PRIMO GANITANO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Sometime in 1955, Corazon B. Cabanos filed with the Bureau of Lands
an application for a free patent regarding a parcel of land situated in
Dingras, Ilocos Norte, which was opposed by one Primo Ganitano. On
September 24, 1959, the Chief of Region No. 1 of the Bureau of Lands,
acting under the authority of the Director of Lands, rendered a
decision dismissing the claim of the oppositor and giving due course to
the application. Ganitano appealed the decision to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources within the reglementary period who,
on November 16, 1959, through his Undersecretary, affirmed the decision
rendered by the Bureau of Lands, the dispositive portion of which says:
“By and large, the evidence shows that the appellee has established a
better right to the land in question by virtue of being the applicant
therefor and by reason of his actual occupation and cultivation
thereof”, as a result of which the appeal was dismissed. 

Ganitano filed a motion for reconsideration, and when the same was
denied, he filed on September 1, 1960 the instant petition for
certiorari before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte praying
for the annulment of the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources on the ground that it was rendered with abuse of
discretion or in a manner that amounts to lack of jurisdiction.

On September 17, 1960, Corazon B. Cabanos filed a motion to dismiss
on the main ground that the action of Ganitano does not state
sufficient cause of action that may entitle him to the relief he is
seeking for, which was denied on October 1, 1960. Whereupon, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources filed on September 26,
1960 an answer to the petition, while respondent Corazon B. Cabanos
filed also hers on October 12, 1960. On October 29, 1962, however,
after considering the pleadings and the arguments advanced by both
parties, the court a quo rendered judgment dismissing the petition,
without costs. From this decision, Ganitano interposed the present
appeal.

At the outset, it should be stated that appellant does not assail
the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands nor that of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to hear and act on the application
for free patent filed by appellee Corazon B. Cabanos concerning the
parcel of land in question. Neither does he dispute the fact that he
was given every opportunity to adduce his evidence during the hearing
of said application in all the proceedings held before said Director
and Secretary to the end that his rights and interests can be preserved
and protected. In short, it is not disputed that the elementary rules
of due process were observed in all the aforesaid administrative
proceedings.

Appellant, however, contends that the court a quo erred in
dismissing the petition merely on the basis of the findings made by the
Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
in their decisions rendered on the matter in controversy for it should
have ordered before doing so the production of all the evidence adduced
before said officials during the administrative investigation in order
that the same may be considered in the decision on the merits. In other
words, appellant takes the position that it is the duty and obligation
of the lower court to assess and evaluate anew all the evidence
presented in the administrative proceedings and ascertain therefrom if
appellee Cabanos is really entitled to the free patent she is applying
for in the light of the foregoing evidence.

This posture of appellant is untenable considering that the land in
dispute belongs to the public domain. Under Section 3 of Commonwealth
Act 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources is the executive officer
charged with carrying out the provisions of said Act through the
Director of Lands, while, on the other hand, under Section 4 of the
same Act, the Director of Lands has direct executive control of the
survey, classification, lease, sale or any other form of concession or
disposition of the lands of the public domain with the particularity
that his decision as to questions of fact is deemed conclusive when
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

It may, therefore, be inferred from the foregoing that what
appellant desires the court a quo to do is beyond its competence and
jurisdiction because for said court to consider and weigh again the
evidence already presented and passed upon by said officials would be
to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of said officials who
are in a peculiar and better position to consider and weigh the same in
the light of the power and authority specifically vested in them by
law. Such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is well-settled in a
long line of decisions that the courts of justice will not generally
interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies unless there is a clear showing
that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or
when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that
their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Thus, in Pajo, et al. vs. Ago, et al., G. R. No. L-15414, June 30, 1960, this Court made the following pronouncement:

“Anent the first issue, there can be no question
that petitioner Director of Forestry has jurisdiction over the grant of
renewal of respondent Ago’s timber license (Sec. 1816, Rev. Adm. Code);
that petitioner Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as
department head, is empowered by law to affirm, modify or reject said
grant or renewal of respondent Ago’s timber license by petitioner
Director of Forestry (Sec. 79 [C], Rev. Adm. Code); and that petitioner
Executive Secretary, acting for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has, likewise, jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or reverse the
orders regarding the grant or renewal of said timber license by the two
aforementioned officials (Art. VII [11] [1], Const.; Sec. 75, Rev. Adm.
Code).

*     *     *     *     *     *     *

“In the case of Espinosa et al. vs. Makalintal, et
al. (G. R. No. L-1334, August 29, 1947, 45 Off. Gaz. 712), we held
that the powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce
(Natural Resources) by law regarding the disposition of public lands
such as granting of licenses, permits, leases, and contracts or
approving, rejecting, reinstating, or cancelling applications, or
deciding conflicting applications, are all executive and administrative
in nature. It is a well-recognized principle that purely administrative
and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts.
In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and
actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is
generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment
or discretion, and findings of fact. Findings of fact by an
administrative board or official, following a hearing, are binding upon
the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official
has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional
powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or
with grave abuse of discretion. And we have repeatedly held that there
is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of
certiorari only when there is capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Tan vs. People, G. R. No. L-4269,
Prom. April 27, 1951), as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal
hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation
of law (Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs. Nable, 67 Phil. 340; Alafriz vs. Nable, 72
Phil. 278; Liwanag vs. Castillo, G. R. No. L-13517, prom. October 20,
1959). We have, likewise, repeatedly held that the lack of jurisdiction
which entitles one to the remedy of certiorari, is that which is from
the beginning or having jurisdiction, the court, board, or officer
oversteps it while acting thereon (Leung Ben vs. O’Brien, 39 Phil. 182;
Silvestre vs. Torres, 57 Phil. 885; Hamoy vs. Secretary, G. R. No.
L-13456, prom. January 30, 1960).”

Here no such claim of abuse is made though appellant’s thesis is
made to consist in that the administrative authorities that took
cognizance of appellee’s application for a free patent did not evaluate
properly the evidence that has been submitted by the oppositor in
support of his opposition for which reason he desires that a new
evaluation of such evidence be made by this Court, but such pretense
cannot be entertained for, as already said, the findings of
administrative officials regarding lands that belong to the public
domain are deemed final and conclusive subject only to the limitation
pointed out above. Hence, we find no merit in this petition for review.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.