G.R. No. 21390. November 18, 1967

RAMIRO V. ARAGON, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. HON. MACARIO PERALTA, JR., ET AL., RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions November 18, 1967 REYES, J.B.L., J.:
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REYES, J.B.L., J.:


Appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Sp. Civil Action No. 7174), declaring Captain
Ramiro V. Aragon, a reserve officer in the active service of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, exempted from the operation of Sections 1 and 2 of Republic
Act 2334, and permanently enjoining the Secretary of National Defense, the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and the Acting Chief of
the Philippine Constabulary, from reverting him into inactive status.

There is no dispute as to
the following facts:

Ramiro V. Aragon joined the 7th Allied Intelligence Bureau, 7th
Military District, a duly recognized guerrilla unit, on January 10, 1944. 
His name was concededly included in the initial roster of troops of that unit (Appellant’s
Brief, p. 11).  He was given the rank of
third lieutenant until March 28, 1945,
when he was made a second lieutenant.  By
November 16, 1945, he had
the rank of a first lieutenant.  In January, 1946, Aragon was processed, given a serial number
(0-29888) and assigned to duty at
Camp Spencer, La Union. 
On
January 23, 1947, he
was formally commissioned as first lieutenant in the Reserve Force of the
Philippine Army, and was promoted to captain on
February 1, 1955.[1]

The records show that Aragon was paid his arrears in pay (base
pay and quarters allowance) as third lieutenant, from Jan­uary 10, 1944 to July 4, 1944, and as second
lieutenant from July 5, 1944 to March 28, 1945; his application for educational
benefits was approved by the Philippine Veterans Board on June 13, 1951, and he
was paid his backpay corresponding to the period of
from February 27, 1945 to September 26, 1945, as evidenced by Acknowledgment
No. 18352[2]
of the Bureau of Treasury dated March 24, 1960.

On February 28, 1962,
the Philippine Constabulary authorities issued Special Order No. 196,
providing, among other things, for the reversion of Captain Ramiro Aragon
to inactive status, effective June 19,
1962.  He sent a letter to
the Secretary of National Defense, through the Armed Forces Chief of Staff,
requesting for reconsideration of the aforesaid Special Order; and receiving no
reply thereto, Aragon
instituted on June 11, 1962, in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, prohibition
proceedings against therein respondents Secretary of National Defense, the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Acting Chief of the Philippine
Constabulary or their agents to prohibit or enjoin petitioner’s reversion to
inactive status.

Respondents tried to justify the disputed Special Order allegedly
issued pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act 2334, directing the reversion into
inactive status of reserve officers on active duty.  It was alleged that petitioner has to his
credit only a total of 7 years, 10 months and 24 days of active accumulated
commissioned service, computed from his formal commission into the Army on July 23, 1947, or short of the
10-year period required under Republic Act 1382 and, consequently, he falls
within the coverage of Republic Act 2334. 
Petitioner’s voluntary civilian (guerrilla) service from January 10, 1944 to July 23, 1947 was not considered in
computing his total accumulated service, because petitioner’s name does not
appear in the approved reconstructed roster of his guerrilla unit.  Respondents also put up the defenses of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies and the impropriety of prohibition
proceedings to secure the relief sought by peti­tioner.

On February 18, 1963,
judgment was rendered for the petitioner; the trial Court declared him exempted
from the operation of Republic Act 2334, and respondents were permanently
enjoined from ordering the reversion of petitioner to inactive status.  Respon­dents interposed the present appeal.

The controversy in this case arose from the enforcement of the
following provisions of Republic Act 2334:

“SEC. 2. After the approval of this
Act, and except in time of emergency, no reserve officer shall be called to
extended tours of active duty exceeding a total of two years within any period
of five consecutive years:  Provided, That
reserve officers on active duty for more than two years
on the date of
approval of this Act, with the exception of those covered by section three of
this Act, shall be reverted to inactive status within three years from
the approval of this Act:  x x x.

“SEC. 3. The provisions of section two of this
Act shall not apply to
reserve officers covered by the provisions of Republic Act
Numbered Thirteen
hundred eighty-two
x x x.” (Emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, Republic Act 1382 referred to above, and
approved on June 18, 1955,
provides as follows:

“SECTION 1. Reserve Officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of
this Act shall not be reverted into inactive status except for cause
after proper court martial proceedings or upon their own request:  Provided, That for purposes of computing the
length of service, six months or more of active service shall be considered one
year.” (Emphasis supplied)

As appellants themselves put it, the main question here is whether
or not as of June 18, 1955,
petitioner-appellee had at least 10 years of
accumulated active commissioned service in the Philippine Army to his credit,
to entitle him to exemption from the operation of Republic Act 2334.  Since appellee’s
service as a regularly
commissioned officer commenced only on July 23, 1947, the issue calls for a determination of
whether or not his voluntary civilian (guerilla) service, from January 10, 1944
to January 23, 1947,
should be considered active commissioned service.

Appellee’s argument, that his guerilla
service should be included in the computation of his accumulated active
military service, is based on Executive
Order No. 21, of the late President Sergio Osmeña,
issued on
October 28, 1944 reading as follows:

“EXECUTIVE ORDER No. 21

“DECLARATION TO BE ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN THE PHILIPPINE ARMY
ALL PERSONS NOW ACTIVELY SERVING IN RECOGNIZED MILITARY FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES

WHEREAS, these military forces have contributed in a large measure to
all Allied Military effort
and to the liberation of the Filipino people from
the yoke of the Japanese invader;

WHEREAS, it is the desire of the Government of the Philippines
to recognize this allegiance;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, SERGIO OSMEÑA, President of the Philippines by virtue of the authority vested in
me by the Emergency Power Law, Section 22(a) and Section 27 of the Commonwealth
Act Numbered One notwithstanding, do hereby ordained and promulgate
the following:

1. All persons of any nationality or citizenship, who
are actively serving in recognized military forces in the
Philippines, are hereby considered to be on active
service in the Philippine Army
.

2. The temporary grades of enlisted men, enlisted or promoted in
the field by Commanders of
recognized military forces or by their delegated authority, are hereby
confirmed.

3. The temporary ranks of all officers, appointed or promoted in the field prior to this date by Commanders of recognized military forces are
hereby confirmed
.

4. The date of
entry into active service in the Philippine Army will be that of joining a
recognized military
force.

5. The effective date
of rank for commissioned officers and enlisted men will be the date on which they were appointed or promoted to
such ranks by the Commander of recognized military forces.

6. A recognized military force, as used herein, is defined as a force under a Commander who has been
appointed, designated or recognized by the
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific
Area.” (Emphasis supplied)

Appellants do not contest the applicability of the abovequoted presidential order to guerrilla-services like
those of appellee. 
It is claimed, however, that said executive order is not by itself self-executory; that the benefits granted thereunder
may only be availed of by persons whose claims were duly verified and whose
names were included in the roster of recognized guerrillas; and, since the name
of appellee is not carried in the revised roster[3]
of members of the military unit to which he supposedly belonged, then for all
intents and purposes, he is an unrecognized guerrilla whose services cannot be
considered active commissioned service in the Army.  In other words, notwithstanding appellants’
acknowledgment or ad­mission of the fact that appellee
had been initially a member of a legitimate guerrilla organization as of
January 10, 1944 (pp. 3-4, Appellants’ brief), they would not credit him for
such services and would withhold the benefits to which he may be entitled by
reason thereof, simply because his name is not in the roster of recognized
guerrillas.

For legal and equitable considerations, appellants’ theory must
be rejected.  The entries in the Army’s
roster of recognized guerrillas, assuming them to be the official acts of duly
authorized public officers, are merely prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.[4]  Otherwise stated, this roster or list is not
to be considered the sole and exclusive evidence of the government’s recognition of the actual services of civilian volunteers; there
is nothing in the law making inadmissible other proof of such recogni­tion,
where they are material and relevant. 
Furthermore the recognized roster (drawn up primarily for backpay purposes)
must yield to the initial roster, which shows that appellant was already
serving even six months before the Leyte
landing of the liberation troops.

Thus, in the present case, there can be no other logical
conclusion than that the Philippine government recognized appellee’s war-time and post liberation services in the army.  Not only does appellee’s name appear in the initial roster, but he
was
paid
the corresponding officer’s base
pay and quarter’s allowance,
from January 10, 1944 to March 28, 1945, as
“a member of the Army of the Philippines in the service of the United
States Armed Forces” (Annex B, p. 14, C.F.I. Record); there was
recognition of appellee’s guerrilla services when he was given backpay for services rendered from February 27, 1945 to
September 26, 1945, in an
Acknowledgment by the National Treasurer dated March 24, 1960; when the
Philippine Veterans Board approved his claim for educational benefits; when the
military authorities themselves formally commissioned him in the Philippine
Army, by considering his voluntary civilian services as proper substitute for
actual combat duty – a prerequisite to such commission (Annex E, pp. 20-21,
C. F. I. Record); and when he was promoted as
captain (permanent) on February 1, 1955. 
Neither can it
be argued
that these benefits were granted on the erroneous assumption that appellee was a recognized guerrilla, because some of them
were given or made long after the roster of members of appellee’s
guerrilla unit was revised, and appellee’s name was
left out therefrom.

In the circumstances, and there being adequate showing that
petitioner-appellee’s volunteer civilian services
started since January 10, 1944, and were duly recognized by the Philippine
government, it would be inequitable to deny him the rights duly appertaining to
one with such accumulated length of service in the military, just because for
reason or reasons not disclosed in the records, his name did not appear in the
revised list of recognized guerrillas.

Appellant’s allegation that there was failure to exhaust
administrative remedies in this case, is, similarly,
without merit.  The present proceedings,
having been brought against a department secretary, an alter ego
of the President, and allegedly involving a threatened violation or disregard
of the petitioner’s right that requires immediate judicial intervention, the
rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be relaxed.[5]

There is equally no necessity for the Republic of the Philippines
to be impleaded. 
Unlike in the case of Ruperto vs.
Moore
,[6]
which essentially involved a pecuniary claim against the Treasury of the United
States (payment of backpay), and consequently, the
latter government must be given opportunity
to be heard, the issue
in the
case at bar concerns only the validity of the Armed Forces Special Order
reverting herein petitioner-appellee to inactive
status in the Reserve Force, which order he claims to be in violation of his
right as an officer with the required minimum length of service.

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the decision appealed from,
the same is hereby affirmed.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.


[1]
Annex G, p. 24, C.F.I. Record.

[2]
Issued only to members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and recognized guerrillas.  (p. 19, Record).

[3]
Appellee’s name appeared in the initial roster of his
unit. – p. 11, Appellants’ Brief.  

[4]
Sec. 38, Revised Rule 130; Sec. 35, Rule 123, old Rules of
Court.

[5]
See Gonzales vs. Hechanova, L-21897, Oct. 22, 1963, and cases cited
therein.

[6]
91 Phil. 185.