PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. PO1 CYRIL A. DE GRACIA, RESPONDENT.

People versus De Gracia

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, against Police Officer One Cyril A. De Gracia, a policeman charged with murder for the shooting death of David Paul at a post-Christmas party in Malate, Manila. The action is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the prosecution after the trial court and the Court of Appeals both allowed the accused to post bail. The case matters because it fixes the standard a court must apply in a bail hearing for a person charged with a capital offense: bail is a matter of right unless the evidence of guilt is strong, and where the qualifying circumstance of treachery is not shown by strong evidence, bail must be granted.

Procedural History

De Gracia was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40. While detained at the Manila City Jail, he filed a petition for bail. After a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting the petition, ruling that treachery was not sufficiently established and that the evidence of guilt for murder was not strong. The prosecution moved for reconsideration; the trial court denied the motion but fixed bail at One Hundred Thousand Pesos.

The public prosecutor then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which required the rectification of certain defects; the Office of the Solicitor General thereafter filed an amended petition. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, agreeing that the prosecution had not shown a strong case for murder, and later denied the motion for reconsideration. The People then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

On the night of December 28, 2011, David Paul gathered with friends, including Robert Bryan Villanueva, Joshua Mendoza, Merwin Irison and Bless Roquero, for a post-Christmas party at the house of Rio Polintan in Malate, Manila. Past midnight, De Gracia, a policeman in civilian clothes, arrived and announced himself as a gate-crasher. Asked by Rio's sister whether he had any gift, he replied, "Ito bala," and then joined the group, drank coffee cocktail, and spoke with Bless, whom he recognized as the former girlfriend of a friend.

At about two in the morning, De Gracia and Bless were still conversing in the sala. Merwin noticed a gun on the table and saw De Gracia insert a magazine of bullets, place the gun in his holster and tuck it in his waistline. After a while, Bless was heard telling De Gracia, "Kayang kaya ko ngang bugbugin ang ex ko, ikaw pa kaya," and then she pulled his hair. Joshua heard De Gracia threaten in a high-pitched tone, "Sige kapag sinabunutan mo ako ulit, babarilin ko yung kaibigan mo," and saw him hold his gun and point it at David.

The gun fired, hitting David in the chest. Robert ran to the kitchen; Merwin, hearing the shot, turned and saw David slipping down from his seat. De Gracia approached David, lifted his shirt, saw the blood, and told the others to bring David to his vehicle. David was taken to the Ospital ng Maynila, where he was pronounced dead. Robert testified that De Gracia was about one to one and a quarter meters away when he fired; Joshua testified that there was no heated discussion before the shooting, no anger in De Gracia's tone, and that De Gracia had a drink but was not intoxicated.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the trial court correctly concluded that the prosecution failed to establish that the evidence of guilt of De Gracia for murder is strong, and in agreeing with the order admitting him to bail.
• Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery was established by strong evidence so as to deny the accused his provisional liberty before conviction.

Applicable Provisions

Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This is the provision that governs whether bail may be denied, and it makes the strength of the evidence of guilt the decisive test.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes murder, provides:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

Treachery is the qualifying circumstance alleged by the prosecution, and it is the element whose proof determines whether the evidence of guilt for murder is strong.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition lacks merit and that an accused charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua may still be granted bail. Under Section 13, Article III of the Constitution, bail is denied only when the evidence of guilt is strong; in all other instances, bail must be granted before conviction, because the right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence. The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion, and the prosecution must establish it before the trial court, after proper notice and hearing.

On the second issue, the Court held that treachery was not proven by strong evidence. Two conditions must concur for treachery to be appreciated: first, the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and second, that the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. The Court stressed that treachery is never presumed, and that the suddenness of the attack does not by itself render it treacherous.

The Court rejected the prosecution's reliance on the trial court's phrase that the accused "decided to shoot any of the friends of Bless in an instant," holding that the order must be read as a whole and that the phrase referred to the swiftness of the attack. The very short interval between the threat and the shooting, less than three seconds, showed that De Gracia could not have meditated on the means of execution; he was simply irritated by the childish act of Bless pulling his hair, and the killing was perpetrated on the spur of the moment. His conduct before and after the shooting, not knowing David, having no reason to be angry with him, and offering his vehicle to bring him to the hospital, was inconsistent with a treacherous mindset.

Doctrine

First, an accused charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua is not absolutely barred from bail; bail is denied only when the evidence of guilt is strong, and the strength of that evidence is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court after notice and hearing.

Second, for treachery to be appreciated, two conditions must concur: the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of that means of execution. The suddenness of the attack, the vulnerable position of the victim, or the fact that the victim was unarmed do not by themselves render the attack treacherous.

Third, treachery is never presumed; absent any external manifestation that the accused wilfully and thoughtfully chose the manner of killing, the qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated, and without it the evidence of guilt for murder is not strong.

Disposition

The petition was denied, and the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals were affirmed in toto, with the express caveat that the ruling would not in any way affect the merits of the case before the trial court.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a charge of a non-bailable offense does not foreclose bail, because bail is denied only when the evidence of guilt is strong, and treachery, being never presumed, must be shown by strong evidence of a deliberately chosen means of execution. Examiners use this case to test the grant of bail in capital offenses and the elements of treachery, especially where the killing was sudden and on the spur of the moment.