TEODORO ABUEVA ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. LEONARD WOOD ET, AL., RESPONDENTS.

JOHNSON, J.:


This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the petitioners
for the writ of mandamus, to compel the respondents to exhibit to the
petitioners and to permit them to examine all the vouchers and other documentary
proofs in their possession, showing the disbursements and expenditures made by
them out of the funds of the Independence Commission. To the petition each of
the respondents demurred. In order that there may be a clear understanding of
the arguments in support of the demurder, a statement of the facts as they
appear in the petition becomes necessary. They are:

(1) That the petitioners are and have been for more than six months members
of the Independence Commission, created by virtue of the Concurrent Resolution
No. 20 (vol. 14, Public Laws, p. 343), adopted on the 7th day of November, 1918,
by the Philippine Legislature; and that the creation of said Independence
Commission had been confirmed and ratified by Joint Resolution No. 13 (vol. 14,
Public Laws, p. 342), adopted by the Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of
March, 1919;

(2) That all and each one of the petitioners are actually members of the
Philippine Legislature, elected at the general election held on the 6th day of
June, 1922; that the first twenty-six of the petitioners are members of the
House of Representatives and the last four are members of the Senate of the
Philippine Islands; that they all belong to the democratic party;

(3) That the respondent Leonard Wood is the Govenor-General of the Philippine
Islands, with his residence and office in the City of Manila; that Manuel L.
Quezon and Manuel Roxas are Presidents of the Independence Commission; that
Paciano Dizon is the Acting Auditor of the Philippine Islands; that Teodoro M.
Kalaw is the Executive Secretary of the Independence Commission, with a salary
of P12,000 per annum, and that Fernando Mariano Guerrero is the Secretary of the
Independence Commission;

(4) That by Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided
for a standing appropriation of one million pesos (P1,000,000) per annum,
payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to
defray the expenses of the Independence Commission, including publicity and all
other expenses in connection with the performance of its duties; that said
appropriation shall be considered as included in the annual appropriation for
the Senate and the House of Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each
house, although the appropriation act hereafter approved may not make any
specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso that no part of said
sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be
necessary to make the payment or payments authorized by said act;

(5) That the petitioners are citizens and taxpayers and persons interested in
knowing how the public funds are expended; that as members of the Legislature
they are entrusted with the honest investment, disposition, and administration
of the public funds of the Government; that as members of the Independence
Commission they are legally obliged to prevent the funds of said Commission from
being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in open
contravention of the purposes of the law ; that the petitioners have verbally
and by writing requested the respondents many times to exhibit to them and to
permit them to see and examine the vouchers and other documentary proofs
relating to the expenditures and payments made out of the funds appropriated for
the use of the Independence Commission;

(6) That notwithstanding the fact that the original vouchers showing the
expenses paid out of the Independence Commission fund are in the possession of
the respondent Paciano Dizon, as Acting Insular Auditor, who is under the
control and authority of the respondent Leonard Wood as Governor-General; and
notwithstanding the fact that the duplicates of said vouchers are in the
possession of the officers of the Independence Commission, Manuel L. Quezon,
Manuel Roxas, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fernando Mariano Guerrero, said respondents
taking advantage of all classes of pretexts and subterfuges, have denied and
continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said vouchers and
documentary proofs of the expenditures of the funds of said Independence
Commission, thus trampling upon and denying the rights of the petitioners in
their capacity as citizens of the Philippine Islands, as members of the
Legislature, and as members of the Independence Commission, and inflicting an
unpardonable offense upon the electors of the Philippine Islands, who confided
their votes and their representation in the petitioners;

(7) That the petitioners not only have a recognized right under the law, but
also the important duty of knowing how the funds of the Commission are managed;
that much of the funds of the Independence Commission is being used for purposes
contrary to the Concurrent Resolution No. 20 of the 7th day of November,
1918;

(8) That the petitioners are without other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy.

To the petition the Attorney-General, Antonio Villa Real, appeared as
attorney for the respondents Leonard Wood, as Governor-General, Manuel L. Quezon
and Manuel Roxas as Chairmen of the Independence Commission, and entered a
special appearance for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court
over his clients, upon the ground, first, that Leonard Wood, as
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive department
of the Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of
the courts, and second, that Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as
Chairmen of the Independence Commission, are mere agents of the Philippine
Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts.

The Attorney-General appeared on behalf of Paciano Dizon, as -Acting Auditor
of the Philippine Islands, and demurred to the petition upon the ground: First,
that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because section
24 of the Jones Law provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the
Auditor over accounts, whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and
records pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive;” and also because the
determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of
Independence should be shown to the plaintiffs or not, is a question of policy
and administrative discretion, and is therefore not justiciable; Second, that
the complaint does not state a cause of action in that (a) there is no
provision of law making it the duty of the Auditor to exhibit the vouchers of
expenses of the Independence Commission to anybody that may ask for the
privilege, and it is a well-established rule that mandamus will not issue if
there is no legal duty to be enforced; (b) the work of the Independence
Commission is largely of a political and confidential nature, so that the
granting of the writ to compel the exhibition of its records to the plaintiffs
or to the public in general would be contrary to public interest; (c)
the plaintiffs have another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law, to wit:
by addressing their petition to the Independence Commission or to the Philippine
Legislature itself, of both of which bodies the said plaintiffs are members;

Third, the plaintiffs have no beneficial interest in the act which they seek
to have performed, or any particular right to be protected thereby, independent
of that which they hold in common with the public at large, to make them proper
parties to these proceedings and to entitle them to maintain the same;

Fourth, that the complaint is ambiguous, unintelligible, and uncertain.

The Attorney-General appeared on behalf of the respondents Teodoro M. Kalaw
and Fernando Mariano Guerrero, and demurred to the petition upon the following
grounds:

First, that the court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action, because (a) the Commission of Independence is a commission of
the Philippine Legislature; that the funds appropriated by Act No. 2933 to
defray the expenses of said Commission is, under the same law, deemed a part of
the appropriation for the Legislature; that the vouchers and other documents
relative to the disbursement of said funds form a part of the record of the
Legislature, over which the Legislature has exclusive control; that it is for
the Legislature to decide whether or not its record should be shown to the
public, and that the courts cannot determine that question without encroaching
upon the domain of a coordinate branch of the government; and (b) that
said respondents are not officers with specific duties assigned by law but are
acting as mere agents of the Philippine Legislature, and as agents of the
Legislature their action cannot be controlled by the court;

Second, that the petitioners have no beneficial interest in the act which
they seek to have performed, or any right to be protected thereby, independent
from that which they hold in common with the public at large, to make them
proper parties to the proceedings and to entitle them to maintain the same;

Third, that there is a misjoinder of parties defendant, in that the
respondents are not proper parties to these proceedings for the reason that, as
mere officers of the Commission of Independence, they have neither the right nor
the power to exhibit the records of the said Commission without the
authorization or consent of the latter; Fourth, that the complaint does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that: (a)
there is no provision of law making it the duty of the Philippine Legislature,
of the Commission of Independence, and much less of both or either of these
respondents, to exhibit the records of the Commission to any person that may ask
for the same; (b) the duties sought to be enforced by the petitioners,
granting that they exist, are, by nature, discretionary and political, their
performance being left to the judgment of these respondents or of their
superiors; (c) that the plaintiffs have another plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, to wit: by addressing their petition to the Commission of
Independence or, to the Philippine Legislature itself. The complaint does not
show that this has been done. The plaintiffs not having exhausted their remedy
at law, they are not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus;
(d) that the granting will be prejudicial to the public interest;

Fifth, the petition is ambiguous, unintelligible, and uncertain.

The particular defense presented by each of the respondents has been set out
in full in order that their respective positions might be clearly shown. At the
close of the argument each requested ten days in which to present a memorandum
in support of his respective contention. Later, the Attorney-General presented
an extensive memorandum for the respondents in support of his contention. The
petitioners failed to present a memorandum in support of their contention.

The petition calls upon the judicial department of the Government to direct
some of the officials of the executive and legislative departments to permit the
petitioners to see and examine the vouchers showing the various expenditures of
the “Independence Commission,” out of the appropriation authorized by Act No.
2933. The petition presents no question concerning the legality of said
appropriation. That would be quite a different question from the one which we
are considering. The petition presents but one question and that is: Has the
judicial department of the Government jurisdiction or authority to direct either
or both of the other departments of the Government to do or to perform any duty
which pertains particularly to those departments of the Government?

The question presented is not a new one, and this is not the first time that
it has been presented to the courts for solution. Neither is it the first time
it has been presented to the courts here.

The Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands is divided
under its charter or constitution (the Organic Act) into three great, separate,
distinct, and independent departments; the executive, the legislative, and the
judicial. The duties of each department are well defined and limited to certain
fields of governmental operation. This government is modeled after the Federal
or state governments of the United States, and possesses a complete governmental
organization with executive, legislative, and judicial departments which are
exercising functions, as independent of each other, as the Federal or state
governments.

We shall consider the questions in the order in which they have been argued
by the respondents.

First. Have the courts of the Philippine Islands jurisdiction to issue the
writ of mandamus against Leonard Wood, as Governor-General, to compel him to
permit the petitioners to see and examine the vouchers in question? In the first
place section 222 of Act No. 190 provides generally when courts may issue the
writ of mandamus. Said section provides that “when the complaint in an action in
a court of first instance alleges that any inferior tribunal, corporation,
board, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes the plaintiff from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which he is entitled and from which he is unlawfully precluded by such
inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, and the court, on trial, finds
the allegations of the complaint to be true, it may, if there is no other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary courts (course) of law, render a
judgment granting a peremptory order against the defendant, commanding him,
immediately after the receipt of such order, or at some other specified time, to
do the act required (by law or resulting from an office, trust, or station) to
be done to protect the rights of the plaintiff.” Section 515 of Act No. 190
confers upon the Supreme Court the same powers and duties conferred upon the
courts of first instance by section 222.

It will be noted from said section 222 (and 515) that in order for the courts
to issue the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, it must be shown that the persons
mentioned therein have unlawfully neglected “the performance of an act which the
law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,” or
unlawfully excluded “the plaintiff from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which he is entitled, etc.”

There is no allegation in the petition in the present case that Leonard Wood,
as Governor-General, has unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which
the law specially enjoins as a duty upon him resulting from his office, trust,
or station, or has unlawfully excluded the plaintiffs from the use or enjoyment
of a right or office to which they are entitled. The only allegation in the
complaint relating to the duty or the neglected duty on the part of Leonard Wood
as Governor-General is, “that the original of said vouchers are in possession of
the respondent Paciano Dizon as Acting Insular Auditor, who is under his
authority and high general inspection as Governor-General.” There is no
allegation or intimation in the petition that Leonard Wood, as Governor-General,
has neglected the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins upon him
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station or has unlawfully excluded
the petitioners from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which they are
entitled.

The failure of sufficient allegations in the complaint might therefore be
sufficient reason for denying the right prayed for. The demurrer, however, is
not based upon that ground. It is based upon the ground that this department of
the Government, even though the allegations of the petition were sufficient, is
without authority or jurisdiction to grant the remedy prayed for. The
Attorney-General preferred to place his objection upon broader grounds than the
mere failure of allegations in the petition.

The Attorney-General challenges the attention of the petitioners upon the
question of jurisdiction. The petitioners accepted the challenge and the cause
was argued upon the theory that the courts have no jurisdiction at all in the
premises to grant the remedy prayed for as against the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands. The question whether or not the courts have jurisdiction to
control the official acts of the executive and legislative departments of the
Government has come before the courts a great many times. The courts in the
United States have not always been uniform in their conclusion.

The question was presented to this court in 1910 in the case of Severino
vs. Governor-General (16 Phil., 366). In that case an original petition
was presented in the Supreme Court, praying for the writ of mandamus against the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands to compel him to call a special
election for the purpose of electing a municipal president in the town of Silay.
After a very careful consideration of the question and the power of this court
to control the action of the Governor-General by mandamus, the court announced,
through a very extended opinion by Mr. Justice Trent, that we could not and
should not entertain a complaint which seeks to control or interfere with the
official duties of the Governor-General. In the course of that decision
practically every case which had been decided up to that time, pro and con, was
carefully considered by the court. After a full consideration of all of the
decisions pro and con, the conclusion was reached that the better doctrine to be
adopted in the Philippine Islands was, that which the court then adopted, to the
effect that the judicial department would not interfere by mandamus or otherwise
for the purpose of controlling or directing the action of the officials of a
coordinate department of the Government.

The writ of mandamus was originally a prerogative writ and issued only by the
King or the representative of the Sovereign. It was called a prerogative writ
from the fact that it proceeded from the King himself in his Court of King’s
Bench, superintending the police and preserving the peace of the realm, and it
was granted where one is entitled to an office or function and there was no
other remedy. (Opinion of Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice, in the case of King
vs. Barker, 1 Black. W., 352.)

Blackstone terms the writ of mandamus “a high prerogative writ of a most
extensive remedial nature” (3 Blackstone Commentaries, 110) and it is uniformly
referred to in the earlier decisions as a prerogative remedy,, and spoken of by
many judges as one of the flowers of the King’s Bench. It is remedy of very
ancient origin, so ancient that Dr. High in his work on Extraordinary Legal
Remedies says that its early history is involved in obscurity and has been the
cause of much curious research and of many conflicting opinions. It seems,
originally, to have been one of that large class of writs or mandates by which
the Sovereign of England directed the performance of any desired act by his
subjects. It finally, in tjie time of the reigns of Edward II and Edward III,
came to be known as a judicial writ and was issued by authority of the courts.
In the United States, however, and in all of the states of the Union the writ of
mandamus has never been regarded as a prerogative writ. It has always been
regarded as a judicial remedy. It is now generally considered as an ordinary
action obtained by petition, demurrer, and answer, as any other remedy is
obtained through the courts.

One of the first cases, and perhaps the first which came before the Supreme
Court of the United States in which the writ of mandamus was prayed for against
an officer of the executive department of the Government, was that of Marbury
vs. Madison (1 Cranch, U. S.f 137-172). In that case Marbury had been
appointed as a justice of the peace for the City of Washington, D. C, by
President Adams, as one of his last official acts as President of the United
States. The commission of the appointee was properly executed, but had not been
delivered at the time when President Adams ceased to be President of the United
States and Mr. Jefferson became President. Mr. Jefferson directed that the
commission appointing Mr. Marbury should not be delivered. As a result, an
action was commenced against Mr. Madison to obtain the writ of mandamus,
requiring him to deliver said commission. The Supreme Court, after due
deliberation and consideration of its own powers in the premises, througfi a
very able and learned opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, reached the conclusion
that it had no power or jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus, and that, in
the face of the fact that the Congress of the United States had provided for the
appointment of said justice of the peace and the issuing of a commission of
appointment. To have required Mr. Madison to deliver the commission of
appointment, would have been an interference with the discretion and duties of
the executive department of the Government, which the Supreme Court of the
United States positively refused to do upon the ground that the different
departments of the government were separate and independent, and that one
department had no right, authority or jurisdiction to intervene in the
performance of the duties of the other for the purpose of directing and
controlling those duties. The delivery of the commission of appointment to Mr.
Marbury was entirely within the discretion of the executive department of ‘the
government.

Among the numerous cases which have been brought before the courts, involving
the question of the right of the courts to intervene in the administration of
the other independent departments of the government, we find one of the
best-reasoned cases in that of Sutherland vs. Governor (29 Mich., 320).
The decision in that case was rendered by Mr. Justice Cooley, one of the
greatest and ablest jurists who ever sat upon any of the courts in the United
States. In that case the Legislature of the State of Michigan had by statute
authorized the Governor of the state to issue a patent to certain public lands
when certain improvements had been made thereon by any citizen of the state. Mr.
Sutherland claimed that he had complied with the law and requested the Governor
to issue to him a patent for the particular land. The Governor refused for
reasons which were sufficient for himself. A petition for the writ of mandamus
was presented in the Supreme Court, which was denied upon the ground that the
court was without jurisdiction to direct the Governor of the state in the
performance of any duty which pertained to his particular department. In the
course of that opinion, Mr. Justice Cooley, speaking for the court, said:

“There is no very clear and palpable line of distinction between those duties
of the governor which are political, and those which are to be considered
ministerial merely; and if we should undertake to draw one, and to declare that
in all cases falling on one side the line the governor was subject to judicial
process, and in all falling on the other he was independent of it, we should
open the doors to an endless train of litigation, and the cases would be
numerous in which neither the governor nor the parties would be able to
determine whether his conclusion was, under the law, to be final, and the courts
would be appealed to by every dissatisfied party to subject a coordinate
department of the government to their jurisdiction. However desirable a pcwer in
the judiciary to interfere in such cases might seem from the standpoint of
interested parties, it is manifest that harmony of action between the executive
and judicial departments would be directly threatened, and that exercise of such
power could only be justified on most imperative reasons. Moreover, it is not
customary in our republican government to confer upon the governor duties merely
ministerial, and in the performance of which he is to be left to no discretion
whatever; and the presumption in all cases must be, where a duty is devolved
upon the chief executive of the State rather than upon an inferior officer, that
it is so because his superior judgment, discretion, and sense of responsibility
were confided in for a more accurate, faithful, and discreet performance than
could be relied upon if the duty were devolved upon an officer chosen for
inferior duties. * * *

“We are not disposed, however, in the present case, to attempt on any grounds
to distinguish it from other cases of executive duty with a view to lay down a
narrow rule which, while disposing of this motion, may leave the grave question
it presents to be presented again and again in other cases which the ingenuity
of counsel may be able to distinguish in some minor particulars from the one
before us. If a broad general principle underlies all these cases, and requires
the same decision in all, it would scarcely be respectful to the governor, or
consistent with our own sense of duty, that we should seek to avoid its
application and strive to decide each in succession upon some narrow and perhaps
technical point peculiar to the special case, if such might be discovered.”

The Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands is one whose
powers have been carefully apportioned between three distinct departments which
have their powers alike limited and defined, and are of equal dignity and within
their respective spheres of action equally independent. It is a maxim, under the
Government of the United States, that the legislature cannot dictate to the
courts what their judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments after
they had been duly considered and rendered. If it could, says Mr. Justice
Cooley, constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the legislature
could in like manner override executive action also, the government would become
only a despotism under popular forms. On the other hand, it would be readily
conceded that no court can compel the legislature to make or to refrain from
making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any action
whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made ever so clear by the constitution
or the laws. If the courts could intervene in the administration of the other
independent departments of the government or vice versa, they would break away
from those checks and balances of government which were meant, under our system
of government, to be checks of cooperation and not of antagonism or mastery, and
would concentrate in their own hands something at least of the power which the
people, either directly or by the action of their representatives, decided to
entrust to the other departments of the government.

Under the form of government established by the United States in the
Philippine Islands, one department of the government has no power or authority
to inquire into the acts of another, which acts are performed within the
discretion of the other department. That doctrine has been uniformally
maintained from the very commencement of the government, not only in the
Government of the United States in the Philippine Islands, but as well in the
Government of the United States and that of the States. The absurdity of any
other rule is manifest upon the slightest meditation. By the organic law of the
Philippine Islands the Governor-General is invested with certain important
political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion arid
is accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own
conscience.

The judicial and executive departments of the government are distinct and
independent, and neither is responsible to the other for the performance of its
duties and neither can enforce the performance of the duties of the other. The
dangers and difficulties which would grow out of the adop- tion of a contrary
rule are, by Chief Justice Taney in the case of Luther vs. Borden (7
Howard, U. S., 1, 44), clearly and ably pointed out.

No government past or present, under the American flag, has more carefully
and safely guarded and protected by law the individual rights of life and
property of its citizens, than the Government of the United States and of the
va- rious States of the Union. Each of the three departments of the government
has separate and distinct functions to perform in this great labor. The history
of the United States covering nearly a century and a half discloses the fact
that each department has performed its part well. No one department of the
government can or ever has claimed, within its discretionary power, a greater
zeal than the others in its desire to promote the welfare of the individual
citizen and to protect his rights. They are all joined together in their
respective spheres, harmoniously working to maintain good government, peace, and
order, to the end that the rights of each citizen be equally protected. No
one department can claim that it has a monopoly of these benign purposes of the
government. Each department has an exclusive field within which it can
perform its part within certain discretionary limits. No other department can
claim a right to enter these discretionary limits and assume to act there. No
presumption of an abuse of these discretionary powers by one department will be
considered or entertained by another. Such conduct on the part of one
department, instead of tending to conserve the government and the rights of the
people, would directly tend to destroy the confidence of the people in the
government and to undermine the very foundations of the government itself, and
lead to disaster, confusion, and uncertainty. (Barcelon vs. Baker and
Thompson, 5 Phil., 87.)

No well-organized government or business even, can be managed if one
department can enter upon the field of another and attempt to administer or
interfere with the administration of the other. Suppose, for example, the chief
of one department of the government, whose duties are well defined and whose
field of operation is well delimited, should attempt to enter upon the field of
another coordinate and equal department and to interfere with the administration
of that department and to direct its affairs, disorder and confusion would
immediately arise. This illustration of the interference« of one department with
another in any branch of the government fully demonstrates what would result
from an interference by one of the great departments of the government with the
administration of another.

Of course, nothing which has been said here can be construed to mean that the
Governor-General might not, if the circumstances justified it, exhibit and
deliver to the petitioners the vouchers in question if in his judgment he
thought it was wise to do for the best interest and highest welfare of the
people of the Philippine Islands. Whether such inspection and examination should
be granted, lies within the absolute discretion of the Governor-General. If he
should deem it important and advisable to exhibit the vouchers in question to
the petitioners or to the public in order that the taxpayers might know in what
manner their contributions to the government are expended, that is a question
for him to decide. It is purely a political question, and lies within the breast
of the Governor-General. The responsibility to decide that question rests with
him and his conscience to act as he deems wise in accordance with the best
interest and the highest welfare of the people. It was argued at the hearing of
the present case that the Philippine Government was a government of laws and not
of men, and that no individual or officer within the state was above the law,
and to deny the petitioners the right which they claim would be to recognize the
doctrine that some officials of the government are not governed by the law.

It was urged by the petitioners that in the government of laws there must be
an adequate remedy for every wrong and that where a clear right exists, there
must be some mode of enforcing that right. As a legal proposition, that
contention has much weight. But, as was said in the case of People ex rel.
vs. Bissell (19 I11., 229) : “While human society is governed by so
imperfect a being as man, this can be true only in theory. If we are to compel
the governor or the legislature to right every wrong which may arise from their
omissions of duty, then surely they (the executive and legislative departments)
must, in order to make this Utopian system perfect, have the power to compel us
(the courts) to do right in every case. May it not be as well supposed that we
(the courts) will act per- versely, and refuse to perform a duty imposed upon
us, to the injury of the citizen, as that the governor will do so? In the
formation of the government, equal confidence was rightfully reposed in each
department, to which appropriate and independent duties were assigned.”

In the performance of those independent duties assigned to each department of
the government, a discretion was given. Such duties were assigned to the
respective departments upon the theory that by reason of the machinery of
government furnished to each department, they could be better and more
efficiently performed by the particular department to which they had been
assigned. Under the theory of the three distinct and independent departments of
the government, it was not intended that one should encroach upon the field of
duty of the other. It was not intended by the framers of the theory of our
government that the duties which had been assigned to the executive should be
performed by the legislative, nor that the duties which had been assigned to
each of them should be performed and directed by the judicial department. The
reason why the courts will not entertain jurisdiction to control or direct the
action of the executive or legislative departments of the government, is not
that either of said departments or the officers thereof are above the law, but
because the people, in the organization of their government, deemed it wise to
impose such duties upon those departments. If the courts should take
jurisdiction for the purpose of controlling the acts of the executive and
legislative departments of the government, then the courts might become the
ruling and directing power of the government and deprive those departments of
their legal functions, contrary to the very fundamental idea of a republican
form of government.

The courts exercise no functions of sovereignty. The courts cannot even
execute their judgment except by contempt proceedings. When a judgment is
rendered and becomes final, its execution depends upon the executive department
of the government. The courts can only pronounce what the law is, and what the
rights of the parties thereunder are. When the courts pronounce an act of the
executive or legislative department of the government illegal and contrary to
the fundamental laws of the land, it is because the act of the executive
department of the government or the law adopted by the legislative department of
the government, falls within some of the inhibitions of the fundamental law of
the state. The wisdom or advisability of a particular act of the legislative
department or of a particular statute, is not a question for the courts to
determine. If a particular act or statute of the other departments of the
government is within the constitutional power of said departments, it should be
sustained by the courts whether they agree or not in the wisdom of the act or
the enactment. If the act of the executive department or the enactment of the
legislative department of the government covers subjects not authorized by the
fundamental laws of the land, or by the constitution, then the courts are not
only authorized to take jurisdiction to consider the same, but are justified in
pronouncing the same illegal and void, no matter how wise and beneficient they
may be. Courts are not justified in measuring their opinions with the opinions
of the other departments of the government as expressed in their acts, upon
questions of the wisdom, justice, and advisability of a particular act.

In exercising the high authority conferred upon the courts to pronounce valid
or invalid a particular act of the other departments of the government, they are
only the administrators of the public will as expressed in the fundamental law
of the land—the law of the people. If an act of either of the other departments
is to be held illegal, it is not because the judges or the courts have any
control over them, but because the act is forbidden by the fundamental law of
the land and because the will of the people, as declared in their law—the
fundamental law of the land—is paramount and must be obeyed even by the other
departments of the government. In pronouncing an act of the other departments of
the government illegal, the courts are simply interpreting the meaning, force,
and application of the fundamental law of the state.

Another potent reason why the judicial department will not take jurisdiction
of a case for the purpose of directing and controlling the action of the
executive department of the government, is, first, that it is without the
machinery or the power to enforce its processes. The Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, as the Chief Executive of the Government, is possessed with
the only machinery by which and through which the orders of the court and the
laws of the country are enforced. The courts are without power to enforce their
orders except in contempt proceedings, and then only with the assistance of the
officers of the executive department.

Second. What has been said with reference to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus against the Governor-General, as the head of the executive Hepartment
of the Government,, is equally applicable to the legislative department of the
Government and its officers when the duty is one pertaining to that particular
department of the Government. It may be asserted as a principle founded upon the
clearest legal reasoning that the legislature or legislative officers, in so far
as concerns their purely legislative functions, are beyond the control of the
courts by the writ of mandamus. The legislative department, being a coordinate
and independent branch of the government, its action within its own sphere
cannot be revised or controlled by mandamus by the judicial department, without
a gross usurpation of power upon the part of the latter. When the legislative
department of the government imposes upon its officers the performance of
certain duties which are not prohibited by the organic law of the land, the
performance, the non-performance, or the manner’ of the performance is under the
direct control of the legislature, and such officers are not subject to the
direction of the courts. (High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies [3d edition],
150-152, and cases cited; Turnbull vs. Giddings, 95 Mich., 314; Sinking
Fund Cases, 99 U. S., 700; 25 L. ed., 504; Ex Parte Echols, 39 Ala.,
698.)

In the case of Ex Parte Echols the Speaker of the House of
Representatives decided that a bill had not passed by a vote of two-thirds in
that branch of the legislature, and an appeal was taken from his decision to the
house and his decision was sustained. A member of the House of Representatives
presented a petition for the writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court to require
the Speaker of the House of Representatives to send said bill to the Senate of
the State upon the theory that it had passed by a majority vote of the House of
Representatives. In passing upon that question, the Supreme Court of Alabama
said: “This court will not interfere with either of the other coordinate
departments of the government, in the legitimate exercise of their jurisdiction
and powers, except to enforce mere ministerial acts required by law to be
performed by some officer thereof; and not then, if the law leaves it
discretionary with the officer or department. To this extent, and no farther, do
the decisions of this court go, upon this branch of the subject.”

*          *          *          *          *          *          *

“Each department of the government should be careful not to trench upon the
powers of the others; and this court should be the more so, as its decisions are
to be taken as the measure, in the last legal resort, of the powers which
pertain to each department thereof; and while it will uphold its own
jurisdiction and powers, it will be careful not to invade or usurp any that
appropriately belongs to either of the other coordinate branches of the
government.” (Miles vs. Bradford, 85 Am. Dec, 643; State ex
rel., Davisson vs. Bolte, 151 Mo., 362; Greenwood Cemetery Land
Co. vs. Routt, 17 Colo., 156; 31 Am. St. Rep., 284.)

The petitioners in the present case, together with others, constitute a
committee (commission) duly appointed by the Legislature for certain definite
and defined purposes, under Concurrent Resolution No. 20, of November 7, 1918.
The respondents Manuel L. Quezon, Manuel Roxas, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and Fernando
Mariano Guerrero are officers of that committee (commission). While it has been
decided in many cases that the courts will not interfere with the legislative
department of the government in the performance of its duties, does that rule
apply to the committees duly appointed by the legislative department of the
government and its officers? The powers and duties conferred upon said committee
by the Legislature, granting the legality of the object and purpose of said
committee, and granting that the Legislature itself had the power to do and to
perform the duties imposed upon said committee, then an interference by the
courts with the performance of those duties by it would be tantamount to
interfering with the workings and operations of the legislative branch of the
government itself. An interference by the judicial department of the government
with the workings and operations of the committee of the legislative department
would be tantamount to an interference with the workings and operations of the
legislative department itself. And, again, we are called upon to say, that one
branch of the government cannot encroach upon the domain of another without
danger. The safety of our institutions depends in no small degree on a strict
observance of this salutary rule. (Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S., 700, 718;
Clough vs. Curtis, 134 U. S., 361, 371; Wise vs. Bigger, 79
Va., 269.)

The committee (commission) composed of the petitioners and others, of which
the respondents Quezon, Roxas, Kalaw, and Guerrero are officers, is responsible
to the Legislature itself in the performance of the duties conferred upon it.
The Legislature may call upon it snd demand from time to time reports of its
work and its expenditures. It is alleged that all the members of the committee,
except its secretaries, are members of the Legislature. The petitioners
therefore have a remedy through the regular machinery of the Legislature for
obtaining the information which they are now seeking. If any irregularity or
illegality appears in the performance of the duties of either the Legislature or
its committees, their responsibility is to the people and not to the courts. An
appeal in case of illegality and irregularity on the part of the Legislature, as
a body, or of its individual members, may be had to the people who commissioned
them through the ballot and whose personal rep- resentatives they are. Each
department of the government should be sovereign and supreme in the performance
of its duties within its own sphere, and should be left without interference in
the full and free exercise of all such powers, rights, and duties which
rightfully belong to it. Each department should be left to interpret and apply,
within the constitutional powers conferred upon it, without interference, what
may be termed its political duties. For one department to assume to interpret,
or to apply, or to attempt to indicate how such political duties should be
performed, would be an unwarranted, gross, and palpable violation of the duties
which were intended by the creation of the separate and distinct departments of
the government. (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534,
574; Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87.)

The executive and legislative departments of the gorvernment are frequently
called upon to deal with what are known as political questions, with which the
judicial department of the government has no intervention. In all such
questions, in the first instance the courts have uniformally refused to’
intervene for the purpose of directing or controlling the actions of the other
departments. Such questions are many times reserved to those departments in the
organic law of the state. (22 Harvard Law Review, 132; Parker vs.
State, ex rel, Powell, 133 Ind., 178; 18 L. R. A., 569; Farrell vs.
United States, 110 Fed. Rep., 942; Kelley vs. State, 25 Ark., 392; U.
S. vs. Holliday, 3 Wallace [U. S.], 407; Message of President Polk to
the Congress of the United States, Apr. 20, 1846.)

And, in addition to all of the foregoing, the petitioners, as members of the
Legislature, may, through the Legislature itself, require the Independence
Commission to make a full and complete report of all of its operations,
including an itemized statement of its expenditures and thereby obtain the very
information which they are now seeking through the judicial department of the
government.

Third. With reference to the jurisdiction of the court to compel the Acting
Insular Auditor, Mr. Dizon, to comply with the prayer of the petition, it may be
said that the Auditor of the Philippine Islands, under the law, has (a)
exclusive jurisdiction over government accounts and records pertaining thereto,
and (b) power and authority to audit, in accordance with law and
administrative regula- tions, all expenditures of funds or property pertaining
to, or held in trust by the Government or the provinces or mu- nicipalities, and
to preserve the vouchers pertaining thereto. The Jones Law further provides that
the decisions of the Auditor shall be final and conclusive upon the executive
branches of the government, except that appeal therefrom may be taken by the
party aggrieved or the head of the department concerned, within one year, to the
Governor- General, which appeal shall specifically set forth the particular
action of the Auditor from which the exception is taken, with the reasons and
authorities relied upon for reversing such decision. The law further provides
that, in case of a disagreement between the Governor-General and the Auditor, a
further appeal is permitted to the Secretary of War, whose decision upon the
question presented shall be final and conclusive. (Act of Congress, August 29,
1916, sections 24 and 25, vol. 12, Public Laws, pp. 247-249.) Under said
provisions of the Jones Law, the decision of the Auditor is final unless an
appeal is taken within the time prescribed. The decision of the Auditor is final
unless it is reversed or modified in the manner provided by law, and the courts
are therefore without jurisdiction to intervene or to modify his decision in the
premises. The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts, whether
of funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be
exclusive. The jurisdiction of the Auditor in auditing and settling accounts is
exclusive, whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining
thereto, and his decision or his accounting of such revenues and receipts and
expenditures is final and conclusive, unless an appeal is taken therefrom within
the period of one year. The Auditor being possessed with exclusive and final
jurisdiction, except on an appeal, to audit all accounts of expenditures of
public funds of the Philippine Government, it would seem to be a reasonable
conclusion to hold that he has, at least, certain discretionary powers in
arriving at an uncontrolled and independent conclusion. The legislative
department of the government of the United States in the Philippine Islands
would not have made the decisions of the Auditor final, unless an appeal is
taken therefrom, without intending to give him an uncontrollable discretion with
reference thereto. (Lamb vs. Phipps, 22 Phil., 456; State vs.
Babcock, 22 Neb., 38.)

Without a further discussion of the questions presented, we are of the
opinion, and so decide, that we are without authority or jurisdiction to grant
the remedy prayed for; and the petition is therefore hereby denied, without any
finding as to costs. So ordered.

Street, Malcolm, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.