RAMON ZARAGOZA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VICTOR ALFONSO, AS TREASURER OF THE CITY OF MANILA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

JOHNSON, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila on or about the 25th day of October, 1922. Its purpose was to recover of
the defendant the sum of P2,029.50, which the former had paid to the latter as a
license fee under Ordinance No. 301 of the City of Manila, which sum was paid
under protest. The license fee was required by the City of Manila for the
construction of an arcade on a building located at Nos. 242-432 Rizal Avenue, in
the district of Santa Cruz of the City of Manila. The said sum was paid on the
4th day of October, 1917. But the present action was not commenced until the
25th day of October, 1922, and not then, until the Supreme Court had decided on
the 21st day of February, 1922, in the case of Cuunjieng vs. Patstone
(42 Phil., 818), that said Ordinance No. 301 was illegal, null, and void.

The defendant interposed a general and special denial. In his general defense
he denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint. In his special
defense he alleged that the plaintiff had paid said sum voluntarily and
spontaneously. Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Simplicio del
Rosario, judge, after hearing the respective parties, decided: (a) That
the plaintiff had paid said sum under protest, and (b) that his right
to maintain the present action had not prescribed, and rendered a judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of P2,029.50,
without any finding as to costs. From that judgment the defendant appealed.

The question presented by the appellant is whether or not the payment of a
license fee, under a simple protest of record, amounts to an involuntary
0payment, in this jurisdiction, which will justify an action to recover the
same. It was proved during the trial that the payment in question was made under
protest of record. While there is much conflict in the authorities upon what
amounts to a voluntary or involuntary payment of money, as will be seen from the
citation of authorities by the appellant and appellee, yet in this jurisdiction
the rule has been established for many years, that, where an entity of the
Government, without legal right, has demanded of a taxpayer the payment of an
alleged tax, the taxpayer may pay the tax under protest of record and sue for
the recovery thereof. It is reasonable that a man who denies the legality of a
tax should have a clear and certain remedy. The rule being established that,
apart from special circumstances, he cannot interfere by injunction with the
state’s collection of its revenues, an action at law to recover back what he has
paid is the alternative left; and where as is common, the State has a
summary remedy—such as distress—and the party indicates by protest that
he is yielding to what he cannot prevent, courts have been a little too slow to
recognize the implied duress under which the payment is made. Where a citizen by
refusing to pay an illegal tax is put at a serious disadvantage in the assertion
of his legal rights with respect to such tax, justice requires that he
should be at liberty to avoid that disadvantage by paying the tax and bringing
suit for its recovery. (Ayala de Roxas vs. City of Manila, 27 Phil.
336; Viuda e Hijos de Pedro P. Roxas vs. Rafferty, 37 Phil., 957.)

Inasmuch as a rule has been established for years in this jurisdiction that a
mere protest of record against the payment of an illegal demand, is sufficient
to constitute an involuntary payment, and justifies an action for its recovery,
we find no reason for invoking the doctrine announced in other jurisdictions.
Inasmuch as the money in the present case was paid under protest of record, it
was paid involuntarily, and the payor is entitled to bring an action for its
recovery any time before the same is barred by the statutes of limitations.

In view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion, and so decide, that
the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed. And without
any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.