G.R. No. 207522. April 18, 2021
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, PETITIONER, VS. NELSON C. BOOL, RESPONDENT.
HERNANDO, J.:
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding respondent Nelson C. Bool
(Bool) guilty of gross neglect of duty and suspending him from office
without pay for one year.
The Antecedents:
On
August 11, 2005, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) awarded the
contract for the supply and delivery of finished banknotes to Francois
Charles Oberthur Fiduciare (FCOF), a French firm engaged in private
security printing. The contract was for the production and delivery of
160 million pieces of 100-Piso notes equivalent to US$5,264,000.00 and
89 million pieces of 1,000-Piso notes equivalent to US$2,996,000.00.[6]
On August 17, 2005, FCOF extended an invitation to BSP to send its representative to witness the production of the litho and intaglio printed sheets and approve the same. The litho plate is used in the process of printing the background features of the banknote while the intaglio plate is used in the process of printing the embossed features of the banknote, such as the Philippine President’s name.[7]
On September 15, 2005, the BSP authorized respondent Bool to travel to
Rennes, France as BSP’s representative. Bool was tasked to ensure that
the quality of the printed sheets conformed to the BSP’s prescribed
specifications for the 100-Piso and 1000-Piso denominations before the
start of the actual production.[8]
Unfortunately, on November 9, 2005, it was discovered that the surname
of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 100-Piso outsourced
notes was misspelled as “Arroyo” instead of “Arroyo.”[9]
Perforce, the BSP formally charged Bool with gross neglect of duty. In the BSP Investigation Report[10]
dated December 10, 2009, petitioner was adjudged guilty of gross
neglect of duty and was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service,
with forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation of civil service
eligibility, and perpetual disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.[11]
Bool filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the BSP in its October 4, 2010 Resolution.[12] Thus, he elevated the case to the CSC.
Ruling of the Civil Service Commission:
In a Decision[13]
dated November 15, 2011, the CSC affirmed the BSP’s findings and also
imposed the additional accessory penalty of “bar from taking the Civil
Service Examination,” to wit:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Nelson C. Bool, Manager I, Simultan
Division Banknote Printing Group, Banknotes and Securities Printing
Department (BPSD), Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 10, 2009 of the
Monetary Board, finding Bool guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and
imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service with the
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits, cancellation
of Civil Service eligibility and perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in the government service, and the Resolution dated October
4, 2010, denying his motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. The
accessory penalty of bar from taking Civil Service examination is
likewise imposed.[14]
In a Resolution[15] dated February 1, 2012, the CSC denied Bool’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, Bool filed a Petition for Review with the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
In its Decision[16]
dated January 21, 2013, the appellate court partly granted Bool’s
Petition and modified the penalty recommended by the CSC from dismissal
from service to suspension from office for one year. Pertinent portions
of the Decision read as follows:
Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Hao v. Andres,
We find the penalty imposed by the CSC on petitioner to be too harsh.
In view of the presence of several mitigating circumstances available to
petitioner in this case, We hereby lower the penalty imposed on
petitioner to one (1) year suspension, without pay.WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 November 2011 of the Civil Service
Commission finding petitioner guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and its
Resolution dated 1 February 2012 Order denying his Motion for
Reconsideration are hereby AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that
petitioner is merely SUSPENDED from office without pay for ONE (1) YEAR.SO ORDERED.[17] (Citation omitted)
In a Resolution[18]
dated May 20, 2013, the appellate court denied BSP’s Motion for
Reconsideration for being bereft of merit. Thus, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
Issue
Whether or not the appellate court erred when it downgraded
respondent’s penalty to suspension for one year thereby disregarding the
applicable laws and jurisprudence penalizing gross neglect of duty with
dismissal from the service.
Our Ruling
We grant the Petition.
Gross neglect of duty is a grave offense under Section 52 (A) (2), Rule IV[19]
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(Uniform Rules). The Uniform Rules prescribe the penalty of dismissal
from service for gross neglect of duty even if committed for the first
time.
Section 46 (A)(2), Rule 10[20]
of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(Revised Rules) similarly classified gross neglect of duty as a grave
offense. However, Section 53, Rule IV[21]
of the Uniform Rules recognized the application of mitigating,
aggravating, or alternative circumstances in the imposition of
administrative penalties. Notably, both provisions do not expressly
state that mitigating, aggravating, or alternative circumstances should
not be considered when the prescribed penalty for the administrative
offense is an indivisible penalty, such as dismissal from the service.
Duque III v. Veloso (Duque)[22] sheds light on this issue:
It is true that Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules
provides the application of mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances in the imposition of administrative penalties. Section 53,
Rule IV applies only when clear proof is shown, using the specific
standards set by law and jurisprudence, that the facts in a given case
justify the mitigation of the prescribed penalty.[23] (Emphasis supplied)
Jurisprudence is clear that Section 53 also applies to indivisible
penalties, such as dismissal, as long as there is clear proof, under
specific legal and jurisprudential standards, that the facts of the case
justify the mitigated, aggravated, or alternated penalty.
Duque further instructs:
In appreciating the presence of mitigating, aggravating or
alternative circumstances to a given case, two constitutional principles
come into play which the Court is tasked to balance. The first is
public accountability which requires the Court to consider the
improvement of public service, and the preservation of the public’s
faith and confidence in the government by ensuring that only individuals
who possess good moral character, integrity and competence are employed
in the government service. The second relates to social justice which
gives the Court discretionary leeway to lessen the harsh effects of the
wrongdoing committed by an offender for equitable and humanitarian
consideration.[24] (Citation omitted)
Based on the foregoing, We affirm the factual findings of both the
CSC and the CA that Bool was indeed guilty of gross neglect of duty.
However, We deviate from the conclusion of the appellate court that
Bool’s length of service, good faith, and the fact that it was his first
offense served to mitigate his liability.
Length of service is
an alternative circumstance that can either be considered as mitigating
or aggravating depending on the factual milieu of each case.[25]
It is “not a magic word that, once invoked, will automatically be
considered as a mitigating circumstance in favor of the party invoking
it.”[26] The Court has applied the alternative circumstance of length of service differently through the years:
In University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,[27]
the Court did not consider therein private respondent’s length of
service as a mitigating circumstance since it was her length of service,
among others, that earned her the position she was in and through which
she illicitly allowed her relatives to enjoy unmerited privileges, like
an unwarranted diploma. In short, the length of service helped
facilitate private respondent’s commission of the offense.
Length of service cannot also be considered as a mitigating circumstance when the offense committed is found to be serious. In Yuson v. Noel,[28]
respondent judge was found guilty of abusing his office when he
misappropriated the amount deposited with him in settlement of the
judgment debt. The Court held that the mere length of his service for 10
years could not mitigate the gravity of his offense or the penalty he
deserves.
The above-cited cases, as applied to the case at bar,
show that length of service cannot be considered as a mitigating
circumstance when the length of respondent’s service itself helped
facilitate the commission of the offense, which is found to be grave or
serious.
In this case, the Court agrees with the BSP that it was
precisely because of Bool’s length of service and experience that he
was chosen as BSP’s representative to France. It was in consideration of
his extensive experience, special skills, and relevant expertise that
he acquired by reason of his long years of service with the BSP that
Bool was chosen for the highly technical work abroad.[29]
The CSC correctly held that the fact that Bool had been in the service
for 33 years should have made him “more meticulous and prudent in
discharging his responsibility.”[30]
Moreover, the offense committed is so gross, grave, and serious in
character as to endanger or threaten the public welfare. The CSC is
correct in holding that the repercussions and the impact resulting from
Bool’s negligence in not detecting the error in former President
Arroyo’s surname are so great. The CSC held:
It is undeniable that with the [Bool]’s failure to detect the
error in the surname of former President Arroyo in the 100-Piso bills
printed by FCOF, the money spent for the production of the 100-Piso
notes containing the misspelled surname of former President Arroyo was
put to waste. Worse, the BSP, as well as former President Arroyo, became
subjects of public ridicule and embarrassment. Such negligence of
[Bool] could not be compared to the ordinary negligence which other
employees may commit as to hold him liable only for Simple Neglect of
Duty. As aptly explained by BSP, “[Bool] is not an ordinary person doing
an ordinary task in an ordinary place and committing an ordinary
mistake with ordinary effects. On the contrary, [Boo!] is the official
representative of the BSP; he had gained a certain level of expertise in
the printing of banknotes; he was chosen and accepted to be sent to the
printer site in France to perform the specialized function of assuring
the quality of the proof not of the 100-piso of the Republic of the
Philippines.”[31]
Moreover, Bool’s assertion of good faith does not persuade. Jurisprudence defines good faith in this wise:
Good faith is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry;
an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of
another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of
all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render [a]
transaction unconscientious. In short, good faith is actually a question
of intention. Although this is something internal, we can ascertain a
person’s intention not from his own protestation of good faith, which
is self-serving, hut from evidence of his conduct and outward acts.[32] (Emphasis supplied; citation omitted)
In this case, the Court finds that Bool was not completely
innocent In its Investigation Report, the BSP held that Bool was sent to
France to “specifically assure; meaning, to make certain that the
quality of printed proof sheets conforms to the prescribed
specifications.”[33] Bool,
however, admitted that he merely focused his attention on the color
quality, registration, and design preference before actual production.[34] He did not check the spelling of the former President’s surname because such task, he alleged, did not belong to him.[35] Clearly, Bool’s conduct and outward acts negate his assertion of good faith.
Lastly, the defense of first offense does not apply. Section 52 (A)
(2), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules and Section 46 (A) (2), Rule 10 of the
Revised Rules clearly state that the grave offense of gross neglect of
duty is punishable by dismissal, even if committed for the first time.
Incidentally, Bool’s dismissal from service should not carry the
accessory penalty of forfeiture of leave credits, if any, as imposed by
the CSC, as these have already been earned and accrued to his benefit.[36]
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The January 21, 2013 Decision and the May 20, 2013 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 123467 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Decision and Resolution of the Civil Service Commission finding
respondent Nelson C. Bool guilty of gross neglect of duty and imposing
the penalty of dismissal from the service, with the accessory penalties
of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service,
for gross neglect of duty, are hereby REINSTATED with the MODIFICATION that Bool is entitled to receive the monetary equivalent of his accrued leave credits, if any.
SO ORDERED.
Leonen (Chairperson), Inting, Delos Santos, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-18.
[2] Id. at 19-37; penned
by Associate Justice Priscilla Baltazar-Padilla (retired Member of the
Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicenta
and Agnes Reyes-Carpio.
[3] Id. at 38-39.
[4] Id. at 78-89, penned
by Chairman Francisco T. Duque III and concurred in by Commissioner
Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza. Commissioner Rasol L. Mitmug, on leave.
[5] Id. at 90-93.
[6] Id. at 20.
[7] Id.
[8] Id. at 21.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 52-67.
[11] Id. at 21.
[12] Id. at 68-77.
[13] Id. at 78-89.
[14] Id. at 89.
[15] Id. at 90-93.
[16] Id. at 19-37.
[17] Id. at 36.
[18] Id. at 38-39.
[19] Section 52 (A) (2), Rule IV of the Uniform Rules states:
Section 52. Classification of Offenses. -Administrative
offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less
grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on
the government service.
A. The following are grave offenses with their corresponding penalties:
x x x x
2. Gross Neglect of Duty
1st Offense -Dismissalx x x x
[20] Section 46 (A) (2), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules states:
Section 46. Classification of Offenses. – Administrative
offenses with corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less
grave or light, depending on their gravity or depravity and effects on
the government service.A. The following grave offenses shall be punishable by dismissal from the service:
x x x x
2. Gross Neglect of Duty;
x x x x
[21] Section 53 of the Uniform Rules states:
Section 53. Extenuating, Mitigating, Aggravating, or Alternative Circumstances.
– In the determination of the penalties to be imposed, mitigating,
aggravating and alternative circumstances attendant to the commission of
the offense shall be considered.The following circumstances shall be appreciated:
a. Physical illness
b. Good faith
c. Taking undue advantage of official position
d. Taking undue advantage of subordinate
e. Undue disclosure of confidential information
f. Use of government property in the commission of the offense
g. Habituality
h. Offense is committed during office hours and within the premises of the office or building
i. Employment of fraudulent means to commit or conceal the offense
j. Length of service in the government
k. Education, or
ll. Other analogous circumstances.
Nevertheless, in the appreciation thereof, the same must be invoked
or pleaded by the proper party, otherwise, said circumstances shall not
be considered in the imposition of the proper penalty. The Commission,
however, in the interest of substantial justice may take and consider
these circumstances.
[22] 688 Phil. 318 (2012).
[23] Id. at 323.
[24] Id.
[25] Civil Service Commission v. Cortez, 474 Phil. 670, 686 (2004).
[26] Id. at 685-686.
[27] 284 Phil. 296 (1992).
[28] A.M. No. RTJ-91-762, October 1, 1993.
[29] Rollo, p. 11.
[30] Id. at 88.
[31] Id.
[32] Dumduma v. Civil Service Commission, 674 Phil. 257, 268-269 (2011) citing Bacsasar v. CSC, 596 Phil. 858 (2009).
[33] Rollo, p. 57.
[34] Id. at 78.
[35] Id. at 58.
[36] See Re: Alleged
Dishonesty and Falsification of Civil Service Eligibility of Mr. Samuel
R. Ruñez, Jr., Cashier III, Check Disbursement Division, Financial
Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, A.M. No.
2019-18-SC, January 28, 2020.