ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. VIVENCIA ANDO PEPITO, AND THE MINORS, LOLITA, ALBERTO, NELSON, MARYLEN & MARIA, ALL SURNAMED PEPITO, REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER, T…

Between the night of November 30 and the early morning of December 1, 1961,
Demetrio Pepito, a crew member of m/v P. Aboitiz, disappeared therefrom while
said vessel was on voyage.

On December 26, 1961, petitioner received from respondent Vivencia Ando
Pepito a letter dated December 21, 1961, stating —

“You are hereby notified that one of your employees, Mr. Demetrio Pepito, a
crew member of M/V P. Aboitiz, one of your vessels, was reported missing as per
record of the Deck Log Book of the M/V P. Aboitiz while said vessel was
navigating from Surigao to Tandag. It is our belief that Mr. Pepito is already
dead. A diligent search has been made but the same is rendered
futile.”

On January 12, 1962, Vivencia Ando Pepito, for herself and in behalf of her
children, the other respondents, filed with Regional Office No. 8, Department of
Labor, Cebu City, a notice and claim for compensation, asking for death
benefits, and describing the circumstances of the alleged death of Demetrio
Pepito on the night of November 30, 1961 in the following manner, viz:
“While the vessel was navigating from Surigao to Tandag, the herein deceased was
lost or reported missing as per record of the deck log of the M/V P.
Aboitiz”.

Having received on February 15, 1962 from the chief, labor operations section
of said regional office, a letter enclosing the foregoing claim, petitioner, on
February 16, 1962, sent to that office the employer’s report of accident or
sickness, controverting the claim for compensation and alleging that Demetrio
Pepito was found missing on December 1, 1961 and giving its own version of the
incident as follows: “Pepito disappeared while off duty, and when the vessel was
near Bucas Grande Island while the ship was in navigation on a calm sea arid
good weather. We do not know if he purposely jumped and awam ashore”.

On March 21, 1962, without hearing, the Regional Administrator issued
an award for death benefits to respondents, planted upon the ground that “the
right to compensation of the claimant has not been controverted by respondent
within the period provided for by law”.

Motion to reconsider was of no avail. Petitioner sought review from the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission. In a decision dated March 8, 1963, said
Commission affirmed. The reconsideration sought was thwarted in the Commission’s
en banc resolution of April 5, 1963.

We are now called upon to review on certiorari the Commission’s decision of
March 8, 1963 and its resolution of April 5, 1963.

1. There should be no quarrel as to the fact that petitioner came to know of
   the disappearance of Demetrio Pepito on December 1, 1961, Petitioner so admits
   in its report of accident or sickness. And then, on December 26, 1961 petitioner
   received from respondent Vivencia Ando Pepito a letter informing it of the fact
   that Demetrio Pepito was reported missing on December 1, 1961, as per record of
   the deck log book of m/v P. Aboitiz.

   Decidedly, the purported controversion — filed on February 16, 1962 — was
   made beyond the periods set forth in the law and the rules and regulations of
   the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, namely, 14 days from the date of accident
   or 10 days from knowledge thereof.^[1]

2. Logically, the next problem we face is the scope of the non-controversion
   which may be clamped upon petitioner.

   By Section 2, Rule 7 of the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission,
   “[A]ll the general rules of procedure in the Courts of First Instance shall be
   suppletory to the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission but the
   commission shall not be bound by the technical rules of procedure”.

   We go deep into the recitals of the notice and claim for compensation. It
   simply says that while the vessel was navigating, “the herein deceased was lost
   or reported missing”. This claim was filed on January 12, 1962, or barely 42
   days after the event took place. At that time, no presumption existed that
   Demetrio Pepito was dead. The boat was not lost. This opens up a number of
   possibilities. Because nothing is certain. Nobody knows what has happened to
   him. He could have transferred to another vessel or watercraft. He could even
   have swam to safety. Or he could have died. Or worse, he could have taken his
   own life. Legal implications — such as right to compensation, succession, the
   legal status of the wife — are so important that courts should not so easily be
   carried to the conclusion that the man is dead.^[2] The result is that death cannot be taken
   as a fact.

   Non-controversion in compensation cases, as in the case of pleadings in
   ordinary civil cases,^[3] simply means
   admission of facts, not conclusions of law.

   As applied to the case before us, the mere failure to controvert the
   statement that Demetrio Pepito is believed to be “dead” or “deceased” because he
   “was lost” or was “reported missing”, does not import an admission that the man
   is actually dead, but that he was just lost or missing.

   We, therefore, rule that petitioner’s non-controversion admits but the fact
   that Demetrio Pepito was lost or missing, but certainly is not an admission of
   the actual fact of death.

3. But petitioner was directed to pay compensation without inquiry into the
   fact and circumstances of death. This trenches upon petitioner’s right to due
   process enshrined in Section 1(1) of Article III of the Constitution that “[N]o
   person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
   law.” The award having been made before petitioner was given an opportunity to
   be heard on the debatable fact and circumstances of death, that award has no leg
   to stand on. We nullify that award as a violation of a constitutional
   proscription.

4. But the Commission would want to downgrade petitioner’s cry of denial of due
   process by a reference to a certain investigation report dated January 12, 1962,
   made — barely 42 days after the incident — by one Anselmo M. Morales, a
   constabulary sergeant, to the effect that Demetrio Pepito was “on board said
   boat on her maiden voyage to Tandag, Surigao del Sur; that at about 2:00 o’clock
   a.m. on December 1, 1961, Francisco Ygot, a watchman on duty, noticed that
   Demetrio Pepito was not in the crews’ sleeping quarters; that when a thorough
   search of the boat failed to locate the missing crew member, the boat’s course
   was reversed upon instruction of its captain in order to look for him; that
   because no trace of Demetrio Pepito or his body could be found, the search was
   abandoned and the boat then proceeded to Tandag; and that no one knew what
   happened to Demetrio Pepito because he disappeared at midnight on a rough
   sea (big waves)”.^[4] This report does
   not prove death. At best, it confirms a known fact — disappearance, with the
   circumstance that “no one knew what happened to Demetrio Pepito”. Besides, said
   report was not brought up at any hearing. It was but the result of an
   investigation. Whatever the investigator said would not rise above the level of
   hearsay twice removed. By Section 7 of the Workmen’s Compensation Law “[A]ll
   ex parte evidence received by the Commissioner shall be reduced to
   writing and any party in interest shall have the opportunity to examine and
   rebut the same”. Petitioner was not afforded an opportunity to as much as
   examine or contradict this report. It thus results that said report is of no
   value as evidence.

5. The employer-employee relationship is conceded. The event arose out of, and
   took place in the course of, employment. It matters not that the disappearance
   occurred, as alleged by petitioner, while Demetrio Pepito was off-duty. For,
   that incident happened while the boat was on a sea voyage. He had no choice. He
   had to be in the vessel.[5]

6. From the time the event took place, i.e., from the night of November 30,
   1961, to this date, more than 4 years have elapsed. It is because of this that
   we approach this problem with a practical end in view. By this time, it cannot
   be gainsaid that the case of the disappearance of Demetrio Pepito could come
   within the coverage of paragraph 3, Article 391 of the Civil Code, which reads:

   “ART. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
   including the division of estate among the heirs: x x x x x x (3) A person who
   has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
   been known for four years.”^[6]

   With the known facts, namely, that Demetrio Pepito was lost or missing while
   the boat was navigating, he could have been in danger of death. But of course,
   evidence must be taken that his existence has not been known for four years or
   thereafter.

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, we vote to set aside
the appealed decision of March 8, 1963 and the resolution of April 5, 1963, and
to direct that the record hereof be returned to the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission with instructions —

1. To hold a hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine (a) whether
   Demetrio Pepito is alive; or (b) whether he should be presumed dead, under the
   provisions of paragraph 3, Article 391 of the Civil Code; and (c) the
   circumstances of death if it be found or presumed that he died; and
2. To render judgment accordingly. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon,
Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, and Ruiz Castro, JJ.,
concur.

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^[1] Sec. 45, Workmen’s Compensation Law;
Sec. 2, Rule 5, Workmen’s Compensation Commission Rules.

^[2] Article 391, Civil Code; Madrigal Shipping
Co., Inc. vs. Del Rosario, et al., L-13130, October 31, 1959, citing Joaquin vs.
Navarro, 93 Phil. 257, 265; Victory Shipping Lines vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, et al., L-9268, November 28, 1959.

^[3] Tec Bi & Co. vs. Chartered Bank of
India, Australia & China, 41 Phil. 596, 605-606; Dalandan, et al., vs.
Julio, et al., L-19101, February 29, 1964.

^[4] Emphasis supplied.

^[5] Martha Lumber Mill, Inc. vs. Lagradante,
etc., et al., 99 Phil. 434, 437.

^[6] Art. 391(3), Civil Code, is now Sec. 5(x),
par. 3(3), Rule 131, Rules of Court.