SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A. MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO AND ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, PE…

Secretary of Justice De Lima versus Reyes

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari brought by the Secretary of Justice and the members of a second panel of prosecutors against former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes. The dispute is not about guilt for the killing of Doctor Gerry Ortega, but about a single executive act: the Secretary of Justice's issuance of a department order creating a new panel to reinvestigate the murder complaint after the first panel had dismissed it. The Court of Appeals annulled that order as a grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court's decision matters because it fixes the boundary between executive and quasi-judicial power in preliminary investigation, and it settles whether the Secretary of Justice may act on her own initiative, without a pending appeal, to prevent a probable miscarriage of justice.

Procedural History

The first panel of prosecutors conducted the preliminary investigation and dismissed the complaint. The widow's motions to reopen and for partial reconsideration were denied. The Secretary of Justice then issued the department order creating a second panel, which found probable cause and recommended the filing of informations; the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 52, then issued warrants of arrest. Former Governor Reyes went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition, later supplemented, attacking the creation of the second panel and the trial court's reliance on its resolution. The Court of Appeals, sitting in a Special Division of Five, rendered its decision declaring the department order null and void and reinstating the first panel's resolutions. It denied reconsideration, holding that no miscarriage of justice was shown and that the evidence examined was merely forgotten evidence already available to the first panel. The Secretary of Justice and the second panel then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.

Facts

Doctor Gerry Ortega, a veterinarian and radio anchor in Palawan, was shot dead on the morning of January 24, 2011 inside an ukay-ukay shop in Puerto Princesa City. Marlon Recamata was arrested after a brief chase and confessed, implicating Rodolfo Edrad, Dennis Aranas, and Armando Noel. On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a sworn statement before the National Bureau of Investigation alleging that former Governor Reyes ordered the killing.

The Secretary of Justice created a special panel of prosecutors, the First Panel, to conduct the preliminary investigation. Doctor Ortega's wife then filed a supplemental affidavit-complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the mastermind, together with several others. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel dismissed the complaint. The widow filed a motion to reopen the preliminary investigation seeking admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes and Edrad, and later a motion for partial reconsideration; the First Panel denied both.

On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued the assailed department order creating a Second Panel to conduct a reinvestigation, in the interest of service and due process, to address the additional evidence the First Panel had refused. The Second Panel subpoenaed former Governor Reyes, and on March 12, 2012 it found probable cause and recommended the filing of informations against all the accused. The trial court issued warrants of arrest, though those against former Governor Reyes and his brother were not served because they had allegedly left the country.

Issues

• Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the department order creating the Second Panel.
• Whether or not the issuance of that department order was an executive function beyond the reach of a petition for certiorari or prohibition.
• Whether or not the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create, on her own initiative, another panel of prosecutors to conduct a reinvestigation.
• Whether or not the petition has been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 provides:

Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. The power vested in the Secretary of Justice includes authority to act directly on any matter involving national security or a probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor and to review, reverse, revise, modify or affirm on appeal or petition for review as the law or the rules of the Department of Justice may provide, final judgments and orders of the prosecutor general, regional prosecutors, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.

This is the statutory source of the Secretary's power to act directly where a probable miscarriage of justice is involved.

Section 11 of the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal provides:

Section 11. Reinvestigation. If the Secretary of Justice finds it necessary to reinvestigate the case, the reinvestigation shall be held by the investigating prosecutor, unless, for compelling reasons, another prosecutor is designated to conduct the same.

This provision supplies the authority to designate another prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation for compelling reasons.

Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:

If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the parties.

The words motu proprio are decisive: they show the Secretary may act even without a pending petition for review.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred. The determination of probable cause by the Department of Justice is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, but the actions of the Secretary in affirming or reversing prosecutors may still be judicially reviewed if tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Here, no such abuse attended the creation of the Second Panel.

On the second issue, the Court explained that certiorari lies only against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, and that a prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine guilt or innocence; he performs no adjudication and no rule-making. Prohibition, in turn, reaches judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, and the Secretary's review is neither quasi-judicial nor ministerial but discretionary. Nevertheless, the Constitution mandates judicial review where grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is alleged, so the question could properly be raised.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Secretary is authorized to issue the order. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 empowers her to act directly on any matter involving a probable miscarriage of justice. Although the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal contemplates a petition for review, Section 4 of Rule 112 expressly allows her to act motu proprio. The Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or on her own initiative, to act on any matter that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in a preliminary investigation, and that this action may include, but is not limited to, the conduct of a reinvestigation.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that a petition for certiorari questioning the regularity of a preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial court completes its determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of arrest.

Doctrine

First, preliminary investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding; the prosecutor merely determines whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty and should be held for trial.

Second, the Secretary of Justice may, upon motion or motu proprio, act directly on any matter involving a probable miscarriage of justice, including ordering a reinvestigation and designating another prosecutor for compelling reasons, under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 and Section 11 of the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal.

Third, executive action on probable cause remains subject to certiorari for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, but once the trial court has made its own finding of probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest, a certiorari challenge to the regularity of the preliminary investigation is moot.

Disposition

The Court granted the petition, set aside the Court of Appeals decision and resolution, and upheld the validity of the department order creating the Second Panel.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the Secretary of Justice may act upon motion or motu proprio on any matter involving a probable miscarriage of justice, and may order a reinvestigation. Examiners use this case to test the executive, non-quasi-judicial character of preliminary investigation and the mootness rule once a warrant of arrest issues.