PEPITO LAO ALFONSO AND JUANITO LAO ALFONSO, PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT AND APPELLANT.

Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

In March, 1961, the petitioners-appellees Pepito Lao Alfonso and
Juanito Lao Alfonso, both born in China, applied for admission into the
Philippines as sons of one Sofronio Lao Alfonso, a resident of this
country who elected Philippine citizenship on September 27, 1946. The
application was heard by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of the
Bureau of Immigration which, on August 7, 1961, rendered a decision
declaring that “the Board is satisfied that the herein applicants are
really children of Sofronio Lao Alfonso and, therefore, are entitled to
Philippine citizenship pursuant to paragraph (3), Section 1, Article
IV, of the Constitution,” and are ‘admitted’ under that status.” The
petitioners were accordingly issued identification certificates. On
November 1, 1961, Pepito Lao Alfonso was issued Philippine Passport No.
49253. It does not appear, however, that he ever used the passport in
going abroad.

The decision of the said Board of Special Inquiry was passed upon by
the Board of Commissioners on April 28, 1961, with then Commissioner
Galang voting for exclusion and both the First and Second Deputy
Commissioner voting for admission.

On July 14, 1962, respondent Acting Commissioner of Immigration issued a “Warrant of Arrest” reading as follows:

“WHEREAS, it has been shown to the undersigned and the
undersigned is satisfied that 1. PEPITO LAO ALFONSO, male, 20 years
old; 2. JUANITO LAO ALFONSO, male, 18 years old, are citizens or
subjects of the Republic of China who are now in the Philippines:

“WHEREAS, it has also been shown to the undersigned and the
undersigned is satisfied that the above-named alien is subject to
deportation under Sections 37(a)(1) and 37(a)(2) in relation to Sec.
29(a)(17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in
view of the following facts and circumstances:

“The above-named persons, being aliens who were not admissible at
the time of entry and are not admissible now, falsely represented
themselves as Philippine citizens, to wit, through the use of
fraudulently and/or illegally obtained certificates of registration and
identity and, by such artifice and fraud, secured admission into the
Philippines aboard a Cathay Pacific Airways plane which landed at the
Manila International Airport on March 26, 1961.

“NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in the
undersigned by law, you are hereby commanded to apprehend the
above-named alien said to be residing at 640 Ronquillo, Manila, or
wherever found and to bring him before the undersigned for the said
alien to show cause, if any there be, why he should not be deported
from the Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Immigration
Act of 1940, as amended.”

On August 6, 1962, Pepito Lao Alfonso and Juanito Lao Alfonso filed
with the court below a petition captioned “Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction,” with the prayer—

“x x x that pending the final determination of this case
and the filing of the necessary bond, a writ of preliminary injunction
be issued directing respondent herein and all persons acting on his
behalf to desist from enforcing the warrant of arrest (Annex ‘C’) and
from ordering, at any time before final judgment herein, the
deportation of petitioners from the Philippines, and after due hearing,
judgment be rendered declaring the petitioners herein to be citizens of
the Philippines and commanding the respondent herein to cause the
records of his office to show that petitioners herein are citizens of
the Philippines.”

It is alleged in the petition that
petitioners were born in China, their parents being Sofronio Lao
Alfonso, a Filipino citizen by election, and Sy Yat Tee; that upon
securing certificates of Registration and Identity by the Consulate
General in Hongkong in March, 1961, they sought admission into this
country as sons of a Filipino citizen; that after due hearing a
decision was rendered by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of the
Bureau of Immigration to the effect that petitioners are children of
said Sofronio Lao Alfonso; that said decision was affirmed upon review
by the Board of Commissioners; that one Benjamin de Mesa of the
Commission of Immigration submitted to the respondent Acting
Commissioner a report finding that petitioners are not Filipino but
Chinese citizens who entered the country illegally and fraudulently;
that by virtue of said report, herein respondent issued a warrant for
the arrest of petitioners preparatory to their deportation thereby
excluding them from the use and enjoyment of the right to be admitted
into and stay in this country as citizens; that because of the summary
nature of the action, it would be futile to ask for a reconsideration
of the order; that respondent acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction; and that there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available to them in the ordinary course of law.

Against the opposition of the respondent Acting Commissioner, the
lower court issued on September 4, 1962 a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the respondent and all persons acting on his
behalf from enforcing the warrant dated July 14, 1962.

Answering the petition, the respondent alleged, by way of special
and affirmative defenses, that petitioners entered this country
fraudulently and illegally; that the decision of the Special Board of
Inquiry, dated April 28, 1961, admitting petitioners into the
Philippines had been revoked by respondent and petitioners were
declared aliens subject to deportation; that such revocation is valid
and legal because the revoked decision did not constitute res judicata
and the evidence on record was insufficient to establish the Philippine
citizenship of petitioners; that petitioners’ stay in this country was
a mere privilege and their continued stay here made them liable to
deportation; that the petition stated no cause of action; that the
petition could not be availed of to have petitioners declared Filipino
citizens or to control respondent’s exercise of discretion; and that
respondent is the official in charge of administering and enforcing all
immigration laws. Respondent then prayed for the dismissal of the
petition.

During trial, no testimonial evidence was presented and the parties
merely submitted documentary exhibits which were admitted without any
objection manifested by either side. Upon the submission of this
evidence, the trial court rendered judgment enjoining respondent from
arresting and deporting petitioners under the order of arrest of July
14, 1962, without prejudice, however, to respondent’s right to carry
out the deportation of petitioners in accordance with Section 37, in
relation to Section 29 of the Philippine Immigration Act, as amended.

Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the lower court issued
an order modifying the dispositive part of its decision, as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered making permanent
the writ of preliminary injunction issued in this case, insofar as it
enjoins the respondent from enforcing the order deporting the
petitioners, without prejudice to the right of the respondent to
proceed against the petitioners with a view to their deportation in
accordance with the provisions of Section 37, in relation to Section
29, of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, in the
manner adverted to in this decision. No costs.”

Not satisfied, the respondent has interposed this appeal maintaining the propriety of the warrant.

The appeal is meritorious.

Portions of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, under which the
Acting Commissioner of Immigration had issued the warrant in question,
read:

“SEC. 37(a) The following aliens shall be arrested
upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other
officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant
of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board
of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as
charged against the alien:

(1) Any alien who enters the
Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false and
misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the
immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place
other than at a designated port of entry;

(2) Any alien who
enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was
not lawfully admissible at the time of entry;”

“Sec. 29(a) The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into the Philippines :

(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this Act.”

Clearly, the abovequoted section 37(a) speaks of two warrants — one
for the arrest and the other for the deportation of the alien. The
warrant of arrest is issued by the Commissioner of Immigration “upon a
determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the
ground for deportation as charged against the alien.” Note that the
concurrence or approval by the Board of Immigration Commissioners is
not required for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. For in stating
that the Commissioner of Immigration or any officer designated by him
may thus issue such a warrant, section 37(a) authorizes the said
Commissioner to apprehend undesirable aliens and initiate for their
expulsion on any of the grounds enumerated thereunder.

While the warrant in question charges the petitioners for having
falsely represented themselves as Philippine citizens through the use
of fraudulently or illegally obtained certificates of registration and
identity, it is not at the same time an order to deport, since under
the last paragraph thereof the respondents are to be given a chance to
show cause why they should not be deported. Bearing this in mind, it
would be unfair to state, as petitioners do, that the respondent Acting
Commissioner has arrogated unto himself alone the power to deport. In
the absence of any indication to the contrary, it is to be presumed
that the proceedings contemplated in the warrant in question would be
in accordance with the Rules adopted by the Commission pertinent
portions of which read:

“103. At the conclusion of the hearing a complete
record of the proceedings together with the findings and recommendation
of the examining officer or board of special inquiry shall be forwarded
to the Commissioner of Immigration for consideration by the Board of
Commissioners. Counsel desiring to file a brief to accompany the record
shall be given by the investigating officer or board of special inquiry
not more than 10 days within which to submit the same. Counsel shall
also be permitted to appear in person before the Board of Commissioners
on behalf of their clients.

“104. If a warrant of
deportation is issued, an alien shall be deported, unless the
Commissioner of Immigration in his discretion, grants the alien an
opportunity to depart voluntarily within a stated period and the alien
so departs. In the event that the Board of Commissioners finds that the
alien is not subject to deportation, the proceedings shall be
dismissed.”

Under the above rules, the Board of Commissioners, acting as a body,
and not the Commissioner of Immigration alone, has to determine and the
final say on whether or not the aliens are to be expelled from the
country.

Again, petitioners-appellees contend that since the Board of
Immigration had already decided or affirmed the finding that they are
citizens of the Philippines and had admitted them into the country as
such, the respondent Acting Commissioner may no longer review the
decision of the Board. In support of this argument, the
petitioners-appellees cite our decision in Commissioner of Immigration
v. Fernandez, et al., G. R. No. L-22696, May 29, 1964. In that case a
new set of Board of Commissioners reviewed and reversed a decision of
its predecessor Board and we there made a statement that “the actuation
of the new Board of Commissioners in reviewing a decision already
passed upon by its predecessor Board, may breed chaos in the Bureau of
Immigration.” We also held that “the review, if authorized, should be
made in accordance with the processes established by law, with a view
to protecting the rights of the individuals.” The circumstances of this
case, however, are different in that the respondent herein has merely
issued a warrant of arrest but, at the same time, giving the
petitioners a chance to show cause why they should not be deported.

In this connection, it may appear that the object of inquiry in the
deportation proceedings being instituted by the respondent Commissioner
would be the same as that already passed upon by the Special Board of
Inquiry and the Board of Commissioners in admitting petitioners into
the country, but this should be no reason to stop the proceedings. It
has already been established that decisions of immigration officials do
not constitute res judicata so as to bar reexamination of the aliens’
right to stay (Ong Se Lun v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R.
No. L-6017, September 16, 1954 , cited in Sy Hong vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G. R. No. L-10224, May 11, 1957).

Lastly, we find this occasion to repeat our holding in the case of Bisschop v. Galang, G. R. No. L-18365, May 31, 1963, that—

“* * * the use of habeas corpus to test the legality
of aliens’ confinement and proposed expulsion from the Philippines is
now a settled practice (Lao Tang Bun vs. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682, 683). This
is because habeas corpus, aside from being thorough and complete,
affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind, and under
all circumstances. It reaches the facts affecting jurisdiction, or want
of power, by the most direct method, and at once releases the applicant
from restraint when it is shown to be unauthorized (cf. People ex rel
Livingston vs. Wyatt, 186 N.Y. 383; 79 N.E. 330).”

Under the circumstances, the petition entitled “mandamus with
preliminary injunction” would not be the proper action to file in this
case.

In view whreof, the judgment appealed from is
reversed. The petition is hereby dismissed and the preliminary
Injunctive writ dissolved, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Makalintal, Bengzon, J. P., Zaldivar, and Sanchez, JJ., concur.