DR. FE LASAM, PETITIONER, VS. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK AND HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 66, SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION, RESPONDENTS.

Lasam versus Philippine National Bank

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Dr. Fe Lasam against the Philippine National Bank and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 66. Lasam asks the Supreme Court to annul the trial court's orders dismissing outright her petition for relief from a final order, and to set aside the earlier order that dismissed her complaint for annulment of mortgage. The case matters because it fixes the reckoning of the twin reglementary periods for a petition for relief from judgment, and because it reminds every practitioner that the hierarchy of courts is not a matter of choice but of policy.

Procedural History

On January 14, 2003, Lasam filed a complaint for annulment of mortgage against the Philippine National Bank before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 66. On February 23, 2010, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint for failure to prosecute and for the failure of her counsel to appear. Her former counsel filed an urgent manifestation and motion, which the trial court denied in an order dated April 29, 2010, for not having been seasonably filed. A motion for reconsideration followed, but the trial court denied it in an order dated July 7, 2010, for being in the nature of a second motion for reconsideration.

Her former counsel then filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed. A petition for review on certiorari assailing that dismissal was denied by the Supreme Court in a resolution dated February 22, 2012, and an entry of judgment was recorded on May 3, 2012. On January 22, 2013, Lasam filed a petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings before the trial court. The trial court dismissed the petition outright in its order dated March 18, 2013, and denied her motion for reconsideration in its order dated May 28, 2013. Lasam then went directly to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Facts

Lasam sued the Philippine National Bank in 2003 to annul a mortgage. The case dragged on, and on February 23, 2010, the date set for the initial reception of evidence, Lasam was present but her counsel was not. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute and for counsel's non-appearance.

Her former counsel tried to undo the dismissal, but the attempts failed: the motion was denied as late, the reconsideration was denied as a second motion, the petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals was dismissed, and the petition for review in the Supreme Court was denied, with judgment entered on May 3, 2012.

Lasam then consulted a different lawyer and, claiming she had only then learned of the finality of the February 23, 2010 order, filed a petition for relief on January 22, 2013, within sixty days of that belated knowledge. She blamed the gross negligence and ignorance of her former counsel for the loss of her case. The trial court dismissed the petition as filed beyond the periods fixed by the Rules, and she brought the matter to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the Regional Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed outright Lasam's petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings and denied her motion for reconsideration.
• Whether or not the petition for relief was filed within the reglementary periods fixed by Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
• Whether or not the direct recourse to the Supreme Court violated the principle of hierarchy of courts.

Applicable Provisions

Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Time for filing petition; contents and verification. — A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

This provision supplies the twin periods whose non-compliance the Court treats as jurisdictional, and it is the very ground on which the petition for relief was dismissed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court committed no grave abuse of discretion. A petition for relief is an equitable remedy allowed only in exceptional circumstances, and strict compliance with the reglementary periods must be satisfactorily shown, because the remedy is a final act of liberality on the part of the State that cannot be allowed to erode the principle that a judgment must at some definite time attain finality.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petition was filed out of time on both periods. The sixty-day period runs from knowledge of the judgment or order sought to be set aside, not from knowledge of its finality. Lasam knew of the February 23, 2010 order on the very day it was issued, since she was in attendance, and again when she signed the verification of her petition for certiorari in July 2010. Her January 22, 2013 petition came almost three years after that knowledge. As to the six-month period, the order was in effect entered on May 3, 2012, when the Supreme Court's resolution became final, so the petition was more than eight months late. Since the periods had expired, the trial court had lost jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

On the third issue, the Court held that the direct recourse to the Supreme Court violated the principle of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Courts share concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence does not give a petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of forum. Petitions against first-level courts go to the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter go to the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is allowed only when there are special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition, and none appear here.

Because the petition for relief was clearly filed out of time, the Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the alleged negligence of former counsel constituted sufficient ground for relief.

Doctrine

A petition for relief from judgment, order, or other proceedings must be filed within sixty days from knowledge of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or final order was entered. These two periods must concur, cannot be extended, and cannot be interrupted; compliance is jurisdictional, and non-compliance warrants outright dismissal.

The sixty-day period is reckoned from knowledge of the judgment or order itself, not from knowledge of its finality. The negligence of counsel binds the client, and the client cannot revive a lost case by claiming belated discovery of finality after consulting a new lawyer.

Finally, the hierarchy of courts is a settled policy. A direct petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court against a Regional Trial Court is improper absent special and important reasons clearly and specifically set out in the petition.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for utter lack of merit, and the trial court's orders dismissing the petition for relief and denying reconsideration stand.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the sixty-day period under Rule 38 runs from knowledge of the order to be set aside, not from knowledge of its finality, and the six-month period runs from entry. Examiners use this case to test the twin periods of a petition for relief and the hierarchy of courts.