G.R. No. 21241. April 07, 1924
COMPANIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE INSULAR COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
AVANCEÑA, C.J.:
On March 6, 1923, the appellant paid under protest to the Insular Collector
of Customs at Manila the sum of P1,427.26 under the provisions of section 14 of
the Act of Congress of the United States of August 5, 1909, entitled “An Act to
raise revenue for the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes.” This action
is brought to recover of the defendant Insular Collector of Customs the sum of
P1,427.26 alleged to have been illegally collected. The judgment appealed from
absolves the defendant from the complaint.
The appellant contends that section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5,
1909, was repealed by section 11 of the Jones Law, passed by the same
Congress.
The Act of Congress of August 5, 1909, in its sections 13 and 14, says
literally as follows:
“EXPORT DUTIES
“SEC. 13. That upon the exportation to any foreign country from the
Philippine Islands, or the shipment thereof to the United States or any of its
possessions, of the following articles, there shall be levied, collected and
paid thereon the following export duties: Provided, however, That all
articles the growth and product of the Philippine Islands coming directly from
said Islands to the United States or any of its possessions for use and
consumption therein, shall be exempt from any export duties imposed in the
Philippine Islands:
352. Abaca (hemp), gross weight, one hundred kilos, seventy-five cents.
353. Sugar, gross weight, one hundred kilos, five cents.
354. Copra, gross weight, one hundred kilos, ten cents.
355. Tobacco, gross weight:
(a) Manufactured or unmanufactured, except as otherwise provided,
one hundred kilos, one dollar and thirty cents.(b) Stems, clippings, and other wastes of tobacco, one hundred
kilos, fifty cents.
“WHARFAGE
“SEC. 14. That there shall be levied and collected upon all articles, goods,
wares, or merchandise, except coal, timber and cement, the product of the
Philippine Islands, exported through ports’ of entry of the Philippine Islands,
or shipped therefrom to the United States or any of its possessions, a duty of
one dollar per gross ton of one thousand kilos, as a charge for wharfage,
whatever be the port of destination or nationality of the exporting vessel:
Provided, That articles, goods, wares, or merchandise imported,
exported, or shipped in transit for the use of the Government of the United
States, or of that of the Philippine Islands, shall be exempt from the charges
prescribed in this section.”
Section 11 of the Jones Law is as follows:
“SEC. 11. That no export duty shall be levied or collected on exports from
the Philippine Islands, * * *.”
It is claimed that this section 11 of the Jones Law impliedly repealed
section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909. In our opinion it did
not.
An implied repeal rests only on the presumption of the intention to repeal.
This presumption arises when the new and the old law are absolutely
incompatible. There is no such incompatibility between section 11 of the Jones
Law and section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909. What is prohibited
in section 11 of the Jones’ Law is the collection of export duties upon articles
exported from the Philippine Islands. Section 14 of the Act of Congress of
August 5, 1909, refers to wharfage and not to export duties. A lengthy
discussion is made in the appellant’s brief to the effect that the wharfage
duties referred to in section 14 of the Act of Congress of August 5, 1909, are
in fact export duties. Whatever may be the merit of the points of view of the
appellant, the same are not, however, abstractly speaking, applicable to the
case before us. The question at issue concerns two Acts enacted by the Congress
of the United States. In the Act of August 5, 1909, section 13 was written under
the caption of “Export Duties” and section 14 under the caption of “Wharfage.”
Evidently, according to this, the Congress has considered both things, export
duty and wharfage duty, as different. So much so that in the Tariff Law of 1913
of the same Congress, section 13 of the Act of August 5,1909, was expressly
repealed and yet section 14 was preserved.
On the other hand, section 11 of the Jones Law is a general provision, while
section 14 of the Act of August 5, 1909, is a special one. The rule is that a
general law does not repeal another special one unless it is so expressly
provided, or they are incompatible. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that the
Jones Law was enacted to fix, in general terms, the powers of the Philippine
Legislature and it is easy to conceive that in enacting this law the Congress
had not in mind the idea of repealing any other special law on a determinate
matter.
Although the negative form in which section 11 of the Jones Law was written
creates a stronger inference in favor of the intention to repeal than if it had
been in the affirmative form, yet the question, in the last analysis, is, What
is the intention of the law? And such circumstance ceases to have any influence
when otherwise, as in the instant case, such an intention does not appear, but
on the contrary it rather appears that there was not such intention.
Furthermore, it is not proper to discuss the question whether this wharfage
duty can be collected, when the articles exported did not pass through any wharf
of the Government because it would be an abstract question in this case,
inasmuch as there is no proof, nor does it appear in the agreed statement of
facts, that the articles upon which the defendant collected the duty of
P1,427.26 ever passed through any wharf of the Government.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.
DISSENTING
JOHNSON, J., with whom concurs ARAULLO, C.
J.:
I dissent. The only question before the court for decision is whether section
14 of the Federal Tariff Act of 1909 can stand with section 11 of the Jones Law,
or whether the former must yield to the latter. The language of the Jones Law on
the subject of export duties is clear and emphatic. The unqualified declaration
is “that no export duty shall be levied or collected on exports from
the Philippine Islands.”
The manifest purpose of this provision of the organic law was to foster and
encourage, and not stifle or impede trade and commerce. The interpretation to be
placed upon laws relating to trade, industry and commerce should tend to aid and
not to handicap business. This provision of the Jones Law was intended to
stimulate export trade. The utter incompatibility between the two provisions is
made manifest from a comparison of their terms:
” * * * no export duties
shall be levied or collected on exports from the Philippine Islands
By no process of reasoning can one reach the conclusion that Congress
intended anything different from the plainly expressed idea contained in the
above quotation from the Jones Law. The tax collected by the Insular Collector
of Customs is clearly an export duty. The 1909 Tariff Act qualifies it
as such, and it is levied specifically upon all merchandise exported
from the Philippine Islands; but, apart from the language of the statute itself,
it is a fundamental proposition, and so held by this court, that any tax which
accrues by reason of the exportation of merchandise is an export duty (Smith,
Bell & Company vs. Rafferty, 40 Phil., 691, citing with approval Crew Levick
Co. vs. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S., 292).
Mere language cannot be availed of to accomplish that which is directly
prohibited by statute, and export taxes or burdens placed upon
exportation of merchandise, under the guise of occupation taxes, such as duties
upon bills of lading and the like, have uniformly been held invalid. (Brown vs.
State of Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419; Low vs. Austin, 13 Wall., 29; Cook vs.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 7 Otto, 566; Waring vs. Mayor of Mobile, 8 Wall.,
110; People ex rel. Burke vs. Wells, 208 United States, 14; Cook vs.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 97 United States, 566; Howe Machine Co. vs. Gage,
10 Otto, 676; Western Union Telegraph Co. vs. State of Texas, 105 U. S., 460;
Fairbank vs. United States, 181 United States, 283-4; Income Tax Cases, 157
United States, 427.)
Section 4 of the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, repealed section 13 of the
Tariff Act of 1909, under which specific duties were levied upon the exportation
of hemp, sugar, copra and tobacco. If this had remained on the statute books, it
would necessarily, by implication, have been repealed by section 11 of the Jones
Law. Having been previously repealed, however, there was no statute in force in
the Philippine Islands authorizing an export tax at the time of the enactment of
the Jones Law in 1916, except section 14 of the Tariff Act of 1909.
Clearly, the provisions of section 11 of the Jones Law were not solely
prospective, but were intended to operate, and did operate, upon any law then
existing and repugnant thereto. As section 14 of the 1909 Tariff Act falls
within this classification, it must be deemed repugnant to the latter law, and
consequently yield thereto.
It is mere specious reasoning to say that the duty is a mere charge for
wharfage when the law provides that a “duty” shall be levied and collected.
It cannot possibly be so held. No duty on exports can be justified by
the plea that the money so collected might be used for the construction of
wharves (Cannon vs. City of New Orleans, 87 U. S., 577; Keokuk Northern Line
Package Co. vs. City of Keokuk, 95 U.S., 80).
It is manifest that the prohibition of all export duties contained
in section 11 of the Jones Law is applicable to the tax levied under section 14
of the Tariff Act of 1909, and that consequently the latter provision has been
repealed.
The judgment appealed from should be revoked.