G.R. No. 207964. September 16, 2015
SPOUSES ALFONSO ALCUITAS, SR. (DECEASED-REPRESENTED BY HIS HEIRS) AND ESTELA ALCUITAS (FOR HERSELF AND AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED ALFONSO ALCUITAS, SR.), PET…
MENDOZA, J.:
Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the May 31,
2002 Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City
(RTC), which dismissed the Complaint for Redemption
of Real Property under Commonwealth Act No. 141 filed by respondent
Minviluz C. Villanueva (Villanueva) against
petitioners Spouses Alfonso Alcuitas, Sr. and Estela Alcuitas
(Spouses Alcuitas).
The Factual Antecedents
Records show that Villanueva is the registered owner of a parcel of lot
containing an area of 712 square meters, more or less, and located at
Poblacion, Municipality of Buug, Province of Zamboanga del Sur,
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. P-32, 887 and issued by virtue of the grant
of Free Patent No. IX-6-121.
Since June 1988, Spouses Alcuitas have been lessees over the subject
property operating therein a gasoline station with a term due to expire
by June 2009.[3]
On June 22, 1993, Villanueva mortgaged her parcel of land in favor of a
certain Lucas Datoy as security for the payment of her loan obligation
of P200,000.00. Villanueva reneged on her loan obligation so the
mortgage on the subject property was foreclosed under Act No. 3135, as
amended. When the property was put up for sale in a public auction,
Spouses Alcuitas bought it for P201,000.00.
The sheriff executed a definite deed of sale in favor of Spouses
Alcuitas after Villanueva’s failure to redeem the subject property
within the one-year redemption under Act No. 3135. Accordingly, title
over the subject property was consolidated in favor of Spouses Alcuitas
and OCT No. P-32, 887 was cancelled and, finally, Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-32, 392 was issued in the name of Spouses Alcuitas.
Villanueva informed Spouses Alcuitas of her desire and intention to
redeem the subject property at the price of P201,000.00 but the latter
refused her offer. Villanueva then proceeded to tender the amount of
P201,000.00 as redemption price to Spouses Alcuitas and consigned said
amount in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pagadian City.
In view of the failure of both parties to settle the matter at the
barangay level, Villanueva filed a complaint for Redemption of Real
Property under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141
against the petitioners before the RTC.
On the other hand, Spouses Alcuitas averred that Villanueva is guilty of
fraud, misrepresentation and intentional concealment when she failed to
inform them about the mortgage of the subject property to Lucas Datoy
during the time when both parties entered into a contract of lease
covering the subject property; that they never refused to accede to
Villanueva’s willingness to repurchase the subject property; that
redemption of the subject property was moot and academic because it had
been transferred in their names; that Villanueva failed to redeem the
subject property within the reglementary period; and that Villanueva
made no tender of payment.
Decision of the RTC
On May 31, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of Spouses Alcuitas dismissing Villanueva’s complaint.
It explained, among others, that Villanueva’s right to repurchase the
subject property under Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 is baseless for the
following reasons:
1) It is indubitable that the subject property has
been reclassified from its previous classification consistent with the
patent covering the land, i.e., as agricultural to commercial lot,
consistent with its actual use and location per zoning ordinance in
accordance with the Comprehensive Municipal Land Use and Town Plan of
the Municipality of Buug, Zamboanga del Sur, where the property is
located;2) The rationale of the passage of the law granting unto the Patentee
the right to repurchase, i.e., to preserve the property to the Grantee
who was a recipient from the government of a public land grant which was
designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to
land destitute citizens for their cultivation, is very much wanting to
be availing with the reclassification of the subject property;3) In the case of Santana vs. Mariñas, 94 SCRA 753,
reiterating the doctrine laid down in the case of Sinedon vs.
Peña, 36 SCRA 617, cited in the case of Bargas vs.
Court of Appeals, 91 SCRA 195, the Supreme Court ruled that
the undergoing principle of Sec. 119 of C.A. No. 141 is to give the
Homesteader as Patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his
family the land that the State has gratuitously given to him as a reward
for his labor, in cleaning and cultivating it. However, when the
property has already been reclassified and no longer used for
agricultural purposes having been reclassified as commercial lot and
utilized as such, the spirit of the law granting unto the patentee the
right of repurchase can no longer be made availing, its purpose, i.e.,
to preserve the land for cultivation is no longer there, for which
reason, repurchase in such a situation would do violence to what C.A.
141 stands for and the same will no longer be consistent with the spirit
and purpose of the law, the purchaser is not the kind of farmer for
whom the Homestead and Free Patent were intended by law.[4]
The dispositive portion of the May 31, 2002 RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the
instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for wanting of a cause of action.
As a consequence, the defendants being compelled to incur litigation
expenses to protect their rights and interests brought about by the
filing of an unfounded complaint, it is but proper to order the
plaintiff to pay unto the defendants the sum of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos as actual, compensatory and nominal damages and to
pay the costs of litigation.SO ORDERED.[5]
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set
aside the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that Villanueva
had the clear statutory right to repurchase the subject property under
Section 119 of C.A. No. 141. The CA stated that Villanueva exercised her
right to repurchase or re-acquire the subject property when she filed
the subject complaint before the RTC. The filing was equivalent to an
offer to repurchase the same and to which offer, Spouses Alcuitas
admitted, they never acceded.
The CA opined that the mere reclassification of the subject land from
residential to commercial could not ipso facto
deprive Villanueva of her right to repurchase. The CA stated that C.A.
No. 141 did not provide that the right of repurchase ceases once the
subject property’s nature and classification changes. Section 119 of C.A.
No. 141 did not make any qualification as to how the property shall be
utilized. It further wrote that what the law sought to enforce was that
the repurchase must be for the purpose of preserving the land for the
use of the patentee and his family. It adhered to the policy of
preservation to the patentee and his family given by the law must be
liberally construed in order to carry out its purpose.
The CA explained that Villanueva’s primary purpose for repurchasing the
subject property was for residential purposes and not for any other
purposes. The fact that the subject property had been utilized as a
gasoline station within a commercial zone was of no moment because the
commercial classification of the subject property could not serve as a
justification to defeat Villanueva’s right to repurchase under C.A. No.
141. Villanueva’s right to repurchase could not be arbitrarily denied
under the guise of land reclassification because to allow such situation
would put a premium on vendees acquiring patented lands because they
would convert the subject property into a commercial one to retain
ownership over it. This situation is repugnant to the purpose of C.A. No.
141.
Unsatisfied with the CA’s decision, Spouses Alcuitas come to this Court
via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court anchoring their petition on the following
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT VILLANUEVA WAS ABLE
TO ESTABLISH HER RIGHT TO REPURCHASE THE SUBJECT PROPERTY UNDER
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141.THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MERE RECLASSIFICATION OF
LAND CANNOT DEPRIVE VILLANUEVA OF HER RIGHT TO
REPURCHASE.
Spouses Alcuitas’ position
Spouses Alcuitas argued that the CA’s unfavorable ruling resulted in the
economic prejudice and grave injustice to them because Villanueva would
unjustly enrich herself at their expense considering that they had
already developed the entire subject property into a Class A gasoline
station and car service center, spending so much for the improvements
introduced. They likewise pointed out that the amount offered by
Villanueva to repurchase the subject property was unconscionable.
Finally, they averred that Villanueva could no longer rely on the
principle in Section 119 of C.A. 141 considering that the subject
property had already been reclassified into a commercial lot.
Villanueva’s position
Villanueva argued that Spouses Alcuitas failed to perfect the subject
petition on time due to the following procedural grounds, to wit: 1)
failure of their counsel to comply with the mandatory MCLE requirement
specifically MCLE No. IV; and 2) failure to comply with the mandatory
requirement of a valid verification and certification.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Simply, the crucial issues that need to be resolved in this case are: 1)
whether Villanueva has the right to repurchase the subject property
from Spouses Alcuitas; and 2) whether Villanueva’s right to repurchase
the subject property ceased upon the reclassification of the same into a
commercial zone.
To recap, Spouses Alcuitas have posed two (2) main objections on
Villanueva’s decision to repurchase the subject property.
First, the amount offered for the repurchase of the
subject property was so unconscionable considering that they incurred
necessary and useful expenses and introduced improvements therein. If
the repurchase of the subject property would push through with such an
unconscionable offer, it would result to their economic prejudice.
Second, Villanueva had lost her right to repurchase
under Section 119 of C.A. No. 141 because of the reclassification of the
subject property from a residential zone to a commercial zone.
Spouses Alcuitas’ arguments fail to persuade.
Villanueva has the statutory right to
Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the
free patent or homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs, within a period
of five years from the date of the conveyance.
It is crystal clear from the above provision that patentees or
homesteaders of land including their family are given the right to
repurchase the homestead land which they have conveyed to another within
a limited period of time. The purpose and spirit of the law has been
discussed in numerous cases. In Heirs of Venancio Bajenting vs.
Romeo F. Baez,[6] it was written:
As elucidated by this Court, the object of the
provisions of Act 141, as amended, granting rights and privileges to
patentees or homesteaders is to provide a house for each citizen where
his family may settle and live beyond the reach of financial misfortune
and to inculcate in the individuals the feelings of independence which
are essential to the maintenance of free institution. The State is
called upon to ensure that the citizen shall not be divested of needs
for support, and reclined to pauperism. The Court, likewise, emphasized
that the purpose of such law is conservation of a family home in keeping
with the policy of the State to foster families as the factors of
society and, thus, promote public welfare. The sentiment of patriotism
and independence, the spirit of citizenship, the feeling of interest in
public affairs, are cultivated and fostered more readily when the
citizen lives permanently in his own house with a sense of its
protection and durability. It is intended to promote the spread of small
land ownership and the preservation of public land grants in the names
of the underprivileged for whose benefits they are specially intended
and whose welfare is a special concern of the State. The law is intended
to commence ownership of lands acquired as homestead by the patentee or
homesteader or his heirs.[7]
The reclassification of the subject property
zone cannot stop
same under Section 119
The Court agrees with the CA that the mere reclassification of the
subject property from residential to commercial does not ipso
facto deprive Villanueva of her right to repurchase the same.
The Court is also of the view that the law does not make any
qualification as to how the property shall be utilized and that the
right to repurchase does not cease once the property’s nature and
classification are changed.
What the law strictly requires is that the repurchase must be for the
purpose of preserving the land for the use of the patentee and his
family. The law gives more importance to the purpose behind the
patentee’s repurchase than the reclassification or utilization of the
property. More importantly, the law focuses on the preservation of
public land grants and the conservation of the family home for the
underprivileged citizens – which is the primordial concern of the State.
Although it is true that a gasoline station has been built on the
subject property and the same has been reclassified into a commercial
zone, Villanueva’s primary purpose for repurchasing said property is for
residential purposes. There is no evidence whatsoever that the purpose
behind Villanueva’s decision to repurchase the same was for commercial
profit or for anything other than residential family use. There is no
proof either that Villanueva had the intention to re-sell the subject
property for monetary gain or profit.
For the Court, Spouses Alcuitas’ argument that the repurchase of the
subject property would result in economic prejudice and grave injustice
to them again fails to move us. First, they did not
raise this argument in their answer.[8] In fact, Spouses Alcuitas expressly stated in
their answer that they never refused to accede to Villanueva’s
willingness to repurchase the subject property.
Second, as found by the CA, their lease contract with
Villanueva expressly stipulated that “the lessee may, aside from the
existing building, construct or erect at its option, an additional
structure and install such machinery, facilities and equipment at the
back of the lease premises as it may consider necessary or convenient
for the operation of its business at its own
expense.”[9] Besides, they knew that their lease contract was
up to June 2009 only.
In any event, the homestead provision in this particular case leans
towards the objective of protecting Villanueva whose only desire and
intent was to repurchase the homestead land she once lost in order to
start a new family life. The commercial reclassification of the subject
property cannot divest Villanueva of her statutory right to repurchase
the subject property.
The rulings in Simeon v. Peña,
Contrary to the posture of Spouses Alcuitas, the Francisco
Santana v. Sotero Mariñas,[10] Marina B. Vargas v. The Court of
Appeals,[11] and Deogracias Simeon v. Lourdes
Peña[12]
cases cited by the RTC in its decision cannot be applied in this case.
Although it is true that the subject land in the
Santana case involved a commercial area, the
homesteader therein was not allowed to repurchase the homestead lot
because he primarily wanted to exploit the land for business purposes.
Similarly, the homesteaders in the Vargas case and
Simeon case were also prohibited from repurchasing
the subject homestead lots because their motives were speculative and
for profit. In all these cases, the repurchase was not for the purpose
of preserving the land for the family but for greater profit in
violation of the policy and spirit of the law. Reselling for profit, and
not preservation for the family, was foremost in the minds of the
homesteaders in these three (3) cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez,* and Leonen, JJ., concur.
* Designated
Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, per Special
Order No. 2191, dated September 16, 2015.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 28-36 (Penned by Associate Justice Marie
Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred in by Associate Justices Edgardo
T. Lloren and Edward B. Contreras).
[2] Id. at 37-41 (Penned by Presiding Judge Reinerio Abraham B. Ramas).
[3] Verified Petition, p. 5; id. at 1.
[4] Id. at 40-41.
[5] Id. at 41.
[6] 533 Phil. 809 (2006).
[7] Id. at 831.
[8] Rollo, pp. 52-58.
[9] Id. at 34-35.
[10] 183 Phil. 415 (1979).
[11] 180 Phil. 160 (1979).
[12] 146 Phil. 1093 (1970).