G.R. No. 213753. November 10, 2020
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY MAJOR GENERAL OSCAR T. LACTAO, AFP, COMMANDING GENERAL, FOURTH INFANTRY DIVISION, PHILIPPINE ARMY, PETITIONER, VS. ENELINDA AMOGO…
GAERLAN, J.:
instance of petitioner Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
represented by Major General Oscar T. Lactao, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Commanding General of the Fourth Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, are the Decision[1] dated August 22, 2013 and the Resolution[2]
dated July 30, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No. 01833-MIN, whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC) Order[3] dated October 29, 2008 in Civil Case Nos. 2007-104 and 2007-152.
Antecedents
On May 7, 2007, Enelida Amogod, Nicanor Arado, Ma. Leonora
Arbutante, Dario Arbutante, Marciana Arbutante, Marfelina Arbutante,
Cesar Alferez, Gertrudes Agura, Isidro Balan, Mary Grace Bacas, Emilio
Bantang, Ruth Bulay-og, Feliza Baranodin, Ernesto Basilio, Salvador
Castillo, Aquillo Cagampang, Julius Corbeta, Philip Cortes, Vicente
Carullu, Jr., Henry Dela Cruz, Violeta Cruz, Janice Caingay, Marciano
Denamarca, Emmanuel Denamarca, Wilson Domingo, Mary Deloria, Florante
Damo, Rodolfo Estrada, Jorge Estrone, Vivencia Elemanco, Felix Faballe,
Anita Fortiza, Jovelyn Forteza, Arsenio Gevero, Jr., Arsenio Gevero,
Sr., Gregoria Gerochi, Rose Marie Gabutan, Anastacio Galvez, Felix
Garcia, Carlos Garcia, Valentina Garcia, Ricardo Galit, Rita Hernane,
Vivian Ilas, Elias Jaramillo, Ethel Kawaling, Roberto Lamata, Primo
Lubico, Mamerto Luzon, Jemuel Mabanag, Ruth Macahilas, Edna Macanoquit,
Candido Manglicmot, Yolanda Manglicmot, Danilo Manglicmot, Arlene
Mantis, Aqiolino Mendoza, Gil Micabalo, Antonina Manuel Mortejo, Nonito
Nual, Godofredo Navarez, Perfecta Neyra, Pedrito Nala, Pablo Nala
Panchito Nob, Luz Pionan, Jimmy Perales, Marceleno Reyes, Casimiro
Raguine, Bernabe Sanggual, Teresita Saguing, Edwino Secillo, Benjamin
Tagud, Cesar Tacogdoy, Jose Torayno, Salvador Ting, Esperanza Valdez,
Zenaida Vigor, Rodolfo Valencia, Paz Vallecer, Jeric Villanueva, Celsa
Baroro, Benjamin Tagus, Jr., Marietta Erolan, Amado Recha, Gerrica
Navarez, Pedrito Nala, Amario Erolan, Fe Dawal, and Amparo Micanbalo
(respondents), the actual occupants of the parcels of land located in
Cagayan de Oro City and designated as Lot 2, Lot 45748 with an area of
69,974 square meters (sq.m.) and Lot 3, Lot 45749, with an area of
12,859 sq.m. filed a petition for injunction[4]
(Civil Case No. 2007-104) against petitioner AFP, Fourth Infantry
Division (4ID), Philippine Army (PA), Camp Edilberto Evangelista.
A separate petition[5]
(Civil Case No. 2007-152), likewise for injunction, was filed on June
27, 2007 by respondents Rogelio C. Serquiña, Elizabeth Suganob, Apolonio
Suganob, Melia C. Aso, Helen D. Centeno, Loreto Salomon, Eduardo
Salomon, Cristina Figueroa, Jose Arlo Figueroa, Bernadette Mendaros,
Arnold Figueroa, Teresita Estigoy, Emperatris Ceballos, Eduardo Paumar,
Marina Acero, Cesar Mandalucay, Rosita Lorenzo, Jocelyn Emong, Wilbur
Mamawag, Josephine Pogay, Rosalino Cupay, Gerondio Tapongot, Aurelia
Galanida, Victoriana T. Aljas, Johniel Pogay, Corazon Espina, Mamerto
Señeres, Flordeliza de Jesus, Asuncion Jacalan and Nicolas Pogay, all
actual occupants of Lot 4, Lot 45750 with an area of 1,417 sq.m., Lot 5,
Lot 45751 with an area of 4,739 sq.m. and Lot 6, Lot 45752 with an area
of 2,462 sq. m. of Lots 22052 and 4353, CAD 237, likewise located in
Cagayan de Oro City, also against petitioner AFP, 4ID, PA.
In both petitions for injunction, respondents averred that
they and their predecessors-in-interest are the lawful occupants of the
subject parcels of land for more than 30 years; their lands are outside
the Philippine Army’s Camp Edilberto Evangelista, a 32-hectare land
given to petitioner by the Velezes; and they, as early as November 9,
1995, filed a petition to the President of the Philippines for the
segregation and release thereof on the ground that these are outside the
property of the petitioner.[6]
Respondents further narrated that sometime in 2007, they received a
notice to vacate their respective areas within a period of two months.
Respondents, however, did not give heed to petitioner’s demand. As a
result, thereof, petitioner harrassed respondents and unceremoniously
closed some of their stores. Respondents, thus, sought to enjoin
petitioner from closing their stores and from disturbing their lawful
and peaceful possession of the subject parcels of land.[7]
In its answer (with counterclairn),[8] petitioner contended that respondents are all squatters in a military reservation, hence, they are considered as nuisances per se and may be subjected to summary abatement.[9]
Petitioner explained further that it is the lawful owner of the subject
parcels of land considering that the land was sold to its favor by
Apolinar Velez in 1936; and that such sale was acknowledged by the
Velezes and Pinedas in their respective deeds of donation and quitclaim.[10]
RTC Ruling
The RTC rendered the October 29, 2008 Order[11]
granting respondents’ petitions for injunction. It ratiocinated that
based on the relocation/verification report of Engr. Arlene Galope and
the supplemental report of Director Dichoso of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the subject parcels of land
are not only outside the 36-hectare property of petitioner but are also
considered alienable and disposable.[12]
The trial court further concluded that since respondents are in actual
possession of the subject parcels of land since time immemorial, they
have a clear and unmistakable right over the subject property, which
must be protected. The trial court, thus, disposed the case in this
wise:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the injunctive writ
prayed for by plaintiffs – prohibitory injunction is hereby GRANTED for
being meritorious. Accordingly, defendants 4th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, represented by its Officers and personnel and
defendants in their own rights, Major General Jose T. Barbieto, Jr.,
AFP Commanding General, 4th ID PA; Col. Augusto L. Tolentino,
PA, Chief of Staff 4ID, PA; LTC Rex G. Gatiologo, PA, Camp Commander,
4ID, PA; LTC Silver P. Linsangan, PA, Division Adjutant; Major Crispin
O. Mendoza, Jr., PA, Commanding Officer, Post Engineering Detachment
(PED), 4ID, PA; and Capt. Eduardo Abaño, PA, Division Real Estate
Officer (DREO), 4ID, PA, and all persons acting for and in their behalf,
are hereby ordered to cease and desist in their summary eviction of
plaintiffs, and cease and desist in harassing the plaintiffs; open all
stores of some plaintiffs which were closed without due process and
remove the wooden structures indicating the closure.Considering that the main cause for action of the instant
complaints/petitions is injunction, with the granting of the same by the
Court, the bond put up by the plaintiffs in the sum of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) pesos under Official Receipt No. 0847126A re:
temporary restraining order issued by the Court dated July 8, 2008, is
hereby ordered cancelled and returned to the bondsmen Enelida Amogod and
Rogelio C. Serquiña.SO ORDERED.[13]
Undaunted, petitioner filed an appeal to the CA.
CA Ruling
In a Decision promulgated on August 22, 2013, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED
for lack of merit. The assailed Decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case Nos. 2007-104 and 2007-152 is hereby AFFIRMED.No costs.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The CA based its decision mainly on the September 21, 2010 Order
of the Regional Executive Director (RED) of DENR-Region X which granted
respondents’ petition for exclusion and segregation. In the said Order,
the DENR concluded that, after evaluation of the documentary evidence of
respondents, as well as the findings of the ocular inspection conducted
over the lots in question, the subject parcels of land are deemed
alienable and disposable. As such, respondents, being the actual
occupants thereon, have the right to apply for segregation and
exclusion. The DENR, likewise, found the deeds of donation and quitclaim
executed by the Velezes and the Pinedas without value considering that
no acceptance thereof was made by petitioner. Accordingly, the CA ruled
that as between petitioner and respondents, the latter has a clear and
unmistakable right over the subject parcels of land.[15]
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration. It was, however, denied in a Resolution[16] dated July 30, 2014,
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari interposing a lone issue.
Issue
Whether or not the Court of Appeals, in CA-GR CV No.
01833-MIN, seriously erred in sustaining, through its herein challenged
August 22, 2013 Decision and July 30, 2014 Resolution, the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 39 which, in Civil Case No.
2007-104 and 2007-152, granted (sic) the complaints/petitions below,
through its October 29, 2008 and January 8, 2009 Orders.[17]
Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
It must be stressed at
the outset that the main issue involved in the instant petition is
whether the issuance or non-issuance of a writ of injunction is
warranted in the case. Notwithstanding, a determination as to who
between the parties have the legal right over the subject property is
necessary before arriving at a proper and legally sound conclusion.
In the instant petition, petitioner AFP, 4ID, PA insists that although
the subject property is outside their military reservation, it is still
within the area covered by the quitclaim and donation executed by the
Velezes and Pinedas in its favor; this is confirmed by the Secretary of
DENR in his August 8, 2013 Decision[18]
which in turn, reversed the RED’s September 21, 2010 Order. Petitioner
further claims that with the issuance of the DENR Secretary’s August 8,
2013 Decision, respondents’ occupation of the subject property no longer
has any legal basis, hence, a writ of injunction is no longer
warranted; thus, petitioner may now summarily evict respondents
therefrom.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that the appeal
to the DENR Secretary was made out of time. They further aver that the
donation and quitclaim executed in petitioner’s favor were invalid
considering that it failed to make an acceptance thereof. Simply,
respondents insist that they, being the actual occupants of the subject
property, declared as disposable and alienable, have the right not to be
disturbed from their peaceful possession of the disputed lands.[19]
This Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Settled is the rule that a petition for injunction may be the principal
action and not merely an ancillary to a main case. This has been the
ruling of the Court in the case of Sangguniang Panglunsod ng Baguio City v. Jadewell Parking Systems, Corporation,[20] to wit:
An action for inunction is a recognized remedy in this
jurisdiction. It is a suit for the purpose of enjoining the defendant,
perpetually or for a particular time, from committing or continuing to
commit a specific act, or compelling the defendant to continue
performing a particular act. It has an independent existence. The action
for injunction is distinct from the ancillary remedy of preliminary
injunction, which cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an
independent action or proceeding.[21]
Now, Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the grounds for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction (WPI), whether prohibitive or mandatory, viz.:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.”
Section 5 thereof further provides:
Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.
– No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great
or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter
can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for
preliminary injunction was made may issue a temporary restraining order
to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from notice to the
party or person sought to be enjoined. Within the said twenty-day
period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a
specified time and place, why the injunction should not be granted,
determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary
injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding
order.However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding
sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will
suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a
multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only
seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply
with the provisions of the next preceding section as to service of
summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within the
aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is
pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine whether the
temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for
preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case shall the total period
of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20)
days, including the original seventy-two hours provided herein.In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is
denied or not resolved within the said period, the temporary restraining
order is deemed automatically vacated. The effectivity of a temporary
restraining order is not extendible without need of any judicial
declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend
or renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof,
the temporary restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days
from notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. A restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court or a member thereof shall be effective
until further orders.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the following
elements must be present before a writ of preliminary injunction or a
writ of injunction may be issued, to wit: (a) extreme urgency, and (b)
grave and irreparable injury will be suffered by the applicant.
In addition, the Court in the case of European Resources and Technologies, Inc, et. al. v. Ingenieuburo Birkhahn +Nolte, et. al.,[22] ruled that prior to the issuance of a WPI, the existence of some requirements must be proved, to wit:
Before an injunctive writ can be issued, it is essential that
the following requisites are present: (1) there must be a right in esse
or the existence of a right to be protected; and (2) the act against
which injunction to be directed is a violation of such right. The onus
probandi is on movant to show that there exists a right to be protected,
which is directly threatened by the act sought to be enjoined. Further,
there must be a showing that the invasion of the right is material and
substantial and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the
writ to prevent a serious damage. Thus, it is clear that for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction to be proper, it must be
shown that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material
and substantial, that the right of complainant is clear and unmistakable
and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.[23]
The foregoing requisites were synthesized in the case of Lukang v. Pagbilao Development Corporation, et. al., [24] where the Court explained:
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which
is adjunct to a main suit, as well as a preservative remedy issued to
maintain the status quo of the things subject of the action or the
relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit. The
purpose of injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous
irremediable injury to the parties before their claims can be thoroughly
studied and educated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case are fully heard. Under Section 3, Rule 58 of the
Rules of Court, an application for a writ of preliminary injunction may
be granted if the following grounds are established:(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and
the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the
act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing,
threatening, or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be
done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and
tending to render the judgment ineffectual.Thus, a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued upon the concurrence of the following essential requisites, to wit: (a)
the invasion of right sought to be protected is material and
substantial; (b) the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable;
and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to
prevent serious damage.“[25] (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
After a careful review and evaluation of the records of this case, vis-a-vis
the arguments raised by the parties, this Court finds that the elements
for the issuance of writ preliminary injunction and/or writ of
injunction are wanting in this case.
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Respondents have no clear and unmistakable right over the subject property.
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To recall, respondents’ right over the subject property is anchored
on the fact that they are the actual occupants thereon, as well as, on
their contention that such is outside the property of petitioner. While
their actual possession of the subject property has been established,
the ownership thereof is still the subject of litigation. The DENR
Secretary, however, in his Decision dated August 8, 2013 made a
pronouncement that petitioner, not the respondents, has a better right
to the disputed subject property, viz.:
The appealed Decision correctly pointed out that appellees are
the actual occupants of the disputed lots. However, the records did not
show that [respondent’s] entry was legal. There was also no showing that
[respondent’s] possession was in the concept of an owner. Hence, it was
erroneous for the RED to give appellees preferential rights to the
disputed lots. The law giving preferential rights to actual occupants is
not designed to encourage, condone and reward illegal settlers.
Moreover, it must be stressed that the law on preferential rights of
actual occupants was not designed to defeat or nullify the legal title
or the vested right of the lawful possessor of the land involved,
because it would [be] tantamount to a taking without just compensation.Unlike appellees, appellant (petitioner herein) was able to
adduce evidence to support its claim over the controverted lots.
Appellant submitted the following evidence:(1) the Quitclaim Deed of the
Heirs of Apolinar Velez dated 28 December 1951; (2) the Quitclaim Deed
of Hernando Pineda dated 22 December 1951; (3) the invalid Deed of
Donation executed by the Heirs of Apolinar Velez dated 20 September
1960; (4) the Tax Declaration No. 198089; (5) the Land History Card of
Lot 4319 in the Cadastral Records showing Apolinar Velez as Cadastral
Claimant of said lot; and (6) the Consolidation/Subdivision Plan No.
10-001013.On the basis of the above evidence, it is the considered opinion
of this Office that appellant has a better right to the disputed lots
than appellees.[26]
Admittedly, while opinions of administrative bodies are not
controlling to this Court, administrative decisions on matters within
their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on
proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.[27]
Otherwise stated, unless it is shown that the DENR Secretary has acted
in a wanton, whimsical, or oppressive manner, giving undue advantage to a
party or for an illegal consideration and similar reasons, this Court
is inclined to be guided by the Secretary’s conclusion. Moreover, the
DENR Secretary, in the instant case, reviewed the evidence, both
testimonial and documentary, submitted by both parties before arriving
at the said ruling. It is worthy to note that this evidence were the
same pieces of evidence adduced by the parties in the instant case to
support their respective claims. Hence, this Court finds no reason to
deviate from the DENR Secretary’s ruling.
Be that as it may, even without considering the DENR
Secretary’s Decision, this Court is still constrained to overturn the
ruling of the CA in respondents’ favor.
To prove ownership over
the subject parcels of land, petitioner presented and offered as
evidence the following documents: (1) Quitclaim Deed executed by the
Velezes;[28] (2) the Land History Card of Lot No. 4319;[29] (3) Tax Declaration No. 198089;[30] (4) Deed of Donation executed by the Velezes;[31] (5) Quitclaim Deed executed by the Pinedas;[32] (6) Consolidation/Subdivision Plan No. Ccs-10-001013[33] duly approved by the Land Management Services, DENR; and (7) Supplemental Relocation Survey Report.[34]
Based on the Quitclaim Deed[35] executed by the Velezes, as well as the Quitclaim Deed[36]
executed by the Pinedas, both in 1951, the disputed parcels of land
were already sold to petitioner AFP as early as 1936. It is for this
reason that the Deed of Donation executed by the Velezes in 1960 are
considered invalid. The object of their donation are the very same
parcels of land already sold in 1936. Simply, the Velezes and the
Pinedas could not have donated the disputed lands since as early as
1936, these subject properties were already sold to petitioner. Despite
the invalidity of the donation, the sale of the subject properties in
favor of petitioner was acknowledged in these deeds of donation. It,
thus, supports the fact that a sale thereof was executed in favor of
petitioner.
Further solidifying petitioner’s claim of ownership
is their consistent declaration of the subject property for tax
purposes. While it is true that tax receipts and tax declarations are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute credible
proof of a claim of title over the property.[37]
Finally, the duly approved consolidation plan, vis-a-vis
the Supplemental Relocation Survey Report from the DENR fortify
petitioner’s claim of ownership. The pertinent portion of the Survey
Report reads:
That it is hereby informed that the area subject of the
relocation survey which is the Consolidation/subdivision plan of Lots
22052 and 4353, Cad 237, Ccs-10-001013 is outside the Military
Reservation under Presidential Proclamation No. 265, which are Lot Nos.
4318, 4354 and 4357, all of Cad. 237, Cagayan Cadastre. However, the
same relocated area covered by the Deed of Quitclaim by the Velez’es,
Deed of Donations by the Velez’es and Affidavit of Quitclaim by Hermundo
Pineda, all in favor of the Philippine Army, executed on December 26,
1951, September 20, 1960 and December 22, 1951, respectively, copies
attached for reference. In fact, a previous plan Pcs-3919 was approved
by the Bureau of Lands confirming the claims of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines covering Lot 1. The same was surveyed for the Republic of
the Philippines.That Lot 2, identified to Lot 45748, Cad. 237; Lot 3, identical
to Lot 45749, Cad. 237; Lot 7, identical to Lot 45753, Cad. 237; Lot 8,
identical to Lot 45755, Cad. 237, all of plan Ccs-10-001013 are outside
the Military Reservation under PP No. 265 but inside the area subject of
the Deed of Quitclaim and Deeds of Donation by the Velez’es executed on
December 26, 1951 and September 20, 1951. The same are occupied by as
follows: the herein plaintiffs of Civil Case Nos. 2007-104 & 2007-38
utilized as their residence for a long time, National Food Authority
Bodega for a long time, Regional Training Division & Special Forces
Company for a long time and 4th LD. Used as a Mosque, respectively.That Lot 4, identical to Lot 45750, Cad. 237; Lot 5, identical
to Lot 45752, Cad. 237, all of plan Ccs-10-001013 are outside the
Military Reservation but inside the area subject of a Affidavit of
Quitclaim by Hernando Pineda executed on December 22, 1951. The same
area are occupied by herein plaintiffs of Civil Case No. 2007-152 and
are utilized as their residence for a long period of time.[38]
Based on this Survey Report, the DENR confirmed that the disputed
lands, while outside petitioner’s Military Reservation, are the subject
of Deeds of Quitclaim executed by the Velezes and Pinedas in favor of
petitioner sometime in 1951.
Respondents, on the other hand, rely
on acquisitive prescription contending that they have been in actual
possession of the subject property for more than 30 years. While they
are indeed the actual occupants of the disputed parcels of land, they,
unfortunately, failed to establish that such possession was in the
concept of an owner. Worse, records are bereft of any showing of the
legality of their entry into the subject lands. Respondents likewise
failed to state the date when they entered and occupied the subject
property.
Despite having actual possession of the disputed lands
allegedly for more than 30 years, however, respondents’ possession did
not and will not ripen to ownership. This is pursuant to the established
rule that while acquisitive prescription is a mode of ownership,
possession by mere tolerance does not start the running of the
prescriptive period.[39] Thus,
lawful owners have the right to demand the return of their property at
any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated.
This right is never barred by laches, because possession by mere
tolerance does not start the running of the prescriptive period.[40] This was exhaustively explained in the case of Heirs of Jarque v. Jarque,[41] to wit:
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Thus, mere possession with a juridical title, such as, to exemplify, by
a usufructuary, a trustee, a lessee, an agent or a pledgee, not being
in the concept of an owner, cannot ripen into ownership by acquisitive
prescription, unless the juridical relation is first expressly
repudiated and such repudiation has been communicated to the other
party. Acts of possessory character executed due to license or by
mere tolerance of the owner would likewise be inadequate. Possession, to
constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en concepto de duno,
or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that possession
should be adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do
not start the running of the period of prescription.[42] (Emphasis supplied)
Viewed in light of all the foregoing, as between petitioner and
respondents, this Court holds and so rules that it is petitioner who has
a better right over the subject parcels of land. Respondents,
therefore, have no clear and unmistakable right over the subject
properties. Corollarily, there is no invasion of a purported right that
needs to be protected. A Writ of Injunction is, therefore, unwarranted
in this case.
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Petitioner cannot summarily abate or evict respondents from the disputed lands.
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Petitioner contends that respondents’ illegal occupation of the
subject parcels of land is considered nuisance per se. Hence, it may be
summarily abated even without judicial order. It further avers that
under Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, or the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992, petitioner may summarily evict
respondents, and their homes summarily demolished.
These contentions, however, are unmeritorious.
Despite
having the right of possession over the subject parcels of land,
petitioner cannot summarily abate and/or evict respondents therefrom.
Neither can petitioner close and padlock the stores of respondents.
Firstly, respondents cannot be considered nuisance per se.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or
offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any
public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or
impairs the use of property.
The Court recognizes two kinds of nuisances. In Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc.,[43] the Court made this distinction, “nuisance per se
is one recognized as a nuisance under any and all circumstances,
because it constitutes a direct menace to public health or safety, and,
for that reason, may be abated summarily under the undefined law of
necessity. The second, nuisance per accidens, is that which
depends upon certain conditions and circumstances, and its existence
being a question of fact, it cannot be abated without due hearing
thereon in a tribunal authorized to decide whether such a thing in law
constitutes a nuisance.”[44]
It can easily be gleaned that respondents’ occupation of the disputed lands is not a nuisance per se.
This Court agrees with the CA that the residential houses and stores
built and occupied by respondents cannot be considered as a nuisance per se
because, by their very nature, they are not a “direct menace to public
health or safety.” They were built merely for residential purposes.
Thus, their summary abatement is unwarranted.
Secondly, under
Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279, there are only three situations where
summary eviction and demolition of underprivileged and homeless citizens
and their residential structures may be allowed: (1) when persons or
entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such
as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; (2) when government
infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented; and (3) when there is a court order for eviction and
demolition. This case, however, does not fall within the ambit of any of
these instances.
The disputed lands cannot be considered one of
or similar to the enumerated danger areas. There is likewise no court
order for eviction and/or demolition. Furthermore, records are bereft of
any showing that the disputed lands are subject of an infrastructure
project with available funding. While petitioner claimed that the
subject lands were dedicated for the quarters of its personnel
temporarily assigned to it, no evidence whatsoever was ever presented to
prove that there was indeed a concrete plan to construct the said
infrastructure project and that funds were already available therefor.
Petitioner’s assertion that it may summarily abate and evict respondents
from the disputed lands, therefore, has no bases, both in fact and in
law.
|
Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1227 is inapplicable to this case.
|
Finally, petitioner claims that respondents violated and are
violating Section l of Presidential Decree No. 1227 by entering and
re-entering Camp Evangelista, where the subject parcels of land are
located.
Such contention, however, is misplaced.
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1227[45]
proscribes and sanctions anyone who re-enters a military base after
having been removed therefrom and ordered not to re-enter by the base
commander. This provision, however, finds no application to the instant
case.
The subject parcels of land are not within the premises of
petitioner’s military base. As clearly stated in the Supplemental
Relocation Survey Report from the DENR, “the area subject of the
relocation survey x x x is outside the Military Reservation under
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 x x x.” While the disputed lands
belong to petitioner, they are not, at least for the time being, a part
of its military base. Respondents’ occupation of the subject parcels of
land, therefore, is not tantamount to entry to a military base.
All told, the RTC and the CA committed reversible error when it granted
respondents’ petitions and issued a Writ of Injunction to enjoin
petitioner from evicting respondents and demolishing their houses and
stores. From the evidence presented, petitioner was able to prove that
it has the legal right over the disputed lands. Meanwhile, respondents’
possession thereof, despite the lapse of time, did not ripen to
ownership. This, however, does not necessarily give petitioner the
unbridled right to summarily abate and/or evict respondents from the
disputed lands. Compliance with the pertinent laws and rules still needs
to be observed.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 22, 2013 and
the Resolution dated July 30, 2014 in CA-G.R. CV No. 01833-MIN, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Petitions for Injunction are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Peralta, C.J., (Chairperson), Caguioa, Carandang, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp.
56-78; penned by Associate Justice Edward B. Contreras, with Associate
Justices Edgardo A. Camello and Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob,
concurring.
[2] Id. at 79-83.
[3] Id. at 388-438; penned by Judge Downey C. Valdevilla.
[4] Id. at 103-111.
[5] Id. at 135-147.
[6] Id. at 106, 137.
[7] Id. at 139.
[8] Id. at 112-134.
[9] Id. at 114.
[10] Id. at 121.
[11] Id. at 388-438.
[12] Id. at 431.
[13] Id. at 437-438.
[14] Id. at 77.
[15] Id. at 69-75.
[16] Id. at 79-83.
[17] Id. at 32.
[18] Id. at 545-567.
[19] Id. at 616-624.
[20] 734 Phil. 53 (2014).
[21] Id. at 100.
[22] 479 Phil. 114 (2004).
[23] Id. at 129.
[24] 728 Phil. 608 (2014).
[25] Id. at 617-618.
[26] Rollo, pp. 556-557.
[27] Alecha v. Atienza, Jr., 795 Phil. 126, 141 (2016).
[28] Rollo, pp. 84-85.
[29] Id. at 86.
[30] Id. at 87-88.
[31] Id. at 89-91.
[32] Id. at 92-93.
[33] Id. at 94.
[34] Id. at 95-96.
[35] Id. at 84-85.
[36] Id. at 92-93.
[37] Heirs of Spouse Suyam v. Heirs of Julaton, G.R. No. 209081, June 19, 2019.
[38] Rollo, pp. 95-96.
[39] Estrella v. Robles, Jr., 563 Phil. 384, 398 (2007).
[40] Bishop v. Court of Appeals, 284-A Phil. 125, 130 (1992).
[41] G.R. No 196733, November 21, 2018, 886 SCRA 269.
[42] Id. at 290-291 citing Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, 365 Phil. 354, 361-362 (1999).
[43] 809 Phil. 453 (2017).
[44] Id. at 541.
[45] Section 1. Any
person who, without express or implied permission or authority of the
base commander or his duly authorized representatives, shall re-enter by
the base commander or his duly authorized representative, shall be
punished for the first offense, with imprisonment of not more than ten
(10) days or a fine not exceeding P100.00, or both; for the second
offense, with imprisonment of not less than ten (10) days but not more
than P200.00 or both; and for the third and subsequent offenses, with
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more than six (6)
months or a fine of not less than P200.00 but not more than P1,000.00,
or both.