MARIA A. GAYACAO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE DIRECT…

Direct appeal
on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Basilan City, in Special Civil Case No. 322 of that court,
dismissing the complaint of Maria A. Gayacao, for lack
of jurisdiction.

On
January 2,
1962. appellant Gayacao had instituted action in the aforesaid court against
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the
Director of Lands, and a private respondent, Felix Alcarmen, charging in substance that on April 3, 1935
petitioner had acquired the right to purchase of residential Lots No. 55 and 56
located at Isabela, Basilan
City, through Miscellaneous Sales Application No. 8558, received by the Bureau
of Lands; that upon demand she paid the installments then due, and the Bureau
recommended approval of her application to the Department Head on October
24,1939; and thereafter Gayacao improved the lots,
paid the taxes thereon, and remained in possession thereof; that after World War
II, respondent Alcarmen, a war refugee, secured Gayacao’s permission to temporarily occupy part of the lots,
but subsequently filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application No. V-8113 over Lot 55;
that in 1949 the Director of Lands, without hearing Gayacao and despite her prior rights, gave due course to
Alcarmen’s application and excluded Lot 55 from her
application”, which action the respondent secretaries on appeal affirmed and
sustained, in violation of Section 81 of Commonwealth Act 141, and prayed as
follows:

“Wherefore, petitioner prays that
respondents be ordered to answer this petition, and, after hearing to order that
the decision of the respondent Director of Lands, as concurred in with
modification by the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the respondent Executive Secretary, over Lot No. 55 be annulled or amended
so as to grant the whole of the same to your petitioner and not to the
respondent Felixberto Alcarmen; to order that due course be given to Miscellaneous
Sales Application No. 8558 of your petitioner over Lots Nos. 55 and 56 to which
she is entitled by law; to order respondent Felixberto
Alcarmen to vacate the premises immediately; to order
respondents Director of Lands and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
to reject the application of respondent Felixberto
Alcarmen; to declare: that all improvements introduced
by respondent Felixberto Alcarmen on the residential lot covered by M. S. A. No. 8558
of your petitioner, had been introduced in bad faith and subject to all
consequences provided for by law.

Petitioner further prays for such
other relief or remedy as may be deemed just and equitable under the
premises.”

The respondent public officials
interposed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the Court of First Instance of
Basilan City had no jurisdiction to entertain
petitions for writs of certiorari or mandamus, nor issue such writs, against
them because the administrative orders and decisions complained of were
promulgated by officers holding office outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the Court. They invoked section 44(h) of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296, as
amended) and the rulings of this Supreme Court in Acosta vs. Alvendia, 109 Phil., 1017, and Samar Mining Co. vs. Amado,
L-17109, June 30, 1961). Finding the motion
meritorious, the court below, by order of December 3,
1962,
dismissed the petition of Maria Gayacao, and the
latter appealed to this Court.

We are of the opinion that the
dismissal of the petitioner’s action is reversible error.

A careful analysis of the
allegations made in the petition will show that the petitioner’s principal
complaint was that the decision of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the
Secretary of Agriculture and the Executive Secretary, was contrary to law in
refusing to apply section 81 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, and in giving
retroactive application to Lands Administrative Order No. 7-1. In other words,
the remedy sought was the judicial review of the administrative decision in
question and its annulment on account of errors of law allegedly committed. This
power of judicial review arises from the doctrine of supremacy of law, which
lodges in the courts inherent authority to decide the constitutionality of
legislative enactments, and, therefore, the constitutionality of the exercise of
the power delegated by the legislature to administrative agencies, and to
enforce constitutional rights, in this particular case the guaranty against
deprivation of property without due process (St. Joseph Stockyards Co.
vs. U. S. 80 L. Ed. 1033; Grand Trunk Western Co. vs. Railroad
Commission, 55 L-Ed. 786; Sabre vs. Rutland R.
Co., add Cas. 1915 C 1269).

The doctrines invoked in support
of the theory of non-jurisdiction (Castaño vs. Lobingier, 7 Phil 91; Acosta vs. Alvendia, Supra; Samar Mining
vs. Amado, L-17109, June 30, 1961) are
inapplicable, in that those cases involved petitions for writs of injunction
seeking to control the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the respondent courts involved. Here the sole point in issue is
whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or
not, and, without going into the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why
this power of judicial review should be confined to the courts of first instance
of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the
exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the
plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are being enforced.

It is easy to see that if the
contested ruling of the court below is sustained the same would result not only
in hardship to litigants of limited means, practically amounting to denial of
access to the courts, but would also unnecessarily encumber the Manila courts
whose dockets are already overburdened. Actually, since Ortua vs. Singson, 59 Phil.
440, the power of provincial courts of first instance to review administrative
decisions of national officials, has been consistently recognized.

While the petitioner herein also
prayed that the land authorities be ordered to reinstate her original
application, such remedy is purely a corollary to the main relief sought; for,
as the allegations now stand, reversal of the questioned administrative decision
would necessarily lead to the same result.

IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the
appealed order of dismissal is reversed and set aside, and the records ordered
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in conformity with this
decision. No costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo. Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,
Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P. and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.