ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, AS MAYOR OF MANILA, AND THE BUSINESS AND INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIERS (FAR EAST), INCORPORATED, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES, VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL AND CITY AUDITOR JOSE…

Upon appropriation totalling
P580,000.00^[1] for the purchase of closed refuse collection
trucks, the City Public Services Officer of Manila requisitioned 20 units. The
bidding, as published and posted, was set for February 23,
1962. Bid
offers were received, amongst others, from CCH, Inc., hereinafter referred to as
CCH, G. A. Machineries, Inc., (GAMI) and the Business & Industrial
Suppliers, Inc., (BISI). Because of too restrictive specifications, no award was
made. The committee on awards, composed of the City Mayor, the City Auditor and
the City Treasurer, decided at its meeting of May
17, 1932
to hold a rebidding on June 4,
1962.

Revised specifications were drawn
up. The rebidding set for June 4,
1962 was
advertised in the newspapers. Copy.of the invitation to bid was posted on the
bulletin board of the property division of the City Treasurer’s office; and a
copy thereof was mailed to each of fifteen prospective bidders including CCH,
GAMI and BISI. The three just-mentioned were amongst the nine who submitted
bids.

On June 18, 1962, the committee
on awards consisting of Manuel Cudiamat, City Treasurer; Jose Erestain, City
Auditor; and Fernando Manalastas, representing the City Mayor, convened. Present
thereat also were transportation chief Leopoldo Reyes,
in behalf of the requisi-tioner. Department of Public
Services; and Magdaleno Gomez of the Department of Engineering and Public Works,
technical adviser. The committee deliberated on the submitted bids.
Manalastas informed the committee that he had evaluated each and all of the bids
entered and, in his opinion, BISI’s was the best and most advantageous.
Following a discussion and desiring further information, the committee adjourned
the meeting to June 20,
1962. The
Secretary was instructed to phone all the bidders to come at the next
meeting.

On June
20, 1962,
the committee on awards resumed its meeting with City Treasurer Cudiamat, City
Auditor Erestain and Manalastas in attendance. Also present were Leopoldo Reyes,
of the requisitioning Department of Public Services; and Miguel Montaner of the
Department of Engineering and Public Works and Ambrosio Zamora, central garage
foreman, the last two as technical advisers. Angel Sarmiento representing CCH
and Enrique Pineda of the GAMI were amongst the five bidders’ representatives
who appeared thereat. In an-open discussion, the bidders’ men participated.
After the bidders’ spokesmen left, the committee settled down to wait for Public
Services Officer Ejercito or his assistant Chico. BISI’s representative Romulo
David thereafter entered the room. Asst. Public Services Officer
Chico later came in.
Chico paraphrased his written
recommendation, stated that the best and most advantageous offer was that of
BISI. BISI’s representative Romulo David, when asked by committee member
Erestain as to the supply of spare parts, replied that he would try his best to
get GAMI, the distributor in the Philippines, to deliver the said spare parts
whenever and wherever needed. The committee on awards, on motion of Fernando
Manalastas, seconded by City Auditor Erestain, unanimously made the award in
favor of BISI. Following [with emphasis supplied] is an excerpt from the
minutes:

“12. Premises considered, then,
and on the merits of the bids presented and evaluated by him on the basis
of the recommendations of Mr. Reyes and Mr. Chico, Mr. Manalastas
formally moved to make the award in favor of the BUSINESS & INDUSTRIAL
SUPPLIERS, Inc. for the Ochsner w/ Thames Trader at $12,064 CIF each, for as
many units as can be covered by the P580,000 fund
available. On the basis of Mr. Manalastas’ evaluation as technical expert and
Mr. Reyes’ and Mr. Chico’s recommendation as end-users for an award in
favor of the bid most advantageous to the City, Mr. Erestain formally
seconded the motion.”

On June
25, 1962,
purchase order No. 53935-62, for 12 units of closed refuse collection trucks,
was prepared. This was approved by the Mayor on July 2,
1962,
attested by City Auditor Erestain on July 6,
1962 and
accepted by BISI on July 18,
1962.

Came the letter-protests of CCH
and GAMI, At its meeting of July
16, 1962,
the committee on awards composed of City Treasurer Cudiamat, City Auditor
Erestain and Manalastas, representing the Mayor, met to deliberate thereon.
After an exchange of views, on motion of Manalastas, seconded by Erestain, the
committee resolved to dismiss the said protests. Lifted from the minutes are the
following:

“The foregoing were all excerpts
from Mr. Manalastas’ memorandum to the Committee, who now went into
deliberation. Presently, he moved (Mr. Erestain seconding) that in view of all
these foregoing considerations summarizing the advantages to be derived from the
Ochsner^[2] instead of the
Eagle,^[3] to affirm the BISI award
and to deny both CCH and GAMI protests, as approved and initialed by His Honor,
the Mayor, on the aforesaid memorandum. Motion unanimously
carried.”

GAMI and CCH, on July 23 and
July 24,
1962,
respectively, protested the committee’s decision to the Auditor
General.

On July
24, 1962,
the City Public Services Officer prepared DPS Voucher No. 1129 for P571,310. 65 to cover bank deposit and other
charges for establishing a letter of credit of $144,768. 00, needed for the importation of the 12 units of closed
refuse collection trucks in question. This voucher was submitted to the City
Auditor on July 25,
1962 for
“pre-audit”.

City Auditor Erestain, however,
previously received’verbal instructions from Mr. Reboredo of the Local
Governments Auditing Department, Auditor General’s Office, that further action
on the opening of the letter of credit for this purchase be held in abeyance. Accordingly, Erestain, on
August 14,
1962,
wrote the Auditor General requesting that his office be advised of the decision
on this matter.

The Auditor General created a
committee composed of Supervising Auditor Teodulo A. Hayag, Mechanical Engineer
Salustiano C. Guinto and Architect Elpidio Z. Salvador, “to look into the
technical aspects of the case”. This committee opined that the Dennis-Paxit
truck offered by CCH “is better” than BISI’s Ochsner. The Deputy Auditor
General, on September 12,
1962,
wrote City Auditor Erestain that on the basis of the committee’s report, “the award should have been given” to CCH and directed him to
“be guided accordingly.”

On September 18, 1962, the Mayor,
to whom the papers were indorsed by the City Auditor, transmitted them to the
City Treasurer through the City Auditor, stating that BISI’s is the most
advantageous bid; that the decision of the city’s committee on awards was sound,
and that “CCH is presently under investigation for having supplied the City of
Manila with 20-Eagle Compressmore units in 1961” which equipment, in the opinion
of “the very Committee of the General Auditing Office, ‘could not be used
efficiently’, attention being invited to the GAO’s Committee’s memorandum dated
September 12, 1962”. All the papers were indorsed back by the City Auditor to
the Auditor General.

On September 28, 1962, the Deputy
Auditor General returned the papers to the City Auditor with the information
that, based on the report of his technical committee, his office was of the
belief that CCH offered the most advantageous bid, reiterated that CCH should
have been awarded the contract, and warned that the proposed purchase from BISI
“may not be allowed in audit”.

The papers finally found their
way back to the office of the City Mayor who, in his indorsement of October 10,
1962, challenged the jurisdiction of the Auditor General to take cognizance of
the protest lodged by CCH, stated that the contract with BISI for the purchase
of the trucks had been perfected, and added that because CCH failed to comply
faithfully with a “previous contract for the delivery of the trucks to the
City,” the latter “had filed a suit against the said
entity”.

Offshoot of this impasse is that
the City Auditor, in obedience to superior orders, refused to pre-audit and sign
the voucher dated July 24,
1962 in
favor of the Philippine National Bank for the amount of P571,310.65.

Upon the averment that
respondents’ duty to sign the voucher in question—necessary for the issuance of
the corresponding letter of credit—was ministerial, petitioners. Mayor of
Manila and BISI, went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on
mandamus, praying that respondents be directed to sign the voucher
aforesaid and “to perform, all such other pertinent acts within their
jurisdiction leading towards the early delivery to the City of
Manila of the urgently needed garbage
trucks”. Upon the petition and the respondents1 answer thereto, and the
stipulated facts, the court rendered judgment as follows:

“IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING,
the respondents, Auditor General and City Auditor Jose Erestain of the City of
Manila, are hereby commanded and directed to sign the voucher dated July 24,
1962, signed by the City Public Service Officer and the City Treasurer, in favor
of the Philippine National Bank in the amount of P571,310. 65, purposely to open
a letter of credit for the payment of the equipment in question which is needed
to be imported from abroad and which was forwarded to the respondent City
Auditor for ‘pre-audit’ on July 25, 1962, and to perform all such other
pertinent acts within their jurisdiction leading towards the early delivery to
the City of Manila of the urgently needed garbage
trucks.”

The case is now before us on
appeal upon questions of law.

1.     
We first address ourselves to the
legality of the constitution of the committee on awards, which on
June 20,
1962
approved BISI’s bid. It will be recalled that, while at the first meeting on
February 23, 1932, said committee was constituted by City Mayor Villegas, City
Treasurer Cudiamat and City Auditor Erestain, at the meeting of June 20
following, the City Mayor was represented by Fernando Manalastas. This
delegation, respondents challenge “as clearly illegal and unauthorized under the
law” which allowed “no substitution.”

By legal mandate, Section 3(c) of
Republic Act 2254,^[4] purchases for cities in excess of P5,000. 00
“shall be made” by a committee on awards composed of the City Mayor, City
Auditor and City Treasurer. The rule is well settled that officers, in letting
municipal contracts, perform not merely ministerial functions, but duties of a
“judicial and discretionary nature”.^[5] As well established is the principle that
judicial or quasi-judicial powers may not be delegated. In the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, an administrative officer may not
alienate or surrender his discretionary power, or powers which require exercise
of judgment, or deputize another for him with respect thereto.^[6] For, when a public official is granted
discretionary power, it is to be presumed that so much is reposed on his
integrity, ability, acumen, judgment. Because he is to look into the facts,
weigh them, act upon them, decide on them — acts that should be entrusted to no
other. The Mayor, therefore, was not empowered to delegate his duties as a
member of the committee on awards to Fernando Manalastas, his technical
assistant on public health, hygiene and sanitation.

Manalastas
eliminated, two members of the committee, the City Treasurer and the City
Auditor, remained. Nothing extant in the controlling statute would prevent a
quorum — and two constitute a quorum — to transact business.^[7] Action therefore by a majority — as in this
case — is valid. Reason is that the other member, the Mayor, was duly notified,
given an opportunity to be present at the June 20 meeting.^[8]

But if more were needed to add force
to the power of the committee to make the award, there is the fact that the
approval of telSI’s bid counted not only with the support of the City Treasurer
and the City Auditor but was subsequently ratified by the City Mayor. Proof: The
City Mayor approved the purchase order on July 2,
1962,
upheld the award on September 18,
1962, and
is one of the petitioners herein.

We accordingly rule that the committee
on awards was duly empowered to act on the bids submitted.

2.     
We are next ushered to the
problem of whether the award in favor of BISI was authorized by law.

The
reason for the grant of power, in Section 3(c) of Republic Act 2264, to the
local committee on awards, is to remove red tape occasioned by the purchase made
through the Bureau of Supply.^[9]
Safeguards, of course, have to be provided. Section 791 of the Revised Manual of
Instructions to Tresurers thus provides:

“SEC.
791.
Reservation of rights to reject any or
all bids.— The contract will be awarded to the contractor whose
proposal appears to be the most advantageous to the Government, but the right
shall be reserved to reject any or all bids, to waive any informality in the
bids received, and to accept or reject any items of any bid unless such bid is
qualified by specific limitations; also to disregard the bid of any failing
bidder, known as such to the Director of Public Works, or any bid which is
obviously unbalanced or below what the work can be done for. The right shall be
also reserved to reject the bid of a bidder who has previously failed to perform
properly or complete on time contracts of a similar nature, or a bid of a bidder
who is not in a position to perform the contract. reasonable grounds for supposing that any bidder is
interested in more than one bid or for the proposed work under this bidding will
be a sufficient cause for the rejection of all the bids in which he is
interested. The right to reject bids, therefore, is not one to be arbitrarily or
capriciously exercised. If the bids are excessive, or if the bidders are not
responsible men, as those having records for habitual default or failure in
other contracts, or if they do not count with sufficient capital to undertake
the first stages, at least 50 percentum of the work; or where there is reason to
suspect that there is evident collusion on the part of the bidders, then the
right to reject may be freely exercised.”

Here, the committee on awards
required public bidding — two biiddings we should say — pursuant to Section 3(c)
of Republic Act 2264, because the amount is well beyonds the P5,000.00 mark. Notice to bidders was published and posted. At
the first meeting of February 23,
1962, the
committee decided at holding aq second public bidding. The second bidding was
held on June 4. The committee deliberated on the bids on June 18. They could not
reach a decision. Then they met again on June 20. Technical advisers and
representatives of end-users were in attendance thereat. The bidders, too, were
heard. The pros and cons were weighed. Before reaching a
conclusion as to which bid is the most advatageous, the committee considered,
amongst others, the points in favor of BISI and those which impelled rejection
of the CCH offer only thereafter did the committee give the nod to BISI. Then
the CCH and GAMI protests came up. The committee, again after deliberation on
the merits, decided against the protest.

It matters not that the BISI bid
did not satisfy certain provisions in the revised specifications. That the offer
of BISI was “C and F, Manila” and not “CIF,
Manila“, was properly remedied by the
fact that in the award BISI was required to deliver “CIF,
Manila“. As to the guarantee as to
spare parts, this was also considered by the committee which accepted the
explanation given by EISI’s representative to the effect that GAMI (the
distributor thereof) “will certainly cooperate by supplying any needed spare
parts and accessories for the proposed units”.^[10] At any rate, the committee had authority to
waive informality in the bids. On top of all these is the fact that it became
the duty of the committee on awards to reject^[11] CCH’s bid for the reason that, as heretofore
stated, the previous performance of this company in a contract with the city was
so unsatisfactory – a fact known to the General Auditing Office— that the city
was compelled to file suit against it.

If the acts of the committee on
awards had any meaning at all, they exhibited care, meticulousness and a high
regard for the responsibility on it reposed. The committee inquired into the
various bids, made comparisons to ascertain who was the most advantageous
bidder, sought technical advice, twice deliberated thereon, decided thereafter. At this distance, we are not prepared to
say that the committee abused its wide discretion^[12] in making the award. After all, there is the
legal presumption that public duty has been regularly performed.^[13]

3.     
Respondents mounted a major
attack against the refusal of the trial court to recognize the power of the
Auditor General to examine and review the award in favor of BISI.

The
Auditor General’s constitutionally vested powers are written in Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution, viz;

“SEC.
2. The
Auditor General shall examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
revenues and receipts from whatever source, including trust funds derived from
bond issues; and audit, in accordance with law and administrative regulations,
all expenditures of funds or property pertaining to or held in trust by the
Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof. He shall keep the general
accounts of the Government and preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto. It
shall be the duty of the Auditor General to bring to the attention of the proper
administrative officer expenditures of funds or property, which, in his opinion,
are irregular, unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant. He shall also perform
such other functions as may be prescribed by law.”

Section 584 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Section 1 of Republic Act 2266, implementing
the foregoing constitutional precept, recites:

“SEC.
584. General jurisdiction of General Auditing Office. – The
authority and powers of the General Auditing Office extend to and comprehend all
matters relating to accounting procedure, including the keeping of the accounts
of the Government, the preservation of vouchers, the methods 6f accounting, the
examination and inspection of the books, records and papers relating to such
accounts and to the audit and settlement of the accounts of all persons
respecting funds or property received or held by them in an accountable
capacity, as well as to the examination and audit of all debts and claims of any
sort due from or coming to the Government of the Philippines in any of its
branches, x x x.”

Guevara vs. Gimenez, et al.,^[14] gave this Court an opportunity to define
thefcone of action of the Auditor General in connection with expenditures of the
government. There, this Court declined to confer authority upon the Auditor
General to disapprove the contract for attorney’s fees validly entered into
between the Central Bank and Judge Guevara. Said this
Court:

“Under our Constitution, the
authority of the Auditor General, in connection with expenditures of the
Government is limited to the
auditing of expenditures of funds or property pertaining to, or held in trust
by, the Government or the provinces or municipalities thereof (Article XI,
section 2, of the Constitution). Such function is limited to a determination of whether
there is a law appropriating funds for a given purpose; whether a contract, made
by the proper officer, has been entered into in conformity with said
appropriation law; whether the goods or services covered by said contract have
been delivered or rendered in pursuance of the provisions thereof, as attested
to by the proper officer; and whether payment therefor has been authorized by
the officials of the Corresponding department or bureau. If these requirements have been
fulfilled, it is the ministerial duty of the Auditor General
to approve and pass in audit the voucher and treasury warrant for said payment.
He has no discretion or authority to
disapprove said payment upon the ground that the aforementioned contract was
unwise or that the amount stipulated thereon is unreasonable . If he
entertains such belief, he may do no more than discharge the duty imposed upon
him by the Constitution (Article XI, section 2), ‘to bring to the
attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of funds or property
which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant’.
This duty implies a negation of the power
to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its
disapproval, if he had authority therefor, would bring to the attention of the
aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the adverse action thus
taken by the General Auditing Office, and, hence, render the imposition of said
duty unnecessary.”

Not that the views expressed in
Guevara stand alone in our
jurisprudence. As early as 1902, this Court,^[15] quoting from Mr. Justice Gray in Ekiu vs.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660, enunciated in broad outlines the concept that
where “a statute gives a discretionary power to an officer, to be exercised by
him upon his own opinion of
certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those
facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so,
is at liberty to re-examine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on
which he acted”. Tan C. Tee & Co. , vs. Wright, 53
Phil. 172, 191, is to be read as controlling here. We there held that “[l]t is
the Director of Public Works and not the Insular Auditor to whom the law grants
the power to award a contract to the lowest responsible bidder”. Citing
Ynchausti & Co. vs. Wright, [1925], 47 Phil. 866, ^[16] this Court in Tan C. Tee ruled that “the Insular
Auditor has no power to re-examine the merits of a decision by the Insular
Collector of Customs”, and added that “[W]hat the Insular Auditor can properly
and legally do when, in his desire to protect the public treasury, he sees money
being dissipated by irresponsible or careless officials, is clearly indicated in
the Organic Act when it provides that ‘[l]t shall be the duty of the Auditor to
bring to the attention of the proper administrative officer expenditures of
funds or property which, in his opinion, are irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
or extravagant'”. And in Zobel, et al., vs. City of
Manila, 47 Phil. 169, the language is
as clear and explicit. We there said:

“Another reason advanced for
supposing the contract for the purchase of this property to be invalid, or at
least unenforcible, is that the Insular Auditor has refused to countersign the
warrant for the first instalment of the purchase price; and it is insisted for
the defendant that this action on his part is conclusive against the plaintiffs.
Their sole recourse, so it is claimed, is, or rather was, by way of
administrative appeal from the action of the Auditor to the Governor-General.
The suggestion is in our opinion without merit. The general provisions of law
defining the jurisdiction and powers of the Auditor and which, if literally
construed, would seem to make him absolute arbiter of all claims of any sort
against all branches of the Government must be considered to be qualified as
regards the contract rights of persons dealing with the city by the more
specific provisions declaring how and by whom contracts can be made which will
be binding on it. It was not intended that the Auditor should possess a general veto power over all city
contracts, and his refusal to countersign the warrant referred to is
of no moment in this action to enforce the legal liability of the
city.”^[17]

As we fall back on the facts,
here is the situation presented in the case before us. There is a perfected
contract for the purchase of the trucks. The purchase order was approved by the
City Mayor, attested to by respondent City Auditor, and accepted by BISI on
July 18,
1962.
That contract conforms to the provisions of the law prescribing the procedure as
to how and by whom said contract can be validly entered
into. Public bidding was conducted upon notice and publication. The various bids
were examined. The committee awarded the bid to BISI. The City Mayor signed the
contract as he is empowered so to do.^[18] In this factual backdrop, respondents have
no discretion to disapprove the voucher for payment. If the Auditor General
believed that the contract was unwise, his duty under the Constitution was
simply to bring the matter to the attention of the city authorities. Which he did.

The illegality of contract — non-compliance
with the mandatory provisions of law and administrative regulations
indispensable to the validity of a contract — is here absent. Therefore, the rulings of this Court in Matute vs. Hernandez, 66
Phil. 68 and Vda. e Hijos de C. Zamora, vs. Wright and Segado, 53 Phil.
613 — which upheld the Auditor’s power of refusal to pass in audit disbursements
upon contracts in violation of law – find no application in the case before
us.

We rule that the Auditor General is bereft of authority to revise,
revoke or veto the award herein.

4.     
Respondents would want to
overturn the award upon the averment that the same was given under an irregular
procedure and circumstances indicative of arbitrariness or favoritism amounting
to fraud.

All quarters concede that the action of an administrative body
which is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious may be stricken down by the courts of
justice.^[19]

All that
respondents could muster on this point is a reference to the actuations of
Fernando Manalastas. The charge funnels down to the averment that Manalastas
endorsed BISI’s bid to the two committee members and against the competing
bidders, and that, for this reason, he was the mouthpiece of BISI and incapable
of exercising an independent mind and judgment. Manalastas was the mayor’s
consultant in public health, hygiene and sanitation. That Manalastas was
entitled to his opinion, we should not dispute. That opinion was expressed
openly, was the subject of scrutiny of the two members of the committee, the
City Treasurer and the City Auditor. These two pitted the arguments advanced by
Manalastas as against those offered by GAMI and CCH. Manalastas was not alone in
his view. Two other officials of the city government, Leopoldo Reyes of the
department of public services and Mr. Chico, Assistant Public Services Officer,
both representing the end-users, also recommended the award. The two committee
members, the City Treasurer and the City Auditor, who gave their imprimatur to
BISI’s bid, are responsible public officials. And then, respondent City Auditor
Jose Erestain — the minutes of the meetings of June 18 and 20, 1962 show —
actively participated in the discussions, placed his stamp of approval on the
award to BISI only after he had satisfied himself of the correctness thereof. At
the meeting of June 20,
1962, he
even served notice that “the Committee will do what is right under any
administration”. And more. When the protests of GAMI and CCH were taken up by
the Committee on July 16 following, Erestain took proper precautions to make
anew a searching examination of the facts, before he reached the conclusion that
the protests were without merit. Well did the trial judge remark that the charge
of irregularity amounting to fraud is a “sad and unfair reflection on the
respondent City Auditor Jose Erestain”.

Really, mere suspicion as to the
actuations of Manalastas will not override the presumption of regularity and
legality of his official acts as technical assistant, or, for that matter, the
official acts of the members of the committee.^[20]

We hold that vice did not
contaminate the award.

5.     
The proposed expenditure of
city funds here involved is legal. The contract was entered into by the Mayor
acting within the scope of his authority. There is appropriation to cover the
disbursement. And this, not to say that the voucher therefor had been duly
attested by respondent City Auditor. Mandamus lies to compel respondents to
perform their ministerial duty – to sign the voucher for the purchase of the
equipment.^[21]

For the reasons
given, we
affirm the judgment under review. No costs.

SO
ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Ordinance
4327—P280,000; Ordinance 4378, Item
364—P300,000.

^[2] Trucks
offered by MSI.

^[3] Trucks
offered by GAMI.

^[4] Known as
the Local Autonomy Act.

^[5]
43 Am. Jur., p. 783; Madison vs. Harbor Board, 25 A. 337, 338, and cases
cited.

^[6] 73C.J.S., 380-382;
42 Am. Jur., p. 387.

^[7] 73 C.J.S., pp.
314-316. Cf. Section 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended.

^[8] 42 Am. Jur., pp.
384-386; 73C.J.S., pp. 314-315.

^[9] The following excerpts appear from the
sponsorship speech of Senator Rosales during the deliberation on Senate Bill No.
224 (now R.A. No. 2264):
“Senator ROSALES. x x x x
The next additional power given to our local
governments is in the matter of purchases. At present almost all the purchases
made by the provinces and municipalities are being made through the Bureau of
Supply which on many occasions has caused inconvenience, and people and
officials in our provinces and municipalities have wasted their time to come to
Manila to follow up their purchases because we know by experience that matters
in the Bureau of Supply go very slow and so, under this proposed amendment, when
the price of the article is not over and above that fixed by the Tureau of
Supply, the local authorities are empowered to make local purchases so long as
the amount does not exceed P500 (P1,000 as approved) in the case of
municipalities and P5,000 in the case of cities and provinces, in which case
when the amounts exceed those figures, the purchase has to be made through
public bidding. ” Congressional Record, (Senate), 4th
Congress, 1st Session, May 13,
1958,
Vol. I, No. 70, p. 1519.

^[10]
Minutes of the committee meeting of July 16,
1962,
when the protests ere rejected.

^[11]
See Revised
Manual of Instructions to Treasurers, Sec. 791, supra.

^[12] Esguerra & Sons vs. Aytona, et al.,
L-18751, April 28,
1962.

^[13] Section 5(m),Rule 131, Rules of Court; Quiem vs. Seriña, etc., et al.,
L-22610, June 30,
1956.

^[14] L-17115,
promulgated November 30,
1962;
emphasis supplied.

^[15] In re: Patterson, 1 Phil. 93, 98.

^[16] Affirmed by the Supreme Court of
the United
States, 272
U.
S. 640.

^[17] At pp. 184-185; emphasis
supplied.

^[18] Section 11(i),
R. A. 409, in conjunction with Section 791 of the Revised Manual of Instructions
to Treasurers.

^[19] Borromeo vs.
City of Manila, et al., 62 Phil. 512, 516-517; Tan C. Tee & Co., vs. Wright,
supra, p. 191, citing People vs. Kent, 150 111. 655.

^[20] Tolentino vs. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300,
304.

^[21] Hoey vs. Baldwin, 1 Phil.
551, 558; Ynchausti & Co. vs. Wright, supra, at p. 891; Radiowealth, Inc.
vs. Agregado, etc., et al, 86 Phil. 429, 440; Guevara vs. Gimenez, etc., et al.,
supra.