduced cash bond.
x x x x
In the instant case, We do not find any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Labor Arbiter when he found for complainant and when he
cited the case of the Heirs of the Late Radio Operator Reynaldo Aniban v. NLRC.
The Labor Arbiter also correctly awarded complainant full disability
benefits, sickness allowance, damages and attorney’s fees.WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent’s motion for reconsideration is DENIED and their appeal DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[32]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
Aggrieved, Arktis filed a Petition[33] for Certiorari
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC in denying their motion
for reconsideration and dismissing their appeal. Moreover, the monetary
awards in favor of petitioner were baseless considering that
petitioner’s illness was not work-related.
In its assailed May 31, 2013 Decision,[34]
the appellate court reversed the ruling of the NLRC. It found
petitioner not entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
Thefallo of the appellate court’s Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated 15 March 2012
and 23 August 2012 promulgated by the National Labor Relations
Commission Seventh Division in Cebu City in NLRC Case No. OFW
VAC-02-000008-2012 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. A new judgment is
accordingly rendered ordering Arlctis, Fil-Pride and Prosper to jointly
and severally pay Singson the following amounts:1) sickness allowance equivalent to Singson’s basic wage
corresponding to the 134 days he was unable to work amounting to
US$4426.47;2) refund of Singson’s medical expenses amounting to Php9,396;
3) moral damages of Php30,000;
4) exemplary damages of Php20,000;
5) attorney’s fees of Php20,000.
SO ORDERED.[35]
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[36] but it was denied by the appellate court in its August 15, 2014 Resolution.[37]
Hence, the instant Petition raising the sole –
Issue
Whether or not the CA committed serious errors of law in ruling that he
is not entitled to the award of total and permanent disability benefits.[38]
Our Ruling
The Petition is denied.
The mere lapse of the 120-day period
under Article 198(c)(l) of the Labor
Code does not automatically give rise
to a cause of action for a claim of
permanent total disability benefits.
To determine whether or not an error of law was committed, we must
first examine what the applicable law actually says. Relevantly, how
“permanent total disability” is defined under the law is of utmost
importance to the resolution of sole issue in this petition. Article 198
(formerly Article 192) of the Labor Code, as amended, defines
“permanent total disability” as follows:
Article 198. [192] Permanent total disability. – x x x
x x x x
The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty
days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules;The number of months of paid coverage shall be
defined and approximated by a formula to be approved by the Commission.
(Emphasis supplied)
Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.(Vergara)[39]
clearly clarifies that the qualifying phrase “except as otherwise
provided in the Rules” quoted above means those rules adopted to
implement the provisions of the Labor Code, to wit:
In this respect and in the context of the present case, Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code provides that:
x x x The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules;
x x x
The rule referred to – Rule X, Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations implementing Book IV of the Labor Code- states:
Period of entitlement. – (a) The income benefit shall be paid
beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or
sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except
where such injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond
120 days but not to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which
case benefit for temporary total disability shall be paid.
However, the System may declare the total and permanent status at any
time after 120 days of continuous temporary total disability as may be
warranted by the degree of actual loss or impairment of physical or
mental functions as determined by the System.These provisions are to be read hand in hand with the POEA Standard Employment Contract whose Section 20 (3) states:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the
seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage
until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability
has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case
shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his
vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within three (3)
days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the duration of the
treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary
total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic
wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his
temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent,
either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA
Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the
120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made
because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the
temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240
days, subject to the right of the employer to declare within this
period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The
seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by his medical condition.[40] (Underscoring in the original)
Indeed, the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation (AREC), as
adopted by the Employees Compensation Commission, provides for an
exception to the general rule provided by Article 192. Rule X, Section
2(a) of the AREC expressly provides thus:
Section 2. Period of entitlement. – (a) The income
benefit shall be paid beginning on the first day of such disability. If
caused by an injury or sickness it shall not be paid longer than 120
consecutive days except where such injury or sickness still requires
medical attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 davs from onset
of disability in which case benefit for temporary total disability
shall be paid. However, the System may declare the total and permanent
status at any time after 120 days of continuous temporary total
disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss or
impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
(Underscoring supplied)
The above provision must be read with Section 1(b), Rule XI of the same AREC, which provides:
(b) The following total disabilities shall be considered permanent:
(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided for in Rule X hereof.
(2) Complete loss of sight of both eyes;
(3) Loss of two limbs at or above the ankle or wrist;
(4) Permanent complete paralysis of two limbs.
(5) Brain injury resulting in incurable imbecility and insanity, and
(6) Such cases as determined by the System and approved by the Commission. (Underscoring supplied)
The AREC thus carved out an exception for situations wherein such injury
or sickness causing temporary total disability still requires medical
attendance beyond 120 days but not to exceed 240 days from the onset of
disability. In such situations, the benefits for temporary total
disability shall be paid. As an exception to this exception, the rule
provides that the System (GSIS or SSS, whichever is applicable) may
declare the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of
continuous temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree
of actual loss or impairment of physical or mental functions. This was
also explained in Vergara where it was held that:
As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off
from his vessel, must report to the company-designated physician within
three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. For the
duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman
is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He
receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to
work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined
under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine
laws. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such
declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical
attention, then the temporary total disability period may be extended up
to a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of the employer to
declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability
already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at
any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition.[41](Underscoring supplied)
In C.F. Sharp Crew Management, Inc. v. Taok,[42] we have further distilled the principles laid down in Vergara
and clearly set out the conditions when an action for total and
permanent disability may prosper. These conditions were reiterated in Daraug v. KGJS Fleet Management Manila, Inc.[43] as follows:
Actually, petitioner’s filing of his claim was premature.
The Court has held that a seafarer may have basis to pursue an action
for total and permanent disability benefits, if any of the following
conditions are present:(a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as
to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse
of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical
treatment would address his temporary total disability, hence, justify
an extension of the period to 240 days;(b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician;
(c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea
duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his
physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20 B(3) of the
POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion;(d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is
partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on
his own and jointly with his employer, believed that his disability is
not only permanent but total as well;(e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally
and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability
grading;(f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical
condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his
doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of
the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work;(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and
permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the
corresponding benefits; and(h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and
permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains
incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said
periods.[44]
To be clear, when a certain sickness or injury causes a temporary and
total disability which lasts continuously for more than 120 days, then
such total disability is considered to be permanent. However, as an
exception to this rule, if the said sickness or injury that caused the
temporary total disability requires medical treatment beyond the 120-day period but not to exceed 240 days,
then the employee is only entitled to temporary total disability
benefits until he is declared as either: 1) “fit to work,” which stops
his entitlement to disability benefits; or 2) “permanently and totally
disabled,” which then entitles him to permanent total disability
benefits. In any event, if the 240 days had lapsed without any
certification issued by the companyÂdesignated doctor, then the employee
may pursue an action for permanent total disability benefits.
With the above principles in mind, we must now determine whether the CA correctly applied the same to the present case.
The appellate court did not commit
any error of law when it ruled that
petitioner is not entitled to total and
permanent disability benefits.
The CA applied in this case the principles in Vergara since the factual milieu involved is similar.[45]
It held that petitioner was not entitled to permanent total disability
benefits but only to temporary disability benefits until the time he was
declared fit to work by the company physician, Dr. de Leon.[46]
Petitioner, however, claims that the appellate court’s Decision is
erroneous. The fact that he still had to undergo surgery even after the
company doctor’s fit-to-work declaration clearly shows that he was not
yet fit to work during the time when the said declaration was made.[47] He then cited the case of Crystal Shipping v. Natividad (Crystal Shipping)[48] and other related jurisprudence to support his claim.
Petitioner’s arguments clearly have no merit.
Petitioner failed to prove that the
company physician issued the fit to
work certification dated February 28,
2011 in bad faith.
Petitioner’s mere allegation of bad faith cannot prevail over a
medical certificate issued and signed by a duly licensed physician. Such
medical certificates, even if unnotarized, bear all the earmarks of
regularity in their issuance and are entitled to full probative weight.[49]
He who alleges must prove.[50] Petitioner’s imputations of bad faith must be duly proven.[51]
In this case, he utterly failed to discharge this burden of proof when
he merely alleged possible ulterior motives behind the company
physician’s certification, without presenting proof to support such
allegations. Simply put, petitioner’s allegations discrediting the
medical certificate issued by Dr. de Leon on February 28, 2011 cannot be
given any weight as there is nothing on record to support the same.
A recommendation to undergo
surgery does not necessarily prove
that petitioner was not fit to work.
Rather, such recommendation merely
proves that further medical
treatment is needed.
We cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that the fit-to-work
declaration was “absurd” since he still had to undergo surgery even
after such declaration was made; the recommendation for surgery does not
necessarily mean that petitioner is still not fit to work.
A person with a disease may be asymptomatic; he/she may not be
showing symptoms of the disease. While still stricken by the disease,
he/she may not even be aware of it, or even if he/she is aware of such
disease, he/she may continue to function without impairment.
In this case, it is entirely possible that petitioner, while still
afflicted with a disease, was not manifesting any symptoms, or that such
symptoms were already managed in such a way that they did not manifest
anymore. Thus, when he was examined by Dr. de Leon, it is possible that
the latter might have determined that the disease that petitioner was
diagnosed with had no notable effect on his fitness to work. Indeed, the
mere presence of a disease is not necessarily a disability.
The Crystal Shipping case and its
related line of cases do not apply to
the factual circumstances of the
present case.
Finally, Crystal Shipping is not on all fours with the present case. In Crystal Shipping, the employee-respondent therein was never declared to be fit to work
by any of the doctors involved in said case, and the primary issue was
merely the grading or degree of disability employee-respondent therein
suffered.[52] On the other hand, the instant petition presents to us a situation wherein petitioner was expressly declared to be asymptomatic and fit to work.[53]
We have already explained in Vergara that several considerations must be taken into account when citing the same Crystal Shipping case, to wit:
As a last point, the petitioner has repeatedly invoked
our ruling in Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, apparently for its
statement that the respondent in the case “was unable to perform his
customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total
disability.” This declaration of a permanent total disabilitv after
the initial 120 days of temporary total disability cannot. however, be
simply lifted and applied as a general rule for all cases in all
contexts. The specific context of the application should be considered,
as we must do in the application of all rulings and even of the law and
of the implementing regulations.Crystal Shipping was a case where the seafarer was completely unable
to work for three years and was undisputably unfit for sea duty “due to
respondent’s need for regular medical check-up and treatment which
would not be available if he were at sea.” While the case was not clear
on how the initial 120-day and subsequent temporary total disability
period operated, what appears clear is that the disability went beyond 240 days without any declaration that the seafarer was fit to resume work.
Under the circumstances, a ruling of permanent and total disability was
called for, fully in accordance with the operation of the period for
entitlement that we described above. Viewed from this perspective, the
petitioner caunot cite the Crystal Shipping ruling as basis for his
claim for permanent total disability.Additionally and to reiterate what we pointed out above regarding the
governing rules that affect the disability of Filipino seafarers in
ocean-going vessels, the POEA Standard Employment Contract provides its
own Schedule of Disability or Impediment for Injuries Suffered and
Diseases Including Occupational Diseases or Illness Contracted (Section
32); Disability Allowances (a subpart of Section 32); and its own
guidelines on Occupational Diseases (Section 32-A) which caunot be
disregarded in considering disability compensation and benefits. All
these – read in relation with applicable Philippine laws and rules –
should also be taken into account in considering and citing Crystal
Shipping and its related line of cases as authorities.[54] (Underscoring supplied).
As applied in the instant case, the records show that there was no
declaration as to petitioner’s fitness to work or as to the permanent
and total status of his disability within the 120-day period. However,
since petitioner’s sickness required medical treatment beyond the
120-day period, the temporary total disability period was extended up to
a maximum of 240 days, subject to the right of his employer to declare
within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already
exists. In this connection, petitioner never presented any declaration
to the effect that his disability is total and permanent.
On the contrary, the evidence on record would reveal that petitioner
was declared as asymptomatic and fit to work on Februarv 28, 2011 or one
hundred thirty-four (134) days after the onset of the disability,
well within the 240-day period. Therefore, petitioner cannot claim
permanent total disability benefits and is only entitled to temporary
total disability benefits until the time when he was declared to be fit
to work.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 31, 2013 Decision and August 15, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07134 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen, J, (Chairperson), Inting, Lopez,* and Rosario, JJ., concur.
*
Designated as additional Member per raffle dated December 21, 2020 vice
J. Delos Santos who recused himself for having penned the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals.
[1] Rollo, pp. 10-29.
[2] Id. at 32-44; penned by
Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos (now a Member of this Court)
and concurred in by Associate Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and
Maria Elisa Sempio Diy.
[3] Id. at 47-48; penned by
Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos (now a Member of this Court)
and concurred in by Associate Justices Pamela Ann and Jhosep Y. Lopez.
[4] Id. at 32.
[5] Id.
[6] Id.
[7] Id. at 33.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id. at 33.
[13] Id.
[14] Id. at 34.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Id. at 34.
[21] Id.
[22] Id.
[23] Id.
[24] CA rollo, pp. 78-84.
[25] Id. at 83-84.
[26] Id. at 85-107.
[27] Id. at 116-121.
[28] Id. at 21-33.
[29] Id. at 22.
[30] Id. at 151-158.
[31] Id. at 25-33.
[32] Id. at 31-32.
[33] Id. at 3-19.
[34] Rollo, pp. 32-44.
[35] Id. at 43-44.
[36] CA rollo, pp. 445-455.
[37] Rollo, pp. 47-48.
[38] Id. at 11.
[39] 588 Phil. 895 (2008).
[40] Id. at 911-912.
[41] Id. at 912.
[42] 691 Phil. 531 (2012).
[43] 750 Phil. 949 (2015).
[44] Id. at 964-965.
[45] Rollo, at pp. 37-39.
[46] Id. at 43-44.
[47] Id.
[48] 510 Phil. 332 (2005).
[49] Union Motor Coporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 487 Phil. 197, 208-209 (2004).
[50] Lim v. Equitable PCI Bank, 724 Phil. 453, 461 (2014).
[51] Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd v. Spouses Vazquez, 447 Phil. 306, 321-322 (2003).
[52] Crystal Shipping, Inc. v. Natividad, supra, note 48.
[53] Rollo, p. 33.
[54] Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., supra, note 39 at 915-916.