JAY H. LICAYAN, PETITIONER, VS. SEACREST MARITIME MANAGEMENT, INC., CLIPPER FLEET MANAGEMENT, A/S AND/OR REDENTOR ANAYA, RESPONDENTS.

Licayan versus Seacrest Maritime Management

The Case

This is a labor case about a seafarer's claim for permanent total disability benefits. Jay Licayan, hired as a Fitter for an ocean-going vessel through the local manning agent Seacrest Maritime Management, suffered a panic disorder while on board and was eventually declared unfit to work. When his employers refused to pay, he sued. The case matters because it settles how the law treats a seafarer's illness that is not on the official list of occupational diseases — whether the employer or the seafarer must prove work-connection, and how much proof is needed.

Procedural History

Licayan filed a complaint for disability benefits, sickness benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor, awarding permanent total disability benefits in the amount provided by the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Seacrest appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter. Seacrest's motion for reconsideration was denied. Seacrest then filed a special action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which reversed and set aside the Commission's decision, holding that Licayan failed to prove by substantial evidence that his illness was work-related, and dismissed the complaint. Licayan's motion for reconsideration was denied. He then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.

Facts

Licayan was hired as a Fitter for the vessel MT Clipper Ann under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-approved contract for seven months at a basic salary of 698 dollars. He passed his pre-employment medical examination and was declared fit for sea service. He boarded on March 23, 2011. Beyond his main duties, he was tasked to install water and oil separation fixtures and the safety equipment of the engine, and to install the steel platforms that served as the crew's path walk whenever the vessel was loaded with chemicals.

On September 7, 2011, he suddenly felt a severe headache. The Master referred him to the principal's health provider for examination by a psychiatrist. At the port of Cartagena, Colombia, on September 15, 2011, he was examined and initially diagnosed with vertigo and anxiety disorder. The next day the attending physician made a definitive finding of panic disorder and recommended repatriation. He arrived in Manila on September 20, 2011, and was directed to the company-designated doctor, who ran a series of tests. On January 25, 2012, more than 120 days from his initial treatment, that doctor certified that Licayan suffered from panic disorder, muscular spasm of the cervical region, and hypertension, and that he was unfit to work.

Licayan underwent more comprehensive treatment at the National Center for Mental Health, but his condition did not improve. He then consulted a clinical psychologist, who certified on July 2, 2012 that he was permanently incapacitated to work as a seafarer, finding a work-related generalized anxiety disorder and an anxiety disorder associated with or secondary to toxic chemical exposure. On these findings, Licayan claimed total and permanent disability benefits. Seacrest rejected the claim, insisting the illness was not the result of an accident and was not work-related.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Licayan failed to support his claim of work-relatedness by substantial evidence.
• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no evidence that Licayan suffered an incident on board that contributed to his panic attacks.
• Whether or not Licayan is entitled to permanent total disability compensation and attorney's fees.

Applicable Provisions

Section 20, paragraph B, number 6 of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract provides:

In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seafarer caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.

This is the source of the two elements of compensability: the illness must be work-related, and it must have arisen during the term of the employment contract.

Section 20, paragraph B, number 4 of the same contract provides:

Those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are disputably presumed as work related.

This creates the disputable presumption in favor of compensability that decides the case.

Section 32-A of the same contract provides:

For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied: 1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks described herein; 2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to the described risks; 3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it; and 4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.

These are the conditions for listed occupational diseases, which the Court treats as not exclusive of other illnesses.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court found merit in the petition. It held that the list of occupational diseases does not exclude other illnesses from being compensable, because the contract cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer unfit for sea duties. Reading Section 20, paragraph B, number 4, the Court held that a disputable presumption is created in favor of compensability, and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome that presumption. But the presumption is not an automatic grant: the claimant must still present substantial evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of the disease, and only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation, is required.

On the second issue, the Court held that Licayan met that burden. He showed his exposure to harsh conditions at sea, severe stress from being away from his family, fatigue, irregular sleep because he was on call twenty-four hours a day, and the extraordinary assignment of installing separation fixtures while the vessel was on voyage rather than in dry dock. His psychologist's diagnosis supplied the reasonable connection between his work and his condition. The presumption therefore arose, and the employer failed to overcome it. The company-designated doctor's report was too sweeping and inadequate: it stated that the cause of panic disorder is unknown and that genetics may play a role, which does not defeat the claim. The Court stressed that neither the claimant nor the labor tribunals and courts are automatically bound by the company-designated physician's report; its inherent merit must still be weighed.

On the third issue, the Court held that Licayan suffered permanent total disability, since he was unable to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of similar nature that he was trained for or accustomed to perform. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission.

Doctrine

An illness not listed as an occupational disease under the Standard Employment Contract is disputably presumed to be work-related. The employer bears the burden of overcoming that presumption. The seafarer, for his part, must present substantial evidence that his working conditions caused or at least increased the risk of the illness; reasonable proof of work-connection suffices, and direct causal relation is not required. The company-designated physician's findings are not automatically binding on the claimant, the labor tribunals, or the courts; their inherent merit must be weighed. Where the seafarer is unable to earn wages in the same kind of work or work of similar nature for which he was trained, the disability is total and permanent.

Disposition

The petition was granted; the Court of Appeals decision and resolution were reversed and set aside, and the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission awarding permanent total disability benefits to Licayan was reinstated.

Remember This

Memorize the line: illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed work-related, and it is the employer who must overcome that presumption. Examiners use this case to test the burden of proof in seafarer disability claims and the weight to be given to the company-designated physician's report.